Exponential Bounds for Information Leakage in Unknown-Message Side-Channel Attacks

Daniel Z.  Zanger

Paper 2010/391

Exponential Bounds for Information Leakage in Unknown-Message Side-Channel Attacks

Daniel Z. Zanger

Abstract

In Backes&Kopf(2008), the authors introduced an important new information theoretic numerical measure for assessing a system's resistance to unknown-message side-channel attacks and computed a formula for the limit of the numerical values defined by this measure as the number of side-channel observations tends to infinity. Here, we present corresponding quantitative (exponential) bounds that yield an actual rate-of-convergence for this limit, something not given in Backes&Kopf(2008). Such rate-of-convergence results can potentially be used to significantly strengthen the utility of the limit formula of Backes&Kopf(2008) as a tool to reduce computational complexity difficulties associated with calculating the side-channel attack resistance measure presented there. In addition, our arguments here show how the arguments used in Backes&Kopf(2008) to prove the limit formula can be substantially simplified.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Side Channel Attacks Information Theory
Contact author(s): danielzanger @ gmail com
History: 2010-07-10: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/391
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/391,
      author = {Daniel Z.  Zanger},
      title = {Exponential Bounds for Information Leakage in Unknown-Message Side-Channel Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/391},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/391}
}