Ubiquitous Weak-key Classes of BRW-polynomial Function

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Abstract. BRW-polynomial function is suggested as a preferred alternative of polynomial function, owing to its high efficiency and seemingly non-existent weak keys. In this paper we investigate the weak-key issue of BRW-polynomial function as well as BRW-instantiated cryptographic schemes. Though, in BRW-polynomial evaluation, the relationship between coefficients and input blocks is indistinct, we give out a recursive algorithm to compute another $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block message, for any given $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block message, such that their output-differential through BRW-polynomial evaluation, equals any given s-degree polynomial, where $v \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$. With such algorithm, we illustrate that any non-empty key subset is a weak-key class in BRW-polynomial function. Moreover any key subset of BRW-polynomial function, consisting of at least 2 keys, is a weak-key class in BRW-instantiated cryptographic schemes like the Wegman-Carter scheme, the UHF-then-PRF scheme, DCT, etc. Especially in the AE scheme DCT, its confidentiality, as well as its integrity, collapses totally, when using weak keys of BRW-polynomial function, which are ubiquitous.

Keywords. Weak key, polynomial evaluation hash, BRW-polynomial, DCT, message authentication code, authenticated encryption.

1 Introduction

Universal hash function. Universal hash functions (short as UHFs) were firstly introduced by Carter and Wegman [8,37], and have become common components in numerous cryptographic constructions, like message authentication code (short as MAC) schemes [13,11,13,7], tweakable enciphering schemes [19,35,10] and authenticated encryption (short as AE) schemes [21,3], etc. A UHF is a keyed function. Compared with other primitives like pseudorandom permutations (short as PRPs) and pseudorandom functions (short as PRFs), UHFs

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have no strength of pseudorandomness. The only requirement is some simple combinatorial properties, which makes UHFs high-performance but brittle and vulnerable to weak-key analyses [14,27,25,39,1] and related-key attacks [34,36].

Weak-key analysis. Handschuh and Preneel [14] initiated the study of the weak-key issue of UHFs, as they pointed out that "in symmetric cryptology, a class of keys is called a weak-key class if for the members of that class the algorithm *behaves in an unexpected way* and if it is easy to *detect* whether a particular unknown key belongs to this class. Moreover, if a weak-key class is of size C, one requires that identifying that a key belongs to this class requires testing fewer than C keys by exhaustive search and fewer than C verification queries." Following such definition, they investigated several weak-key classes of UHFs in MACs. Later on the weak-key analyses of UHFs mainly focused on a specific UHF, i.e. polynomial function.

Polynomial function. Polynomial function, which evaluates a polynomial in the key with the data blocks as coefficients, is one of the most widely used UHFs [5,20,17,35,10,4,15]. However the weak-key issue of polynomial function in cryptographic schemes such as MACs was extensively studied and was found unavoidable, especially in the example of GCM/GMAC which uses polynomial function in its authentication component. Saarrinen [27] found that the keys of polynomial function satisfying $K^t = K$ formed a weak-key class in GCM. Procter and Cid [25] found that any subset $\mathcal{W}$ is a weak-key class in GCM and GMAC, if $|\mathcal{W}| \geq 3$ or $|\mathcal{W}| \geq 2$ and $0 \in \mathcal{W}$, exploiting the so-called forgery polynomial $q(K) = \Sigma_{H \in \mathcal{W}}(K - H)$. Zhu, Tan and Gong [39] pointed out that any subset $\mathcal{W}$ consisting of at least 2 keys is a weak-key class. Sun, Wang and Zhang [34] applied the above results to tweakable enciphering schemes based on polynomial function. Abdelraheem, Beelen, Bogdanov and Tischhauser [1] further proposed twisted polynomials from Ore rings to construct sparse forgery polynomials, which greatly facilitate key recovery attacks.

The weak-key issue casts shadow on the further application of polynomial function. For example, during the CAESAR competition, due to the weak-key issue of polynomial function in the AE scheme POET [2], the designers [3] decided to abandon the polynomial-function-based POET and retain the four-round-AES-based version.

BRW-polynomial function. Bernstein [6] proposed a variant of polynomial function, after the work of Rabin and Winograd [26], which is named as BRW (short for Bernstein-Rabin-Winograd) in [28]. BRW-polynomial function performs more highly-efficient than polynomial function, as it decreases nearly a half of multiplications in polynomial evaluation. BRW-polynomial function is widely-used in lots of cryptographic schemes, including authentication schemes [6,30], tweakable enciphering schemes [28,29,9], authenticated encryption schemes [12], etc.

Furthermore, unlike the case of polynomial function, the weak-key issue of BRW-polynomial function seems avoidable. By now, no weak-key problem of BRW-polynomial function has been found [14,12], which makes BRW-polynomial function an ideal UHF candidate in cryptographic schemes to alleviate the threat

of weak keys. For example, the designers of DCT, a deterministic authenticated encryption scheme [12], suggested using BRW-polynomial function to instantiate its UHF to avoid the weak-key issue.

Our contributions. This work investigates the weak-key problem of BRW-polynomial function and BRW-instantiated schemes. Unlike polynomial function, in BRW-polynomial evaluation, the relationship between coefficients and input blocks is indistinct owing to its recursive definition. Nevertheless we give out a recursive algorithm -*SumBRWpoly*- which, for any given $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block message M and any given s-degree polynomial $q(K) = Q_0K^s + Q_1K^{s-1} + \cdots + Q_s$ that $v \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$, computes another $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block message M' such that $BRW_K(M') = BRW_K(M) + q(K)$.

With *SumBRWpoly*, we illustrate that any s-key subset $\mathcal{W} = \{H_0, \cdots, H_{s-1}\}$ is a weak-key class of BRW-polynomial function. Moreover similar to the case of polynomial function, any $\mathcal{W}$, as long as $s \geq 2$, is also a weak-key class in BRW-instantiated schemes, even when padding rules are taken into consideration, which negates the suggestion of substituting BRW-polynomial function for polynomial function to mitigate the weak-key threat.

For example, when instantiating with BRW-polynomial, both the Wegman-Carter scheme and the UHF-then-PRF scheme suffer the forgery attack if the UHF key falls into $\mathcal{W}$, and it is easy to detect if the unknown UHF key belongs to $\mathcal{W}$. Furthermore, the BRW-instantiated DCT, a deterministic AE scheme, suffers both the distinguishing attack and the forgery attack once its UHF key is in $\mathcal{W}$, implying that the confidentiality, as well as the integrity, of DCT totally collapses when using weak keys of BRW-polynomial, which are ubiquitous.

The remaining of the paper is structured as following: after reviewing the weak-key problem of polynomial-based MACs in Section 2, *SumBRWpoly* is illustrated in Section 3, together with ubiquitous weak keys of BRW-polynomial and BRW-instantiated MACs. Section 4 discuss weak-key classes of DCT, and Section 5 makes a simple conclusion of this work.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

For a finite set $\mathcal{S}$, let $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}$ denote selecting an element x uniformly at random from the set $\mathcal{S}$ and $\#\mathcal{S}$ denote the number of members in $\mathcal{S}$. Let $|s|$ represent the bit length of s. For $b \in \{0,1\}$, b^m denotes m bits of b. Let $\|$ denote the concatenation of two bit-strings, and $\Longleftrightarrow$ means if and only if. For a function $H : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ where $\mathcal{K}$ is a key space, we often write $H(K, M)$ as $H_K(M)$, where $(K, M) \in \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{D}$. Without loss of generality, most of operations, such as additions, multiplications, in the remaining are defined over the finite filed $\mathbb{GF}(2^n)$. $M = M_0 \cdots M_{m-1}$ is a m-block message where $M_i \in \mathbb{GF}(2^n)$ for $i = 0, \cdots, m-1$.

2.2 Universal hash functions

Two commonly-used UHFs are almost-universal (AU) hash function and almost-XOR-universal (AXU) hash function. Both UHFs satisfy some simple combinatorial properties for *any* two different inputs.

For AU hash function, the output-collision probability of any two different inputs is negligible.

Definition 1 (AU [32]). *$H : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ is an ϵ-almost-universal (ϵ-AU) hash function, if for any $M, M' \in \mathcal{D}$, $M \neq M'$,*

$$\Pr[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} : H_K(M) = H_K(M')] = \frac{\#\{K \in \mathcal{K} : H_K(M) = H_K(M')\}}{\#\mathcal{K}} \leq \epsilon.$$

When ϵ is negligible we say that H is AU. Generally, $\epsilon = \max_{M \neq M'} \Pr[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} : H_K(M) = H_K(M')]$.

For AXU hash function, the output-differential distribution of any two different inputs is almost uniform.

Definition 2 (AXU [33]). *Let $(\mathcal{R}, +)$ be an abelian group where the addition is exclusive-OR (XOR). $H : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ is an ϵ-almost-xor-universal (ϵ-AXU), if for any $M, M' \in \mathcal{D}$, $M \neq M'$, and any $C \in \mathcal{R}$,*

$$\Pr[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} : H_K(M) + H_K(M') = C] = \frac{\#\{K \in \mathcal{K} : H_K(M) + H_K(M') = C\}}{\#\mathcal{K}} \leq \epsilon.$$

When ϵ is negligible we say that H is AXU. Generally, $\epsilon = \max_{M \neq M', C} \Pr[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} : H_K(M) + H_K(M') = C]$.

Clearly, if H is ϵ-AXU, it is also ϵ-AU, for ϵ-AU is a special case of ϵ-AXU when $C = 0$.

2.3 UHF-based MACs

One popular design of UHF-based MACs is to firstly compress the variable-length input message into a fixed-length digest by a UHF and secondly encrypt it into a tag. For example, the Wegman-Carter scheme [37,18,31] masks the digest with the keystream of a block-cipher, while the UHF-then-PRF scheme [31] maps the digest into a tag by a PRF.

More specifically, let $H : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ be a UHF and $E : \mathcal{K}' \times \mathcal{R} \to \mathcal{R}$ be a secure block-cipher. Two common UHF-based MACs are as following:

- The Wegman-Carter scheme $\mathrm{WC} : (\mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{K}') \times \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$, for $M \in \mathcal{D}, N \in \mathcal{N}$ and $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}, K' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}'$,

$$\mathrm{WC}_{K,K'}(N, M) = E_{K'}(N) + H_K(M).$$

– The UHF-Then-PRF scheme UTP : $(\mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{K}') \times \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$, for $M \in \mathcal{D}$ and $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}, K' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}'$,

$$\mathrm{UTP}_{K,K'}(M) = E_{K'}(H_K(M)).$$

In the Wegman-Carter scheme, N denotes a non-repeated Nonce which is required fresh in each computation.

The Security of MACs. Without loss of generality, assuming that the key is uniform-randomly chosen, i.e. $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}, K' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}'$, the MAC scheme $\mathcal{O}$ often consists of two algorithms: (let $\mathcal{O} \in \{\mathrm{WC}, \mathrm{UTP}\}$)

– Tag-generation $\mathcal{T}^{\mathcal{O}}$: When $\mathcal{O} = \mathrm{WC}$, on the input (N, M) where N is non-repeated nonce, calculate $T = \mathrm{WC}_{K,K'}(N, M)$; otherwise on the input M, calculate $T = \mathrm{UTP}_{K,K'}(M)$. Return T.
– Verification $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{O}}$: When $\mathcal{O} = \mathrm{WC}$, on the input (N, M, T), compute $T' = \mathrm{WC}_{K,K'}(N, M)$; otherwise on the input (M, T) compute $T' = \mathrm{UTP}_{K,K'}(M)$. If $T' = T$, return 1; else return 0.

During the communication between two parties who have shared a secret key (K, K'), the sender generates tags of his messages by the tag-generation algorithm $\mathcal{T}^{\mathcal{O}}$ and transmits the message-tag pairs, while the receiver validates the received message-tag pairs when the verification algorithm $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{O}}$ returns 1.

The security goal of MACs is to resist the forgery attack. More specifically, any adversary who has access to both the tag-generation oracle $\mathcal{T}^{\mathcal{O}}$ and the verification oracle $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{O}}$, is said to have made a successful forgery, once it outputs a new message-tag pair, i.e. a triple (N, M, T) when $\mathcal{O} = \mathrm{WC}$ or a duplet (M, T) when $\mathcal{O} = \mathrm{UTP}$, which is not produced by $\mathcal{T}^{\mathcal{O}}$ but is validated by $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{O}}$.

It has been proved that the Wegman-Carter scheme is secure if H is an AXU and E is a PRP [18], and that the UHF-then-PRF scheme is secure if H is an AU and E is a PRP [31].

2.4 Weak keys of polynomial function and polynomial-based MACs

Polynomial function. Polynomial function is defined as

$$Poly_K(M) = M_0 K^{m-1} + M_1 K^{m-2} + \cdots + M_{m-1}$$

where $K \in \mathbb{GF}(2^n)$, $M = M_0 M_1 \cdots M_{m-1}$, $M_i \in \mathbb{GF}(2^n)$ for $i = 0, 1, \cdots, m-1$. Obviously $Poly_K(M)$ determines a polynomial in $\mathbb{GF}(2^n)[K]$.

It is easy to deduce that $Poly_K(\cdot)$ is a $(m-1)/2^n$-AU, and that $K \cdot Poly_K(\cdot)$ is a $m/2^n$-AXU. Because for any distinct M, M' and any $C \in \mathbb{GF}(2^n)$, the equation $Poly_K(M') = Poly_K(M)$ has at most $(m-1)$ roots in $\mathbb{GF}(2^n)$, while the equation $K \cdot Poly_K(M) + K \cdot Poly_K(M') = C$ has at most m roots.

Weak-key classes of *Poly* and *Poly*-based MACs. Unfortunately, the weak-key issue of polynomial function is unavoidable. As shown in [25,39,34], any subset $\mathcal{W}$, as long as $|\mathcal{W}| \geq 2$, is a weak-key class of polynomial function in GCM and GMAC, both *Poly*-based schemes. We just give it a brief explanation in the following, and more details refer to [14,25,39,34].

For any key subset $\mathcal{W} = \{H_0, H_1, \cdots, H_{s-1}\}$ that $s \geq 2$, define

$$q(K) = (K - H_0)(K - H_1)\cdots(K - H_{s-1}) = Q_0 K^s + Q_1 K^{s-1} + \cdots + Q_s,$$

where $Q_0 = 1$. It is obvious that

$$K \in \mathcal{W} \iff q(K) = 0. \tag{1}$$

In polynomial function, each coefficient corresponds exactly each input block, and it is easy to find message pairs whose output-differential after polynomial evaluating equals $q(K)$. Specifically, for arbitrary m-block M that $m > s$, compute

$$\begin{aligned} Poly_K(M) + q(K) &= M'_0 K^{m-1} + M'_1 K^{m-2} + \cdots + M'_{m-1}, \\ K \cdot Poly_K(M) + q(K) &= K \cdot \left(M''_0 K^{m-1} + M''_1 K^{m-2} + \cdots + M''_{m-1}\right) + Q_s. \end{aligned}$$

Let $M' = M'_0 M'_1 \cdots M'_{m-1}$ and $M'' = M''_0 M''_1 \cdots M''_{m-1}$, and by (1),

$$K \in \mathcal{W} \iff Poly_K(M) = Poly_K(M'), \tag{2}$$
$$K \in \mathcal{W} \iff K \cdot Poly_K(M) = K \cdot Poly_K(M'') + Q_s. \tag{3}$$

By (2) (3), it is trivial that $\Pr\left[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{W} : Poly_K(M) = Poly_K(M')\right] = 1$ and $\Pr\left[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{W} : K \cdot Poly_K(M) = K \cdot Poly_K(M'') + Q_s\right] = 1$, which implies that the AU property of $Poly_K(\cdot)$, as well as the AXU property of $K \cdot Poly_K(\cdot)$, totally disappears in the key subset $\mathcal{W}$.

Furthermore, once the key of *Poly* falls into $\mathcal{W}$, the security of *Poly*-based schemes also collapses, and it is easy to detect whether the unknown key of *Poly* belongs to $\mathcal{W}$. Thus $\mathcal{W}$ ($|\mathcal{W}| \geq 2$) is a weak-key class of *Poly* in *Poly*-based schemes. Take two common *Poly*-based MACs, i.e. UTP and WC, as examples, that is, $\mathrm{UTP}_{K,K'}(M) = E_{K'}(Poly_K(M))$, and $\mathrm{WC}_{K,K'}(N, M) = E_{K'}(N) + K \cdot Poly_K(M)$. Since $E_{K'}$ is a PRP, according to (2) (3), it is easy to deduce that

$$K \in \mathcal{W} \iff \mathrm{UTP}_{K,K'}(M) = \mathrm{UTP}_{K,K'}(M'), \tag{4}$$
$$K \in \mathcal{W} \iff \mathrm{WC}_{K,K'}(N, M) = \mathrm{WC}_{K,K'}(N, M'') + Q_s, \tag{5}$$

which means that 1) when $K \in \mathcal{W}$, neither UTP nor WC can resist the forgery attack, and 2) by verifying if the UTP tags between M and M' or the WC tags between (N, M) and (N, M'') are equal, it is able to detect if K belongs to $\mathcal{W}$.

From above, it is crucial that, for arbitrary key subset $\mathcal{W}$, it is easy to find message pairs whose output-differential after polynomial evaluating equals $q(K)$, the so-called forgery polynomial defined by $\mathcal{W}$. To deal with variable-length inputs in real applications, inputs to polynomial function are padded firstly. However even when padding rules are taken into consideration, such message pairs are easy to find, and examples include GCM and GMAC [27,25,39,1].

3 Weak keys of BRW-polynomial function and BRW-instantiated MACs

3.1 The description of BRW-polynomial function

BRW-polynomial function [6,23] is defined recursively, just as follows:

- $BRW_K(\varepsilon) = 0^n$;
- $BRW_K(M_0) = M_0$;
- $BRW_K(M_0M_1) = M_0K + M_1$;
- $BRW_K(M_0M_1M_2) = (M_0 + K)(M_1 + K^2) + M_2$;
- $BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{m-1}) = BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2})(K^t + M_{t-1}) + BRW_K(M_t \cdots M_{m-1})$ for $t \in \{4, 8, 16, 32, \cdots\}$ and $t \leq m < 2t$ (i.e. $t = 2^{\lfloor \log_2 m \rfloor}$);

where ε is an empty string, $K \in \mathbb{GF}(2^n), M_i \in \mathbb{GF}(2^n)$ for $i = 0, \cdots, m-1$. When $m \geq 3$, let $t = 2^{\lfloor \log_2 m \rfloor}$, $BRW_K(\cdot)$ is a monic polynomial with the degree of $(2t-1)$. And it is easy to conclude that $BRW_K(\cdot)$ is $(2t-1)/2^n$-AU and $K \cdot BRW_K(\cdot)$ is $2t/2^n$-AXU [28].

Unlike the case of polynomial function, in BRW-polynomial evaluation, each input block may affect multiple coefficients in the meantime, and its difficult to track the coefficients after modifying input blocks. However, even though the relationship between input blocks and coefficients is not so obvious as that in polynomial function, there are efficient methods to find message pairs whose output-differential after BRW-polynomial evaluating equals some given polynomial, and BRW-polynomial function suffers the same weak-key issue as polynomial function.

In the following, we firstly give out a recursive algorithm, *SumBRWpoly* in Algorithm 1, which finds another new $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block message for any given $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block message such that their output-differential after BRW-polynomial evaluating equals any given s-degree polynomial, where $v \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$. Secondly, we study the weak-key problem of BRW-polynomial function and BRW-instantiated MACs, i.e. BRW-based UTP and WC, with the recursive algorithm.

3.2 The description of *SumBRWpoly*.

Given any s-degree polynomial $q(K) = Q_0K^s + Q_1K^{s-1} + \cdots + Q_s$ and any m-block message M that $m = 2^{v+1} - 1$ and $v \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$, *SumBRWpoly*, exploiting the observations about the BRW-polynomial evaluation of the specific $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block inputs, computes another new m-block message M' such that $BRW_K(M')$ is exactly the sum of $BRW_K(M)$ and $q(K)$.

In this section, we first introduce the observations about the BRW-polynomial evaluation of $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block inputs, and then explain how *SumBRWpoly* works, where $v \geq 2$.

BRW-polynomial evaluation of $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block inputs. When $v \geq 2$, let $m = 2^{v+1} - 1$ and $t = 2^{\lfloor \log_2(m) \rfloor} = 2^v$. To an m-block message M,

$$BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}M_{t-1}M_t \cdots M_{2t-2}) =$$
$$BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) \cdot K^t + M_{t-1} \cdot BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) + BRW_K(M_t \cdots M_{2t-2}),$$

and the observations exploited in *SumBRWpoly* are as following:

(1) $BRW_K(M)$ is a monic polynomial with the degree of $(2t-1)$, i.e. m or $2^{v+1}-1$;
(2) Both $BRW_K(M_0\cdots M_{t-2})$ and $BRW_K(M_t\cdots M_{2t-2})$ are monic polynomials with the degree of $(t-1)$, i.e. (2^v-1), and thus the coefficient of K^{t-1} is $(M_{t-1}+1)$;
(3) The last $(t-1)$ blocks of M, i.e. $M_t\cdots M_{2t-2}$, only affect the terms with a degree lower than $(t-1)$;
(4) Only the first $(t-1)$ blocks of M, i.e. $M_0\cdots M_{t-2}$, affect the terms with a degree greater than t.
(5) The last block of M, i.e. M_{2t-2}, only affects the constant term, and the constant term in $BRW_K(M_0\cdots M_{t-2})$ (if any) turns out to be the coefficient of K^t.

Note that when $v=0,1$ and $m=1,3$ respectively, the evaluation of $BRW_K(M)$ is simple.

How *SumBRWpoly* **works.** The description of *SumBRWpoly* is shown in Algorithm 1. It is required that $m>s$. Otherwise there is no such m-block message pair M, M' satisfying $BRW_K(M')=BRW_K(M)+q(K)$ since both $BRW_K(M')$ and $BRW_K(M)$ are monic polynomials with the degree of m. By $2^{v+1}-1>s$, let $v\geq\lfloor\log_2(s+1)\rfloor$ for simplicity. Besides, m is often expected to be as small as possible to make the attacks efficient. For any s, the shortest messages dealt by *SumBRWpoly* is $m_{\min}=2^{\lfloor\log_2(s+1)\rfloor+1}-1$, i.e. $s<m_{\min}\leq(2s+1)$.

When $s=0$**.** Note that when $s=0$, $\mathcal{W}=\emptyset$, which is actually insignificant, and this case is given to complete the recursive algorithm. And $v=0$ is included in this case. Let $q(K)=Q_0$ that $Q_0\in\mathbb{GF}(2^n)$. To be simple, let $M'_{m-1}=M_{m-1}+Q_0$, as the last block of the $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block message only affect the constant term in BRW-polynomial evaluation for $v\geq 0$.

When $v=1$ **and** $s=1,2$**.** In this case, the specific message that *SumBRWpoly* processes is of 3 blocks, i.e $m=3$. According to

$$\begin{cases} BRW_K(M'_0M'_1M'_2)=K^3+M'_0K^2+M'_1K+M'_0M'_1+M'_2 \\ BRW_K(M_0M_1M_2)=K^3+M_0K^2+M_1K+M_0M_1+M_2 \end{cases},$$

it is easy to define M' satisfying $BRW_K(M')=BRW_K(M)+q(K)$ for $s=1,2$. One simple way to define M' is given in Algorithm 1.

When $v\geq 2$**.** In this case, *SumBRWpoly* runs in a recursive way by exploiting the observations about the BRW-polynomial evaluation of $(2^{v+1}-1)$-block inputs. Let $t=2^v$ (see Algorithm 1).

If $s<t-1$, because the last $(t-1)$ input blocks only affect the terms with the degree lower than $(t-1)$ in BRW-polynomial evaluation, to be simple, $SumBRWpoly(q(K),M)$ keeps the first t blocks of M' the same as that of M, and computes the remaining $(t-1)$ blocks of M' by making a recursive call of $SumBRWpoly(q(K),M_t\cdots M_{2t-2})$. That is,

$$SumBRWpoly\,(q(K),M)=M_0\cdots M_{t-1}\|SumBRWpoly\,(q(K),M_t\cdots M_{2t-2})\,.$$

Algorithm 1: The description of *SumBRWpoly*

Input: $q(K) = Q_0K^s + Q_1K^{s-1} + \cdots + Q_s$, $M = M_0 \cdots M_{m-1}$, where $m = 2^{v+1} - 1$ and $v \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$.

Output: $M' = M'_0 \cdots M'_{m-1}$.

if $s = 0$ **then**
- $M'_0 \cdots M'_{m-2} = M_0 \cdots M_{m-2}$;
- $M'_{m-1} = M_{m-1} + Q_s$;

else
- $v = \lfloor \log_2 m \rfloor$;
- $t = 2^v$;
- **if** $v = 1$ **then**
  - **if** $s = 1$ **then**
    - $M'_0 = M_0$;
    - $M'_1 = M_1 + Q_0$;
    - $M'_2 = M_2 + Q_1 + M_0Q_0$;
  - **if** $s = 2$ **then**
    - $M'_0 = M_0 + Q_0$;
    - $M'_1 = M_1 + Q_1$;
    - $M'_2 = M_2 + Q_2 + M_0Q_1 + M_1Q_0 + Q_0Q_1$;
- **else**
  - **if** $s < t - 1$ **then**
    - $M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-1} = M_0 \cdots M_{t-1}$;
    - $M'_t \cdots M'_{2t-2} = SumBRWpoly(q(K), M_t \cdots M_{2t-2})$;
  - **if** $s \geq t - 1$ **then**
    - **if** $s \geq t$ **then**
      - $q_1(K) = \sum_{i=0}^{s-t} Q_{s-t-i}K^i$;
      - $M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-2} = SumBRWpoly\left(q_1(K), M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}\right)$;
    - **else**
      - $q_1(K) = \varepsilon$;
      - $M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-2} = M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}$;
    - $M'_{t-1} = M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}$;
    - $q_2(K) = \sum_{i=0}^{t-2} Q_{s-i}K^i + Q_{s-t+1} \cdot \left(BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) + K^{t-1}\right) + (M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}) \cdot q_1(K)$;
    - $M'_t \cdots M'_{2t-2} = SumBRWpoly\left(q_2(K), M_t \cdots M_{2t-2}\right)$;

return M'

Note that in this specific case $s < t-1$ and $v \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$, thus $v-1 \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$ which means that the recursive call of $SumBRWpoly(q(K), M_t \cdots M_{2t-2})$ is reasonable.

However when $s \geq t-1$, the problem is a bit complex. Rewrite the terms of $q(K)$ into three parts as following:

$$\begin{aligned} q(K) &= \left(Q_0 K^s + \cdots + Q_{s-t} K^t\right) + Q_{s-t+1} K^{t-1} + \left(Q_{s-t+2} K^{t-2} + \cdots + Q_s\right) \\ &= q_1(K) \cdot K^t + Q_{s-t+1} K^{t-1} + \left(Q_{s-t+2} K^{t-2} + \cdots + Q_s\right), \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

where when $s \geq t$, $q_1(K) = Q_0 K^{s-t} + Q_1 K^{s-t-1} + \cdots + Q_{s-t}$, and when $s = t-1$, $q_1(K) = \varepsilon$.

When $s \geq t$, because only the first $(t-1)$ input blocks affect the terms whose degree is greater than t in BRW-polynomial evaluation, $SumBRWpoly(q(K), M)$ first calls $SumBRWpoly(q_1(K), M_0 \cdots M_{t-2})$ to computes $M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-2}$. The recursive call is reasonable, since $M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}$ is a $(2^{(v-1)+1} - 1)$-block input and the relationship between $(v-1)$ and the degree of $q_1(K)$, i.e. $(s-t)$, satisfies the requirement of $SumBRWpoly$. Due to the property of floor number, $(s+1) \leq 2^{2\lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor - 1} + 2^{\lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor - 1}$ for $s \geq 1$, and

$$s - t + 1 = s - 2^v + 1 \leq s + 1 - 2^{\lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor} \leq 2^{\lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor - 1}.$$

Since $v - 1 \geq \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor - 1$, it is easy to deduce that $v - 1 \geq \lfloor \log_2(s-t+1) \rfloor$. Otherwise when $s = t-1$, since $q_1(K) = \varepsilon$, let $M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-2} = M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}$.

After that $SumBRWpoly$ figures out how $q_1(K)$ affects the remaining lower-degree terms. Moreover let $M'_{t-1} = M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}$, and then

$$\begin{aligned} & BRW_K(M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-2}) \cdot \left(K^t + M'_{t-1}\right) \\ &= \left(BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) + q_1(K)\right) \cdot \left(K^t + M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}\right) \\ &= BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) \cdot \left(K^t + M_{t-1}\right) + q_1(K) \cdot K^t \\ &\quad + (M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}) \cdot q_1(K) + Q_{s-t+1} \cdot BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) \\ &= BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) \cdot \left(K^t + M_{t-1}\right) + q_1(K) \cdot K^t + Q_{s-t+1} K^{t-1} \\ &\quad + (M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}) \cdot q_1(K) + Q_{s-t+1} \cdot \left(BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) + K^{t-1}\right). \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

To deal with the lower-degree terms, by (6) (7), let

$$\begin{aligned} q_2(K) = {} & Q_{s-t+2} K^{t-2} + \cdots + Q_s \\ & + (M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}) \cdot q_1(K) + Q_{s-t+1} \cdot \left(BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) + K^{t-1}\right), \end{aligned}$$

and the degree of $q_2(K)$ is either smaller than $(t-1)$ or equal to that of $q_1(K)$, and thus satisfies the requirement to call $SumBRWpoly(q_2(K), M_t \cdots M_{2t-2})$.

That is, the remaining blocks $M'_t \cdots M'_{2t-2}$ can be computed by making another recursive call of $SumBRWpoly(q_2(K), M_t \cdots M_{2t-2})$, and then

$$BRW_K(M'_t \cdots M'_{2t-2}) = BRW_K(M_t \cdots M_{2t-2}) + q_2(K). \tag{8}$$

Therefore when $s \geq t-1$, by (7) (8),

$$\begin{aligned}
&BRW_K(M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-2} M'_{t-1} M'_t \cdots M'_{2t-2}) \\
&= BRW_K(M'_0 \cdots M'_{t-2}) \cdot \left(K^t + M'_{t-1}\right) + BRW_K(M'_t \cdots M'_{2t-2}) \\
&= BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M^{t-2}) \cdot \left(K^t + M_{t-1}\right) + BRW_K(M_t \cdots M_{2t-2}) \\
&\quad + q_1(K) \cdot K^t + Q_{s-t+1} K^{t-1} + q_2(K) \\
&\quad + (M_{t-1} + Q_{s-t+1}) \cdot q_1(K) + Q_{s-t+1} \cdot \left(BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2}) + K^{t-1}\right) \\
&= BRW_K(M_0 \cdots M_{t-2} M_{t-1} M_t \cdots M_{2t-2}) + q(K).
\end{aligned}$$

3.3 Weak keys of BRW-polynomial in MACs

Weak keys in BRW-polynomial function are found ubiquitous, which also threats BRW-based schemes. In this section, we explain how a key subset of BRW-polynomial function turns out to be a weak-key class, and then briefly discuss the weak-key issue of BRW-instantiated MACs.

For any key subset $\mathcal{W} = \{H_0, H_1, \cdots, H_{s-1}\}$ that $s \geq 1$, define

$$q(K) = (K - H_0)(K - H_1) \cdots (K - H_{s-1}) = Q_0 K^s + Q_1 K^{s-1} + \cdots + Q_s$$

where $Q_0 = 1$, similarly. Moreover let $\overline{q}(K) = Q_0 K^{s-1} + Q_1 K^{s-2} + \cdots + Q_{s-1}$ and then $q(K) = K \cdot \overline{q}(K) + Q_s$.

Choose arbitrary m-block message M where $m = 2^{v+1} - 1$ and $v = \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$, i.e. $s < m \leq (2s+1)$. Compute M' and M'' by calling $SumBRWpoly$, that is $M' = SumBRWpoly\left(q(K), M\right)$ and $M'' = SumBRWpoly\left(\overline{q}(K), M\right)$. By

$$\begin{aligned}
BRW_K(M') &= BRW_K(M) + q(K), \\
K \cdot BRW_K(M'') &= K \cdot BRW_K(M) + K \cdot \overline{q}(K),
\end{aligned}$$

it is obvious that

$$K \in \mathcal{W} \iff BRW_K(M') = BRW_K(M), \tag{9}$$

$$K \in \mathcal{W} \iff K \cdot BRW_K(M'') = K \cdot BRW_K(M) + Q_s. \tag{10}$$

Thus the AU property of $BRW_K(\cdot)$, as well as the AXU property of $K \cdot BRW_K(\cdot)$, totally disappears in $\mathcal{W}$, as $\Pr\left[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{W} : BRW_K(M) = BRW_K(M')\right] = 1$ and $\Pr\left[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{W} : K \cdot BRW_K(M) = K \cdot BRW_K(M'') + Q_s\right] = 1$.

Besides, once the key of BRW falls into $\mathcal{W}$, the security of the BRW-based scheme also collapses, and it is easy to detect whether the unknown key of BRW belongs to $\mathcal{W}$. So $\mathcal{W}$ is a weak-key class of BRW in the BRW-based schemes.

Take two BRW-instantiated MACs, i.e. UTP and WC, as examples, any $\mathcal{W}$ is a weak-key class, as long as $|\mathcal{W}| \geq 2$, because that:

- $\mathrm{UTP}_{K,K'}(M) = E_{K'}(BRW_K(M))$
  1) Forgery attack. Make a single tag-generation query of M and get its tag T. Once $K \in \mathcal{W}$, (M', T) is a successful forgery, since $E_{K'}$ is a PRP and then $T = E_{K'}\left(BRW_K(M)\right) = E_{K'}\left(BRW_K(M')\right)$ according to (9).

2) Detection. Simply make a tag-generation query of M to get its tag T, and one more verification query of (M', T). If 1 is returned, $BRW_K(M) = BRW_K(M')$ since $E_{K'}$ is a PRP, and thus $K \in \mathcal{W}$ according to (9), otherwise $K \notin \mathcal{W}$.

– $\mathrm{WC}_{K,K'}(N, M) = E_{K'}(N) + K \cdot BRW_K(M)$
  1) Forgery attack. Make a single tag-generation query of (N, M) and get its tag T. Once $K \in \mathcal{W}$, $(N, M'', T + Q_s)$ is a successful forgery, since $T + Q_s = E_{K'}(N) + K \cdot BRW_K(M) + Q_s = E_{K'}(N) + K \cdot BRW_K(M'')$ according to (10).
  2) Detection. Make a single tag-generation query of (N, M) to get its T, and one more verification query of $(N, M'', T + Q_s)$. If 1 is returned, $K \in \mathcal{W}$ according to (10), otherwise $K \notin \mathcal{W}$.

Both forgery attack and detection given above require at least 1 tag-generation query and 1 verification query, and to avoid non-sense weak-key classes, it is required that $|\mathcal{W}| \geq 2$. In real applications, inputs are often padded firstly to deal with variable-length inputs. However even when padding rules are taken into consideration, *SumBRWpoly* still works by some tricks, such as the one used in the weak-key discussion of DCT (Section 4.2), and more refer to [27,25,39,1].

4 Weak keys of BRW-polynomial in DCT

DCT [12], short for Deterministic Counter in Tweak, is a Beyond-Birthday-Bound-secure AE scheme, which is constructed from an efficient UHF, a CCA-secure PRP and a Beyond-Birthday-Bound-secure encryption scheme. Forler et al., the designers of DCT, suggest instantiating the underlying UHF with BRW-polynomial function, rather than polynomial function, to avoid the weak-key issue. However BRW-polynomial function suffers the same weak-key problem, which can be extended to DCT when instantiating with BRW-polynomial function.

4.1 A brief introduction to DCT.

The encryption of DCT takes the input (A, P), where A is the associated data and P is the plaintext, and outputs the ciphertext C. The decryption of DCT takes the input (A, C), and outputs the plaintext P if the verification is passed.

The encryption and decryption of DCT are illustrated in Table 1. The block length is n-bit. $Encode_\tau(P)$ puts 0^τ on the left of P and then partitions the data into two part $P_L \| P_R$ where $|P_L| = n$. E is a block cipher. $\mathcal{E}$ is an encryption scheme and $\mathcal{D}$ is its inverse. If the left τ bits of P_L are zeroes, $Decode_\tau(P_L, P_R)$ deletes the zeroes and returns the rest bits of $P_L \| P_R$, otherwise $Decode_\tau$ returns $\perp$ indicating the verification is failed.

In DCT, $\mathcal{E}$ is instantiated by the stream-cipher mode CTRT [24]. For simplicity, let $CTRT.Gen_{K_3}(C_L, l)$ be the function that outputs l-bit keystream in the key K_3, and once C_L is new, the l-bit keystream looks random at all. And

$\mathrm{DCT}.enc_{K_1,K_2,K_3}(A,P)$	$\mathrm{DCT}.dec_{K_1,K_2,K_3}(A,C)$
$P_L\|P_R = Encode_\tau(P)$	$C_L\|C_R = C$
$X = H_{K_1}(A,P_R)$	$P_R = \mathcal{D}_{K_3}(C_L,C_R)$
$Y = P_L + X$	$X = H_{K_1}(A,P_R)$
$C_L = E_{K_2}(Y)$	$Y = E^{-1}_{K_2}(C_L)$
$C_R = \mathcal{E}_{K_3}(C_L,P_R)$	$P_L = Y - X$
return $C_L\|C_R$	**return** $Decode_\tau(P_L,P_R)$

Table 1. The encryption and decryption of DCT.

then

$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{E}_{K_3}(C_L,P_R) = P_R + CTRT.Gen_{K_3}(C_L,|P_R|) \\ \mathcal{D}_{K_3}(C_L,C_R) = C_R + CTRT.Gen_{K_3}(C_L,|C_R|) \end{cases}.$$

The underlying UHF is defined as

$$H_{K_1}(A,P_R) = K_1 \cdot BRW_{K_1}(pad(A)\|pad(P_R)\|L)$$

where the function $pad(X)$ pads X with the minimal number of trailing zeroes such that its length after padding are multiples of n, $L = len(A)\|len(P_R)$ that $len(X)$ is an $(n/2)$-bit variable representing the bit length of X. Note that the UHF description here is a bit different from the original design in [12], but it doesn't affect the weak-key discussion in the following.

4.2 Weak keys of BRW-polynomial function in DCT.

When instantiating with BRW-polynomial function, which is suggested by its designers, DCT suffers the unavoidable weak-key problem, owing to ubiquitous weak keys of its BRW-polynomial UHF component, and the details are given out in the following.

AE schemes are designed to provide both the confidentiality of plaintexts and the integrity of plaintexts and associated data. However when weak keys are used, at least one of the security goal is broken. For example, GCM, one of the standardized AE schemes, fails to provide the integrity when using weak keys of its polynomial-function UHF, which is proved by the forgery attacks given in [14,27,25,39,1]. Another example is the robust AE scheme AEZ [16], which, when using weak keys given in [22], fails to offer the confidentiality, as its ciphertexts can be distinguished from random bits efficiently. As for BRW-instantiated DCT, both its confidentiality and integrity collapse, when using weak keys of BRW-polynomial. Besides it is easy to detect if the unknown key of BRW-polynomial belongs to some weak-key class.

Inherited from BRW-polynomial function, any subset $\mathcal{W} = \{H_0,\cdots,H_{s-1}\}$ is a weak-key class of DCT, as long as $s \geq 2$. That is, once $K_1 \in \mathcal{W}$, the confidentiality, as well as the integrity, of DCT collapses totally, and it is easy to detect whether $K_1 \in \mathcal{W}$.

Construct message pairs. The crux is how to construct distinct message pairs, say $(A, P), (A', P')$, for any $\mathcal{W}$, satisfying that

$$K_1 \in \mathcal{W} \iff H_{K_1}(A', P'_R) = H_{K_1}(A, P_R).$$

In the following, we explain how to find such pairs with *SumBRWpoly* and a little trick to deal with the padding rule.

For any s-key subset $\mathcal{W}$, let $m = 2^{v+1} - 1$ and $v = \lfloor \log_2(s+1) \rfloor$, i.e. $s < m \leq (2s+1)$. Let A be arbitrary m-block message, i.e. $A = M_0 \cdots M_{m-1}$ where $M_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ for $i = 0, \cdots, m-1$. Let $q(K_1) = (K_1 - H_0) \cdots (K_1 - H_{s-1})$ and $A' = M'_0 \cdots M'_{m-1} = SumBRWpoly(q(K_1), M_0 \cdots M_{m-1})$, thus

$$BRW_{K_1}(M'_0 \cdots M'_{m-1}) = BRW_{K_1}(M_0 \cdots M_{m-1}) + q(K_1). \tag{11}$$

Besides, let $P_R = P'_R = 0^n \| U$ where $U \in \bigcup_{l=0}^{(m-2)n} \{0,1\}^l$, and

$$\begin{cases} pad(A) \| pad(P_R) \| L &= M_0 \cdots M_{m-1} \quad \| \quad 0^n \| pad(U) \| L \\ pad(A') \| pad(P'_R) \| L' &= M'_0 \cdots M'_{m-1} \quad \| \quad 0^n \| pad(U) \| L' \end{cases} \tag{12}$$

where $L = len(A) \| len(P_R)$, $L' = len(A') \| len(P'_R)$ and $L = L'$. Obviously, $(m+2)n \leq | \ pad(A) \| pad(P_R) \| L \ | \leq 2mn$, i.e. at most $2(2s+2)$ blocks, and $| \ pad(A) \| pad(P_R) \| L \ | = | \ pad(A') \| pad(P'_R) \| L \ |$.

Therefore, by (11)(12),

$$\begin{aligned}
&BRW_{K_1}(pad(A') \| pad(P'_R) \| L') \\
&= BRW_{K_1}(pad(A') \| pad(P'_R) \| L) \\
&= BRW_{K_1}(M'_0 \cdots M'_{m-1}) \cdot \left(K_1^{m+1} + 0^n\right) + BRW_{K_1}(pad(U) \| L) \\
&= (BRW_{K_1}(M_0 \cdots M_{m-1}) + q(K_1)) \cdot \left(K_1^{m+1} + 0^n\right) + BRW_{K_1}(pad(U) \| L) \\
&= BRW_{K_1}(M_0 \cdots M_{m-1}) \cdot \left(K_1^{m+1} + 0^n\right) + BRW_{K_1}(pad(U) \| L) + q(K_1) \cdot K_1^{m+1} \\
&= BRW_{K_1}(pad(A) \| pad(P_R) \| L) + q(K_1) \cdot K_1^{m+1},
\end{aligned}$$

and thus

$$K_1 \in \mathcal{W} \bigcup \{0\} \iff H_{K_1}(A', P'_R) = H_{K_1}(A, P_R). \tag{13}$$

Moreover, with $H_{K_1}(A', P'_R) = H_{K_1}(A, P_R)$, let $P = V \| P_R, P' = V \| P'_R$ where $V \in \{0,1\}^{n-\tau}$, and thus

$$C'_L = C_L, \tag{14}$$

where $C'_L \| C'_R = \text{DCT}.enc_{K_1,K_2,K_3}(A', P')$, $C_L \| C_R = \text{DCT}.enc_{K_1,K_2,K_3}(A, P)$.

Weak-key classes in DCT. For any key subset $\mathcal{W}$ of BRW-polynomial function, with the message pair $(A, P), (A', P')$ that satisfy (13) (14) found, both confidentiality and integrity of DCT collapse when $K_1 \in \mathcal{W}$. More specifically, when $K_1 \in \mathcal{W}$, the following attacks are successful:

– **Distinguishing attack.** Make two encryption queries of $(A, P), (A', P')$, and denote the ciphertexts as $C_L \| C_R, C'_L \| C'_R$ respectively. According to (14), $C_L = C'_L$ is always true in DCT, while happens with the small probability of 2^{-n} in the random case.
– **Forgery attack.** Make a single encryption query of (A, P) to get its ciphertext $C_L \| C_R$, and forge the ciphertext of (A', P') as $C_L \| (P'_R + P_R + C_R)$, where $P_R + C_R$ is the keystream which is produced by the CTRT encryption component $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $P_R + C_R = CTRT.Gen_{K_3}(C_L, |P_R|)$.
More specifically, let $C'_L \| C'_R = \text{DCT}.enc_{K_1,K_2,K_3}(A', P')$. By (14), $C'_L = C_L$, and then $CTRT.Gen_{K_3}(C'_L, |P'_R|) = CTRT.Gen_{K_3}(C_L, |P_R|)$ since $|P_R| = |P'_R|$. Thus $C'_R = P'_R + CTRT.Gen_{K_3}(C'_L, |P'_R|) = P'_R + P_R + C_R$.

Moreover it is easy to detect whether $K_1 \in \mathcal{W} \bigcup \{0\}$. Simply make two encryption queries of $(A, P), (A', P')$ and denote the ciphertexts as $C_L \| C_R, C'_L \| C'_R$ respectively. Once $C'_L = C_L$, $H_{K_1}(A', P'_R) = H_{K_1}(A, P_R)$ as the block-cipher E is a PRP, and by (13), $K_1 \in \mathcal{W}$.

Besides, if $K_1 = 0$, the UHF outputs 0 for arbitrary input, and thus when $0 \notin \mathcal{W}$, by 1 more encryption query, it is able to detect either $K_1 = 0$ or $K_1 \in \mathcal{W}$. That is, make a encryption query of some input (A'', P'') for any A'' and $P'' = V \| P''_R$, and observe if its first n-bit ciphertext equals C_L.

Thus, any key subset $\mathcal{W}$ of BRW-polynomial function that $|\mathcal{W}| \geq 2$ is a weak-key class in BRW-instantiated DCT. Again, $|\mathcal{W}| \geq 2$ is required to avoid non-sense weak-key classes.

5 Conclusions

This work studies the weak-key problem of BRW-polynomial function and BRW-instantiated schemes. It is found that weak keys in BRW-polynomial function are ubiquitous, and that any key subset of BRW-polynomial which consists of at least 2 keys is a weak-key class in BRW-based cryptographic schemes like the Wegman-Carter scheme, the UHF-then-PRF scheme, DCT, etc. Similar weak-key classes also exist in more BRW-instantiated schemes [6,30,28,29,9]. Although the weak-key attack seems impossible to break the provable security of these schemes, the ubiquity of weak keys is a potential security risk.

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