Paper 2017/068
Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage
Guy Barwell, Daniel P. Martin, Elisabeth Oswald, and Martijn Stam
Abstract
Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based, instantiation of the latter.
Note: Updated full version of the corresponding Asiacrypt'17 author's version
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in ASIACRYPT 2017
- Keywords
- provable securityauthenticated encryptiongeneric compositionleakage resiliencerobustness
- Contact author(s)
- martijn stam @ bristol ac uk
- History
- 2017-09-13: last of 3 revisions
- 2017-01-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/068
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/068,
author = {Guy Barwell and Daniel P. Martin and Elisabeth Oswald and Martijn Stam},
title = {Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/068},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/068}
}
