Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Reconciliation Secure in the Malicious Model (Extended version)

Georg Neugebauer; Lucas Brutschy; Ulrike Meyer; Susanne Wetzel

Paper 2013/655

Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Reconciliation Secure in the Malicious Model (Extended version)

Georg Neugebauer, Lucas Brutschy, Ulrike Meyer, and Susanne Wetzel

Abstract

The problem of fair and privacy-preserving ordered set reconciliation arises in a variety of applications like auctions, e-voting, and appointment reconciliation. While several multi-party protocols have been proposed that solve this problem in the semi-honest model, there are no multi-party protocols that are secure in the malicious model so far. In this paper, we close this gap. Our newly proposed protocols are shown to be secure in the malicious model based on a variety of novel non-interactive zero-knowledge-proofs. We describe the implementation of our protocols and evaluate their performance in comparison to protocols solving the problem in the semi-honest case.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Major revision. 8th ACM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management, ESORICS 2013
Keywords: privacy-enhancing technologies secure multi-party computation cryptographic protocols zero-knowledge proofs malicious model
Contact author(s): neugebauer @ itsec rwth-aachen de
History: 2013-10-15: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2013/655
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/655,
      author = {Georg Neugebauer and Lucas Brutschy and Ulrike Meyer and Susanne Wetzel},
      title = {Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Reconciliation Secure in the Malicious Model (Extended version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/655},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/655}
}