

PRISM: Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker*

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Abstract. In this paper we describe PRISM, a tool being developed at the University of Birmingham for the analysis of probabilistic systems. PRISM supports two probabilistic models: continuous-time Markov chains and Markov decision processes. Analysis is performed through model checking such systems against specifications written in the probabilistic temporal logics PCTL and CSL. The tool features three model checking engines: one symbolic, using BDDs (binary decision diagrams) and MTBDDs (multi-terminal BDDs); one based on sparse matrices; and one which combines both symbolic and sparse matrix methods. PRISM has been successfully used to analyse probabilistic termination, performance, dependability and quality of service properties for a range of systems, including randomized distributed algorithms, polling systems, workstation cluster and wireless cell communication.

1 Introduction

Probability is widely used in the design and analysis of software and hardware systems: as a means to derive efficient algorithms (e.g. the use of electronic coin flipping in decision making); as a model for unreliable or unpredictable behaviour (e.g. fault-tolerant systems, computer networks); and as a tool to analyse system performance (e.g. the use of steady-state probabilities in the calculation of throughput and mean waiting time). *Probabilistic model checking* refers to a range of techniques for calculating the likelihood of the occurrence of certain events during the execution of the system, and can be useful to establish properties such as “shutdown occurs with probability at most 0.01” and “the video frame will be delivered within 5ms with probability at least 0.97”.

In this paper we introduce PRISM, a probabilistic model checking tool being developed at the University of Birmingham. Conventional model checkers input a description of a model, represented as a state transition system, and a specification, typically a formula in some temporal logic, and return “yes” or “no”, indicating whether or not the model satisfies the specification. In the case of probabilistic model checking, the models are probabilistic, in the sense that they encode the *probability* of making a transition between states instead of simply the existence of such a transition, and analysis normally entails calculation of the actual likelihoods through appropriate numerical or analytical methods.

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2 Probabilistic model checking

A number of probabilistic models exist. The simplest are *discrete-time Markov chains* (DTMCs), which specify the probability $\pi(s, s')$ of making a transition from state s to some target state s' , where the total probabilities of reaching a target state must sum up to 1, i.e. $\sum_{s'} \pi(s, s') = 1$. *Markov decision processes* (MDPs) extend DTMCs by allowing both probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviour. Non-determinism enables the modelling of asynchronous parallel composition, and permits the under-specification of certain aspects of a system. *Continuous-time Markov chains* (CTMCs), on the other hand, specify the rates $\rho(s, s')$ of making a transition from state s to s' , with the interpretation that the probability of moving from s to s' within $t (\in \mathbb{R}^{>0})$ time units is $1 - e^{-\rho(s, s') \cdot t}$.

Probabilistic specification formalisms include PCTL [14,8,7], a probabilistic extension of the temporal logic CTL applicable in the context of MDPs, and the logic CSL [6], a specification language for CTMCs based on CTL and PCTL. PCTL allows us to express properties of the form “under any scheduling of processes, the probability that event A occurs is at least p (at most p)”. By way of illustration, we consider an asynchronous randomized leader election protocol [20], where the processors of an asynchronous ring make random choices based on coin tosses in an attempt to elect a leader. Using the atomic proposition *leader* to label states in which a leader has been elected, examples of properties we would wish to verify can be expressed in PCTL as follows:

- $\mathcal{P}_{\geq 1}[true \ U \ leader]$ - “under any fair scheduling, a leader is eventually elected with probability 1”.
- $\mathcal{P}_{\leq 0.5}[true \ U^{\leq k} \ leader]$ - “under any fair scheduling, the probability of electing a leader within k discrete time steps is at most 0.5”.

The specification language CSL includes the means to express both transient and steady-state performance measures of CTMCs. Transient properties describe the system at a fixed real-valued time instant t , whereas steady-state properties refer to the behaviour of a system in the “long run”. For example, consider a queueing system where the atomic proposition *full* labels states where the queue is full. CSL then allows us to express properties such as:

- $\mathcal{P}_{\leq 0.01}[true \ U^{\leq t} \ full]$ - “the probability that the queue becomes full within t time units is less than or equal to 0.01”
- $\mathcal{S}_{\geq 0.98}[\neg full]$ - “in the long run, the chance that the queue is not full is greater than or equal to 0.98”.

3 The Tool

PRISM takes as input a description of a system written in a probabilistic variant of Reactive Modules [1]¹. It first constructs the model from this description and computes the set of reachable states. The model can be a DTMC, MDP

¹ For further information on the language, see www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~dxp/prism

or CTMC. PRISM accepts specifications in either the logic PCTL or CSL depending on the model type. The tool then performs model checking to determine which states of the system satisfy each specification. For PCTL properties PRISM implements the algorithms of [14,8,7,3]. For CSL, methods based on [6,21] are used. It is also possible to export the transition matrix of the model, enabling analysis in other applications and visualisation of the model. Fig. 1 shows the structure of the tool and Fig. 2 shows a screen-shot of the tool running.




Fig. 1. PRISM System Architecture




Fig. 2. The PRISM User Interface

In PRISM, model construction and reachability are implemented using MTBDDs and BDDs respectively. It has been shown in [13] that space efficient representations of structured probabilistic models can be constructed using MTBDDs. Reachability analysis using BDDs forms the basis of non-probabilistic symbolic model checking which has proven to be very successful [9,23].

For both PCTL and CSL, model checking generally reduces to a combination of reachability-based computation and the solution of linear equation systems

or linear optimisation problems. Again, reachability based computation is performed using BDDs. In the case of numerical computation, however, PRISM supports three different model checking engines. The first is based on symbolic model checking using MTBDDs (multi-terminal BDDs) [11]; more details can be found in [5,13]. The second uses more conventional data structures for numerical analysis: sparse matrices and full vectors. The latter engine nearly always provides faster numerical computation than its MTBDD counterpart. MTBDDs can, however, sometimes exploit structure in models and represent them far more compactly than a sparse matrix, and in cases where high regularity occurs, we have been able to perform quantitative analysis for models substantially larger than those representable in a sparse matrix form. The third engine can be seen as a hybrid of the other two. It stores models in a MTBDD-like structure which is adapted so that numerical computation can be carried out in combination with a full vector. This hybrid approach is in general faster than MTBDDs and can handle larger systems than sparse matrices.

PRISM is implemented using a combination of Java and C++. All high-level parts of the tool, such as the user interface and parsers are written in Java. Low-level code and libraries are mostly in C++. For BDDs and MTBDDs, PRISM uses the CUDD package [27], which is written in C.

4 Results

We have used PRISM to build and analyse probabilistic models for a number of case studies. For MDP models, we have considered several randomised distributed algorithms, including randomised mutual exclusion protocols [26,25], a randomized Byzantine agreement protocol [10] and a randomised consensus protocol [2]. In the latter case, we were able to verify quantitative PCTL properties for MDPs with up to 10^{10} states using the MTBDD engine [22]. We have also considered a number of CTMC models. These include a cyclic polling system [19], tandem queueing network [18] and workstation cluster [15]. For example, in the workstation cluster case study, we have used the hybrid engine in PRISM to verify the property “the chance that the quality of service drops below minimum quality within 85 time units is less than 10%” for systems of up to 9 million states. Fig. 3 below includes statistics for some of the case studies mentioned above.

model	states	construction time (in <i>sec</i>)	model size (KB)	iterations	time per iteration (in <i>sec</i>)		
					MTBDD	Sparse	Hybrid
consensus protocol	4.3×10^8	13.2	106	181,791	6.0	-	-
	1.0×10^{10}	16.0	170	85,641	11.5	-	-
workstation cluster	2.3×10^6	33.6	1878	2570	-	-	11.3
	9.4×10^6	151.2	3908	2630	-	-	44.5
polling system	73,728	0.4	36	584	1.29	0.17	0.25
	159,744	0.8	42	584	3.03	0.32	0.55

Fig. 3. Statistics for model checking with PRISM

Further information about these examples, additional case studies and the tool itself can be found on the PRISM web site at www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~dxp/prism.

5 Conclusions and Future Work

We have introduced PRISM, a tool to build and analyse probabilistic systems which supports two types of models (MDPs and CTMCs) and two probabilistic logics (PCTL and CSL). Several CTMC analysis tools are available, for example MARCA [28] and TIPPTool [16], which do not allow logic specifications and instead support steady-state and transient analysis. Of the two probabilistic model checking tools that we are aware of, ProbVerus [4] only supports DTMCs and a subset of PCTL, whereas $E\vdash MC^2$ [17] only supports the model checking of CTMCs using CSL specifications. PRISM is the only model checking tool which allows the quantitative model checking of MDPs.

The development of PRISM is an ongoing activity. In the near future we plan to consider extensions of PCTL for expressing expected time and long run average properties [12]. We are also in the process of making efficiency improvements to the tool, in particular to the hybrid engine. Details of this work will be available in [24].

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