Paper 2022/402

Improved Rotational-XOR Cryptanalysis of Simon-like Block Ciphers

Jinyu Lu, Yunwen Liu, Tomer Ashur, Bing Sun, and Chao Li

Abstract

Rotational-XOR (RX) cryptanalysis is a cryptanalytic method aimed at finding distinguishable statistical properties in ARX-C ciphers, i.e., ciphers that can be described only by using modular addition, cyclic rotation, XOR, and the injection of constants. In this paper we extend RX-cryptanalysis to AND-RX ciphers, a similar design paradigm where the modular addition is replaced by vectorial bitwise AND; such ciphers include the block cipher families Simon and Simeck. We analyze the propagation of RX-differences through AND-RX rounds and develop a closed form formula for their expected probability. Inspired by the MILP verification model proposed by Sadeghi et al., we develop a SAT/SMT model for searching compatible RX-characteristics in Simon-like ciphers, i.e., that there are at least one right pair of messages/keys to satisfy the RK-characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model that takes the RX-difference transitions and value transitions simultaneously into account in Simon-like ciphers. Meanwhile, we investigate how the choice of the round constants affects the resistance of Simon-like ciphers against RX-cryptanalysis. Finally, we show how to use an RX-distinguisher for a key recovery attack. Evaluating our model we find compatible RX-characteristics of up to 20, 27, and 34 rounds with respective probabilities of 2 −26 ,2 −44 , and 2 −56 for versions of Simeck with block sizes of 32, 48, and 64 bits, respectively, for large classes of weak keys in the related-key model. In most cases, these are the longest published distinguishers for the respective variants of Simeck. In the case of Simon, we present compatible RX-characteristics for round reduced versions of all ten instances. We observe that for equal block and key sizes, the RX-distinguishers cover fewer rounds in Simon than in Simeck. Concluding the paper, we present a key recovery attack on Simeck 64 reduced to 28 rounds using a 23-round RX-characteristic.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. IET information security
Keywords
Rotational-XOR cryptanalysisARXSimonSimeckRound constants
Contact author(s)
jinyu_smile @ foxmail com
univerlyw @ hotmail com
tomer ashur @ esat kuleuven be
happy_come @ 163 com
lichao_nudt @ sina com
History
2022-03-31: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/402
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/402,
      author = {Jinyu Lu and Yunwen Liu and Tomer Ashur and Bing Sun and Chao Li},
      title = {Improved Rotational-{XOR} Cryptanalysis of Simon-like Block Ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/402},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/402}
}
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