View source for Operation Ichi-Go

{{Short description|1944 Japanese offensive during the Second Sino-Japanese War}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict          = Operation Ichi-Go
| partof            = the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] and the [[Pacific War|Pacific Theater]] of [[World War II]]
| image             = Ichigo plan.jpg
| image_size        = 300px
| caption           = Japanese plan for Operation Ichi-Go
| date              = {{Date range and age in years, months, weeks and days|1944|4|19|1944|12|31}}<ref>Davison, John ''The Pacific War: Day By Day'', pg. 37, 106</ref>
| place             = [[Henan]], [[Hunan]] and [[Guangxi]]
| result            = Japanese victory
| combatant1        = {{flagcountry|Empire of Japan}}
| combatant2        = {{flagcountry|Nationalist government}}<br /> {{flag|United States|1912}}
| commander1        = {{flagicon|Empire of Japan|army}} [[Shunroku Hata]]<br /> {{flagicon|Empire of Japan|army}} [[Yasuji Okamura]]<br /> {{flagicon|Empire of Japan|army}} [[Isamu Yokoyama]]<br /> {{flagicon|Empire of Japan|army}} [[Hisakazu Tanaka]]
| commander2        = {{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} [[Tang Enbo]]<br /> {{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} [[Xue Yue]]<br /> {{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} [[Bai Chongxi]]<br /> {{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} [[Zhang Fakui]]<br /> {{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} [[Fang Xianjue]]<br /> {{flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} [[Li Jiayu]]{{KIA}}<br />{{flagicon|USA|1912}} [[Joseph Stilwell]] <br />{{flagicon|USA|1912}} [[Albert Coady Wedemeyer]]<br />{{flagicon|USA|1912}} [[Claire Lee Chennault]]
| strength1         = 500,000<br> 15,000 vehicles<br> 1,500 artillery pieces<br> 800 tanks<br> 100,000 horses<br> 200 bombers
| strength2         = 1,000,000{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=165}}
| casualties1       = 100,000 killed<ref name="中国慰霊">[https://books.google.com/books?id=u2AzAQAAIAAJ&q=+%E6%88%A6%E6%AD%BB+%E6%88%A6%E7%97%85%E6%AD%BB] 記者が語りつぐ戦争 16 中国慰霊 読売新聞社 (1983/2) P187</ref><br> heavy [[materiel]] losses<ref>[http://memim.com/operation-ichi-go.html "Operation Ichi-Go"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117022958/http://memim.com/operation-ichi-go.html |date=2015-11-17 }} Retrieved 16 Nov. 2015</ref>
| casualties2       = 500,000-600,000 casualties <small>(according to "China's Bitter Victory: War with Japan, 1937-45"){{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=165}}<br />Armies totalling 750,000 'destroyed' or put out of action according to Cox<ref name="Cox 1980"/><ref name="Sandler, Stanley p. 431">Sandler, Stanley. "World War II in the Pacific: an Encyclopedia" p. 431</ref></small>
| casualties4       = 500,000+ Chinese civilians<ref>Pike, Francis. Hirohito's War: The Pacific War, 1941-1945</ref>
| campaignbox       = {{Campaignbox Second Sino-Japanese War}}
{{Campaignbox Pacific War}}
{{Japanese colonial campaigns}}
{{Campaignbox World War II}}
}}

'''Operation Ichi-Go''' ({{langx|ja|一号作戦|Ichi-gō Sakusen|lit=Operation Number One}}) was a campaign of a series of major battles between the [[Imperial Japanese Army]] forces and the [[National Revolutionary Army]] of the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]], fought from April to December 1944. It consisted of three separate battles in the Chinese provinces of [[Henan]], [[Hunan]] and [[Guangxi]].

These battles were the Japanese '''Operation Kogo''' or Battle of Central Henan, '''Operation Togo 1''' or the [[Battle of Changsha (1944)|Battle of Changheng]], and '''Operation Togo 2''' and '''Togo 3''', or the [[Battle of Guilin–Liuzhou]], respectively. The two primary goals of Ichi-go were to open a land route to [[French Indochina]], and capture air bases in southeast China from which American bombers were attacking the Japanese homeland and shipping.<ref>''The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: China Defensive'', pg. 21</ref>

In [[Japanese language|Japanese]] the operation was also called '''''Tairiku Datsū Sakusen''''' ({{lang|ja|大陸打通作戦}}), or "Continent Cross-Through Operation", while the Chinese refer to it as the '''Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi''' ({{zh|t=豫湘桂會戰|s=豫湘桂会战|p=Yù Xīang Guì Huìzhàn}}).

==Background==

===Japanese planning===
By early 1944, Allied victories in the Pacific were eroding the Japanese defensive perimeter. Japan decided to attack in Burma and China to improve its position; these became [[Operation U-Go]] and Ichi-Go respectively.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=318}} Ichi-Go corresponded with a Imperial General Staff contingency plan to the loss of the Western Pacific; the plan was for securing an overland [[Rail transport|rail]] route through French Indochina and China for raw materials from south-east Asia, which would be used to develop offensives in 1946.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=181}} The objective for Ichi-Go approved by Emperor [[Hirohito]] on 24 January 1944 was the neutralization of USAF bases in China, particularly the [[XX Bomber Command]] bases near [[Chengdu]], [[Sichuan]].{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=318-319}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=181}} [[China Expeditionary Army]] (CEA), commanded by General [[Shunroku Hata]], expanded the objectives in its operational planning to include securing overland routes and neutralizing China by destroying Chinese forces.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=181}} Ichi-Go may also have been intended to force the Allies to open peace negotiations, and give Japan a better negotiating position.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=181-182}} General [[Yasuji Okamura]] was placed in charge of Ichi-Go.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=190}}

By early February, preparations along the [[Yangtze]] included repairs to a major bridge and air field maintenance.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=182}}

The IJA mobilized 500,000 troops, 100,000 horses, 1,500 pieces of artillery, 800 tanks, 15,000 mechanised vehicles,{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=179}} and 200 bombers for the offensive. They were supplied with eight months of fuel and two years of ammunition.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=319}} According to historian Hara Takeshi, it was "the largest military operation carried out in the history of the Japanese army."<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=19}}

===Chinese planning===
The Chinese economy started collapsing in 1941.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=183}} China entered the war in 1937 with a primarily agrarian economy and quickly lost much of its industrial capacity to the Japanese.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=182-183}} Maintaining the forces needed to stay in the war imposed an unsustainable burden on an economy further weakened by blockade, shortages of staple goods, poor weather, and inflation;{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=265-267}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=182-183}} there was widespread famine from 1942. The government responded to the economic pressure, reduced Japanese activity after December 1941, and the lack of offensive capability by encouraging the military to produce its own food. Some troops went further by entering industry and smuggling. The self-sufficiency drive and the lack of military action reduced military prepardness and increased corruption.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=182-183}} By Ichi-Go, the effectiveness of the Chinese military had "plummeted".{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p-185}}

Allied strategy affected Chinese preparations. At the [[Cairo Conference]] in November 1943, China agreed to major combined operations in [[Burma campaign|Burma]] on the condition that the Western Allies committed significant resources.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=308}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=171}} No such commitment occurred. A few days later at the [[Tehran Conference]], the Western Allies and the Soviet Union agreed to prioritize the European theater.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=311-312}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=171-172}} In January 1944, Chiang warned US President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] that prioritizing Europe would encourage Japan to attack and knock China out of the war.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=314}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=172}} In late-March, China believed a Japanese offensive was "imminent"; the US received corroborating reports from [[Clarence E. Gauss]], the [[List of ambassadors of the United States to China|American ambassador to China]].{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=316}} China sought to reinforce the defense with [[Yunnan]]-based [[Y Force]], which was earmarked for Burma; Y Force was an American trained and equipped [[National Revolutionary Army]] (NRA) unit and some of the best troops available to China. In early April, the US threatened to halt [[Lend-Lease]] to China if Y Force was withheld from Stilwell in Burma. Ultimately, Y Force joined the [[Burma campaign (1944–1945)|Allied campaign in Burma]] in mid-May as Ichi-Go was underway.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=317}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=191}}

Chinese intelligence also misassessed indicators. It estimated that the Yangtze bridge would not be usable until May, and that Japanese troop movements in the north were a feint.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=183-184}} On 27 April, after the start of Ichi-Go, China received French intelligence from Indochina of the Japanese goal of securing the rail corridor.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=163}} The intelligence was disregarded as Japanese misinformation to draw forces away from Burma.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=164}} The Chinese could not independently verify significant Japanese movements in central and southern China. Only 30,000 Japanese troops were detected operating in the north, which suggested a localized effort.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=163}} The Chinese expected a larger attack in southern China,{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=319}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=184}} a belief that persisted into May.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=319}}

==Campaign==
===Henan===
[[File:Japanese mechanized forces marching towards Lo-yang.jpg|thumb|left|Japanese mechanized forces advancing towards Luoyang]]
[[File:1944 Operation Ichigo IJA invaded Henan.jpg|thumb|left|Imperial Japanese Army invading Henan, in 1944]]
The first phase of Ichi-Go, codenamed Kogo,{{sfn|Sherry|1996|p=17}} was for capturing the [[Beijing–Hankou railway]] in [[Henan]] and destroying the ROC's First War Zone.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=184}} Kogo involved 60,000–70,000 Japanese troops.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}} The First War Zone was commanded by General [[Jiang Dingwen]] with General [[Tang Enbo]] as deputy. It had only 6000-7000 troops, or 60% to 70% of its authorized strength. USAF General [[Claire Chennault]] described the troops as a "poorly disciplined mob".{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=182-183}} Overall, there were 400,000 Chinese troops in northern China.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=164}}

Kogo opened on 17 April, broke through the defenses by the end of the 18 April, and took [[Xuchang]] a week later.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Chinese communications was poor and the defense of [[Luoyang]] was uncoordinated.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=320}} Chiang intended to allow the Japanese to close around Luoyang - the city was fortified and contained provisions for weeks - and then attack the flanks once the Japanese became overextended; this tactic had been used successfully before to defend [[Changsha]].{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=184}} According to Jiang, he requested permission to attack as early as 23 and 24 April, but did not receive Chiang's permission until 1 May; by that time the Japanese had advanced too far. Poor communications also hampered the direction of reinforcements to Luoyang.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=320}} The Japanese encircled Luoyang on 14 May and captured the city on 25 May. The Japanese pursued Tang's westward retreat as far as the [[Tong Pass]].{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=184}} Combined with an advence north from [[Wuhan]], the Japanese captured the railway.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=184}}

Contemporary Chinese analysis identified additional factors for the collapse of the First War Zone, some of which were related to the general degeneration of the Chinese military. According to one critic, Tang's [[command and control]] was poor and he abandoned his army; Tang was generally seen to have been in effective control of the First War Zone.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=321}} The local population - alienated by wartime deprivation, state corruption, and the First War Zone's aggressive requisitions - also withheld support.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=322-323}} Incidents included civilians attacking Chinese troops, stealing abandoned weapons,{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=320-321}}{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=183}} and refusing to obey orders to destroy highways.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=322}} According to American reports, Kogo met only "token resistance". [[Theodore H. White]] observed Chinese officers neglecting their duties and that within three weeks "a Chinese army of 300,000 men had ceased to exist."{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}}

===Hunan===
{{main|Battle of Changsha (1944)|Battle of Hengyang}}
The next phase was Togo 1{{sfn|Sherry|1996|p=17}} with the objective of securing the [[Guangzhou–Hankou railway]] from Wuhan to [[Hengyang]]. Togo 1 started on 27 May and involved 200,000 Japanese troops advancing south from Wuhan to Changsha.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=185-186}} Central China was defended by another 400,000 troops.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=164}} The ROC's Ninth War Zone, commanded by General [[Xue Yue]], defended Changsha; it had held the city against three Japanese campaigns from 1939 to 1942; as in those engagements, Ninth War Zone strategy was a fighting withdrawal to the city combined with [[scorched earth]]. Togo 1 was much larger than the previous campaigns, advancing in three - rather than one - columns over a 150 kilometer-wide front; it was also adequately supplied.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|pp=185-186}} On 29 May, the ROC [[Military Affairs Commission]] ordered Changsha to be held to defend USAF air bases and maintain American confidence; the option of abandoning railway and retreating south-east to [[Guilin]] was rejected.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=185}} Chiang refused to send supplies to Changsha because he believed Xue was disloyal.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}}

The Japanese reached Changsha in early June. The city was defended by three understrength Chinese divisions commanded by General Zhang Deneng; two of the divisions and the artillery were on [[Yuelu Mountain]] south of the city across the [[Xiang River]].{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Unlike the previous campaigns, it was the Chinese who were outnumbered with 10,000 troops against 30,000 Japanese.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}} One of the two attacking Japanese division had [[urban warfare]] training.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Japanese bombers attacked the artillery on Yuelu while infantry moved around the city to attack from the south. Zhang's redeployment of troops from the city to reinforce Yuelu disorganized the defense; Chinese staff officers were unable to organize movement over the Xiang, leaving many units "stranded", and unclear orders made many troops believe that they were to retreat. The Japanese took Changsha on 18 June{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} after three days of fighting. The Chinese withdrew from Yuelu the same day leaving two companies in the city.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=186}}

Xue retreated south to [[Hengyang]].{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} The city was defended by 18,000 troops.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=186}} USAF [[Fourteenth Air Force]], commanded by Chennault, provided limited support;{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} it was also tasked with protecting USAF [[XX Bomber Command]]'s bases and supporting the Allied Burma offensive.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=187}} The defenses included concrete fortifications, and was well provisioned with artillery, anti-tank guns, and supplies. Two large reserve groups were placed to threaten the Japanese flanks.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Chiang assigned General Fang Xianjue, whom he trusted, to command the city,{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} A relief force from Guangdong was organized. On 25 June, the Japanese captured a major nearby US air base. Afterwards, the Japanese 68th and 116th Division attacked Hengyang from the west and south. The flooded paddy fields and canals to the west made the use of tanks difficult. To the south were hills. The attack was halted with heavy casualties on both sides. The Japanese paused to reinforce their air forces and resupply. On 11 July, after five days of heavy fighting, the Chinese fell back to another line.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=186}} The Japanese paused again to bring up reinforcements of one division and several brigades. The Japanese sought to destroy Chinese reserves to reduce the defender's morale. Air attack destroyed much of the city. By the end of July, there was a food shortage in Hengyang.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=187}} Chiang did not resupply the city. Stilwell - who controlled Lend-Lease in the Chinese theater - refused Chennault's request to divert 1,000 tons of supplies to Hengyang;{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=324-325}} according to the [[United States Army]]'s official history, Stilwell believed that Chinese politics would prevent the supplies from being used against the Japanese.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Romanus |first1=Charles F. |last2=Sunderland |first2=Riley |title=China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Command Problems |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/009/9-2/index.html |series=United States Army in World War II |publisher=United States Army Center of Military History |location=Washington D.C. |date=1956 |page=413}}</ref> Five Japanese divisions resumed the attack on 3 August, broke through the northern wall 7 August, and captured the city by the morning of 8 August.{{sfn|Van de Ven|2018|p=187}}

===Guangxi and Guizhou===
[[File:Situation at the End of World War Two.PNG|thumb|left|Japanese occupation (red) of eastern China near the end of the war, and Communist guerrilla bases (striped)]]
Japanese forced entered [[Guangxi]] in early September 1944 and quickly captured United States air bases at [[Guilin]], [[Liuzhou]], and [[Nanning]].<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=20}} The 170,000 Nationalist troops defending northern Guangxi were largely unwilling to fight and units disintegrated.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=21}} Leaders of the [[New Guangxi clique|Guangxi Clique]] like General [[Bai Chongxi]] deciding that that neither Guilin nor Liuzhou could be successfully defended and Chinese forces abandoned those cities.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=21}} 

In late November 1944, the Japanese advanced slowed approximately 300 miles from Chongqing as it experienced shortages of trained soldiers and [[materiel]].<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=21}} Although Operation Ichi-Go achieved its goals of seizing United States air bases and establishing a potential railway corridor from Manchukuo to Hanoi, it did so too late to impact the result of the broader war.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=21}} American bombers in Chengdu were moved to the [[Mariana Islands]] where, along with bombers from bases in Saipan and Tinian, they could still bomb the Japanese home islands.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=22}} The Japanese also failed to destroy the British and Australian Commando operation, '[[Mission 204]]' which had been  working with the Chinese. Before the US bases were overrun, the mission had left China and returned to Burma <ref>{{cite journal |last=Stevens |first=Keith |year=2005 |title=A Token Operation: 204 Military Mission to China, 1941–1945 |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=36 |issue=1 |page=71 |publisher=Risk Management Reference Center, EBSCOhost |doi= 10.1080/03068370500039151|s2cid=161326427 }}</ref>

Toward the end of Ichi-Go, ROC 8th War Zone in [[Guizhou]] − with five armies and used to contain the Chinese Communists − was redeployed to fight the Japanese. Overextended supply lines and mounting casualties caused the Japanese to end Ichi-Go.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=165}}

==Aftermath==
According to Cox, China suffered 750,000 casualties, including soldiers who simply "melted away" and those rendered combat ineffective besides being killed or captured.<ref name="Cox 1980">{{cite thesis |last1=Cox |first1=Samuel J. |title=The China Theater, 1944 - 1945: A Failure of Joint and Combined Operations Strategy |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a272727.pdf |degree=Master of Military Art and Science |publisher=United States Naval Academy |date=1980 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190428141801/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a272727.pdf |archive-date=28 April 2019 |page=2 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

The poor performance of [[Chiang Kai-shek]]'s forces in opposing the Japanese advance became widely viewed as demonstrating Chiang's incompetence.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=3}} The campaign further weakened the Nationalist economy and government revenues.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=22-24}} Throughout the war, but especially after the Ichigo campaign, the Nationalist government could not pay its bills.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=204}} Because of the Nationalists' increasing inability to fund the military, Nationalist authorities overlooked military corruption and smuggling.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=|pages=24-25}} The Nationalist army increasingly turned to raiding villages to [[Impressment|press-gang]] peasants into service and force marching them to assigned units.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=25}}

With the rapid deterioration of the Chinese front, specifically the Nationalist forces, General [[Joseph Stilwell]] saw Operation Ichi-Go as an opportunity to win his political struggle against Chiang, China's leader, and gain full command of all Chinese armed forces. He was able to convince General [[George Marshall]] to have President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] send an ultimatum to Chiang threatening to end all American aid unless Chiang "at once" placed Stilwell "in unrestricted command of all your forces".<ref>Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, p.446–447</ref>

Stilwell immediately delivered this letter to Chiang despite pleas from [[Patrick J. Hurley|Patrick Hurley]], Roosevelt's special envoy in China, to delay delivering the message and work on a deal that would achieve Stilwell's aim in a manner more acceptable to Chiang.<ref>Lohbeck, Hurley, p.292 {{full citation|date=May 2024}}</ref> Seeing this act as a move toward the complete subjugation of China, a defiant Chiang gave a formal reply in which he said that Stilwell must be replaced immediately and he would welcome any other qualified U.S. general to fill Stilwell's position.<ref>Lohbeck, Hurley, p.298</ref><ref>Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, p.452</ref>
In Chiang's view, Stillwell had moved too many Chinese forces into the [[Burma campaign]], leaving China insufficiently protected.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Coble |first=Parks M. |title=The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War |date=2023 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-009-29761-5 |location=Cambridge New York, NY |author-link=Parks M. Coble}}</ref>{{Rp|page=3}} Stilwell was replaced as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and commander of the U.S. Forces, China Theater (USFCT) by Major General [[Albert Wedemeyer]]. Stilwell's other command responsibilities in the [[China Burma India Theater of World War II|China Burma India Theater]] were divided up and allocated to other officers.

Although Chiang was successful in removing Stilwell, the public relations damage suffered by his Chinese Nationalist Party ([[Kuomintang]]) regime was irreparable. Right before Stilwell's departure, [[The New York Times|''New York Times'']] war correspondent [[Brooks Atkinson]] interviewed him in [[Chongqing]] and wrote:<blockquote>The decision to relieve General Stilwell represents the political triumph of a moribund, anti-democratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China.  The Chinese Communists... have good armies that they are claiming to be fighting guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in North China—actually they are covertly or even overtly building themselves up to fight Generalissimo's government forces... The Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] naturally regards these armies as the chief threat to the country and his supremacy... has seen no need to make sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war... No diplomatic genius could have overcome the Generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle with the Japanese.<ref name=CRISIS-TIME-MAGAZINE>{{cite magazine
| title      = Crisis
| url        = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801570-4,00.html
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071120121411/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801570-4,00.html
| url-status = dead
| archive-date = November 20, 2007
| magazine  = [[Time (magazine)|Time]]
| date       = 1944-11-13
| access-date = 2007-03-02}} quoting ''[[The New York Times]]''</ref></blockquote>Atkinson, who had visited [[Mao Zedong]] in the communist capital of [[Yenan]], saw his Communist Chinese forces as a democratic movement (after Atkinson visited Mao, his article on his visit was titled ''Yenan: A Chinese Wonderland City''), and the Nationalists in turn as hopelessly reactionary and corrupt. This view was shared by many U.S. journalists in China at the time, but due to pro-Chiang Allied press censorship, it was not as well known to their readers until Stilwell's recall and the ensuing anti-Chiang coverage forced it into the open.<ref>
{{cite book
|author1=Knightley, Phillip
|title=The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq
|page=303
|date=2004
|edition=3rd
|publisher=[[Johns Hopkins University Press]]
|isbn=978-0-8018-8030-8
|author1-link=Phillip Knightley
}}
</ref>

The Japanese successes in Operation Ichi-Go had a limited effect on the war. The U.S. could still bomb the Japanese homeland from [[Saipan]] and other Pacific bases. In the territories seized, Japanese forces controlled only the cities, not their surrounding countryside. The increased size of the occupied territory also thinned out the Japanese lines. A great majority of the Chinese forces were able to retreat out of the area, and later come back to attack Japanese positions. As a result, future Japanese attempts to fight into [[Sichuan]], such as in the [[Battle of West Hunan]], ended in failure. All in all, Japan was not any closer in defeating China after this operation, and the constant defeats the Japanese suffered in the Pacific and Burma meant that Japan never got the time and resources needed to achieve final victory over China. The Japanese suffered 11,742 KIAs by mid-November, and the number of soldiers that died of illness was more than twice this.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://d.hatena.ne.jp/Apeman/20070710/p1|title = 「歴戦1万5000キロ」| date=9 July 2007 }}</ref><ref>Until mid-November, IJA had an illness toll of 66,000, and a field hospital had taken in 6164 soldiers, 2,281 of which died due to malnutrition 餓死した英霊たち P116</ref> The total death toll was about 100,000 by the end of 1944.<ref name="中国慰霊"/>

Operation Ichi-Go created a great sense of social confusion in the areas of China that it affected. Chinese Communist guerrillas were able to exploit this confusion to gain influence and control of greater areas of the countryside in the aftermath of Ichi-Go.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=R7qNuIJJsNEC&pg=PA162 ''China at War: An Encyclopedia'']. Ed. Li Xiaobing. United States of America: ABC-CLIO. 2012. {{ISBN|978-1-59884-415-3}}. Retrieved May 21, 2012. p.163.</ref> This along with the aforementioned rapid deterioration of the Nationalist forces, Nationalist unpopularity both internally and abroad, Communist popularity both internally and externally, Kuomintang corruption and other factors allowed the Communists to gain victory in the [[Chinese Civil War#Resumed fighting (1946–1949)|resumed Chinese Civil War after World War II]]. Historian [[Hans van de Ven]] argues that the impact Ichi-Go had on the political situation in China was as important to the post-war world order as [[Operation Overlord]] and [[Operation Bagration]] were in Europe.<ref>Van de Ven, Hans. China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China. Harvard University Press, 2018, p.181</ref>

In the spring of 1945, the US agreed to train and equip 36 Chinese divisions. China also wanted to withdraw some of its troops from China.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=165}} China began planning a counter-offensive for fall of 1945, called "White Tower" and "Iceman", to recapture the coastal ports in south-west China as routes for Allied aid.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=166}}

==In popular culture==
{{Unreferenced section|date=May 2024}}
The 1958 novel ''The Mountain Road'', by [[Theodore H. White|Theodore White]], a ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine correspondent in China at the time of the offensive, was based on an interview with former [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] Major Frank Gleason, who led a demolition group of American soldiers during the offensive that were charged with blowing up anything left behind in the retreat that might be of use to Japan. His group ultimately destroyed over 150 bridges and 50,000 tons of munitions, helping slow the Japanese advance. In 1960, it was [[The Mountain Road|adapted into a film]] by the same name starring [[James Stewart]] and [[Lisa Lu]], noteworthy for being one of Stewart's few war films and the only one in which he plays a soldier, as he opposed war films because of their inaccuracy. It is generally believed he made an exception for this film because it was antiwar.

== References ==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist|2}}

=== Sources ===
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book |editor1-last=Hsiung |editor1-first=James C. |editor2-last=Levine |editor2-first=Steven I.  |title=China's Bitter Victory: The war with Japan, 1937-1945  |year=1992 |publisher=East Gate Book |location=Armonk, New York |isbn=0-87332-708-X}}
* {{cite book |last1=Mitter |first1=Rana |title=Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937–1945 |year=2013 |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Harcourt |location=New York |isbn=978-0-618-89425-3}}
* {{cite book |last1=Sherry |first1=Mark D. |title=China Defensive |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-38/CMH_Pub_72-38.pdf |year=1996 |publisher=[[United States Army Center of Military History]] |series=The Campaigns of World War II |id=CMH Pub 72-38}}
* {{cite book |last1=van de Ven  |first1=Hans |title=China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China |year=2018 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |isbn=978-0-674-98350-2}}
{{refend}}

==Further reading==
* {{Cite book | last = Paine| first = Sarah| title = The Wars for Asia 1911–1949 | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | publisher = Cambridge University Press | pages=201 |year = 2012| isbn = 978-1107020696}}

{{coord missing|China}}
{{World War II}}
[[Category:1944 in China]]
[[Category:1944 in Japan]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of World War II involving the United States]]
[[Category:Battles involving China]]
[[Category:Battles of the Second Sino-Japanese War|Ichi-Go]]
[[Category:Battles of World War II involving Japan]]
[[Category:Conflicts in 1944|Ichi-Go]]
[[Category:Changsha in World War II]]
[[Category:History of Hengyang]]
[[Category:Military history of China during World War II]]
[[Category:Military history of the Republic of China (1912–1949)]]
[[Category:Military history of Guangxi]]
[[Category:Military history of Henan]]
[[Category:Military history of Hunan]]