

How Fast Does the Inverse Walk Approximate a Random Permutation?

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Abstract

For a finite field \mathbb{F} of size n , the (patched) inverse permutation $\text{INV} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ computes the inverse of x over \mathbb{F} when $x \neq 0$ and outputs 0 when $x = 0$, and the ARK_K (for AddRoundKey) permutation adds a fixed constant K to its input, i.e.,

$$\text{INV}(x) = x^{n-2} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ARK}_K(x) = x + K .$$

We study the process of alternately applying the INV permutation followed by a random linear permutation ARK_K , which is a random walk over the alternating (or symmetric) group that we call the *inverse walk*.

We show both lower and upper bounds on the number of rounds it takes for this process to approximate a random permutation over \mathbb{F} . We show that r rounds of the inverse walk over the field of size n with

$$r = \Theta \left(n \log^2 n + n \log n \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right)$$

rounds generates a permutation that is ε -close (in variation distance) to a uniformly random even permutation (i.e. a permutation from the alternating group A_n). This is tight, up to logarithmic factors.

Our result answers an open question from the work of Liu, Pelecanos, Tessaro and Vaikuntanathan (CRYPTO 2023) by providing a missing piece in their proof of t -wise independence of (a variant of) AES. It also constitutes a significant improvement on a result of Carlitz (Proc. American Mathematical Society, 1953) who showed a *reachability result*: namely, that every even permutation can be generated *eventually* by composing INV and ARK . We show a *tight convergence result*, namely a tight quantitative bound on the number of rounds to reach a random (even) permutation.

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1 Introduction

The design and analysis of block ciphers such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [DR02] is a central topic in cryptography. On the one hand, despite extensive cryptanalysis, spanning a wide range of attacks including linear [MY92] and differential [BS91] cryptanalysis, higher-order [Lai94], truncated [Knu94] and impossible [Knu98] differential attacks, interpolation [JK97] and algebraic attacks [CP02], integral cryptanalysis [KW02], biclique attacks [BKR11], there has not been a single devastating attack thus far that undermines our confidence in AES. On the other hand, the situation is unsatisfactory from a foundational perspective: indeed, it is not clear whether it is even possible to formulate a meaningful non-tautological computational hardness assumption that implies the security of AES within the classical framework of provable security.

In this work, we continue the line of research that attempts to formally prove the security of block ciphers against *restricted* classes of attacks, with a focus on *substitution permutation networks* (SPNs), an important class of block ciphers that includes AES. The guiding principle of this line of study is to gradually expand the class of attacks we consider to include a large set of known cryptanalytic paradigms. In particular, we build on a recent pair of works by Liu, Pelecanos, Tessaro, and Vaikuntanathan (LPTV) [LTV21, LPTV23] who study the t -wise independence of SPNs, a statistical security property that prevents all t -input statistical attacks including differential and linear cryptanalysis (with $t = 2$) and higher order differential attacks (with larger t).¹

Censored AES. The first of these works [LTV21] showed the 2-wise independence of the AES construction with many (over 9000) rounds. In an attempt to show comparable results with a lower number of rounds, the second work [LPTV23] looked instead at SPNs with uniformly chosen *random* and secret S-boxes, and proved t -wise independence of a construction called AES*, first introduced by Baignères and Vaudenay [BV05], which differs from AES in that it uses such random S-boxes. They also suggest a generic way to instantiate their results with the concrete AES S-box, i.e., the patched inverse permutation $\text{INV} : x \mapsto x^{2^8-2}$ over the binary extension field \mathbb{F}_{2^8} . They observe in particular that a key-alternating cipher obtained by iterating INV, alternated with adding a random sub-key between each two sequential calls of INV, converges pretty quickly to being a *pairwise independent* permutation. We refer to this construction as the “INV KAC.” Replacing the random S-box in their AES* result with the INV-KAC, they obtain in particular the following result, which they cast in terms of a construction they call “censored AES”, which is essentially AES with some of the mixing layers removed.

Theorem 1.1 ([LPTV23], Theorem 7). *192-round censored AES is 2^{-128} -close to pairwise independent.*

It is natural to conjecture that the actual AES cipher is not less secure than its censored counterpart, i.e., additional mixing layers only help, and so one can conjecture that the bound extends to 192-round AES, hence improving the bound of [LTV21] under this conjecture.

Their result however only applies to pairwise independence. This calls the question of whether the INV-KAC can be proved to be t -wise independent, in order to prove similar results for $t > 2$. In [LTV21], the authors sketch a proof for why this cipher needs at least linear in the size of the field many rounds to converge to a 4-wise independent permutation, but we note that this is not necessarily a major limitation in a context where the domain itself has small size, i.e, 256 elements. This argument relies on a similar idea as the interpolation attack by Jakobsen and Knudsen [JK97].

¹We note here two caveats of their results: the first is that they assume the round keys are independent; and secondly, their proof works for many rounds of SPN/AES, although this has been improved in subsequent works.

Our contributions. In this work, we prove almost matching lower and upper bounds on the number of rounds for the INV KAC to reach t -wise independence. We note here that since the cipher composes an AddRoundKey (henceforth ARK) operation with an INV operation, each round of the cipher generates a permutation with a fixed parity (the parity depends on the size of the field). Thus, we can only hope for the cipher to converge to the alternating group (as opposed to the symmetric group) which means that t has to be at most $n - 2$, for n being the size of our field.

Theorem (Lower bound, Theorem 4.2). *An r -round INV KAC over the field of size n requires at least $r \geq \frac{(1-\varepsilon)n}{4} - \frac{1}{2}$ rounds to reach ε -close to a 4-wise independent permutation.*

Theorem (Upper bound, Theorem 3.1). *An r -round INV KAC over the field of size n with*

$$r = O\left(n \log^2 n + n \log n \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right)$$

rounds generates a permutation that is ε -close to a uniformly random even permutation (equivalently a uniformly random permutation from the alternating group A_n).

The proofs of our theorems view each round of the INV KAC as a step in a random walk over the alternating group, starting from the identity permutation. In each step you apply a random one of the n many permutations $\Pi_K(x) = \text{INV}(x + K)$ where the addition is over the underlying field. Thus, a random walk of length r in this graph is equivalent to a composition of r many random permutations $\Pi_{K_1}, \Pi_{K_2}, \dots, \Pi_{K_r}$, where the randomness is over the choice of the round keys K_1, K_2, \dots, K_r . The problem then reduces to bounding the mixing time of this random walk over the alternating group A_n (here, n is the size of the field which, in the case of AES, is 2^8 .)

A prior version of our upper bound theorem first appeared in the appendix of [LPTV24] with the polynomially worse bound $r \lesssim O(n^2 \log n)$, and only for fields of characteristic 2. In this paper, we include an additional argument for fields of odd characteristic, and use the comparison method to bound the log-Sobolev constant of the underlying random walk, which gives a tighter bound on the mixing time for not too small an ε , compared to the spectral gap.

Having the upper bound, one can now extend the random S-box results of [LPTV23] to the concrete AES S-box. In particular, we get the following corollary.

Corollary 1.2. *Assuming $t < 2^{(0.499-1/(4k))b}$, $\Theta(b^2 2^b \cdot \min\{k, \log t\})$ -round censored SPN with k b -bit blocks, the AES S-box, and a maximal-branch-number linear mixing is $2^{-\Theta(kb)}$ -close to t -wise independent.*

A Mathematical Motivation. In 1963, Carlitz [Car53, Car63, Zie13] proved that the group of all permutations of \mathbb{F}_q is generated by the permutations induced by degree-one polynomials and INV. Our result extends Carlitz’s theorem in two ways. First, we show that if we restrict our attention to degree-one polynomials whose linear coefficient is 1, then we still generate at least the group of all even permutations². Second, while Carlitz shows that every permutation can be reached via a composition of degree-one polynomials and INV, it does not tell us anything about how many steps it takes to do so: we provide an almost-tight quantitative bound on the number of steps (operations) needed to reach a random permutation. We remark that the notion of Carlitz rank of a permutation, namely the number of “Carlitz steps” one needs to take to get the permutation, has been studied in the literature; see [AcMT09, Top14, IW18].

In reverse, the study of this mathematical problem brings to bear sophisticated techniques from both finite field theory (cf. [Car53, Car63] and followups) and Markov chain theory to the practical problem of proving block cipher security.

²In some cases this is the best we can do, e.g. over \mathbb{F}_7 , since both the INV and ARK are even permutations. For other fields (including fields of characteristic 2), we can generate the entire symmetric group since we combine both even and odd permutations.

Related work. We believe that the INV KAC is an important cipher design to study for two reasons. First, many substitution-permutation networks (SPNs) like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [DR02] use the INV as their (non-linear) S-box permutation. Thus studying the INV “in isolation” may provide insight into its strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, the INV KAC is a block cipher that we can understand almost exactly. Furthermore, our analysis of the INV KAC, perhaps in conjunction with generalizations of Carlitz’s result to general power maps [Sta98], may be useful in the analysis of other KACs, such as MiMC [AGR⁺16], which uses the cube instead of the inverse.

Our techniques. Our upper bound result follows from two separate lemmas, one for fields of characteristic 2 and one for fields of odd characteristic. In both cases, when dealing with a field of size n , we employ the comparison method of Sinclair, Diaconis and Saloff-Coste [Sin92, DSC93] to establish the lower bound of $\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \gtrsim \frac{1}{n \log n}$ on the log-Sobolev constant of the Markov chain P_n^{INV} (described above) on the alternating group A_n in which every step corresponds to one round of the INV KAC. (For a definition of the log Sobolev constant and its implication for mixing times, the reader is referred to Section 2.2.) A bound on the log-Sobolev constant implies a mixing time bound and thus an upper bound on the number of rounds required for the INV KAC to approximate a uniformly random even permutation.

At a high level, the comparison method requires one to construct a multi-commodity flow between pairs of vertices that are connected in a Markov chain, by using paths over the P_n^{INV} edges (which correspond to composing INV and ARK operations). Furthermore, this flow must have low congestion, that is, we would like the flow passing through every edge in P_n^{INV} to be roughly uniform. The main technical ingredient of this work is constructing these flows and showing that they have low congestion.

For fields of characteristic 2, we first compare this Markov chain to the chain $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$, in which a random step corresponds to transposing a uniformly random element with the element 0, and leaving all other elements intact. The key component in such a comparison is to show how to generate transpositions of the form $(0, i)$ for any non-zero i using ARK and INV. To do this, we extend the proof of Carlitz [Car63]. In turn, the log-Sobolev constant of $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ can be bounded by a standard comparison to the well-studied random transpositions walk $P_n^{2\text{cyc}}$ where each step is a transposition of the form (i, j) that swaps i and j and leaves the rest of the domain intact [DS81, LY98, FOW18, Sal20].

For fields of odd characteristic, we compare the P_n^{INV} Markov chain to the chain $P_n^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}$, in which a random step corresponds to applying a 3-cycle chosen uniformly at random from a specific subset of all 3-cycles (that involve elements from an arithmetic progression). Then, we bound the log-Sobolev constant of $P_n^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}$ by comparing it to the also well-studied Markov chain $P_n^{3\text{cyc}}$ that applies a random 3-cycle at every step [Goe04, STY22]. We do this by showing how one can combine a constant number of these arithmetic-progression 3-cycles to generate an arbitrary 3-cycle over the n elements.

One may wonder whether there exists a common upper bound approach for fields of characteristic both odd and even. We remark that our comparison approach in the characteristic-2 case follows in the footsteps of [Car63] and shows how to perform a transposition. Our exact paths construction turns out to be very different from Carlitz’s, as the ARK operation does not implement any degree-one polynomial (as Carlitz requires) but is restricted to linear *shifts*. Instead, we show that we can implement the following set of transpositions

$$\left\{ (u + v(uv + 1)^{-1}, u + (v + 1)(uv + u + 1)^{-1}) \right\}_{u,v}$$

for most values of $u, v \in \mathbb{F}_n$, using the following 7 rounds (8 random keys) of the INV KAC:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_1 \circ \\ & \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_u . \end{aligned}$$

The resulting multi-commodity flow does not give an optimal lower bound for the log-Sobolev constant since the P_n^{INV} edges corresponding to ARK_1 suffer from higher congestion. To improve the congestion, we

“spread out” the flow through these edges by demonstrating a randomized way to generate $\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_1$ using 6 random keys that depend on the random variable $w \in \mathbb{F}_n$:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{ARK}_{w+1} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{w-1} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_w \circ \text{INV} \circ \\ & \circ \text{ARK}_{w-1} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_w \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{w-1+1}. \end{aligned}$$

One additional tweak to the first and last round keys is required to obtain a low-congestion set of P_n^{INV} paths that transpose the element 0 with an almost uniformly random non-zero element i and complete the comparison with $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$.

Additional challenges come up when we move to fields of odd characteristic. This is because when the size of the field n is a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4, then the INV operation transposes every element except $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ ³. Thus it computes an even permutation, since it consists of $\frac{n-3}{2}$ transpositions. Moreover, the ARK_K operation is also an even permutation, since it is either the identity, or an odd-sized cycle for all values of $K \in \mathbb{F}_n$. We conclude that one cannot construct a transposition, which is an odd permutation, by composing INV and ARK. This is why our construction for the odd characteristic goes through 3-cycles, which are an even permutation. Our starting point is the observation that the following sequence of operations

$$\text{ARK}_{-u-2v-1} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{-2v-1} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_v \circ \text{ARK}_u$$

generates the 3-cycle $(-u, -u - 2v^{-1}, -u - v^{-1})$ for any u , and $v \neq 0$. This is precisely the subset of 3-cycles whose elements are terms of an arithmetic progression, as $(-u - v^{-1}) - (-u) = (-u - 2v^{-1}) - (-u - v^{-1})$. Furthermore, since every ARK operation in the above sequence has an almost uniformly random key, the resulting multi-commodity flow has low congestion and allows us to compare P_n^{INV} with $P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$.

For the lower bound, we formalize an argument of [Nyb93, LTV21], which relies on the following observation: applying a sequence of ARK’s and INV’s to some input results in a rational function that is described by 3 coefficients (which coefficients depend on the secret keys of the cipher), unless one of the intermediate inputs to the INV becomes 0. Since the secret round keys are random, this happens with probability $\frac{1}{n}$ per round. Thus, unless the number of rounds scales linearly with n , 4 inputs will be enough to distinguish the value of these coefficients from random. This gives a lower bound on the number of rounds to reach 4-wise independence, which in turn is also a lower bound for convergence to any $t > 4$.

2 Preliminaries

For the entirety of this paper, our inputs and operations will be over a finite field \mathbb{F}_n , where n is a prime power p^b . For fields of odd characteristic, we use 2 to denote the sum of the multiplicative identity with itself. We denote by INV the inverse over the field that maps x to x^{n-2} . It holds that $\text{INV}(x) \cdot x = 1$ for all non-zero x , and $\text{INV}(0) = 0$. We will also define ARK_K to be the AddRoundKey operation with secret round key K that maps x to $x + K$. Moreover, we use the symbols \gtrsim, \lesssim to compare two asymptotic quantities without specifying the constant factors.

2.1 The INV Key-Alternating Cipher

A Key-Alternating Cipher (KAC) is parameterized by a field size n , number of rounds r , and fixed permutation $P : \mathbb{F}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_n$. A KAC is a family of functions indexed by $r + 1$ sub-keys K_0, K_1, \dots, K_r , and defined recursively as follows:

$$F_P^{(0)}(x) = x + K_0$$

³Here 1 is the multiplicative identity of the field, and 0 the additive identity.

$$F_{P,K_0,\dots,K_i}^{(i)}(x) = P \left(F_{P,K_0,\dots,K_{i-1}}^{(i-1)}(x) \right) + K_i.$$

The family of functions is

$$\mathcal{F}_P = \{F_{P,K_0,\dots,K_r}^{(r)}(x) \mid K_i \in \mathbb{F}_n\}.$$

One can also naturally extend this to have different permutations in each round. In this paper, we consider the INV KAC, for which we use the INV map over \mathbb{F}_n as the fixed permutation P .

2.2 Markov Chain Preliminaries

In this section, we recall some basic definitions of Markov chains, variational forms, and mixing time results. The interested reader may refer to [SC97, WLP09] for more details and proofs.

Let Π be the transition matrix of an ergodic Markov chain over a finite state space Ω , and let π denote its stationary distribution. We further use E to refer to the set of edges of the underlying graph, that is $E = \{(x, y) : \Pi(x, y) > 0\}$. We identify a Markov chain with its transition matrix, so we will often say that Π is both the transition matrix for a Markov chain and also the Markov chain itself.

Definition 2.1 (Reversible Markov chain). *A Markov chain Π is reversible if for all $x, y \in \Omega$,*

$$\pi(x)\Pi(x, y) = \pi(y)\Pi(y, x).$$

Definition 2.2 (Dirichlet form). *Let $f : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ be a function. The Dirichlet form of f with respect to Π is*

$$\mathcal{E}^\Pi(f, f) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x, y \in \Omega} (f(x) - f(y))^2 \pi(x)\Pi(x, y).$$

Definition 2.3 (Entropy). *The entropy of a function $f : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ with respect to Π is*

$$\text{Ent}_\pi[f] = \sum_{x \in \Omega} \pi(x) f(x) \log \frac{f(x)}{\mathbb{E}_\pi[f]},$$

where $\mathbb{E}_\pi[f] = \sum_{x \in \Omega} \pi(x) f(x)$.

Definition 2.4 (Log-Sobolev constant of Markov chain). *The log-Sobolev constant of Π is defined by*

$$\alpha^\Pi = \inf_{\substack{f: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \\ f \text{ non-constant}}} \frac{\mathcal{E}^\Pi(f, f)}{\text{Ent}_\pi[f^2]}.$$

The log-Sobolev constant of a Markov chain captures some of its mixing properties, as quantified by the following theorem.

Theorem 2.5 (Mixing time by log-Sobolev, [DSC96], Theorem 3.7). *Let Π be the transition matrix of a reversible Markov chain whose stationary distribution is π , and π_{\min} be the smallest stationary probability. For $\varepsilon \leq \frac{1}{e}$, the ε -mixing time is bounded by*

$$\tau_\varepsilon(\Pi) \lesssim \frac{1}{\alpha^\Pi} \left(\log \log \frac{1}{\pi_{\min}} + \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right).$$

2.3 The INV KAC cipher as a Markov Chain

To study the t -wise independence of the INV KAC cipher, we will model its execution as a random walk over the alternating group of permutations over \mathbb{F}_n . Even though generating a truly random even permutation may initially seem too strong for t -wise independence, we will see (perhaps surprisingly) that the number of rounds required to reach 4-wise independence and $(n - 2)$ -wise independence are close (up to logarithmic factors). Thus considering convergence to the entire alternating group makes our analysis more convenient.

A first idea is to consider our block cipher to be a random walk over the alternating group A_n , where every step of the walk applies first the ARK_K operation with a random key K from \mathbb{F}_n , and then the INV operation. The main issue of representing the block cipher this way is that the underlying Markov chain is not reversible, and thus it is harder to apply the mixing time result of Theorem 2.5.

We will instead use the following reversible Markov chain to represent our cipher:

Definition 2.6 (INV KAC Markov chain). *The chain P_n^{INV} on the alternating group A_n has the following transition matrix. Given the current even permutation σ_t , one step in this Markov chain corresponds to drawing uniformly and independently two random keys K_1, K_2 from \mathbb{F}_n , and setting*

$$\sigma_{t+1} = \text{ARK}_{K_2} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{K_1} \circ \sigma_t.$$

Note that the degree of the underlying graph has increased from n to n^2 . It is not hard to observe that this transformation has not introduced any parallel edges to our Markov chain.

Lemma 2.7. *The Markov chain P_n^{INV} does not have any parallel edges for $n \geq 5$. That is, if there exists $\sigma \in A_n$ such that*

$$\text{ARK}_i \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_j \circ \sigma = \text{ARK}_k \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_\ell \circ \sigma,$$

then $(i, j) = (k, \ell)$.

Proof. First, observe that if $i = k$, then the statement is true. Indeed, we can apply the permutation $\text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{-i}$ to both sides and obtain

$$\text{ARK}_j \circ \sigma = \text{ARK}_\ell \circ \sigma \implies j = \ell.$$

Similarly, if $j = \ell$, then the statement also holds. Hence we proceed by considering the case when both $i \neq k$, and $j \neq \ell$.

Now consider the $n - 2$ values of x such that $y = \sigma(x) \notin \{-j, -\ell\}$. The value of x is mapped under the two permutations to equal values:

$$i + \frac{1}{y + j} = k + \frac{1}{y + \ell}$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{iy + ij + 1}{y + j} = \frac{ky + k\ell + 1}{y + \ell}$$

Simplifying, we get

$$iy^2 + (ij + 1 + i\ell)y + ij\ell + \ell = ky^2 + (k\ell + 1 + kj)y + jk\ell + j.$$

and so

$$(i - k)y^2 + ((i - k)j + (i - k)\ell)y + (i - k)j\ell + (\ell - j) = 0.$$

For the above equality to be true for more than 2 values of y , it must hold that $i = k$. This concludes the proof for $n \geq 5$. \square

We will bound the mixing time of this Markov chain by comparing it to the following well-studied Markov chains. On one hand, when \mathbb{F}_n is of characteristic 2, we will use the random transposition Markov chain.

Definition 2.8 (Random transposition Markov chain). *The chain $P_n^{2\text{cyc}}$ on the symmetric group S_n has the following transition matrix. Given the current permutation σ_t , one step in this Markov chain corresponds to drawing uniformly a random transposition (i, j) from S_n , and setting*

$$\sigma_{t+1} = (i, j) \circ \sigma_t.$$

Prior work has obtained tight estimates for the log-Sobolev constant of this chain [DS81, LY98, FOW18, Sal20].

Theorem 2.9 ([Sal20], Theorem 5). *The log-Sobolev constant of the random transposition chain satisfies*

$$\frac{2}{(n-1)\log n} \leq \alpha_n^{2\text{cyc}} \leq \frac{\log 2}{2(n-1)\log n}.$$

On the other hand, when \mathbb{F}_n is of odd characteristic, we will use the random 3-cycle Markov chain.

Definition 2.10 (Random 3-cycle Markov chain). *The chain $P_n^{3\text{cyc}}$ on the alternating group A_n has the following transition matrix. Given the current permutation σ_t , one step in this Markov chain corresponds to drawing uniformly a random 3-cycle (i, j, k) from A_n , and setting*

$$\sigma_{t+1} = (i, j, k) \circ \sigma_t.$$

The underlying graph of $P_n^{3\text{cyc}}$ is $2\binom{n}{3}$ -regular and thus $P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}(x, y) = \frac{1}{2\binom{n}{3}}$ for $(x, y) \in E_n^{3\text{cyc}}$. A bound on the log-Sobolev constant of the 3-cycle chain can be obtained using another variational form, the *modified log-Sobolev constant*.

Theorem 2.11 ([Goe04], Corollary 3.2). *The modified log-Sobolev constant of the 3-cycle Markov chain satisfies*

$$\frac{1}{n-2} \leq \beta_n^{3\text{cyc}} \leq \frac{6}{n-1}.$$

We can use the modified log-Sobolev bound to get a log-Sobolev bound using a result of [STY22]:

Theorem 2.12 ([STY22], Theorem 1). *For any reversible Markov chain Π , let α be its log-Sobolev constant, and β be its modified log-Sobolev constant. Moreover, let p be defined as follo*

$$p = \min_{\substack{x, y \in \Omega \\ \Pi(x, y) \neq 0}} \frac{\Pi(x, y)}{\max \left\{ \sum_{y \neq x} \Pi(x, y), \Pi(y, x) \right\}}.$$

Then

$$\alpha \geq \frac{1}{20 \log \frac{1}{p}} \cdot \beta.$$

Corollary 2.13 (Log-Sobolev constant of 3-cycle chain). *The log-Sobolev constant of the 3-cycle Markov chain satisfies*

$$\alpha_n^{3\text{cyc}} \geq \frac{1}{60(n-2)\log n}.$$

Proof. For the 3-cycle Markov chain, it holds that $p = \frac{1}{\binom{n}{3}} \geq \frac{1}{n^3}$. Thus

$$\alpha_n^{3\text{cyc}} \geq \frac{1}{20 \log n^3} \cdot \frac{1}{n-2} = \frac{1}{60(n-2)\log n}.$$

□




Figure 1: Schematic representation of the comparison method. The comparison method of Corollary 2.15 allows one to compare the log-Sobolev constant (or spectral gap) of a “target” Markov chain P^{tar} with the known log-Sobolev (or spectral gap) constant of a “reference” chain P^{ref} , as long as they have the same stationary distribution. The resulting log-Sobolev bound α^{tar} then implies a mixing time bound $\tau_\varepsilon(P^{\text{tar}})$ using Theorem 2.5. On a high-level, the comparison method allows one to transfer mixing time bounds from a well-studied chain P^{ref} to a new Markov chain P^{tar} , as long as we can construct a valid multi-commodity flow with low congestion.

2.4 The comparison method

Below we sketch the “comparison with multicommodity flows” method of Sinclair, Diaconis and Saloff-Coste [Sin92, DSC93].

Let P^{ref} and P^{tar} be two reversible Markov chains on the same ground set, with stationary distributions $\pi^{\text{ref}}, \pi^{\text{tar}}$ and edge sets $E^{\text{ref}}, E^{\text{tar}}$ respectively. We will think of P^{ref} as the “reference” chain for which we have somehow obtained estimates for its log-Sobolev constant. Our goal is to bound the log-Sobolev constant of the “target” chain P^{tar} , by relating it to that of P^{ref} .

Define a path γ_{xy} for $(x, y) \in E^{\text{ref}}$ to be a sequence of steps

$$(x = a_0, a_1, \dots, a_k = y)$$

in the target chain P^{tar} . For this to be a valid path, it must hold that $(a_i, a_{i+1}) \in E^{\text{tar}}$. We say that such a path has length $|\gamma_{xy}| = k$. Let \mathcal{P}_{xy} be the set of all simple paths connecting x to y . Also let $\mathcal{P} = \cup_{(x,y) \in E^{\text{ref}}} \mathcal{P}_{xy}$ be the union of all such paths. For $(a, b) \in E^{\text{tar}}$, let $\mathcal{P}(a, b) = \{\gamma \in \mathcal{P} \mid (a, b) \in \gamma\}$. That is, $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ contains all paths that use the edge (a, b) of the target graph.

A function F on \mathcal{P} is called a $(P^{\text{tar}}, P^{\text{ref}})$ -flow if

$$\sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{P}_{xy}} F(\gamma) = P^{\text{ref}}(x, y) \pi^{\text{ref}}(x).$$

Theorem 2.14 ([DSC93], Theorem 2.3). *Let $P^{\text{tar}}, P^{\text{ref}}$ be reversible Markov chains on a finite set Ω . For any $(P^{\text{tar}}, P^{\text{ref}})$ -flow F , the Dirichlet forms satisfy*

$$\mathcal{E}^{\text{ref}}(f, f) \leq A(F) \cdot \mathcal{E}^{\text{tar}}(f, f)$$

with

$$A(F) = \max_{(a,b) \in E^{\text{tar}}} \left\{ \frac{1}{\pi^{\text{tar}}(a) P^{\text{tar}}(a, b)} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{P}(a,b)} |\gamma| \cdot F(\gamma) \right\}.$$

Moreover, when these two Markov chains have the same stationary distribution, the theorem above directly implies a relation between their log-Sobolev constants.

Corollary 2.15. *Let P^{tar} and P^{ref} be reversible Markov chains on a finite set Ω with the same stationary distribution π . For any $(P^{\text{tar}}, P^{\text{ref}})$ -flow F , their log-Sobolev constants satisfy*

$$\alpha^{\text{ref}} \leq A(F) \cdot \alpha^{\text{tar}}.$$

Proof. Since they have the same stationary distribution, the denominator in the definition of the log-Sobolev chain is equal. Then

$$\alpha^{\text{ref}} = \inf_{\substack{f: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \\ f \text{ non-constant}}} \frac{\mathcal{E}^{\text{ref}}(f, f)}{\text{Ent}_{\pi}[f^2]} \leq \inf_{\substack{f: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \\ f \text{ non-constant}}} \frac{A(F) \cdot \mathcal{E}^{\text{tar}}(f, f)}{\text{Ent}_{\pi}[f^2]} = A(F) \cdot \alpha^{\text{tar}}.$$

□

Representing edges and paths. To employ the comparison method, we will need a way to specify paths in the P_n^{INV} Markov chain. Since each edge of P_n^{INV} is determined by two keys r_1, r_2 , we will use the notation $[[r_1, r_2]]$ to denote the edge $\text{ARK}_{r_2} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{r_1}$. The starting vertex will be specified separately.

Whenever we need to describe a longer path of P_n^{INV} , we will write it as a tuple of double square brackets, by specifying the first edge first and so on, e.g. $([[r_1, r_2]], [[q_1, q_2]])$ ⁴. Since ARK operations form a subgroup, this path is also equal to

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{ARK}_{q_2} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{q_1}) \circ (\text{ARK}_{r_2} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{r_1}) \\ &= \text{ARK}_{q_2} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{q_1+r_2} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{r_1}. \end{aligned}$$

We will also use the notation $[[r_1, r_2 + q_1, q_2]]$ to describe the above path in P_n^{INV} . In general, we will extend the double square bracket notation to mean:

$$[[r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k]] = \text{ARK}_{r_k} \circ \text{INV} \circ \dots \circ \text{ARK}_{r_2} \circ \text{INV} \circ \text{ARK}_{r_1}.$$

3 Upper Bound

In this section, we formally prove our claim that a random S -box over \mathbb{F}_n can be approximated via the sequential composition of alternating AddRoundKey and INV S -box operations. Our proof is different for fields of characteristic 2 and fields of odd characteristic.

The following subsections show that $\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \geq \frac{1}{n \log n}$ for all fields \mathbb{F}_n with $n \geq 5$. This log-Sobolev constant bound implies a mixing time bound from Theorem 2.5, and thus the following theorem.

Theorem 3.1. *Let $n \geq 5$. The INV KAC over the field of size n with $r \leq O(n \log^2 n + n \log n \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon})$ rounds generates a permutation that is ε -close to a uniformly random even permutation (equivalently a uniformly random permutation from the alternating group A_n).*

Proof. Theorem 2.5 implies:

$$\tau_{\varepsilon}(P_n^{\text{INV}}) \leq O\left(n \log n \left(\log \log n! + \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right)\right) = O\left(n \log^2 n + n \log n \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right).$$

Thus after this many rounds, the distribution of permutations computed by the INV KAC is ε -close to a uniformly random permutation from A_n . □

⁴If we are writing the edges as permutations, we write the permutations corresponding to the edges from right-to-left.

3.1 Fields of odd characteristic

The main result of this section is a bound on the log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} when $n = p^b$ is a power of an odd prime p .

Lemma 3.2. *Let $n = p^b$, where p is an odd prime. The log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} satisfies*

$$\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \geq \Omega\left(\frac{1}{n \log n}\right).$$

We employ the comparison method in two steps. We introduce an intermediate chain $P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$, which is a slight variant of the 3-cycle chain, and compare the log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} with it. Then we bound $\alpha_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$ by comparing it to the 3-cycle chain $P_n^{3\text{cyc}}$. On a high level the proof looks as follows:

$$\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \underset{\text{Lemma 3.5}}{\gtrsim} \alpha_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}} \underset{\text{Lemma 3.4}}{\gtrsim} \alpha_n^{3\text{cyc}} \underset{\text{Lemma 2.13}}{\gtrsim} \frac{1}{n \log n}.$$

Definition 3.3 (Arithmetic progression 3-cycle Markov chain). *The chain $P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$ on the alternating group A_n has the following transition matrix. Given the current permutation σ_t , one step in this Markov chain corresponds to drawing a uniformly random 3-cycle (i, j, k) from A_n , conditioned on the fact that i, k, j form an arithmetic progression, that is, $k - i = j - k$. Then set*

$$\sigma_{t+1} = (i, j, k) \circ \sigma_t.$$

Our paths construction shows that the underlying graph is connected, and thus the stationary distribution of this Markov chain is uniform over A_n , i.e. $\pi_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}(x) = \frac{1}{|A_n|} = \frac{2}{n!}$. Moreover, the underlying graph is $n(n-1)$ -regular. This is because there are n options for the first term of the arithmetic progression u , and $n-1$ options for the difference $-\frac{1}{v}$. Thus if $(x, y) \in E_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$, then $P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}(x, y) = \frac{1}{n(n-1)}$.

Lemma 3.4. *The log-Sobolev constant of $P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$ satisfies*

$$\alpha_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}} \geq \frac{\alpha_n^{3\text{cyc}}}{81}.$$

Proof. To apply the Comparison Theorem (Theorem 2.14), we will define a set of paths \mathcal{P}_{xy} for each edge $(x, y) \in E^{3\text{cyc}}$ and assign flow $F(\cdot)$ to each path.

Our construction of paths in this case is quite simple. We will assign exactly one path to each such edge (x, y) . In particular, let $y = (i, k, j) \circ x$ for some triple of pairwise distinct elements i, j, k . Then $\mathcal{P}_{xy} = \{\gamma_{xy}\}$, and this path is chosen according to the following two cases:

1. The elements i, j, k form an arithmetic progression. This means that either $k - i = j - k$, or $i - j = k - i$, or $j - k = i - j$. Then (i, k, j) is also in $E_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$ and we set

$$\gamma_{xy} = (x, (i, k, j) \circ x = y).$$

2. The elements i, j, k do not form an arithmetic progression. Let $u = \frac{i+j}{2}, v = \frac{j+k}{2}, w = \frac{k+i}{2}$. Then $E_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$ contains the distinct 3-cycles

$$C_1 = (i, j, u), \quad C_2 = (j, k, v), \quad C_3 = (k, i, w).$$

We assign to (x, y) the length-9 path

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_{xy} = (x, & \underbrace{C_1 \circ x}_{a_1}, \underbrace{C_3 \circ a_1}_{a_2}, \underbrace{C_3 \circ a_2}_{a_3}, \underbrace{C_2 \circ a_3}_{a_4}, \\ & \underbrace{C_2 \circ a_4}_{a_5}, \underbrace{C_3 \circ a_5}_{a_6}, \underbrace{C_1 \circ a_6}_{a_7}, \underbrace{C_2 \circ a_7}_{a_8}, C_2 \circ a_8 = y). \end{aligned}$$

The proof that this path connects x to y is deferred to Lemma A.1.

Since each edge $(x, y) \in E_n^{3\text{cyc}}$ has exactly one path to it, all of the flow must go through this path:

$$F(\gamma_{xy}) = P_n^{3\text{cyc}}(x, y) \cdot \pi_n^{3\text{cyc}}(x, y) = \frac{1}{2 \binom{n}{3}} \cdot \frac{2}{n!} = \frac{6}{n(n-1)(n-2) \cdot n!}.$$

The comparison constant we get is

$$\begin{aligned} A(F) &= \max_{(a,b) \in E^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}} \left\{ \frac{1}{\pi^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}(a) \cdot P^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}(a,b)} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{P}(a,b)} |\gamma| \cdot F(\gamma) \right\} \\ &\leq \max_{(a,b) \in E^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}} \left\{ \frac{n!}{2} \cdot \binom{n}{2} \cdot 9 \cdot |\mathcal{P}(a,b)| \cdot \frac{6}{n(n-1)(n-2) \cdot n!} \right\} \\ &\leq \frac{n(n-1) \cdot n!}{4} \cdot 54(n-2) \cdot \frac{6}{n(n-1)(n-2) \cdot n!} \\ &= 81. \end{aligned}$$

We used the fact that the number of paths γ in $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ is at most $6(n-2)$. This is because $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ contains paths of length 1 and 9. The set $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ contains at most 1 path of length 1 for any $(a, b) \in E^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}$.

Moreover, length-9 paths γ in $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ must be using the edge (a, b) as their cycle C_1, C_2 , or C_3 . Without loss of generality, assume (a, b) is used as cycle C_1 in γ_{xy} , and we will multiply the number of paths by 3 to capture the other two cases. Then the edge (a, b) specifies the set of elements $\{i, j, u\}$. There are two ways to choose i, j from this set, and for each such setting of i, j there are $n-3$ remaining elements that could be k . Thus the total number of length-9 paths is at most $3 \cdot 2 \cdot (n-3) = 6(n-3)$.

The total number of paths is at most $1 + 6(n-3) \leq 6(n-2)$. \square

Lemma 3.5. *Let $n = p^b$, where p is an odd prime. The log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} satisfies*

$$\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \geq \frac{\alpha_n^{3\text{cyc},\text{ap}}}{24}.$$

The proof uses the following way to generate the arithmetic progression 3-cycle $(-u, -u - \frac{2}{v}, -u - \frac{1}{v})$ by combining INV and ARK operations.

Lemma 3.6. *Let $n = p^b$, where p is an odd prime. For any $u, v \in \mathbb{F}_n$, $v \neq 0$, the following sequence $\psi_{\text{odd}}(u, v)$ of ARK and INV operations*

$$\psi_{\text{odd}}(u, v) = \left[\left[u, v, -\frac{2}{v}, v, -u - \frac{2}{v} \right] \right]$$

maps x to

$$\begin{cases} -u - \frac{2}{v}, & x = -u \\ -u, & x = -u - \frac{1}{v} \\ -u - \frac{1}{v}, & x = -u - \frac{2}{v} \\ x, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Proof. We consider first the application of $\psi_{\text{even}}(u, v)$ on some x that is not equal to any of $\{-u, -u - \frac{1}{v}, -u - \frac{2}{v}\}$.

$$\begin{aligned}
& x \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} x + u \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{x + u} + v = \frac{xv + uv + 1}{x + u} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} \frac{x + u}{xv + uv + 1} - \frac{2}{v} = -\frac{xv + uv + 2}{v(xv + uv + 1)} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} -\frac{v(xv + uv + 1)}{xv + uv + 2} + v = \frac{v}{xv + uv + 2} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-u-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} -\frac{xv + uv + 2}{v} - u - \frac{2}{v} = x.
\end{aligned}$$

Now consider what happens when $x = -u$:

$$\begin{aligned}
& -u \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} v \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} -\frac{1}{v} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-u-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} -u - \frac{2}{v}.
\end{aligned}$$

Now consider what happens when $x = -u - \frac{1}{v}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
& -u - \frac{1}{v} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} -\frac{1}{v} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} -\frac{2}{v} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} \frac{v}{2} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-u-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} -u.
\end{aligned}$$

Now consider what happens when $x = -u - \frac{2}{v}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
& -u - \frac{2}{v} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} -\frac{2}{v} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} \frac{v}{2} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} 0 \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} v \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{-u-2/v} \circ \text{INV}} -u - \frac{1}{v}.
\end{aligned}$$

□

Using the above Lemma, we can construct paths that connect adjacent vertices of $P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$ using edges of P_n^{INV} .

Corollary 3.7 (Corollary of Lemma 3.6). *Let $n = p^b$, where p is an odd prime. For any $u, v \in \mathbb{F}_n$ such that $v \neq 0$, and any $r_1, r_2, r_3 \in \mathbb{F}_n$ we can generate the 3-cycle $(-u, -u - \frac{2}{v}, -u - \frac{1}{v})$ using the following length-4 path $\phi_{\text{odd}}(u, v, r_1, r_2, r_3)$ in P_n^{INV} :*

$$\begin{aligned}
& \phi_{\text{odd}}(u, v, r_1, r_2, r_3) = \\
& \left([[u, r_1]], [[v - r_1, r_2]], \left[\left[-\frac{2}{v} - r_2, r_3 \right] \right], \left[\left[v - r_3, -u - \frac{2}{v} \right] \right] \right).
\end{aligned}$$

Proof of Lemma 3.5. Towards applying the Comparison Theorem (Theorem 2.14), we will assign to the edge $(x, y) \in E^{3\text{cyc,ap}}$ the set of ϕ_{odd} paths defined in Corollary 3.7. Formally, let $y = (-u, -u - \frac{2}{v}, -u - \frac{1}{v}) \circ x$, then:

$$\mathcal{P}_{xy} = \{\phi_{\text{odd}}(u, v, r_1, r_2, r_3) : r_1, r_2, r_3 \in \mathbb{F}_n\}.$$

It holds that $|\mathcal{P}_{xy}| = n^3$. We will assign the same amount of flow through all paths in $\mathcal{P}(x, y)$. This means that

$$F(\gamma_{xy}) = \frac{P_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}(x, y) \cdot \pi_n^{3\text{cyc,ap}}(x, y)}{n^3} = \frac{1}{n^3} \cdot \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \cdot \frac{2}{n!} = \frac{2}{n^4(n-1) \cdot n!}.$$

The comparison constant we get is

$$\begin{aligned} A(F) &= \max_{(a,b) \in E^{\text{INV}}} \left\{ \frac{1}{\pi^{\text{INV}}(a) \cdot P^{\text{INV}}(a, b)} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{P}(a,b)} |\gamma| \cdot F(\gamma) \right\} \\ &= \max_{(a,b) \in E^{\text{INV}}} \left\{ \frac{n^2 \cdot n!}{2} \cdot \frac{4 \cdot 2}{n^4(n-1) \cdot n!} \cdot |\mathcal{P}(a, b)| \right\} \\ &\leq \frac{n^2 \cdot n!}{2} \cdot \frac{4 \cdot 2}{n^4(n-1) \cdot n!} \cdot 4n^3 \\ &= \frac{16n}{n-1} \leq 24. \end{aligned}$$

We used the fact that $|\mathcal{P}(a, b)| \leq 4n^3$. Lemma 2.7 implies that P_n^{INV} has no parallel edges, and thus the edge (a, b) fully specifies a unique permutation of the form $[[r_1, r_2]]$.

Now consider a path $\gamma = \phi_{\text{odd}}(u', v', r'_1, r'_2, r'_3)$ that uses edge (a, b) . This edge can be one of 4 edges of γ ; let's say that it is the i^{th} edge, for $i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Every value of i implies two equations that the set of variables $\{u', v', r'_1, r'_2, r'_3\}$ must satisfy. This restricts 2 of the 5 degrees of freedom; thus, we can have at most n^3 such paths, since all paths are linearly dependent on the variables $(u', v', r'_1, r'_2, r'_3)$, or their inverses.

The last inequality holds because $n \geq 3$. □

3.2 Fields of characteristic 2

The main result of this section is a bound on the log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} when n is a power of 2.

Lemma 3.8. *Let $n = 2^b$. The log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} satisfies*

$$\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \geq \Omega\left(\frac{1}{n \log n}\right).$$

Similar to the odd characteristic case, our comparison method proceeds in two steps. We introduce an intermediate chain $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$, which is a slight variant of the random transposition chain, and compare the log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} with it. Then we bound $\alpha_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ by comparing it to the random transposition chain $P_n^{2\text{cyc}}$. On a high level the proof looks as follows:

$$\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \underset{\text{Lemma 3.11}}{\gtrsim} \alpha_n^{2\text{cyc},0} \underset{\text{Lemma 3.10}}{\gtrsim} \alpha_n^{2\text{cyc}} \underset{\text{Theorem 2.9}}{\gtrsim} \frac{1}{n \log n}.$$

Definition 3.9 (Transposition with fixed element Markov chain). *The chain $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ on the alternating group A_n has the following transition matrix. Given the current permutation σ_t , one step in this Markov chain corresponds to drawing a uniformly random non-zero element i from $[n]$. Then set*

$$\sigma_{t+1} = (0, i) \circ \sigma_t.$$

Lemma 3.10. *The log-Sobolev constant of $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ satisfies*

$$\alpha_n^{2\text{cyc},0} \geq \frac{\alpha_n^{2\text{cyc}}}{18}.$$

Proof. We will assign exactly one path to every edge $(x, y) \in E_n^{2\text{cyc}}$. Let $y = (i, j) \circ x$ for some $i \neq j$. Then we will set $\mathcal{P}_{xy} = \{\gamma_{xy}\}$, where γ_{xy} is chosen according to the following two cases:

1. One of i, j is equal to zero. Then (i, j) is also in $E_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ and we set

$$\gamma_{xy} = (x, (i, j) \circ x = y).$$

2. Both i, j are non-zero. Then we set

$$\gamma_{xy} = (x, \underbrace{(0, i) \circ x}_{a_1}, \underbrace{(0, j) \circ a_1}_{a_2}, (0, i) \circ a_2 = y).$$

We will assign to each path the same flow $F(\gamma_{xy}) = P_n^{2\text{cyc}}(x, y) \cdot \pi_n^{2\text{cyc}}(x) = \frac{2}{n! \binom{n}{2}} = \frac{4}{n(n-1) \cdot n!}$.

The comparison constant we get is

$$\begin{aligned} A(F) &= \max_{(a,b) \in E^{2\text{cyc},0}} \left\{ \frac{1}{\pi^{2\text{cyc},0}(a) \cdot P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}(a,b)} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{P}(a,b)} |\gamma| \cdot F(\gamma) \right\} \\ &= \max_{(a,b) \in E^{2\text{cyc},0}} \left\{ \frac{n!(n-1)}{2} \cdot 3 \cdot |\mathcal{P}(a,b)| \cdot \frac{4}{n(n-1) \cdot n!} \right\} \\ &\leq \frac{n!(n-1)}{2} \cdot 9(n-1) \cdot \frac{4}{n(n-1) \cdot n!} \\ &\leq 18. \end{aligned}$$

We used the fact that the number of paths γ in $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ is at most $3(n-1)$. This is because $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ contains paths of length 1 and 3. The set $\mathcal{P}(a, b)$ contains at most 1 path of length 1.

We bound the number of length-3 paths in $|\mathcal{P}(a, b)|$ by $3(n-2)$ in the following way. The edge (a, b) specifies a unique ℓ such that $b = (0, \ell) \circ a$. Consider a length-3 path γ_{xy} that uses edge (a, b) , where $y = (i, j) \circ x$. This edge can be one of 3 edges of γ_{xy} , and the position of (a, b) in the path specifies one of i, j to be equal to ℓ . Thus the remaining variable has $n-2$ possible values (except 0 and ℓ). The total number of paths is at most $1 + 3(n-2) \leq 3(n-1)$. \square

Lemma 3.11. *Let $n = 2^b \geq 8$. The log-Sobolev constant of P_n^{INV} satisfies*

$$\alpha_n^{\text{INV}} \geq \frac{\alpha_n^{2\text{cyc},0}}{830}.$$

The proof uses the following way to generate the transposition $(0, \frac{v}{uv+1} + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1})$ by combining INV and ARK operations.

Lemma 3.12. *For any $u, v, w \in \mathbb{F}_n$ such that $uv \neq 1$, $u(v+1) \neq 1$, and $v \notin \{0, 1\}$, we can generate the transposition $(0, \frac{v}{uv+1} + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1})$ using the following sequence $\psi_{\text{even}}(u, v, w)$ of ARK and INV operations*

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_{\text{even}}(u, v, w) &= \left[\left[\frac{v}{uv+1}, u, v, \text{INV}(w) + 1, w, \right. \right. \\ &\quad \left. \left. \text{INV}(w), w, \text{INV}(w), w+1, v+1, u, \frac{v}{uv+1} \right] \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Our proof of Lemma 3.12 will follow from Lemmas 3.13 and 3.14.

Lemma 3.13. *For any $u, v \in \mathbb{F}_n$ such that $uv \neq 1$, $u(v+1) \neq 1$, and $v \notin \{0, 1\}$, we can generate the transposition $\left(u + \frac{v}{uv+1}, u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1}\right)$ using the following sequence $\gamma(u, v)$ of AddRoundKey and INV S-box operations*

$$\gamma(u, v) = [[u, u, v, 1, 1, v+1, u, u]].$$

Proof. We will consider the following cases.

Case 1. $u = 0$: We will show that the sequence $\gamma(0, v) = [[0, 0, v, 1, 1, v+1, 0, 0]]$ generates the transposition $(v, v+1)$.

We consider first the application of π on some x that is not equal to v or $v+1$.

$$\begin{aligned} x &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0} x \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(x) \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} x+v \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{x+v} + 1 = \frac{x+v+1}{x+v} \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{x+v}{x+v+1} + 1 = \frac{1}{x+v+1} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} x \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(x) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} x. \end{aligned}$$

Now consider what happens when $x = v$:

$$\begin{aligned} v &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0} v \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(v) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} 0 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} v+1 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(v+1) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} v+1. \end{aligned}$$

And when $x = v+1$:

$$\begin{aligned} v+1 &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0} v+1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(v+1) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 0 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} v \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(v) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} v. \end{aligned}$$

Case 2. We will now prove the result for all valid parameters $u \neq 0, v$ and inputs x that do not cause any input to $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ to vanish. Thus, for these calculations, we will use the fact that $y \cdot \text{INV}(y) = 1$ for all non-zero y . Also for brevity, we will use $\text{INV}(y)$ and $\frac{1}{y}$ interchangeably.

$$\begin{aligned}
& x \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} x + u \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{x + u} + u = \frac{ux + u^2 + 1}{x + u} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} \frac{x + u}{ux + u^2 + 1} + v = \frac{(uv + 1)x + u^2v + v + u}{ux + u^2 + 1} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{ux + u^2 + 1}{(uv + 1)x + u^2v + v + u} + 1 \\
& \quad = \frac{(uv + u + 1)x + u^2v + v + u + u^2 + 1}{(uv + 1)x + u^2v + v + u} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{(uv + 1)x + u^2v + v + u}{(uv + u + 1)x + u^2v + v + u + u^2 + 1} + 1 \\
& \quad = \frac{ux + u^2 + 1}{(uv + u + 1)x + u^2v + v + u + u^2 + 1} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} \frac{(uv + u + 1)x + u^2v + v + u + u^2 + 1}{ux + u^2 + 1} + v + 1 = \frac{x + u}{ux + u^2 + 1} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{ux + u^2 + 1}{x + u} + u = \frac{1}{x + u} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} x + u + u = x
\end{aligned}$$

So we have seen that for u, v, x such that no input to $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ is zero, $\gamma(u, v)$ acts like the identity and maps x to itself. To complete our proof, we now consider what happens if some input to $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ equals 0. This happens when one of the following equalities hold:

- (a) $x + u = 0 \implies x = u$.
- (b) $ux + u^2 + 1 = 0 \implies ux = u^2 + 1 \implies x = u + \frac{1}{u}$, since the equality doesn't hold if $u = 0$.
- (c) $(uv + 1)x + u^2v + v + u = 0 \implies x = u + \frac{v}{uv+1}$, since we have imposed that $uv \neq 1$.
- (d) $(uv + u + 1)x + u^2v + v + u + u^2 + 1 = 0 \implies x = u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1}$, since we have imposed that $u(v+1) \neq 1$.

Note that the third and fourth cases are the claimed non-fixed points of $\gamma(u, v)$. Looking forward, we will verify that $\gamma(u, v)$ transposes these two inputs.

Case 2(a). $x = u \neq 0$: The permutation $\gamma(u, v)$ maps u to itself as we show below:

$$\begin{aligned}
u & \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} u + u = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} 0 + u = u \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{u} + v = \frac{uv + 1}{u} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{u}{uv + 1} + 1 = \frac{uv + u + 1}{uv + 1} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{u}{uv + u + 1} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} \frac{uv + u + 1}{u} + v + 1 = \frac{1}{u} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} u + u = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} 0 + u = u.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that in all the above computations, we have only evaluated $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ at the values $u, uv + 1$, and $uv + u + 1$, which are non-zero.

Case 2(b). $x = u + \frac{1}{u}$: The permutation $\gamma(u, v)$ maps $u + \frac{1}{u}$ to itself as we show below:

$$\begin{aligned} u + \frac{1}{u} &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} u + \frac{1}{u} + u = \frac{1}{u} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} u + u = 0 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} 0 + v = v \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{v} + 1 = \frac{v+1}{v} \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \frac{v}{v+1} + 1 = \frac{1}{v+1} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} 0 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} u \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{u} + u. \end{aligned}$$

Note that in all the above computations, we have only evaluated $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ at the values u, v , and $v + 1$, which are non-zero.

Case 2(c). $x = u + \frac{v}{uv+1}$: The permutation $\gamma(u, v)$ maps $u + \frac{v}{uv+1}$ to $u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1}$ as we show below:

$$\begin{aligned} u + \frac{v}{uv+1} &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} u + \frac{v}{uv+1} + u = \frac{v}{uv+1} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{uv+1}{v} + u = \frac{1}{v} \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} v + v = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 0 + 1 = 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 1 + 1 = 0 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} 0 + v + 1 = v + 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{v+1} + u = \frac{uv+u+1}{v+1} \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1} + u. \end{aligned}$$

Note that in all the above computations, we have only evaluated $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ at the values $uv+1, uv+u+1, v$, and $v + 1$, which are non-zero.

Case 2(d). $x = u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1}$: The permutation $\gamma(u, v)$ maps $u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1}$ to $u + \frac{v}{uv+1}$ as we show below:

$$\begin{aligned} u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1} &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u} u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1} + u = \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1} \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{uv+u+1}{v+1} + u = \frac{1}{v+1} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_v \circ \text{INV}} v + 1 + v = 1 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 1 + 1 = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} 0 + 1 = 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{v+1} \circ \text{INV}} 1 + v + 1 = v \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{v} + u = \frac{uv+1}{v} \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_u \circ \text{INV}} \frac{v}{uv+1} + u. \end{aligned}$$

Note that in all the above computations, we have only evaluated $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ at the values $uv + 1, uv + u + 1, v$, and $v + 1$, which are non-zero. \square

Note that Lemma 3.13 is already enough to give us a bound on the number of operations required to simulate a random S -box. We use Lemma 3.14 to construct a flow with lower congestion, and thus a better comparison constant.

Lemma 3.14. *The following two sequences of ARK and INV operations implement the same permutations*

$$[[1, 1]] = [[\text{INV}(w) + 1, w, \text{INV}(w), w, \text{INV}(w), w + 1]]$$

Proof. Denote by $\sigma_{LHS}, \sigma_{RHS}$ as the permutations of the LHS and RHS respectively. Then σ_{LHS} maps $x \rightarrow \text{INV}(x + 1) + 1$. We will show that this is the case of σ_{RHS} . For simplicity, we will first compute the image of x under σ_{RHS} , assuming that no input to $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ is equal to zero. Thus, we will use the fact that $y \cdot \text{INV}(y) = 1$ for all non-zero y . Also for brevity, we will use $\text{INV}(y)$ and $\frac{1}{y}$ interchangeably.

$$\begin{aligned}
& x \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w)+1}} x + \frac{1}{w} + 1 = \frac{xw + w + 1}{w} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_w \circ \text{INV}} \frac{w}{xw + w + 1} + w = \frac{xw^2 + w^2}{xw + w + 1} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w)} \circ \text{INV}} \frac{xw + w + 1}{xw^2 + w^2} + \frac{1}{w} = \frac{1}{xw^2 + w^2} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_w \circ \text{INV}} xw^2 + w^2 + w \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w)} \circ \text{INV}} \frac{1}{xw^2 + w^2 + w} + \frac{1}{w} = \frac{xw + w}{xw^2 + w^2 + w} = \frac{x + 1}{xw + w + 1} \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{w+1} \circ \text{INV}} \frac{xw + w + 1}{x + 1} + w + 1 = \frac{xw + w + 1 + (xw + x) + (w + 1)}{x + 1} \\
& = \frac{x}{x + 1} = \text{INV}(x + 1) + 1
\end{aligned}$$

To complete our proof, we now consider what happens if some input to $\text{INV}(\cdot)$ equals 0. Thus, we will consider the following cases separately:

1. $w = 0$,
2. $xw + w + 1 = 0 \implies x = \frac{w+1}{w}$
3. $xw^2 + w^2 = 0 \implies x = 1$
4. $x + 1 = 0 \implies x = 1$.

Case 1. $w = 0$: σ_{RHS} becomes the permutation denoted by $[[1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]]$. This permutation maps

$$\begin{aligned}
x & \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1} x + 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(x + 1) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} x + 1 \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(x + 1) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_0 \circ \text{INV}} x + 1 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_1 \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(x + 1) + 1.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that in the above expression, we only used the fact that $\text{INV}(\text{INV}(y)) = y$, which holds for all y . Hence the above mapping holds for all x .

Case 2. $x = \frac{w+1}{w}$: For simplicity we will assume that $w \neq 0$, as this case was already covered above. This allows us to replace $\text{INV}(w) + 1$ with $\frac{1}{w} + 1 = \frac{w+1}{w}$. The permutation σ_{RHS} maps $\frac{w+1}{w}$ to

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{w+1}{w} & \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w)+1}} \frac{w+1}{w} + \frac{w+1}{w} = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_w \circ \text{INV}} 0 + w = w \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w)} \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(w) + \text{INV}(w) = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_w \circ \text{INV}} 0 + w = w \\
& \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w)} \circ \text{INV}} \text{INV}(w) + \text{INV}(w) = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{w+1} \circ \text{INV}} 0 + w + 1 = w + 1.
\end{aligned}$$

Note that

$$\text{INV}(x + 1) + 1 = \text{INV}\left(\frac{w+1}{w} + 1\right) + 1 = \text{INV}\left(\frac{1}{w}\right) + 1 = w + 1.$$

Thus σ_{RHS} maps this value of x to the same image as the $[[1, 1]]$ permutation.

Case 3. $x = 1$: For simplicity we will assume that $w \neq 0$, as this case was already covered above. This allows us to replace $\text{INV}(w) + 1$ with $\frac{1}{w} + 1 = \frac{w+1}{w}$. The permutation σ_{RHS} maps 1 to

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w)+1}} 1 + \text{INV}(w) + 1 = \text{INV}(w) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{w \circ \text{INV}}} w + w = 0 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w) \circ \text{INV}}} 0 + \text{INV}(w) = \text{INV}(w) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{w \circ \text{INV}}} w + w = 0 \\ &\xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{\text{INV}(w) \circ \text{INV}}} 0 + \text{INV}(w) = \text{INV}(w) \xrightarrow{\text{ARK}_{w+1 \circ \text{INV}}} w + w + 1 = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Again, $\text{INV}(1 + 1) + 1 = 1$, thus σ_{RHS} maps $x = 1$ to the same image as the $[[1, 1]]$ permutation. \square

Proof of Lemma 3.12. From Lemmas 3.13 and 3.14 we know that the sequence

$$\begin{aligned} \psi'_{\text{even}}(u, v, w) = & [[u, u, v, \text{INV}(w) + 1, w, \text{INV}(w), \\ & w, \text{INV}(w), w + 1, v + 1, u, u]]. \end{aligned}$$

generates the transposition $(u + \frac{v}{uv+1}, u + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1})$. This sequence is obtained by substituting the statement of Lemma 3.14 into the middle part of $\gamma(u, v)$ from Lemma 3.13.

Now we modify ψ'_{even} to obtain transpositions with the fixed element 0, i.e. $(0, i)$ for non-zero $i \in \mathbb{F}_n$. We do this by “relabeling” the left endpoint of the resulting transposition to be a 0. It suffices to conjugate ψ'_{even} with a permutation that maps $u + \frac{v}{uv+1}$ to 0, e.g. $\text{ARK}_{u + \frac{v}{uv+1}}$.

Composing two ARK operations gives another ARK operation with a key equal to the sum of the two original round keys. Thus

$$\psi_{\text{even}}(u, v, w) = \text{ARK}_{u + \frac{v}{uv+1}} \circ \psi'_{\text{even}}(u, v, w) \circ \text{ARK}_{u + \frac{v}{uv+1}}.$$

\square

Using Lemma 3.12, we can construct paths that connect adjacent vertices of $P_n^{2\text{cyc}, 0}$ using edges of P_n^{INV} .

Corollary 3.15 (Corollary of Lemma 3.12). *Let $n = 2^b$. For any $u, v, w \in \mathbb{F}_n$ such that $uv \neq 1$, $u(v+1) \neq 1$, and $v \notin \{0, 1\}$, and any $r_1, \dots, r_{10} \in \mathbb{F}_n$ we can generate the transposition $(0, \frac{v}{uv+1} + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1})$ using the following path $\phi_{\text{even}}(u, v, w, r_1, \dots, r_{10})$ of 11 edges of P_n^{INV} :*

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_{\text{even}}(u, v, w, r_1, \dots, r_{10}) = & \left(\left[\left[\frac{v}{uv+1}, r_1 \right] \right], \left[[u + r_1, r_2] \right], \right. \\ & \left[[v + r_2, r_3] \right], \left[[\text{INV}(w) + 1 + r_3, r_4] \right], \left[[w + r_4, r_5] \right], \\ & \left[[\text{INV}(w) + r_5, r_6] \right], \left[[w + r_6, r_7] \right], \left[[\text{INV}(w) + r_7, r_8] \right], \\ & \left. \left[[w + 1 + r_8, r_9] \right], \left[[v + 1 + r_9, r_{10}] \right], \left[\left[u + r_{10}, \frac{v}{uv+1} \right] \right] \right). \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Lemma 3.11. Towards applying the Comparison Theorem (Theorem 2.14), we will only assign a non-zero amount of flow to the ϕ_{even} paths defined in Corollary 3.15. Formally, let $y = (0, \frac{v}{uv+1} + \frac{v+1}{uv+u+1}) \circ x$, then:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{xy} = & \{ \phi_{\text{even}}(u, v, w, r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{10}) \\ & : u, v, w, r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{10} \in \mathbb{F}_n, uv \neq 1, u(v+1) \neq 1, v \notin \{0, 1\} \}. \end{aligned}$$

We further denote by \mathcal{P}_x be the set of ϕ_{even} paths that start from x . It holds that $|\mathcal{P}_x| = n^{11}(n-2)^2 = \Theta(n^{13})$.

Lemma A.2 implies that if we push the same amount of flow through all paths in \mathcal{P}_x , we will get an almost uniform flow routed through all edges $(x, y) \in E_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$. Formally, for $n \geq 8$ it holds that for any $(x, y), (x, y') \in E_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$: $\frac{1}{3} \leq \frac{|\mathcal{P}_{xy}|}{|\mathcal{P}_{xy'}|} \leq 3$. In other words, the maximum total flow along any $(x, y) \in E_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ is at most 3 times the total flow along any other edge.

Since the stationary distribution for $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ is uniform over the alternating group and $P_n^{2\text{cyc},0}(x, y) = \frac{1}{n-1}$ for all $(x, y) \in E_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$, it should hold that that total amount of flow through the simple paths that connect the vertices x and y is

$$\sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{P}_{xy}} F(\gamma) = \frac{2}{n!(n-1)} =: F.$$

Since the number of edges incident to x in $E_n^{2\text{cyc},0}$ is $(n-1)$, pushing one unit of flow through each of the $n^{11}(n-2)^2$ paths will result in each edge (x, y) getting $c_{xy} \cdot \frac{n^{11}(n-2)^2}{n-1} = \Theta(n^{12})$ (where $1/3 \leq c_{xy} \leq 3$) units of flow. Since our goal is to push F units through each edge, the flow through each path will be

$$F(\gamma) = \frac{F}{c_{xy} \cdot \frac{n^{11}(n-2)^2}{n-1}} = d_{xy} \cdot \frac{F}{n^{12}} = \Theta\left(\frac{F}{n^{12}}\right),$$

where $d_{xy} = \frac{n(n-1)}{(n-2)^2 c_{xy}} \in [1/3, 6]$ for $n \geq 8$.

We are now ready to compute the comparison constant for this flow.

$$\begin{aligned} A(F) &= \max_{(a,b) \in E_n^{\text{INV}}} \left\{ \frac{1}{\pi^{\text{INV}}(a) P_n^{\text{INV}}(a,b)} \sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{P}(a,b)} |\gamma| \cdot F(\gamma) \right\} \\ &\leq \max_{(a,b) \in E_n^{\text{INV}}} \left\{ \frac{1}{\frac{2}{n!} \cdot \frac{1}{n^2}} |\mathcal{P}(a,b)| \cdot 11 \cdot \frac{2}{n!(n-1)} \cdot \frac{d_{xy}}{n^{12}} \right\} \\ &\leq \max_{(a,b) \in E_n^{\text{INV}}} \left\{ \frac{n!n^2}{2} \cdot 11n^{11} \cdot 11 \cdot \frac{2}{n!(n-1)} \cdot \frac{d_{xy}}{n^{12}} \right\} \\ &\leq \frac{121n^{13} \cdot d_{xy}}{n^{12}(n-1)} \leq 830. \end{aligned}$$

The last inequality holds for $n \geq 8$. We used the fact that $|\mathcal{P}(a,b)| \leq 11n^{11}$. This is because P_n^{INV} has no parallel edges (Lemma 2.7), and thus the edge (a,b) fully specifies a unique permutation of the form $[[r_1, r_2]]$.

Now consider a path $\gamma = \phi_{\text{even}}(u', v', w', r'_1, r'_2, \dots, r'_{10})$ that uses edge (a,b) . This edge can be one of 11 edges of γ ; let's say that it is the i^{th} edge, for $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, 11\}$. Every value of i implies two equations that the set of variables $\{u', v', w', r'_1, r'_2, \dots, r'_{10}\}$ must satisfy. This restricts 2 of the 13 degrees of freedom; thus, we can have at most n^{11} such paths, since all paths are linearly dependent on the variables $(u', v', w', r'_1, r'_2, \dots, r'_{10})$, or their inverses. \square

4 Lower Bound

In this section, we demonstrate a lower bound on the number of rounds required for the INV KAC to be close to a 4-wise independent permutation, first shown by [LTV21]. This directly implies the same lower bound for the block cipher to converge to A_n .

The crucial observation is the following lemma from [LTV21], whose statement and proof we include below almost verbatim for completeness.

Lemma 4.1 (Lemma B.1 of [LTV21]). *For every r , with probability $1 - \frac{r}{n}$ over a random choice of $K_0, \dots, K_r \sim \mathbb{F}_n$, there are $L_1, L_2, L_3 \in \mathbb{F}_n$ such that*

$$F_{\text{INV}, K_0, \dots, K_r}^{(r)}(x) = (x + L_1) \cdot \text{INV}(L_2x + L_3).$$

Proof. The proof is by induction. For $r = 0$, $L_1 = K_0$, $L_2 = 0$ and $L_3 = 1$. Let us now assume that the statement is true for i . Then:

$$\begin{aligned} F_{\text{INV}, K_0, \dots, K_r}^{(i+1)}(x) &= \text{INV} \left(F_{\text{INV}, K_0, \dots, K_r}^{(i)}(x) + K_{i+1} \right) \\ &= \text{INV} \left(\frac{x + L_1}{L_2x + L_3} + K_{i+1} \right) = \frac{L_2x + L_3}{(K_{i+1}L_2 + 1)x + (K_iL_3 + L_1)} \end{aligned}$$

which is of the same form as well. The only way this fails is if one of the numerators in the expression turns out to be 0. The probability of this happening for any one of the r rounds is at most $\frac{r}{n}$. \square

Theorem 4.2. *An r -round INV KAC requires at least $r \geq \frac{(1-\varepsilon)n}{4} - \frac{1}{2}$ rounds to reach ε -close to a 4-wise independent permutation.*

Proof. We will construct the following algorithm \mathcal{A} that distinguishes between an r -round INV KAC and a truly random 4-wise independent permutation. The algorithm first chooses 4 inputs x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 and computes their images y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4 . Then if there are L_1, L_2, L_3 such that $y_i = (x_i + L_1) \cdot \text{INV}(L_2x_i + L_3)$, the distinguisher will guess “INV KAC”. Otherwise, it will guess a random permutation.

From the lemma above, the probability that the distinguisher correctly detects the INV KAC is at least $1 - \frac{4r}{n}$, since we can union bound over all 4 inputs.

On the other hand, the distinguisher will be fooled by a 4-wise independent permutation with probability at most $\frac{1}{n-3}$. This is because the first three inputs and outputs will give linear equations that determine the constants L_1, L_2, L_3 . Thus the last input and output must satisfy $y_4 = (x_4 + L_1) \cdot \text{INV}(L_2x_4 + L_3)$. Since y_4 is uniformly random from $n - 3$ values this can only happen with probability at most $\frac{1}{n-3}$.

The total variation distance implies an upper bound in the distinguishing advantage of any adversary. Thus for the r -round INV KAC to be ε -close to a uniformly random 4-wise independent permutation, the advantage of \mathcal{A} must be at most ε . Thus

$$\begin{aligned} 1 - \frac{4r}{n} - \varepsilon &\leq \frac{1}{n-3} \\ \implies \frac{4r}{n} &\geq 1 - \varepsilon - \frac{1}{n-3} \\ \implies r &\geq \frac{(1-\varepsilon)n}{4} - \frac{n}{4(n-3)} \\ &\geq \frac{(1-\varepsilon)n}{4} - \frac{1}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Where the last inequality holds for $n \geq 8$. \square

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


Figure 2: A schematic representation of the setting in Lemma A.1. The Claim implies that using the 3-cycles C_1, C_2, C_3 a finite number of times, we can generate the 3-cycle (i, j, k) .

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A Missing Details on the Paths Constructions

A.1 Fields of odd characteristic

Lemma A.1. *Let $n = p^b$, where p is an odd prime. Let $i, j, k \in \mathbb{F}_n$ be distinct numbers that do not form an arithmetic progression. Moreover, let $u = \frac{i+j}{2}, v = \frac{j+k}{2}, w = \frac{k+i}{2}$. Consider the following 3-cycles acting on S_n .*

$$C_1 = (i, j, u), \quad C_2 = (j, k, v), \quad C_3 = (k, i, w).$$

Then

$$C_2^2 \circ C_1 \circ C_3 \circ C_2^2 \circ C_3^2 \circ C_1 = (i, k, j).$$

Proof of Lemma A.1. Since the C_i 's are 3-cycles, applying C_i twice is equal to C_i^{-1} . We will thus compute the permutation $C_2^{-1} \circ C_1 \circ C_3 \circ C_2^{-1} \circ C_3^{-1} \circ C_1$ and show that it is equal to (i, k, j) . Since the 3-cycles only touch the elements i, j, k, u, v, w , it suffices to restrict our attention to these 6 elements. Furthermore, it is convenient to arrange these 6 elements in a triangle as in Figure 2. In the following proof, we also use boldface to indicate the elements that are involved in the 3-cycle that will get applied. The statement follows by a straightforward calculation:

Finally, when $u \neq 0$, we write

$$\begin{aligned} s &= \frac{1}{(uv+1)(uv+u+1)} \\ \implies \frac{1}{s} &= u^2v(v+1) + u + 1 \\ \implies v(v+1) &= \frac{1/s + u + 1}{u^2}. \end{aligned}$$

It is well known that in characteristic 2, the quadratic equation above has 2 solutions if the trace of the right-hand side is equal to 0, and no solutions otherwise.

$$\text{Tr}\left(\frac{1/s + u + 1}{u^2}\right) = \text{Tr}\left(\frac{1/s}{u^2}\right) + \text{Tr}\left(\frac{1}{u}\right) + \text{Tr}\left(\frac{1}{u^2}\right) = \text{Tr}\left(\frac{1/s}{u^2}\right)$$

Here the first equality follows from the linearity of trace and the second equality from the fact that $\text{Tr}(x^2) = \text{Tr}(x)$. The square is an injective map over \mathbb{F}_n , and thus $\frac{1/s}{u^2}$ obtains every non-zero value in the field. Since $\text{Tr}(\cdot) = 0$ defines a subspace, the number of u 's that make $\frac{1/s}{u^2}$ have 0 trace is exactly $n/2 - 1$ (we exclude zero, since $\frac{k}{u^2}$ is never zero and $\text{Tr}(0) = 0$).

All of these values are valid, except $u = 1/s + 1$, for $s \neq 1$. This is because even though

$$\text{Tr}\left(\frac{1/s}{(1/s+1)^2}\right) = \text{Tr}\left(\frac{1}{1/s+1} + \frac{1}{(1/s+1)^2}\right) = 0,$$

this implies that $v(v+1) = 0$ and thus the two solutions to this equation are $v = 0, 1$, which are not valid. The remaining $n/2 - 2$ values of u give 2 valid solutions for v , which means that all $s \notin \{0, 1\}$ have $n - 4$ solutions for non-zero u .

The case of $s = 1$ has the $n - 2$ solutions with $u = 0$ and 2 solutions for the $n/2 - 1$ non-zero valid values of u , for a total of $2n - 4$ solutions. We conclude the proof of this lemma by noting that the last parameter w can be chosen arbitrarily from the field of size n without changing the value of s . Thus the number of paths increases by a multiplicative factor of n .

□