Paper 2024/720
Multivariate Blind Signatures Revisited
Abstract
In 2017, Petzoldt, Szepieniec, and Mohamed proposed a blind signature scheme, based on multivariate cryptography. This construction has been expanded on by several other works. This short paper shows that their construction is susceptible to an efficient polynomial-time attack. The problem is that the authors implicitly assumed that for a random multivariate quadratic map $\mathcal{R}:\mathbb{F}_q^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^m$ and a collision-resistant hash function $H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^m$, the function $\mathsf{Com}(m;\mathbf{r}) := H(m) - \mathcal{R}(\mathbf{r})$ is a binding commitment, which is not the case. There is a "folklore" algorithm that can be used to, given any pair of messages, efficiently produce a commitment that opens to both of them. We hope that by pointing out that multivariate quadratic maps are not binding, similar problems can be avoided in the future.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- multivariate cryptographyattackspost-quantum cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- wbe @ zurich ibm com
- History
- 2024-05-13: revised
- 2024-05-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/720
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/720, author = {Ward Beullens}, title = {Multivariate Blind Signatures Revisited}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/720}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/720} }