Jump to content

1982 Lebanon War: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
Guinsberg (talk | contribs)
No edit summary
Guinsberg (talk | contribs)
No edit summary
Line 32: Line 32:
* Israeli occupation of the southern half of Lebanon (1982–85), withdrawal started in 1983 according to the 17 May Accord.
* Israeli occupation of the southern half of Lebanon (1982–85), withdrawal started in 1983 according to the 17 May Accord.
* Collapse of [[Maronite]]-Israeli alliance, cancellation of Lebanese-Israeli agreement.<ref name = "Morris">[[#refMorris1999|Morris, p. 559]]</ref>
* Collapse of [[Maronite]]-Israeli alliance, cancellation of Lebanese-Israeli agreement.<ref name = "Morris">[[#refMorris1999|Morris, p. 559]]</ref>
* Forceful withdrawal<ref>{{cite book|last=Hirst|first=David|title=Beware of Small States|publisher=NationBooks|year=2010|isbn=978-1-56858-657-1Z|page=203|quote=...the first such unconditional, humiliating retreat from Arab territory that the Israelis had ever made}}</ref> of Israeli troops from most of southern Lebanon and establishment of "[[Israeli Security Zone|Security Zone]]" and the [[South Lebanon Army|SLA]] (1985–2000)
* Forceful withdrawal<ref>{{cite book|last=Hirst|first=David|title=Beware of Small States|publisher=NationBooks|year=2010|isbn=978-1-56858-657-1Z|page=203|quote=...the first such unconditional, humiliating retreat from Arab territory that the Israelis had ever made.}}</ref> of Israeli troops from most of southern Lebanon and establishment of "[[Israeli Security Zone|Security Zone]]" and the [[South Lebanon Army|SLA]] (1985–2000)
* [[1982-2000 South Lebanon conflict|South Lebanon conflict]] (1982–2000)
* [[1982-2000 South Lebanon conflict|South Lebanon conflict]] (1982–2000)
* Increased Syrian influence in Lebanon
* Increased Syrian influence in Lebanon

Revision as of 07:04, 20 December 2012

1982 Lebanon War
Part of Israeli-Lebanese conflict and Lebanese Civil War

Israeli troops in South Lebanon, 6 June 1982
Date6 June 1982 – 17 May 1983
(11 months, 1 week and 4 days)
Location
Southern Lebanon
Result

Israeli military victory according to some sources;[1] PLO unilateral withdrawal according to others.[2]

  • PLO expulsion/withdrawal from Lebanon (1982)
  • Destruction of Syrian SAM batteries in the Bekaa
  • Israeli occupation of the southern half of Lebanon (1982–85), withdrawal started in 1983 according to the 17 May Accord.
  • Collapse of Maronite-Israeli alliance, cancellation of Lebanese-Israeli agreement.[3]
  • Forceful withdrawal[4] of Israeli troops from most of southern Lebanon and establishment of "Security Zone" and the SLA (1985–2000)
  • South Lebanon conflict (1982–2000)
  • Increased Syrian influence in Lebanon
  • Establishment of Hezbollah
Territorial
changes
Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (1982–1985). Syrian de facto occupation of Lebanon (1976–2005).
Belligerents
 Israel
File:Flag of the Government of Free Lebanon.png SLA
Lebanon Lebanese Front (Phalange and al-Tanzim)

State of Palestine PLO
Syria Syria
Lebanon LNRF (LCP, PLA-PSP, OACL, and SSNP)
Hezbollah
Islamic Amal
Amal
ASALA
Al-Tawhid

PKK
Commanders and leaders

Israel Menachem Begin (Prime Minister)
Israel Ariel Sharon (Ministry of Defence)
Israel Rafael Eitan (Army Chief of Staff)
Israel David Ivry (Israeli Air Force)
Israel Ze'ev Almog (Israeli Sea Corps)


Bachir Gemayel
Fadi Frem
Elie Hobeika
Fawzi Mahfuz

File:Flag of the Government of Free Lebanon.png Saad Haddad
State of Palestine Yasser Arafat (PLO leader)
Syria Hafez al-Assad (President)
George Hawi
Elias Atallah
Muhsin Ibrahim
Abbas al-Musawi
Ragheb Harb
Ibrahim Kulaylat
Nabih Berri
Monte Melkonian
Inaam Raad
Said Shaaban
Mahsum Korkmaz
Murat Karayılan
Strength
Israel:
78,000 troops
800 tanks
1,500 APCs
634 aircraft
LF:
30,000 troops
SLA:
5,000 troops
97 tanks
Syria:
22,000 troops
352 tanks
300 APCs
450 aircraft
300 artillery pieces
100 anti-aircraft guns
125 SAM batteries
PLO:
15,000 troops
80 tanks
150 APCs
350+ artillery pieces
250+ anti-aircraft guns
Casualties and losses
Israel:
657 killed
2,383 wounded[5][6]
Syrian & Palestinian combatants:
9,797 killed[7]
civillians: 1,000–8,000 killed[1][8]

The 1982 Lebanon War (Template:Lang-he, Milhemet Levanon Harishona, "the first Lebanon war"), (Template:Lang-ar, Al-ijtiyāḥ, "the invasion"), called Operation Peace for Galilee (Template:Lang-he Mivtsa Shlom HaGalil or Mivtsa Sheleg) by Israel, and later known in Israel as the Lebanon War and First Lebanon War, began on 6 June 1982, when the Israel Defense Forces invaded southern Lebanon. The Government of Israel launched the military operation after the Abu Nidal Organization's assassination attempt against Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov.[9][10]

By expelling the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the removal of Syrian influence over Lebanon, and the installment of a pro-Israeli Christian government led by Bachir Gemayel, Israel hoped to sign a treaty which Menachem Begin promised would give Israel "forty years of peace."[11]

After attacking the PLO, as well as Syrian, leftist and Muslim Lebanese forces, Israel occupied southern Lebanon and eventually surrounded the PLO and elements of the Syrian army. Surrounded in West Beirut and subjected to heavy bombardment, the PLO forces and their allies negotiated passage from Lebanon with the aid of Special Envoy Philip Habib and the protection of international peacekeepers. PLO, under the chairmanship of Yasser Arafat, had relocated its headquarters to Tripoli in June 1982.

However, following the assassination of Bachir Gemayel, Israel's position in Beirut became untenable and the signing of a peace treaty became increasingly unlikely. Outrage following Israel's role in the Christian-led Sabra and Shatila Massacre of Palestinian refugees and Israeli popular disillusionment with the war would lead to a withdrawal from Beirut to southern Lebanon. As a result, Shi'a militant groups began consolidating and waging guerrilla war over the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, leading to 18 years of armed conflict. The Lebanese Civil War would continue until 1990, at which point Syria had established complete dominance over Lebanon.[3]

Background

Relocation of PLO from Jordan to South Lebanon

With the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Lebanon became home to more than 110,000 Palestinian refugees, after fleeing their homes in the former British Mandate of Palestine. After its founding in 1964 and the radicalization among Palestinians, which followed the Six Day War, the PLO became a powerful force, then centred in Jordan. The large influx of Palestinians from Jordan after "Black September" caused an additional demographic imbalance within Lebanese society and its democratic institutions established earlier by the National Pact.[12] By 1975, the refugees numbered more than 300,000 and the PLO in effect created an unofficial state-within-a-state, particularly in Southern Lebanon, which then played an important role in the Lebanese Civil War.

Continual violence near the Lebanese border occurred between Israel and the PLO starting from 1968; this peaked, following the relocation of PLO bases to Lebanon after the civil war in Jordan.

Lebanese civil war

Incidents 1975-1980

The continuing violence near the Lebanese border between Israel and the PLO peaked during Operation Litani in 1978, provoked by the Coastal Road Massacre done by Palestinian militants. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created after the incursion, following the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and help the government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area.[13]

As early as 1976, Israel had been assisting Lebanese Christian militias in their sporadic battles against the PLO.[3] During Operation Litani in 1978, Israel established a security zone in southern Lebanon with mostly Christian inhabitants, in which they began to supply training and arms to Christian militias which would later form the South Lebanese Army.[14] But Israel's main partner was to be the Maronite Phalange party, whose paramilitary was led by Bashir Gemayel, a rising figure in Lebanese politics[14] Gemayel's strategy during the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War was to provoke the Syrians into retaliatory attacks on Christians, such that Israel could not ignore. In 1978, Menachem Begin declared that Israel would not allow a genocide of Lebanese Christians, while refusing direct intervention.[15] Hundreds of Lebanese militiamen began to train in Israel, at the IDF Staff and Command College. The relationship between Israel and the Maronites began to grow into a political-strategic alliance, and members of the Israeli government like Ariel Sharon began to conceive of a plan to install a pro-Israel Christian government in Lebanon, as it was known that Bashir wanted to remove the PLO and all Palestinian refugees in the country.[16]

1981 events and cease-fire

On 10 July 1981, violence erupted in South Lebanon and Northern Israel with the rocketing of Northern Israel by thousands of PLO forces, who had come to occupy Southern Lebanon. Israel renewed its air strikes in an attempt to trigger a war that would allow it to drive out the PLO and restore peace to the region.[17] On 17 July, the Israel Air Force launched a massive attack on PLO buildings in downtown Beirut. "Perhaps as many as three hundred died, and eight hundred were wounded, the great majority of them civilians."[18] The Israeli army also heavily targeted PLO positions in south Lebanon without success in suppressing Palestinian rocket launchers and guns. As a result, thousands of Israeli citizens who resided near the Lebanese border headed south. On 24 July 1981, United States envoy Philip Habib brokered a ceasefire badly needed by both parties. Between July 1981 and June 1982, the Lebanese-Israeli border "enjoyed a state of calm unprecedented since 1968."[3]

US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig filed a report with US President Ronald Reagan on Saturday 30 January 1982 that revealed Secretary Haig's fear that Israel might, at the slightest provocation, start a war against Lebanon.[19] On 21 April 1982, after a landmine killed an Israeli officer while he was visiting a South Lebanese Army gun emplacement in Taibe, Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force attacked the Palestinian-controlled coastal town of Damour, killing 23 people.[20] On 9 May, Israeli aircraft again attacked targets in Lebanon. Later that same day, UNIFIL observed the firing of rockets from Palestinian positions in the Tyre region into northern Israel, but none of the projectiles hit an Israeli settlement[21]—the gunners had been ordered to miss.[18] Major-General Erskine (Ghana), Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported to the Secretary-General and the Security Council (S/14789, S/15194) that from August 1981 to May 1982, inclusive, there were 2096 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters.[22][23] The PLO maintained that the ceasefire agreement covered only operations across the Lebanese–Israeli border, and while the border was peaceful, there were more than 240 PLO actions against Israeli targets elsewhere, which Israel considered to be violations of the ceasefire.[24] The freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel and UNTSO observers within the enclave remained restricted due to the actions of Amal and the South Lebanon Army under Major Saad Haddad's leadership with the backing of Israeli military forces.[23]

Prior to establishing ceasefire in July 1981, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim noted: "After several weeks of relative quiet in the area, a new cycle of violence has begun and has, in the past week, steadily intensified." He further stated: "There have been heavy civilian casualties in Lebanon; there have been civilian casualties in Israel as well. I deeply deplore the extensive human suffering caused by these developments." The President of the U.N. Security Council, Ide Oumarou of Niger, expressed "deep concern at the extent of the loss of life and the scale of the destruction caused by the deplorable events that have been taking place for several days in Lebanon".[25][26]

Immediate causes

Since the ceasefire, established in July 1981, until the start of the war, Israel recorded 240 “terrorist actions” committed by the PLO against Israeli targets including the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Paris and encounters with PLO units attempting to cross from Jordan.[27]

According to George Ball, the PLO had observed the ceasefire.[citation needed] Israel, he said, continued looking for the "internationally recognized provocation" that Secretary of State Alexander Haig said would be necessary to obtain American support for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.[28] Secretary Haig's critics have accused him of "greenlighting" the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.[29] Haig denies this and says he urged restraint.[30]

The American reaction was that they would not apply any undue pressure on Israel to quit Lebanon as the Israeli presence in Lebanon may prove to be a catalyst for the disparate groups of Lebanon to make common cause against both Syrian and Israeli forces. Haig's analysis, which Ronald Reagan agreed with, was that this uniting of Lebanese groups would allow President Elias Sarkis to reform the Lebanese central Government and give the Palestinian refugees Lebanese citizenship.[31]

According to Avi Shlaim, the real driving force behind the Israeli invasion to Lebanon was the defense minister Ariel Sharon. One of his aims was the destruction of PLO military infrastructure in Lebanon and undermining it as a political organization, in order to facilitate the absorption of the West Bank by Israel.[citation needed] The second aim was the establishment of the Maronite government in Lebanon, headed by Bashir Gemayel and signing the peace treaty between two countries, the third aim was the expelling of Syrian army from Lebanon.[citation needed] Also, according to Shlaim, with the completion of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai in March 1982, under the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the Likud-led government of Israel hardened its attitude to the Arab world and became more aggressive.[32]

According to Zeev Maoz in Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s National Security and Foreign Policy the goals of the war were primarily developed by then Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and were fourfold:

  1. "Destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon, including the PLO headquarters in Beirut."
  2. "Drive Syrian forces out of Lebanon."
  3. "Install a Christian-dominated government in Lebanon, with Bashir Gemayel as President."
  4. "Sign a peace treaty with the Lebanese government that would solidify the informal Israeli-Christian alliance and convert it into a binding agreement.[33]

The military plan with the code name "Big Pines", prepared by IDF, envisaged invasion to Lebanon up to the highway Damascus-Beirut and linking with Maronite forces. It was first presented to Israeli cabinet on 20 December 1981 by Begin, but rejected by the majority of ministers. According to Avi Shlaim, Sharon and chief of staff Rafael Eitan, realizing that there was no chance in persuading the cabinet to approve a large-scale operation in Lebanon, adopted a different tactic and intended to implement "Operation Big Pines" in stages by manipulating enemy provocations and Israeli responses.[34]

On 3 June 1982 Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov was shot and seriously wounded in London by terrorists belonging to the Iraqi-backed Abu Nidal terrorist organization. The organization was the longtime rival of PLO and its head was condemned to death by the PLO court, the British police reported that PLO leaders were on the "hit list" of the attackers.[35][better source needed] In his memoirs, Sharon stated that the attack was "merely the spark that lit the fuse".[36]

The PLO denied complicity in the attack, but Israel retaliated with punishing air and artillery strikes against Palestinian targets in Lebanon, including the PLO camps. Sabra and Shatila refugee camps were bombed for four hours and the local "Gaza" hospital was hit there. About 200 people were killed during these attacks.[37][better source needed] The PLO hit back firing rockets at northern Israel causing considerable damage and some loss of life.[citation needed] According to another source, twenty villages were targeted in Galilee and 3 Israelis were wounded.[38]

According to Shlaim, Yasser Arafat, at that time being in Saudi Arabia, told the Americans through the Saudis that he was willing to suspend cross-border shelling. But that message was disregarded by the Israeli government. President Reagan also sent a message to Begin urging him not to widen the attack.[38]

On 4 June the Israeli cabinet authorized a large scale invasion.[39][40]

Timeline

An aerial view of the stadium used as an ammunition supply site for the PLO, after Israeli airstrikes in 1982.

Invasion

On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces under direction of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon invaded southern Lebanon in "Operation Peace for Galilee".

Course of the fighting

Israel's publicly stated objective was to push PLO forces back 40 kilometers (25 mi) to the north. Israeli forces pushed in from Southern Lebanon in a three-pronged offensive. They captured strategic positions throughout the country, with some of the fiercest fighting taking place at Beaufort Castle, Nabatieh, and the Syrian-held town of Jezzine. In an effort to establish air superiority and greater freedom of action, the Israeli Air Force launched Operation Mole Cricket 19. During the course of the operation, the Israeli Air Force scored a dramatic victory over the Syrians shooting down more than 80 Syrian planes and also destroyed 30 Syrian anti-aircraft missile batteries, with no air to air losses of its own. However, one A-4 Skyhawk was lost to anti-aircraft fire on 6 June. Syria acknowledged the loss of 16 aircraft. Israeli aircraft also pounded PLO targets in Beirut, and Israeli gunboats shelled the coastal roads in order to cut PLO supply lines. Although Israeli forces managed to fight their way into the Syrian-held town of Sultan Yacoub, they became surrounded. Although they successfully broke out, Sultan Yacoub was one of the few objectives the IDF failed to take over the course of the war. The Israelis swept through Lebanon, pushing towards Beirut. To cut off any PLO retreat routes, the Israeli Navy facilitated an amphibious landing of tanks, armoured vehicles, and paratroopers north of Sidon. The Israel Defense Forces soon reached Beirut and were determined to drive the PLO from southern Lebanon.[41] Tyre and Sidon (major cities in South Lebanon, still within the 40-kilometer (25 mi) limit) were heavily damaged, and the Lebanese capital Beirut was shelled by Israeli artillery, and bombed by Israeli aircraft for ten weeks, killing PLO members though some civilians were also killed. Israeli troops captured Beirut Airport and several southern suburbs of the city in heavy fighting.

IAF Roundel for the strike aircraft that attacked Syrian SAM batteries in 1982 Lebanon war

During the course of combat operations, the Israeli Air Force conducted successful ground attack missions against Syrian and PLO targets, with Israeli attack helicopters inflicting heavy losses on Syrian armor. Israeli jets shot down between 82[42] and 86 Syrian aircraft in aerial combat, without losses.[43][44] A single Israeli A-4 Skyhawk and two helicopters were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and SAM missiles.[45][46][47] This was the largest aerial combat battle of the jet age with over 150 fighters from both sides engaged. Syrian claims of aerial victories were met with skepticism even from their Soviet allies.[48] The Soviets were so shaken by the staggering losses sustained by their allies that they dispatched the deputy head of their air defense force to Syria to examine how the Israelis had been so dominant.[49] The Israeli Air Force also performed ground attacks, notably destroying the majority of Syrian anti-aircraft batteries stationed in Lebanon. AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships were employed against Syrian armour and fortifications. IAF Cobras destroyed dozens of Syrian Armored fighting vehicles, including some of the modern Soviet T-72 main battle tanks. The war also witnessed the Israeli Merkava MBT make its first combat debut, squaring off against Syrian T-72 tanks. During these engagements, the Merkava proved superior to the T-72 destroying a number of them without sustaining a single loss to T-72 fire.[50] Former IAF commander, David Ivri would later recall a meeting with a high-ranking member of the Warsaw Pact, in which he was told that the dominance of Israeli and U.S. technology and tactics during the war was one of the factors that changed Soviet mind-set, leading to Glasnost and ultimately, the fall of the Soviet Union.[51][52]

IAF Cobra gunships on military exercise. These attack helicopters were successfully employed against Syrian AFVs during the conflict.

An agreement was reached later in 1982. More than 14,000 PLO combatants evacuated the country in August and September, supervised by the Multinational Force in Lebanon, an international peacekeeping force with troops from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy. About 6,500 Fatah fighters relocated from Beirut to Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, both North and South Yemen, Greece, and Tunisia—the latter of which became the new PLO headquarters.[53] Philip Habib, Ronald Reagan's envoy to Lebanon, provided an understanding (i.e., assurance) to the PLO that the Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps would not be harmed. However, the United States Marines left West Beirut two weeks before the end of their official mandate following the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing.

Final accords

On 14 September 1982, Bachir Gemayel, the newly elected President of Lebanon, was assassinated by Habib Shartouni of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.[54] Israeli forces occupied West Beirut the next day. At that time, the Lebanese Christian Militia, also known as the Phalangists, were allied with Israel.[55] The Israeli command authorized the entrance of a force of approximately 150 Phalangist fighters' into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, claiming there was a remaining force of approximately "2000 PLO terrorists" in the camps.[55] The result was the Sabra and Shatila massacre in which at least 800 civilians were killed by the Phalangists, who themselves suffered only two casualties. Meanwhile, Israeli troops surrounded the camps with tanks and checkpoints, monitoring entrances and exits.[55] Further, Israeli investigation by the Kahan Commission of Inquiry found that Ariel Sharon bore "personal responsibility" for failing to prevent the massacre, and for failing to act once he learned that a massacre had started, and recommended that he be removed as Defence Minister and that he never hold a position in any future Israeli government. Sharon initially ignored the call to resign, but after the death of an anti-war protester following an anti-war protest, he did resign as Israel's Defence Minister, however, he remained in Begin's cabinet as a Minister without portfolio. His career recovered 15 years later and was eventually elected Israel’s 11th Prime Minister.

Opposing forces

The 1982 Lebanon War was first a conventional war up to and including when the PLO were expelled from Beirut.[56] The war was limited by both Israel and Syria because they were determined to isolate the fighting, not allowing it to turn into an all-out war.[56] Israeli forces were numerically superior,[citation needed] allowing Israel to maintain both the initiative and an element of surprise. The Syrian Army fielded six divisions and 500 aircraft, while Israel had eleven tank divisions and eleven infantry brigades, plus 600 aircraft.[citation needed] There were numerous other factions involved.[56]

Syria

Syrian anti-tank teams deployed French-made Milan ATGMs during the war in Lebanon in 1982.
Part of a Syrian SA-6 site built near the Beirut-Damascus highway, and overlooking the Bekaa Valley, in early 1982.

The Syrian Army deployed over 30,000 troops in Lebanon.[57][58]

The largest concentration was in the Bekaa Valley where the 1st Armoured Division consisting of the 58th Mechanised and the 76th and 91st Armoured Brigades. The 62nd Independent Armored Brigade and ten commando battalions were also assigned to the division. Syria deployed around 400 tanks in the Bekaa Valley. 19 Surface to Air missile batteries, including SA6's, were also deployed in the Bekaa Valley.

In Beirut and the Shouf Mountains were the 85th Infantry Brigade, the PLA, As-Sa'iqa and 20 commando battalions. Syria deployed around 200 tanks in this area. Their primary mission was to protect the Beirut-Damascus Highway, which was Syria's primary supply line in the region.[56]

Israel

The Israeli Merkava Mark I tank was used throughout the First Lebanon War

IDF forces totalled 78,000 men, 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers. IDF troops were deployed in five divisions and two reinforced brigade-size units. The IDF maintained additional forces on the Golan Heights as an area reserve.[56] IDF forces were divided into three main axis of advances called sectors:[56][59]

Lebanon

Lebanese Army APC, Beirut 1982

Armed Forces

Lebanese Army – By 1982 the Lebanese Army had largely disintegrated and what was left was a Christian-staffed force of about 10,000 men in five brigades (the 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th) plus some smaller independent units. The Lebanese Army was officially neutral and followed the orders of the Lebanese government, but provided tacit and active support to the Lebanese Front.[57] The Army had lost much of its heavy equipment due to defections of its units.[60]

A Lebanese national army unit of 1,350 was under the operational control of the UNIFIL commander, HQ located at Arzun with sub-units attached to UNIFIL Battalions.[23][56]

Lebanese Navy: The mostly Christian manned force operated several patrol boats and was loyal to the government. It played little or no part on the War.

Lebanese Air Force: This largely Christian force operated a force of jet fighters, helicopters and other aircraft and it too played little part on the war.

Security Forces

Internal Security Forces: the national police and security force of Lebanon.

Palestinians

PLO

Palestinian Liberation Organization forces continued to grow in Lebanon with full-time military personnel numbering around 15,000, although only 6,000 of these, including 4,500 regulars, were deployed in the south. They were armed with 80 aging tanks, many of which were no longer mobile, and 100 to 200 pieces of artillery. According to Israeli analysts Schiff and Ya'ari (1984), the PLO more than quadrupled its artillery from 80 cannons and rocket launchers in July 1981 to 250 in June 1982.[61] The same authors also refer to Israeli intelligence estimates of the number of PLO fighters in southern Lebanon of 6,000 as "divided into three concentrations; about 1,500 south of the Litani River in the so-called Iron Triangle (between the villages of Kana, Dir Amas, and Juya), Tyre, and its surrounding refugee camps; another 2,500 of the Kastel Brigade in three districts between the Litani and a line running from Sidon to northeast of Nabatiye; and a third large concentration of about 1,500–2,000 men of the Karameh Brigade in the east, on the slopes of Mount Hermon".[62]

PLO primary forces consisted of three conventional brigades each of 2,000 to 2,500 men and seven artillery battalions.[63] Each brigade was composed of contingents of the many PLO factions. The Yarmouk Brigade was stationed along the coastal strip while the Kastel Brigade was in the south. The Karameh Brigade was stationed on the eastern slopes of Mount Hermon in the area called Fatahland.

The PLO had around 15,000 – 18,000 fighters (of whom about 5,000–6,000 were alleged to be foreign mercenaries (or volunteers) from such countries as Libya, Iraq, India, Sri Lanka, Chad and Mozambique[6]) and they were disposed as follows:[56]

  • 6,000 in the Beirut, Ba'abda and Damour area,
  • 1,500 in Sidon,
  • 1,000 between Sidon and Tyre,
  • 1,500 in Tyre,
  • 1,000 deployed from Nabatiyeh to Beaufort Castle,
  • 2,000 in Fatahland, and
  • around 1,000 in the UNIFIL Zone.

Heavy weapons consisted of about 60 T-34, T-54 and T-55 tanks, most of which were dug in as pillboxes, up to 250 130mm and 155 mm artillery, many BM21 Katyusha multiple rocket launchers plus heavy mortars.[64]

Non-PLO Palestinian groups

Palestinian groups in the radical Rejectionist Front fought on the Muslim-leftist side. The alliance did nothing to improve cooperation between member factions, and internecine bloodshed continued. The following were members of the Rejectionist Front:

Some, such as As-Sa'iqa, the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) were essentially mercenary armies for foreign governments (Syria, Iraq, and Libya, respectively).[57]

Paramilitary forces

Right wing

Left wing

  • The Lebanese National Resistance Front forces totalled about 30,000 fighting men and women. It was the successor of the Lebanese National Movement.
  • The Druze were initially neutral but turned against the LF when the new government attempted to force their way into Druze controlled territory in the Chouf . The militia of the Progressive Socialist Party consisted of 10,000 to 20,000 men and boys.[67]
  • The Al-Mourabitoun (Guardians or Saviours in Arabic) is a secular, non-sectarian movement, its membership has always been overwhelmingly Muslim, being perceived within Lebanon as a predominantly Sunni organization. It's militia (Mouqatin or Fighters) numbered several thousand men and were known for wearing red painted Soviet helmets with Mourabitoun painted on front. The Mourabitoun fought alongside the PLO in the Beirut area until the cease fire after which they acquired much cast-off PLO equipment such as tanks and rocket launchers. They were supported largely by Libya and Syria.[68]
  • The Kurdistan Workers' Party at the time had training camps in Lebanon, where they received support from the Syrians and the PLO. During the Israeli invasion all PKK units were ordered to fight the Israeli forces. A total of 11 PKK fighters died in the conflict.[69][70][71]

Religious

  • Christian

The Christian Lebanese Front, sometimes called the Kufur Front, was a coalition of mainly Christian parties formed in 1976, during the Lebanese Civil War. It was intended to act as a counter force to the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) of Kamal Jumblatt and others. Combined Lebanese Front forces totalled about 30,000 fighting men and women. These forces were mostly Phalangist, though there were some men from Saad Haddad's "Free Lebanon forces"[72] and other smaller right-wing militias, including al-Tanzim.

  • Muslim

Muslim forces were Shiite organizations:

    • Amal Movement the militia wing of the Movement of the Disinherited, a Shi'a political movement. Initially neutral. The Shia Amal guerrillas had been ordered by their leaders not to fight and to surrender their weapons if necessary.[67]
    • Hezbollah the other Shiite militia ostensibly formed during the invasion around Beirut and backed by Iran.
    • Pasdaran – In July 1982 Iran dispatched an expeditionary force of Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon, ostensibly to fight the Israeli invaders. The approximately 650 Pasdaran established their headquarters in the city of Baalbek in the Syrian-controlled Biqa Valley where they conducted guerrilla training, disbursed military matériel and money, and disseminated propaganda.[73]
    • The political fission that characterized Lebanese politics also afflicted the Shia movement, as groups split off from Amal. Husayn al Musawi, a former Amal lieutenant, entered into an alliance with the Revolutionary Guard and established Islamic Amal.
    • Other Shia groups included Jundallah (Soldiers of God), the Husayn Suicide Commandos, the Dawah (Call) Party, and the notorious Islamic Jihad Organization, reportedly headed by Imad Mughniyyah.[73]

UNIFIL

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, was created by the United Nations, with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 425 and 426 on 19 March 1978, to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon which Israel had invaded five days prior, restore international peace and security, and help the Government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area. The first UNIFIL troops were deployed in the area on 23 March 1978; these troops were reassigned from other UN peacekeeping operations in the area (namely the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Zone). During the 1982 Lebanon War, UN positions were overrun, primarily by the South Lebanon Army forces under Saad Haddad.[74]

Outcome of the war

Casualties

It is estimated that between 5,000 and 8,000 Civillians were killed during the conflict, with differing estimates of the proportion of civilians killed. Beirut newspaper An Nahar claimed that 5,515 people, both military and civilian, were killed in the Beirut area alone during the conflict, while 9,797 Syrian soldiers, PLO fighters, and other forces aligned with the PLO, as well as 2,513 civilians were killed outside of the Beirut area.[75] Approximately 675 Israeli soldiers were killed.[1][76]

The security buffer zone and Syrian occupation

Map showing power balance in Lebanon, 1983: Green – controlled by Syria, purple – controlled by Christian groups, yellow – controlled by Israel, blue – controlled by the United Nations

In September 1982, the PLO withdrew most of its forces from Lebanon. With U.S. assistance, Israel and Lebanon reached an accord in May 1983, that set the stage to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon while letting them patrol a "security zone" together with the Lebanese Army.

The instruments of ratification were never exchanged, however, and in March 1984, under pressure from Syria, Lebanon cancelled the agreement.

In January 1985, Israel started to withdraw most of its troops, leaving a small residual Israeli force and an Israeli-supported militia, the South Lebanon Army in southern Lebanon in a "security zone", which Israel considered a necessary buffer against attacks on its northern territory. The Israeli withdrawal to the security zone ended in June 1985. Israel withdrew fully from Lebanon in 2000.

The political vacuum resulting from the 1985 Israeli withdrawal would eventually lead to the de facto Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Syria would gain much more power over Lebanon than what it enjoyed before 1982.[3]

Relocation of PLO

Following Arafat's decision of June 1982, by September 1982, the PLO had withdrawn most of its forces from Lebanon. Syria backed the anti-Arafat PLO forces of Abu Musa in the Beka valley from May 1983. When Arafat castigated the Syrian government for blocking PLO supplies in June 1983, the Syrian government declared Arafat a persona non grata on 24 June 1983.[77]

With the withdrawal of the PLO leadership from Tripoli in December 1983 there was an Egyptian-PLO rapprochement, this was found to be encouraging by the Reagan administration but was condemned by the Israeli government.[78]

Political results for Israel

In the voting in the Knesset on the war, only Hadash opposed the war (and even submitted a no-confidence motion against the Israeli government). Hadash Knesset member Meir Vilner said in the Knesset plenary session that: "The government is leading Israel to an abyss. It is doing something that in the course of time might lead to crying for generations." In response, they were condemned, and calls were heard, among others from the editor of Yediot Ahronoth, to prosecute them for treason. Left-wing Knesset members, including Shulamit Aloni and Yossi Sarid, were absent from the plenary for the vote. Even the Labour faction voted in support. By mid January 1983 Rabin was saying that the Israeli attempt to impose a peace agreement on Lebanon by the use of force was a "mistake" based upon an "illusion".[79]

Heavy Israeli casualties, alleged disinformation of Israeli government leaders and the Israeli public by Israeli military, as well as political advocates of the campaign and lack of clear goals led to increasing disquiet among Israelis. This culminated in a large protest rally in Tel Aviv, organized by the Peace Now movement, following the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre. Organizers claimed 400,000 people participated in the rally, and it became known as the "400,000 rally". Other estimates put the figure much lower, maybe reaching 100,000 Israelis but including thousands of reserve soldiers back from Lebanon.[80]

Political outcome for Lebanon

The Israeli-Maronite alliance dissolved, and Sharon's goal of installing a pro-Israel Christian government in Beirut was not accomplished.[81] Consequently, 850,000 Christians would emigrate during the Civil War out of Lebanon, most of them permanently.[82]

The withdrawal of the IDF from central Lebanon in the summer of 1983, was followed by one of the bloodiest phases of the Lebanese war, where the Christian Militia (the Lebanese Forces) was left alone to defend the "Mountain" area which comprised the Aley and Chouf districts against a coalition of Druze PSP, PLO remnants, Syrian Army, Lebanese Communist, and Syrian Social National Party. The heavilly impacted on the civilian population from both sides (more than 5,000 killed from both sides).[citation needed] The Mountain War ended after the Christian forces and civilians withdrew to the town of Deir el Kamar where they were besieged for 3 months before all hostilities ceased and they were transported to East Beirut.

The invasion led to the switching of sides of Amal Movement, which used to fight against the PLO prior to the invasion. The invasion is also popularly held to be the major catalyst for the creation of the Iranian and Syrian supported Hezbollah organization, which by 1991 was the sole armed militia in Lebanon not supported by Israel and by 2000 had completely replaced the vanquished PLO in Southern Lebanon.[citation needed]

Cold War perspective

According to Abraham Rabinovich, the complete dominance of U.S. and Israeli technology and tactics over those of the Eastern Bloc was to have been a factor that hastened the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.[51][52]

Long term consequences

In 2000, when Ehud Barak was Israeli Prime Minister, Israel finally withdrew from the security zone to behind the Blue Line. Lebanon and Hezbollah continue to claim a small area called Shebaa Farms as Lebanese territory, but Israel insists that it is captured Syrian territory with the same status as the Golan Heights. The United Nations has not determined the final status of Shebaa Farms but has determined that Israel has complied with UNSC resolution 425. The UN Secretary-General had concluded that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978, bringing closure to the 1982 invasion as far as the UN was concerned.[83]

Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon led to pressure on the Syrians to withdraw their occupation forces and this pressure intensified after the assassination of the popular Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. On 26 April 2005 the Syrian occupation forces withdrew from Lebanon.[84]

Other consequences

  • From the standpoint of the Israeli Military, the invasion removed PLO presence from Southern Lebanon and destroying its infrastructure, as well as increasing deterrence on other Arab anti-Israeli militant organizations.[citation needed] The Syrian military was weakened by combat losses, especially in the air.
  • Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden said in a videotape, released on the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential elections, that he was inspired to attack the buildings of the United States by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in which towers and buildings in Beirut were destroyed in the siege of the capital.[87]

Investigation into violation of International Law

On 16 December 1982, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the Sabra and Shatila massacre and declared it to be an act of genocide.[88] The voting record[89][90][91] on section D of Resolution 37/123, which "resolves that the massacre was an act of genocide", was: yes: 123; no: 0; abstentions: 22; non-voting: 12. The abstentions were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Côte d'Ivoire, Papua New Guinea, Barbados and Dominican Republic. Some delegates disputed the claim that the massacre constituted genocide.

In 1982, an international commission investigated into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. Chairman was Seán MacBride, the other members were Richard Falk, Kader Asmal, Brian Bercusson, Géraud de la Pradelle, and Stefan Wild. The commission's report[92] concluded that "the government of Israel has committed acts of aggression contrary to international law", that the government of Israel had no valid reasons under international law for its invasion of Lebanon, and that the Israeli authorities or forces were directly or indirectly responsible for the massacres and killings, which have been reported to have been carried out by Lebanese militiamen in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in the Beirut area between 16 and 18 September.[92]

Following a four-month investigation, on 8 February 1983, the Kahan Commission submitted its report, which was released to the public by spokesman Bezalel Gordon simultaneously in Hebrew and English. It concluded that direct responsibility rested with the Gemayel Phalangists led by Fadi Frem, and that no Israelis were deemed directly responsible, although Israel was held to be indirectly responsible:

The decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was taken without consideration of the danger - which the makers and executors of the decision were obligated to foresee as probable - the Phalangists would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps, and without an examination of the means for preventing this danger.
Similarly, it is clear from the course of events that when the reports began to arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was taken of these reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn from them, and no energetic and immediate action were taken to restrain the Phalangists and put a stop to their actions.

In cinema

Several films were staged, based on the events of the 1982 war:

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b c Gabriel, Richard , A, Operation Peace for Galilee, The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon, New York: Hill & Wang. 1984, p. 167, 168, ISBN 0-8090-7454-0 Cite error: The named reference "Gabriel" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  2. ^ Hirst, David (2010). Beware of Small States. NationBooks. ISBN 978-1-56858-657-1Z. In time, however, Arafat and his guerrilla leadership decided that they would have to withdraw, leaving no military and very little political or symbolic presence behind. Their enemy's firepower and overall strategic advantage were too great and it was apparently ready to use them to destroy the whole city over the heads of its inhabitants. The rank and file did not like this decision, and there were murmurings of 'treason' from some of Arafat's harsher critics. Had they not already held out, far longer than any Arab country in any former war, against all that the most powerful army in the Middle East — and the fourth most powerful in the world, according to Sharon — could throw against them? (...) But [Palestinians] knew that, if they expected too much, they could easily lose [Lebanense Muslim support] again. 'If this had been Jerusalem', they said, 'we would have stayed to the end. But Beirut is not outs to destroy. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help); Text "page - 144-145" ignored (help)
  3. ^ a b c d e Morris, p. 559 Cite error: The named reference "Morris" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  4. ^ Hirst, David (2010). Beware of Small States. NationBooks. p. 203. ISBN 978-1-56858-657-1Z. ...the first such unconditional, humiliating retreat from Arab territory that the Israelis had ever made. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
  5. ^ "Lebanese Civil War 1982". Liberty05.com. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  6. ^ a b "The Lebanon War". Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  7. ^ 3 September 1982 Washington Post
  8. ^ Washington Post, November 16, 1984.
  9. ^ Kahalani, A Warriors Way, Shapolsky Publishers (1994) pp. 299-301
  10. ^ Harvey W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of terrorism Sage Publications (2003), p.13
  11. ^ Friedman, Thomas (2006). From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 157. Anchor Books, New York. ISBN 0-385-41372-6.
  12. ^ Kissinger, Henry (1999). Years of Renewal, Phoenix Press. ISBN 1-84212-042-5. p. 1022. "I think with sadness of these civilized men who in a turbulent part of the world had fashioned a democratic society based on genuine mutual respect of religion. Their achievement did not survive. The passions sweeping the area were too powerful to be contained by subtle constitutional arrangements. As it had attempted in Jordan, the Palestinian movement wrecked the delicate balance of Lebanon's stability. Before the peace process could run its course, Lebanon was torn apart. Over its prostrate body of writing all the factions and forces of the Middle East still chase their eternal dreams and act out their perennial nightmares."
  13. ^ "Extracts relating to Article 98 of the Charter of the United Nations: Supplement No 5 (1970–1978)" (PDF). Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. United Nations. pp. §275–279. Retrieved 6 August 2006.
  14. ^ a b Morris, p. 503
  15. ^ Morris, p. 505
  16. ^ Morris, p. 509
  17. ^ Israel's Lebanon War Schiff & Yaari (1984), pp. 35–36
  18. ^ a b Morris, p. 507
  19. ^ Reagan, Ronald (Brinkley, Douglas, (ed.)) (2007). The Reagan Diaries. Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-06-087600-5 p. 66: Saturday, 30 January
  20. ^ Fisk, Robert (2001). Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-280130-9, and ISBN 978-0-19-280130-2 p. 194.
  21. ^ Friedman, Thomas L. "Israeli Jets Raid P.L.O. in Lebanon; Shelling follows". The New York Times, 10 May 1982, p. 1.
  22. ^ Cobban, 1984, p. 112
  23. ^ a b c UN Doc S/15194 of 10 June 1982 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
  24. ^ Herzog & Gazit (2005), pp. 350–351
  25. ^ UN Doc S/PV.2292, 17 July 1981.
  26. ^ "Sharon's war crimes in Lebanon: the record". Wsws.org. 22 February 2002. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  27. ^ Herzog (1982) p. 341
  28. ^ Ball, George W. Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, p. 35.
  29. ^ Lee, Timothy. "The stupidity of Ronald Reagan. – Slate Magazine". Slate.com. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  30. ^ "Alexander Haig". Time. New York. 9 April 1984. Archived from the original on 28 April 2011. Retrieved 6 April 2011. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  31. ^ Reagan, Ronald (Brinkley, Douglas (ed.)) (2007). The Reagan Diaries. Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-06-087600-5 pp. 87–90.
  32. ^ Shlaim, Avi (2007). Lion of Jordan; The life of King Hussein in War and Peace. Allen Lane. p. 412. ISBN 978-0-7139-9777-4
  33. ^ Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, University of Michigan Press (2006) p. 181
  34. ^ Shlaim 1999 pp. 396–397
  35. ^ Chomsky, Noam (1983). The Fatefull Triangle. South End Press. ISBN 0-89608-187-7. p.196
  36. ^ Joffe, Lawrence (25 February 2003). "Obituary of Shlomo Argov". The Guardian. Retrieved 31 May 2012. At last, the then Israeli defence minister Ariel Sharon had a pretext for his long-planned campaign to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its headquarters in the Lebanese capital, Beirut. In his memoirs, Sharon admits that the Dorchester ambush was "merely the spark that lit the fuse".
  37. ^ Chomsky p.197
  38. ^ a b c Shlaim, Avi (1999). The Iron Wall. Norton. ISBN 0-393-04816-0. p.404 Cite error: The named reference "Shlaim" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  39. ^ Herzog (1982) p. 340-43
  40. ^ Hogg, Ian V., Israeli War Machine, Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd, (1983) p. 171-175 ISBN 0-600-38514-0
  41. ^ John Pike. "Lebanon 1982: The Imbalance Of Political Ends And Military Means". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  42. ^ Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War, Schocken Books (2004) p. 510
  43. ^ Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, Random House (1982) p347-48
  44. ^ Bruce Walker & the editors of Time-Life books, Fighting Jets: The Epic of Flight, Time Life Books (1983) p162-63
  45. ^ Rabinovich p. 510
  46. ^ Herzog, p 347-348
  47. ^ Walker, p.162-63
  48. ^ Hurley, Matthew M. "The Bekaa Valley Air Battle". Airpower Journal (Winter 1989). Archived from the original on 23 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  49. ^ Rabinovich, p. 510-11
  50. ^ Herzog, p. 349
  51. ^ a b Rabinovich p. 510-11
  52. ^ a b Rebecca Grant The Bekaa Valley War Air Force Magazine Online 85 (June 2002). Retrieved 22 August 2009
  53. ^ "1982: PLO leader forced from Beirut". BBC News. 30 August 1982. Retrieved 20 April 2010.
  54. ^ Seale, Patrick (1988). Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East. p. 391. ISBN 0-520-06667-7.
  55. ^ a b c "Flashback: Sabra and Shatila massacres", BBC News Online (London), 24 January 2002.
  56. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Armies in Lebanon 1982–84, Samuel Katz and Lee E. Russell, Osprey Men-At-Arms series No. 165, 1985
  57. ^ a b c "APPENDIX B – Lebanon, APPENDIX B – Lebanon". Lcweb2.loc.gov. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  58. ^ # Armies in Lebanon 1982–84, Samuel Katz and Lee E. Russell, Osprey Men-At-Arms series No. 165, 1985
  59. ^ a b c Israeli Elite Units since 1948, Samuel Katz, Osprey Elite series 18,
  60. ^ http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lebanon/lb_appnb.html
  61. ^ pp. 83–84.
  62. ^ pp. 134–135.
  63. ^ "Lebanon. The Two-Week War. Section 1 of 1; Data as of December 1987 Library of Congress Country Studies". Lcweb2.loc.gov. 3 June 1982. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  64. ^ Sayigh, Y. (1990). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 524. ISBN 0-19-829643-6.
  65. ^ "– An ex-ISF V-200 Chaimite employed by the Guardians of the Cedar pictured at Houche-el-Oumara during the Battle for Zahle, April–June 1981". Milinme.wordpress.com. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  66. ^ "– GoC M34 gun-truck with ZU-23-2 AA autocannon, c.1976". Alsminiature.com. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  67. ^ a b "Lebanon". Lcweb2.loc.gov. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  68. ^ Armies in Lebanon 1982-84, Samuel Katz an Lee E Russell, Osprey Men-at-Arms 165, 1985
  69. ^ "In the Spotlight: PKK (A.k.a KADEK) Kurdish Worker's Party". Cdi.org. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  70. ^ "Abdullah Öcalan en de ontwikkeling van de PKK". Xs4all.nl. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  71. ^ "a secret relationship". Niqash.org. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  72. ^ Shahid, Leila. The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 36–58.
  73. ^ a b "Lebanon". Lcweb2.loc.gov. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  74. ^ "Extracts relating to Article 98 of the Charter of the United Nations: Supplement No 6 (1979 - 1984)" (PDF). Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. United Nations. pp. §185–§199. Retrieved 6 August 2006.
  75. ^ "Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls and Casualty Statistics for Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides". Archived from the original on 7 May 2009. Retrieved 5 April 2009. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  76. ^ Ross, Michael (2006). The Volunteer.
  77. ^ American Jewish Committee Archives American Jewish Yearbook 1985. p. 126.
  78. ^ American Jewish Committee Archives American Jewish Yearbook 1985. p. 130.
  79. ^ American Jewish Committee Archives, American Jewish Yearbook 1985. p. 260.
  80. ^ Warschawski, Michel (April–May 2006). "Inside the Anti-Occupation Camp", The Link (Americans for Middle East Understanding).
  81. ^ Morris, p. 551
  82. ^ Dagher, Carol. Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon's Post-War Challenge" p. 71
  83. ^ "Security Council Endorses Secretary-General's Conclusion On Israeli Withdrawal From Lebanon as of 16 June", UN Press release SC/6878, 18 June 2000.
  84. ^ "Security Council Press Release SC/8372". United Nations. 29 April 2005. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  85. ^ Netanel Lorch. "The Arab-Israeli Wars". Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 29 April 2011. Retrieved 6 April 2011. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  86. ^ "E/CN.4/2000/22/Add.1 of 3 March 2000". United Nations. Retrieved 29 February 2012.
  87. ^ Arak, Joel (29 October 2004). "Osama Bin Laden Warns America: Terror Leader Admits For First Time That He Ordered 9/11 Attacks", CBS News.
  88. ^ U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 37/123, adopted between 16 and 20 December 1982. Retrieved 4 January 2010. (If link doesn’t work, try: U.N.→ welcome → documents → General Assembly Resolutions → 1982 → 37/123.)
  89. ^ Voting Summary U.N. General Assembly Resolution 37/123D. Retrieved 4 January 2010,
  90. ^ Leo Kuper, "Theoretical Issues Relating to Genocide: Uses and Abuses", in George J. Andreopoulos, Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997, ISBN 0-8122-1616-4, p. 37.
  91. ^ William Schabas, Genocide in International Law. The Crimes of Crimes, p. 455
  92. ^ a b MacBride, Seán (1983). Israel in Lebanon: The Report of International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. London: Ithaca Press. p. 191. ISBN 0-903729-96-2. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

References

  • Barzilai, Gad (1996). Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East. New York University Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-2944-0
  • Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2
  • Brzoska, M., & Pearson, F. S. (1994). Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-Escalation, and Negotiation. University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 0-87249-982-0
  • Cobban, H. (1984). The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-27216-5
  • Fisk, Robert (2001) Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War By Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-280130-9, and ISBN 978-0-19-280130-2
  • Maoz, Zeev (2006) Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-115402
  • Gilbert, M. (1998). Israel: A History. London, Black Swan. ISBN 0-688-12362-7
  • Harkabi, Y. (1989). Israel's Fateful Hour. New York, NY: Harper & Row. ISBN 0-06-091613-3
  • Herzog, Chaim (12 July 2005). The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. Vintage Books. p. 560. ISBN 1-4000-7963-2. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Morris, Benny (1999). Righteous Victims. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. p. 768. ISBN 0-679-42120-3.
  • Penslar, Derek J. (2007) Israel in History; The Jewish state in Comparative perspective. Routledge ISBN 0-415-40036-8
  • Reagan, Ronald edited by Douglas Brinkley (2007) The Reagan Diaries Harper Collins ISBN 978-0-06-087600-5
  • Sayigh, Y. (1999). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-829643-6
  • Schiff, Z. & Ya'ari, E. (1984). Israel's Lebanon War. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-47991-1
  • Seale, Patrick. Asad: The Struggle for Syria. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-06667-7.
  • Ed. Sela, Avraham"Arab-Israeli Conflict." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. . New York: Continuum, 2002. ISBN 0-8264-1413-3 and ISBN 978-0-8264-1413-7

Template:Link FA