

THE
CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

4-11 FEBRUARY 1945

THE DOCUMENT

THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE
4-11 February 1945

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to Correspondence,
Signed Documents, and
Minutes of the Meetings.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Record.

The original document has been delivered to the Secretary of State by me this date in accordance with the President's directive of 29 January 1946 to Fleet Admiral Leahy.

George M. Elsey

GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.

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CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

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1.

FEBRUARY 4, 1945

Meeting of the President, Marshal Stalin and
Mr. Molotov, Livadia Palace - 4:00 PM
General Discussion

Printed FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 570-
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - YALTA CONFERENCE:

Present:	The President	Date:	February 4, 1945
	Mr. Bohlen	Time:	4:00 P.M.
	Marshal Stalin	Place:	Livadia Palace, Yalta
	Mr. Molotov		
	Mr. Pavlov		

Subject: General Discussion

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February 4, 1945

THE PRESIDENT replied that General Marshall, at the After an exchange of amenities, in which The President thanked Marshal Stalin for all the successful efforts that had been made for his comfort and convenience, The President said that the military situation was considerably improved since they had last met.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was certainly true, and that the Soviet armies were moving very successfully onto the line of the Oder.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had made a number of bets on board the cruiser coming over as to whether the Russians would get to Berlin before the Americans would get to Manila.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he was certain the Americans would get to Manila before the Russians got to Berlin, since there was at present very hard fighting going on for the Oder line.

There followed a discussion about the climate and characteristics of the Crimea.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that because of the honest blood shed in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been out-flanked and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings.

THE PRESIDENT agreed with this.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired about the military situation on the Western Front.

THE PRESIDENT

February 4, 1945

THE PRESIDENT replied that General Marshall, at the five o'clock meeting, would give a detailed outline of the situation and plans, but he could say now that there was an offensive planned for the 8th of February and another on the 12th, but that the main blow of the Anglo-American armies on the Western Front would take place in March.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed gratification at this news, and said that General Antonov of the Soviet General Staff would give a detailed review of the situation on the Eastern Front at the five o'clock meeting. He added that if it were possible to capture the Ruhr and Saar regions the Germans would be deprived of all sources of coal, since the Russians had already captured the Silesia basin.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he hoped General Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet Staff rather than through the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington as in the past.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and thought it was very important and promised that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion. He added that if the Germans were deprived of all their coal, since they were already short of bread, there was a possibility that the German collapse would come before absolute military defeat.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder were sufficient for further offensive action.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in regard to these bridgeheads, of which there were five or six, fierce battles were in progress on the Eastern front.

THE PRESIDENT said that one of the difficulties on the Western Front was that we had no secure bridgeheads and that on the upper Rhine the current was so strong with floating ice that it made it very difficult for pontoon operations, but that General Eisenhower felt once he reached the Rhine he would be able to

cross

February 4, 1945

cross it, but he did not expect this before March. He added that the British had wanted to make a major crossing of the Rhine on the north sector in Holland, but since we had four times the number of men in France that the British had we felt we were entitled to have an alternative, which would be either through Holland or in the region of Mainz.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with General de Gaulle.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he had not found de Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting.

THE PRESIDENT then described his conversation with de Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that de Gaulle does not seem to understand the situation in France and that in actual fact the French contribution at the present time to military operations on the Western Front was very small and that in 1940 they had not fought at all.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he recently decided to arm eight new French divisions composed of Frenchmen who had had previous military training.

MARSHAL STALIN said that was good insofar as it would help the American armies but at present he felt the de Gaulle army was very weak.

THE PRESIDENT said he had recently heard that the French Government did not plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it placed under international control.

MARSHAL STALIN

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MARSHAL STALIN replied that was not the story de Gaulle had told in Moscow--there he said the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency.

THE PRESIDENT said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The President said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would of preferred to have the northwest zone which would be independent of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether The President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of kindness.

Both MARSHAL STALIN and MR. MOLOTOV spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason to give France a zone. Marshal Stalin said that question would have to be considered further here at Yalta.

As it was then three minutes to five, The President suggested that they proceed to the conference room where the military staffs were gathered.

2.

February 4, 1945

1st Formal Meeting, Livadia Palace - 5:00 PM
The Military Situation (Europe)

Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Malta & Yalta, 574-580, 581-583]

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - YALTA CONFERENCE

First Formal Conference

Present: The President
Mr. Stettinius
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Kuter
General Deane
General McFarland
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

Date: February 4, 1945
Time: 5:00 P.M.
Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral Cunningham
Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander
Major General Sir Hastings Ismay
Sir Charles Portal
Major Bires

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
General Antonov
Admiral Kuznetsov
Air Marshal Khudikov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Pavlov

Subject: The Military Situation.

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MARSHAL STALIN said he hoped the President would again consent to opening the meeting.

THE PRESIDENT replied that his opening of this meeting, as had been the case in Tehran, was not based on any law or historic tradition but merely by chance. He said that he was honored to open this great Conference and he wished first of all to express on behalf of the American guests here their deep appreciation for the hospitality and splendid arrangements made by Marshal Stalin and his assistants for their comfort and convenience. He said that he knew that all the people he represented wished peace above all and the war to be over as soon as possible. He said that he felt that we understood each other much better now than we had in the past and that month by month our understanding was growing. For this reason, he felt safe in proposing that the talks be conducted in an informal manner in which each would speak his mind frankly and freely, since he had discovered through experience that the best way to conduct business expeditiously was through frank and free speaking. He said he knew that while they were here in Yalta they would cover the map of the world, but today he thought that military questions, particularly those on the most important front of all, the Eastern Front, should be the subject of discussion. He said he wished to add that when the Red Armies advanced into Germany 25 kilometers, it was doubtful whether the Soviet people were more thrilled than those of the United States and those of Great Britain. Here, he thought, it would be most appropriate if the Marshal would ask one of his staff officers to give a detailed report on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read a prepared paper, giving in great detail the background development of the Soviet offensive of early January, the estimate of enemy probabilities and the results of the offensive. He concluded with the statement of Soviet desires with regard to the actions of their Allies. (A copy in translation of General Antonov's report is attached hereto.)

In regard to the part of the Soviet report where

General

February 4, 1945

General Antonov referred to the number of divisions which were being moved to the East, the PRIME MINISTER asked if he could go into more detail as to where they were coming from.

GENERAL ANTONOV stated that they anticipated that there would be five German divisions from Norway, twelve from the Western Front, eight from Italy, and eight from the interior of Germany which would be moved to the Eastern Front to reinforce the Germans.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether in the advance into Germany the Russians had altered the guage of the railroads from the customary European guage to the wide Russian guage.

GENERAL ANTONOV replied that the majority of the locomotives and wagons which they had captured from the Germans had been so badly damaged that they had been useless and it was, therefore, necessary to widen the guage on a few important lines of the railroads in order to accommodate Russian rolling stock to supply the troops.

THE PRESIDENT said that as our armies are now approaching each other in Germany it was important that the staffs should discuss this problem so that there would be a definite place in Germany where the different gauges would meet.

MARSHAL STALIN answered at this point that the greater part of the German railroad lines would remain of their customary guage and that it was not for pleasure but for absolute necessity that any at all had been changed, since the Soviet Union did not have adequate resources to adopt this expedient to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that he had a number of questions in regard to General Antonov's report, that he felt that the Anglo-American and Russian staffs which were here gathered for the first time should discuss these technical military matters between themselves. He added, for example, that it was important to find out how long it would take the enemy to move these divisions from Italy and the Western Front to the Eastern

Front

February 4, 1945

Front and whether the Allies could be of more help by reinforcing the Western Front or by leaving the divisions in Italy, or by moving across the Adriatic into the Balkans. He suggested that General Marshall, with the President's approval, present a picture of the operations on the Western Front.

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave the following general summary of the situation on the Western Front:

The Ardennes bulge had now been eliminated and in certain places the Allied armies were further to the East than they had been when the German offensive began.

In the last week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his divisions for future offensive action and was engaged in eliminating enemy pockets on the southern sector of the line north of Switzerland. He was exerting pressure on the base of the Ardennes bulge for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Germans were in sufficient force to successfully oppose a movement Northeast in the direction of Bonn or whether such an operation would require special preparation. He had ascertained that the German resistance was too strong and four days ago had ceased operations in this area and begun to transfer divisions to the North. North of Switzerland operations were being directed toward the elimination of German positions around Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar had been taken but the First French Army was advancing very slowly north of Mulhausen.

Small German bridgeheads to the north of Strasbourg were being eliminated. When our forces have reached the Rhine a number of divisions will be released through the shortening of the line.

Field Marshal Montgomery in command of the 21st British Army Group and the United States Ninth Army is preparing offensive action in a Southeast direction north of Dusseldorf. A supporting operation is planned by the Ninth Army in a northeast direction toward the same objective. The first of these operations is expected to commence on February 8 and the second approximately a week later. These two operations are designed to drive the Germans East of the Rhine and to cross the river North of the Ruhr. This operation will be the main blow of the Anglo-American armies. Airborne divisions will be used in large numbers to land East of the Rhine.

The passage

February 4, 1945.

The passage of the Rhine is considered possible after the first of March. Although a crossing would be attempted if the Rhine were reached before that date it would be a hazardous operation because of ice conditions and the strength of the current. There are three good crossings in this sector and a fourth may be attempted. Only five divisions could be accommodated on the actual front of the assault.

In the South the left wing of the United States First Army was endeavoring to carry out the capture of two dams on the Ruhr River. Despite air action these dams remained intact and there was a danger of imperilling our positions in that area if the Germans were to open the dams.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the area of Frankfort as an alternative if the main operation in the North suffers a check.

Operations on the Western Front had been limited by the shortage of supplies due to inadequacy of shipping. The opening of the port of Antwerp has remedied this situation and the armies are now receiving adequate supplies. The utilization of the town of Rouen has facilitated the movement of supplies. It is now possible to bring in 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo and 12,000 to 15,000 tons of wet cargo a day. The Germans were endeavoring to disrupt the use of the port of Antwerp by robot bombs and rockets and sporadic air attack. The day before yesterday sixty robot bombs and six rockets fell on the city of Antwerp. One ship had been destroyed and one oil dump blown up. The chief danger was that a lucky hit might destroy the Antwerp lock gates. When weather permitted the American Air Forces had been extremely active in destroying German transport, railroad lines and troop convoys, particularly in the direction of Cologne.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired if there was any definite estimate of the actual destruction done by the tactical air force.

GENERAL MARSHALL

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MARSHAL STALIN asked what were the other points.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he did not have the exact estimates but the destruction had been very heavy. According to present data the German oil production had been reduced to about 20% of its former capacity as a result of Allied heavy bombing. They had also struck at tank factories, motor transport factories, rail communications and assembly yards. In these operations were included the heavy bombers from Italy which, when the weather did not permit a strike on Germany, operated in the valley of the Po and against railroad lines leading from Italy into Germany.

In reply to a question General Marshall stated that there were approximately 32 enemy divisions on the Italian front, 27 German and 5 Italian, facing an approximately equal number of Allied divisions. The Allied forces have superiority in fighter aircraft in this theater.

GENERAL MARSHALL mentioned briefly the submarine danger which was more threatening at the moment than it had been in the past, due largely to improvements in German technical methods. At the time of the African landings there had been 100 enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic. At the present time there were between 30 and 35 in the Atlantic and their threat was potential rather than actual. He said difficulty had been encountered in attacking submarines in the shallow waters around the British Isles because the tide made it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. The Allied heavy bomber force has been striking heavily at submarine pens and construction yards but first priority was still being given to enemy oil production and refining centers.

GENERAL MARSHALL concluded by saying that Field Marshal Brooke might have something to add to his report on the military situation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped that Field Marshal Brooke would have some news, but he certainly hoped that Admiral Cunningham would be able to speak on the help the Soviet Armies could give in the U-boat war, since Danzig was the principal point of construction of U-boats.

MARSHAL STALIN

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MARSHAL STALIN asked what were the other points.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM replied: Kiel and Hamburg.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we had had great experience with the United States forces in working out the crossing of oceans for landing operations but that we hoped to benefit by the Russian experience in crossing rivers. There was an officer here especially charged with that duty and he hoped to be able to get into contact with the Russian staff on this subject.

MARSHAL STALIN then asked a number of questions particularly relating to the potentials which the Anglo-Americans would have in the Northern area and those designated for the attacks on February 8 and February 15. He said that on the central front in Poland the Soviet Army had enjoyed a superiority of 100 divisions over the Germans as well as overwhelming artillery supremacy. He added that they had had 9,000 planes on a relatively narrow front in Eastern Poland. He said that the Red Army had had 9,000 tanks on the break-through sector on the central front.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that approximately one in three Allied divisions was armored comprising 200-300 units. There was some discussion as to the relative strength of the German and Allied divisions in which General Marshall said that a German panzer division which they had encountered on the Western Front had had a compliment of 23,000 men, at which Marshal Stalin expressed surprise.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he understood that the British division was composed of 18,000 men and the American 14,000 with tank divisions of approximately 10,000 men.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, in reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, said that we would have 8,000 to 9,000 aircraft on the section of the Western Front designated for the attack, of which 4,000 would be Anglo-American heavy bombers capable of carrying 3 to 4 tons of bombs each.

The

The President

February 4, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER said, in reply to Marshal Stalin's observations that they had 180 Soviet divisions against 80 German divisions on the central front in Poland, that the Anglo-American armies had never had a superiority in manpower but that their superiority had rested in air power and armor.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that ten days ago there had been 79 German divisions on the Western Front opposing 78 Anglo-American divisions.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that in the present offensive the Soviet armies had enjoyed artillery supremacy of four to one and gave a brief description in the manner in which the special Soviet artillery "break-through" divisions had been organized. He said that these artillery divisions had from 300 to 400 guns and in addition to offensive operations the corps artillery was added during the attack. For example, on a front from 35 to 45 kilometers, Marshal Konev had had six artillery "break-through" divisions and the corps artillery, which meant that for every kilometer there were some 230 guns of heavy calibre. The result was after a two hour bombardment a gate was opened in the front through which the Soviet forces advanced fifteen kilometers the first day. The German losses in killed and wounded were very heavy and the survivors were severely stunned and shell shocked. Marshal Stalin then said that they had explained their desires from their Allies, but that they had learned from the discussions already undertaken that their desires had already been met, and inquired what were the wishes of the Allies in regard to the Red Army.

THE PRIME MINISTER said first of all that he wished to express the gratitude of England and he was sure of America for the massive power and successes of the Soviet offensive.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was not a desire. Marshal Stalin then said that the Soviet Union was not bound by any agreement at Tehran to conduct a winter offensive and despite what some people had thought no demand or request had been received from the President or the Prime Minister in regard to such an offensive.

The President

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The President had asked him to receive a representative, Air Marshal Tedder, from General Eisenhower's staff to discuss the situation and he had, of course, immediately agreed. He said that he mentioned this only to emphasize the spirit of the Soviet leaders who not only fulfilled formal obligations but went farther and acted on what they conceived to be their moral duty to their Allies. He said Air Marshal Tedder had explained the desire, which he presumed was that of the President and the Prime Minister, that the Soviet army continue their offensive operations until the end of March. Marshal Stalin said that they would do it if the weather and road conditions permitted.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thoroughly agreed with Marshal Stalin's statement since at the Tehran Conference it had been merely agreed that each partner would move as quickly and as far as possible against the common enemy. He said at that time he personally was facing an election, and that it had been impossible to make detailed plans far into the future. Also at that time our armies were separated by many miles. Now, however, the President said, with our armies approaching each other it should be possible to coordinate more closely our operational plans.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that the reason no request had been made on Marshal Stalin was because of the complete confidence which the President and he felt in the Marshal, the Russian people and the efficiency of the Russian military, and therefore, there had been no attempt to strike any bargain. He had always been thoroughly confident that when an offensive was possible the Red Army would attack. The Prime Minister added that no matter what discussions Air Marshal Tedder had had in Moscow, he felt that it was of the highest importance that the three staffs which were assembled here for the first time should really work out together detailed plans for the coordination of the joint blows against Germany; so that if the Soviet offensive came to a halt because of the weather or road conditions the Allied armies could move. The best of all would be for both armies to attack simultaneously from the East and the West.

Marshal Stalin

February 4, 1945

MARSHAL STALIN agreed with the Prime Minister but stated that they had to take into account what had occurred; that when the Anglo-American armies were on the offensive in the West the Soviet armies were not ready and conversely. He felt that it would be most useful for the staffs to discuss the question of a summer offensive against Germany because he was not so sure that the war would be over before summer.

MR. CHURCHILL replied that he thoroughly shared the view of the Marshal and that we should take full advantage of this gathering.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM then gave a short review of the situation in regard to German submarines. He said that the threat was more potential than actual at the present time. The Germans had kept technically ahead of the Allies although the present sinkings around the British Isles were not serious. We knew, however, that based on a prefabricated method of construction the Germans were building large submarines of a new type fitted out with the latest devices and with high underwater speed. He said that these submarines were being built primarily at Kiel, Hamburg and Danzig and that since the Marshal had asked for our desires he would give a naval desire, namely, that the Red Army should as soon as possible take Danzig where 30% of the German submarine construction was being carried out.

THE PRESIDENT asked if Danzig was within range of Soviet artillery fire.

MARSHAL STALIN replied in the negative but expressed the hope that it soon would be.

It was then agreed that the Military Staffs would meet tomorrow at 12:00 noon at the Soviet villa at Koreis and that tomorrow, February 5, there would be a meeting at the Livadia Palace at 4:00 p.m. between the President, Marshal Stalin, and the Prime Minister and the three Foreign Ministers on the political treatment of Germany.

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Appendix A to Memorandum of 1st Formal
Meeting of Crimean Conference, Febru-
ary 4, 1945

Translation of General Antonov's State-
ment on the Soviet Offensive of January,
1945

Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff record of 1st
Formal Meeting

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Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into attack on the front from the Niemen River to the Carpathians a distance of 700 kilometers. Forces of General Cherniakhovsky advanced towards Koenigsberg; forces of Marshal Rokossovsky, along the north bank of the Vistula cutting off East Prussia from Central Germany; forces of Marshal Zhukov, south of the Vistula against Poznan; forces of Marshal Konev, against Chenstokhov-Breslau; forces of General Petrov, in the area of the Carpathians against Novo Targ. The greatest blow was delivered by the army groups of Rokossovsky, Zhukov, and Konev on the Ostrolenka-Crakow front, 300 kilometers.

Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to commence at the end of January when weather conditions were expected to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the Western Front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in weather.

The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and Vistula Rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector of the front, since striking from this sector led our troops out along the shortest route to the vital centers of Germany. In order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to extend it to the central group of the enemy. For this purpose this operation was conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia, and the advance in Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks were for the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to our attack by a swift transfer of power onto the flank at the expense of the central sector of our front; thus, out of 24 tank divisions on our front, representing the principal German striking power, 11 tank divisions were drawn in to the Budapest sector, 6 tank divisions on the East Prussian (3 tank divisions were located in Courland), and thus on the central part of the front there remained only 4 tank divisions. The aim of the High Command was accomplished.

On the

~~TOP SECRET~~

On the front from Ostrolenk to Crakow, that is in the area of our greatest attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions. We set up a grouping calculated on having a superiority over the enemy: in infantry, more than double; in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority.

The massing of artillery on the sectors of the breakthrough amounted to 220-230 guns (from 75mm. and above) on one kilometer of the front.

The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions--low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility of air operations and limited artillery observation to several hundred meters.

Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and a powerful artillery advance, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during the first day of the advance to move forward 10 to 15 kilometers, that is, to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense.

The following results were achieved.

a. During the 18 days of the advance, the Soviet troops moved forward up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive.

Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25-30 kilometers per day.

b. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector from Kyustrin (north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian industrial area.

c. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East Prussia from Central Germany; thus, in addition to the Courland group (26 divisions) isolated 27 divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Torne, Poznan, Shneidmul and others, an approximate total of up to 15 divisions.

d. Breakthroughs in force of long duration of German defensive positions in East Prussia in the Koenigsberg and Latvian directions.

In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 30 to 40 divisions.

e. Destroyed

Our wishes

e. Destroyed 45 German divisions against which we sustained the following losses:

Prisoners -- about 100,000 men

Casualties -- about 300,000 men

Total -- approximately 400,000 men.

Probable enemy action:

a. The Germans will defend Berlin for which they will try to hold up the movement of the Soviet troops in the area of the Oder River, setting up the defense here at the expense of withdrawn troops and at the expense of reserves being moved over from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.

For the defense of Pomerania they will try to use their Courland grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula.

b. The Germans will probably cover the direction leading to Vienna more strongly, strengthening this sector at the expense of troops now in action in Italy.

The shifting of enemy troops:

a. On our front there have already appeared:

From the central regions of Germany	- 9 divisions
From the western European front	- 6 divisions
From Italy	- <u>1</u> division

Total 16 divisions.

b. In the process of being shifted:

4 tank divisions
<u>1</u> motorized division
5 divisions.

c. It is probable that there will yet be shifted up to 30-35 divisions (at the expense of the western European front, Norway, Italy, and reserves located in Germany).

In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 35 to 40 divisions.

Our wishes

Our wishes are:

a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable:

(1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front.

(2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes.

(3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East.

It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February.

b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy.

In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.

c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.

3.

February 4, 1945

President's dinner for the Prime Minister &
Marshal Stalin, Livadia Palace - 8:30 PM
Voice of Smaller Powers in Postwar
Peace Organization

~~TOP SECRET~~
February 4, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - YALTA CONFERENCE

Dinner, 8:30 P.M., Livadia Palace

Present: The President
Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Churchill
Mr. Eden
Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr
Major Bires

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Subject: Voice of smaller powers in postwar peace organization.

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 4, 1945

Before dinner and during the greater part of the dinner the conversation was general and personal in character. Marshal Stalin, the President and the Prime Minister appeared to be in very good humor throughout the dinner. No political or military subjects of any importance were discussed until the last half hour of the dinner when indirectly the subject of the responsibility and rights of the big powers as against those of the small powers came up.

MARSHAL STALIN made it quite plain on a number of occasions that he felt that the three Great Powers which had borne the brunt of the war and had liberated from German domination the small powers should have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. He said that he could serve no other interest than that of the Soviet state and people but that in the international arena the Soviet Union was prepared to pay its share in the preservation of peace. He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three Great Powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner. He said some of the liberated countries seemed to believe that the Great Powers had been forced to shed their blood in order to liberate them and that they were now scolding these Great Powers for failure to take into consideration the rights of these small powers.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he was prepared in concert with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed that the Great Powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the Three Powers represented at this table.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great nations of the world should discharge their moral responsibility and leadership and should exercise their power with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller nations. (Mr. Vyshinski said to Mr. Bohlen that they would never agree to the right of the small powers to judge the acts of the Great Powers, and in reply to an observation by Mr. Bohlen concerning the opinion of

the American

February 4, 1945

American people he replied that the American people should learn to obey their leaders. Mr. Bohlen said that if Mr. Vyshinski would visit the United States he would like to see him undertake to tell that to the American people. Mr. Vyshinski replied that he would be glad to do so).

Following a toast by the Prime Minister to the proletariat masses of the world, there was considerable discussion about the rights of people to govern themselves in relation to their leaders.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that although he was constantly being "beaten up" as a reactionary, he was the only representative present who could be thrown out at any time by the universal suffrage of his own people and that personally he gloried in that danger.

MARSHAL STALIN ironically remarked that the Prime Minister seemed to fear these elections, to which the PRIME MINISTER replied that he not only did not fear them but that he was proud of the right of the British people to change their government at any time they saw fit. He added that he felt that the three nations represented here were moving toward the same goal by different methods.

THE PRIME MINISTER, referring to the rights of the small nations, gave a quotation which said: "The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefor they sang."

After Marshal Stalin and the President had departed the Prime Minister discussed with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius further the voting question in the Security Council. THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was inclined to the Russian view on voting procedure because he felt that everything depended on the unity of the three Great Powers and that without that the world would be subjected to inestimable catastrophe; anything that deserved that unity would have his vote. Mr. Eden took vigorous exception to the Prime Minister and pointed out that there would be no attraction or reason for the small nations to join an organization based on that principle and that he personally believed it would find no support among the English public. The Prime Minister said that he did not agree in the slightest with Mr. Eden because he was thinking of the realities of the international situation.

In reply to an inquiry of the Prime Minister in regard to the American proposal to the solution of the voting question, MR. BOHLEN remarked that the American

proposal

February 4, 1945

proposal reminded him of the story of the Southern planter who had given a bottle of whiskey to a negro as a present. The next day he asked the negro how he had liked the whiskey, to which the negro replied that it was perfect. The planter asked what he meant, and the negro said if it had been any better it would not have been given to him, and if it had been any worse he could not have drunk it.

Soon thereafter the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden took their departure, obviously in disagreement on the voting procedure on the Security Council of the Dumbarton Oaks organization.

4.

February 5, 1945

Mr. Molotov's lunch for Mr. Stettinius and
Mr. Eden, Koreis Villa - 1:30 PM
GERMANY

Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta,
608-610

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - YALTA CONFERENCE

Luncheon Given by Mr. Molotov

Present: Mr. Stettinius Date: February 5, 1945
 Mr. Harriman Time: 1:30 p.m.
 Mr. Justice Byrnes Place: Koreis Villa
 Mr. Page

 Mr. Eden
 Mr. Cadogan
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
 Major Theakstone

 Mr. Molotov
 Mr. Vyshinski
 Mr. Maisky
 Mr. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to United States
 Mr. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain
 Mr. Pavlov

Subjects: 1. Toasts.
 2. Name of the Conference.
 3. Treatment of Germany
 4. Economic Matters relative to Germany.

[REDACTED]

February 5, 1945

1. Toasts.

MR. MOLOTOV opened the luncheon by proposing a toast to the Leaders of the three countries. Upon being informed by MR. HARRIMAN that Manila had been captured, MR. MOLOTOV immediately proposed a toast to this victory of the Allied armies.

After a brief toast by MR. EDEN to Mr. Molotov as Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the 1945 Moscow Conference, MR. STETTINIUS also proposed a toast to Mr. Molotov. He said that he hoped that he would be able to carry on the fine work of his predecessor, Secretary Hull. He stated that Mr. Hull, who was now in a hospital but was recovering, had asked him to present his compliments to Mr. Molotov. He concluded by stating that he looked forward to the day when he, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden would have frequent meetings.

MR. MOLOTOV immediately rose and proposed a toast to the recovery of Secretary Hull. He requested Mr. Stettinius to convey to Mr. Hull the sympathy and best wishes of all those present at the luncheon. He then proposed a toast to the British Ambassador, who reciprocated by toasting the "Moscow Commission" and its continued cooperation. This was followed by toasts on the part of MR. STETTINIUS to his Dumbarton Oaks colleagues (Messrs. Gromyko and Cadogan); to the health and success of his ally, Mr. Harriman, by MR. MOLOTOV, and a toast to the important head of the Drafting Committee who asserted such control over the "Moscow Commission, Mr. Vyshinski, by MR. HARRIMAN.

MR. JUSTICE BYRNES then proposed that the guests drink to the Great Armies of the Soviet Union and AMBASSADOR GROMYKO toasted Mr. Byrnes as a great American who had served in the three most important branches of the American Government.

MR. VYSHINSKI suggested that Messrs. Strang and Winant, the co-workers on the European Advisory Commission be the subject of a toast.

Mr. Stettinius

[REDACTED]

February 5, 1946

MR. STETTINIUS then raised his glass to Ambassador Gromyko, whom he described as an able and effective representative of the Soviet Union in Washington who had won the respect and admiration of the American people.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that there had been enough toasts to the diplomats. He wished to raise his glass to Mr. Byrnes who held one of the most important positions in the United States Government. He said that it was hard for the average person to imagine just how important Mr. Byrnes was.

MR. EDEN then toasted the men who were fighting the war.

After a toast to the success of the present conference, MR. MAISKY was requested to make a few remarks. He raised his glass to the closest possible unity between the peoples, governments and chiefs of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and remarked that the future of mankind depended upon this unity.

2. Name of the Conference.

During the course of the luncheon MR. MOLOTOV proposed a toast to the "Crimean Conference." After a brief discussion it was suggested that the Conference should be so-called.

3. Treatment of Germany.

MR. EDEN inquired of Mr. Molotov as to what the Russians had in mind to discuss this afternoon.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Russian Delegation was prepared to discuss any question the United States or the United Kingdom Delegations so desired. This included those relating to the breaking up of

Germany

February 5, 1945
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MR. MOLOTOV indicated that the Soviet Government
Germany as well as political and economic matters
relative to that country. States would furnish the
Soviet Union with long term credits.

MR. EISEN stated that the general subject needed
further study before any final decisions could be made.

studied this question and he personally was present
to discuss the matter.
MR. MOLOTOV remarked that in his view the Americans
and British were considerably ahead of the Russians in
their studies on this question.

MR. EISEN replied that although the British had
studied the matter on a technical level, there had yet
been no Cabinet discussions on the question. He stated
that the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal
Stalin would in all probability be unable to come to
any final decisions today on the subject of the treat-
ment of Germany and suggested that the matter be the
subject of a joint study on the part of the three
countries.

MR. MOLOTOV favored this idea.

MR. EISEN continued with the suggestion that the
Prime Minister, the President and Marshal Stalin dis-
cuss the treatment of Germany in general terms at to-
day's meeting, that they refer the question to the
three Foreign Ministers for further study and that
they instruct them to report back to the Big Three in
two or three days with definite proposals.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated his approval of this pro-
posal.

4. Economic Matters Relating to Germany.

MR. STEWART MR. STEWART stated in an aside remark to Mr.
Molotov that the United States Government believed it
very important that agreement be reached on certain
economic considerations with respect to Germany.

Mr. Molotov

February 5, 1945

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that the Soviet Government expected to receive reparations from Germany in kind and hoped that the United States would furnish the Soviet Union with long term credits.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that his Government had studied this question and that he personally was ready to discuss it at any time with Mr. Molotov. This could be done here as well as later either in Moscow or in Washington.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that now that the end of the war was in sight it was most important that agreement be reached on these economic questions.

EP/hnw

5.

February 5, 1945

2nd Formal Meeting, Livadia Palace - 4:00 PM
Treatment of Germany

[Printed FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta,
611-623]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Second Formal Meeting

Present: The President Date: February 5, 1945
 Mr. Stettinius Time: 4:00 P. M.
 Mr. Hopkins Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta
 Mr. Justice Byrnes
 Mr. Harriman
 Admiral Leahy
 Mr. Matthews
 Mr. Bohlen

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Bridges
Mr. Dixon
Mr. Wilson
Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Malisky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Pavlov

Subject: Treatment of Germany

3 pages
Reprinted

February 5, 1945

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by stating that it was his understanding that political matters affecting Germany would be discussed today. He said that they would not cover the map of the world and discuss Dakar or Indochina, but confine themselves to the political aspects of the future treatment of Germany. He said that the first question was that of the zones of occupation, which he understood had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission. He said there was one question still open and that was the desire of France to have a zone of occupation and French participation in the control machinery for Germany. He emphasized that the question of zones did not relate to the permanent treatment of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT then handed a map of the agreed tripartite zones to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that although these zones had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission they had not yet been signed by the three governments.

MARSHAL STALIN said that in the discussion of Germany he would like to include the following points:

(1) The question of dismemberment of Germany. He said that at Tehran they had exchanged views on this subject and later at Moscow he had talked this subject over with the Prime Minister. From these informal exchanges of views he had gathered that all were in favor of dismemberment, but nothing had been decided as to the manner of dismemberment. He said he wished to know first as to whether the President or Prime Minister still adhered to the principle of dismemberment.

(2) Marshal Stalin inquired whether the three governments proposed to set up a German government or not and if there was a definite decision on dismemberment whether or not the three governments would set up separate governments for the various parts of Germany.

(3) Marshal Stalin inquired as to how the principle of unconditional surrender would operate in regard to

Germany;

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Germany; for example, if Hitler should agree to surrender unconditionally, would we deal with his government?

(4) Marshal Stalin said his last point dealt with the question of reparations.

THE PRESIDENT replied that, as he understood it, the permanent treatment of Germany might grow out of the question of the zones of occupation, although the two were not directly connected.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that what he wished to find out here was whether or not it was the joint intention to dismember Germany or not. He said that at Tehran, when the question had been discussed, the President had proposed the division of Germany into five parts. The Prime Minister, after some hesitation, had suggested the division of Germany into two parts with a separation of Prussia from the southern part of Germany. He said that he had associated himself with the views of the President, but the discussion at Tehran had only been an exchange of views. He added that at Moscow with the Prime Minister they had discussed the possibility of dividing Germany into two parts with Prussia on the one hand and Bavaria and Austria on the other, with the Ruhr and Westphalia under international control. He said that he thought that this plan was feasible but that no decision had been taken since the President was not there. He inquired whether the time had not come to make a decision on the dismemberment of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Government agreed in principle to dismemberment but he felt that the actual method and a final decision as to the manner of dismemberment was too complicated to be done here in four or five days. He said it would require elaborate searchings by experienced statesmen on the historical, political, economic and sociological aspects of the problem and prolonged study by a subcommittee. He added that the informal talks at Tehran and Moscow had been very general in character and had not been intended to lay down any precise plan. In fact, he added, if he were asked to state here how Germany should be divided he would not

be in

February 5, 1945

be in a position to answer, and for this reason he couldn't commit himself to any definite plan for the dismemberment of Germany. The Prime Minister said, however, that personally he felt that the isolation of Prussia and the elimination of her might from Germany would remove the arch evil--the German war potential would be greatly diminished. He added that a south German state with perhaps a government in Vienna might indicate the line of great division of Germany. He said that we are agreed that Germany should lose certain territories conquered by the Red Army which would form part of the Polish settlement, but he added that the question of the Rhine valley and the industrial areas of the Rhur and Saar capable of producing armaments had not yet been decided; should they go to one country, or should they be independent, or part of Germany, or should they come under the trusteeship of the world organization which would delegate certain large powers to see to it that these areas were not used to threaten the peace of the world. All this, the Prime Minister said, required careful study, and the British Government had not yet any fixed ideas on the subject. Furthermore, he said, no decision had been reached on the question as to whether Prussia after being isolated from the rest of Germany should be further divided internally. He said that we might set up machinery which would examine the best method of studying the question. Such a body could report to the three governments before any final decision is reached. He said we are well prepared for the immediate future, both as to thought and plans concerning the surrender of Germany. All that was required was a final agreement on zones of occupation and the question of a zone for France.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it wasn't clear to him as to the surrender. Suppose, for example, a German group had declared that they had overthrown Hitler and accepted unconditional surrender. Would

the three

important, but that it was not necessary to discuss it with the Germans but only among ourselves.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he agreed with this view but felt a decision should be made now.

THE PRIME

February 5, 1945

the three governments then deal with such a group as with Badoglio in Italy?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in that case we would present the terms of surrender, but if Hitler or Himmler should offer to surrender unconditionally the answer was clear--we would not negotiate under any circumstances with any war criminals and then the war would go on. He added it was more probable they would be killed or in hiding, but another group of Germans might indicate their willingness to accept unconditional surrender. In such a case the three Allies would immediately consult together as to whether they could deal with this group, and if so terms of unconditional surrender would immediately be submitted; if not, war would continue and we would occupy the entire country under a military government.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether the three Allies should bring up dismemberment at the time of the presentation of the terms of unconditional surrender. In fact, he added, would it not be wise to add a clause to these terms saying that Germany would be dismembered, without going into any details?

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not feel there was any need to discuss with any German any question about their future--that unconditional surrender gave us the right to determine the future of Germany which could perhaps best be done at the second stage after unconditional surrender. He said that we reserve under these terms all rights over the lives, property and activities of the Germans.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he did not think that the question of dismemberment was an additional question, but one of the most important.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it was extremely important, but that it was not necessary to discuss it with the Germans but only among ourselves.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he agreed with this view but felt a decision should be made now.

THE PRIME

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THE PRIME MINISTER replied that there was not sufficient time, as it was a problem that required careful study.

THE PRESIDENT then said that it seemed to him that they were both talking about the same thing, and what Marshal Stalin meant was should we not agree in principle here and now on the principle of dismemberment of Germany. He said personally, as stated by him at Tehran, that he was in favor of dismemberment of Germany. He recalled that forty years ago, when he had been in Germany, the concept of the Reich had not really been known then, and any community dealt with the provincial government. For example, if in Bavaria you dealt with the Bavarian government and if in Hesse-Darmstadt you dealt with that government. In the last twenty years, however, everything has become centralized in Berlin. He added that he still thought the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea.

THE PRIME MINISTER interrupted to say "or less", to which the President agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that there was no need, in his opinion, to inform the Germans of our future policy--that they must surrender unconditionally and then await our decision. He said we are dealing with the fate of eighty million people and that required more than eighty minutes to consider. He said it might not be fully determined until a month or so after our troops occupy Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought the Prime Minister was talking about the question of dismemberment. In his view he said he thought it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion of the dismemberment of Germany as he would certainly receive as many plans as there had been German states in the past. He suggested that the Conference ask the three Foreign Ministers to submit a recommendation as to the best method for the study of plans to dismember Germany and to report within twenty-four hours.

THE PRIME MINISTER said the British Government was prepared to accept now the principle of dismemberment

[REDACTED]

of Germany

[REDACTED]

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of Germany and to set up suitable machinery to determine the best method to carry this out, but he couldn't agree to any specific method here.

MARSHAL STALIN said he wished to put a question in order to ascertain exactly what the intentions of the three governments are. He said events in Germany were moving toward catastrophe for the German people and that German defeats would increase in magnitude since the Allies of the Soviet Union intend to launch an important offensive very soon on the Western Front. In addition, he said that Germany was threatened with internal collapse because of the lack of bread and coal with the loss of Silesia and the potential destruction of the Ruhr. He said that such rapid developments made it imperative that the three governments not fall behind events but be ready to deal with the question when the German collapse occurred. He said he fully understood the Prime Minister's difficulties in setting out a detailed plan, and he felt therefore that the President's suggestion might be acceptable: namely, (1) agreement in principle that Germany should be dismembered; (2) to charge a commission of the Foreign Ministers to work out the details; and, (3) to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that Germany would be dismembered without giving any details. He said he thought this latter point was important as it would definitely inform the group in power who would accept surrender unconditionally, whether generals or others, that the intention of the Allies is to dismember Germany. This group by their signature would then bind the German people to this clause. He said he thought it was very risky to follow the plan of the Prime Minister and say nothing to the German people about dismemberment by the Allies. The advantage of saying it in advance would facilitate acceptance by the whole German people of what was in store for them.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read the text of Article 12 of the surrender terms agreed on by the

European

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February 5, 1945

European Advisory Commission, in which he pointed out that the Allied governments have full power and authority over the future of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said that he shared Marshal Stalin's idea of the advisability of informing the German people at the time of surrender of what was in store for them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the psychological effect on the Germans might stiffen their resistance.

Both THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN said there was no question of making the decision public, and MARSHAL STALIN added that as far as he knew the surrender terms which Italy had accepted had not yet been made public.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would find it difficult to go further than to give the assent of the British to the principle of dismemberment and the setting up of machinery to study the best method of putting it into effect.

It was agreed that the three Foreign Ministers should consider Article 12 of the surrender terms instrument in order to ascertain the best method of bringing in a reference to the intention to dismember Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the occupation of Germany might be a long one and that the British Government was not sure that it could bear the burden alone for an extended period and that the French might be able to be of real assistance in this matter.

MARSHAL STALIN said that if the French were given a zone, would not that change the Tripartite control of Germany to a four-part control.

THE PRIME MINISTER

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THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the British
THE PRESIDENT then said that the question of the French zone remained to be decided. He said that he had understood from Marshal Stalin that the French definitely did not wish to annex outright the German territory up to the Rhine.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was not the case, since during the visit of General DeGaulle the French had made it quite plain that they intended to annex permanently the territory up to the Rhine.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not feel it possible to discuss possible frontiers as they were considering only the zones of temporary military occupation. He added that he was for giving the French a definite zone which could come out of the British and possibly the American zones and that all he sought here was that the Soviet Government would agree that the British and American Governments should have the right to work out with the French a zone of occupation. He added that this zone would not in any way affect the proposed Soviet zone.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether or not the granting of a zone to France would not serve as a precedent to other states.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the occupation of Germany might be a long one and that the British Government was not sure that it could bear the burden alone for an extended period and that the French might be able to be of real assistance in this matter.

MARSHAL STALIN said that if the French were given a zone, would not that change the Tripartite control of Germany to a four-nation control.

In the long term control of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER

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THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the British Government expected that if France were given a zone they would, of course, participate in the control machinery, but that in regard to other nations that might assist in the occupation, such as Belgium or Holland, there would be no question of a specific zone and thus no part in the participation of the control machinery.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that he thought it would bring up many complications if we should have four nations instead of three participating in the determination of German matters. He thought that some method might be evolved whereby England might let the French, Belgians and Dutch assist in the occupation but without the right to participate in the Three Power decisions for Germany. He said that if this was accepted the Soviet Government might desire to ask other states to help in the occupation of the Soviet zone without any right to participate in the decisions of the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he felt that this brought up the whole question of the future role of France in Europe and that he personally felt that France should play a very important role. He pointed out that France had had a long experience in dealing with the Germans, that they were the largest naval power, and could be of great help in the administration of Germany. He went on to say that Great Britain did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was problematical how long the United States forces would be able to stay in Europe, and therefore, it was essential that France be relied upon to assist in the long term control of Germany.

He did not believe that France should be on the list of such powers, but that it should be added to the three nations represented here.

THE PRESIDENT

THE PRIME MINISTER

February 5, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that every nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years. He went on to say that he felt that he could obtain support in Congress and throughout the country for any reasonable measures designed to safeguard the future peace, but he did not believe that this would extend to the maintenance of an appreciable American force in Europe.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that France should have a large army since it was the only ally that Great Britain had in the West, whereas, the Soviet Union in addition to their own powerful military establishment could count on the support of the Poles.

MARSHAL STALIN said he fully appreciated the necessity of a strong France, which had recently signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. He added that he had discussed this matter with Deladier before the war and recently in Moscow with General DeGaulle.

THE PRESIDENT then remarked that he felt that France should be given a zone, but that he personally felt that it would be a mistake to bring other nations into the general question of the control of Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that if France was given the right to participate in the control machinery for Germany, it would be difficult to refuse other nations. He repeated that he wished to see France strong power but that he could not destroy the truth, which was that France had contributed little to this war and had opened the gate to the enemy. In his opinion, he said, the control commission for Germany should be run by those who have stood firmly against Germany and have made the greatest sacrifices in bringing victory. He did not believe that France should belong on the list of such powers, but that it should be limited to the three nations represented here.

THE PRIME MINISTER

February 5, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that every nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war and had made mistakes. He said that France had gone down before the attacks of the new German tank and air units and while it was true that France had not been much help in the war, she still remained the nearest neighbor of Germany and of great importance to Great Britain. He agreed that it would be inconvenient to add France to the present group of major allies, but he felt that British public opinion would not understand why France was being excluded from a problem which was of such direct concern to her. He observed that the destiny of great nations was not decided by the temporary state of their technical apparatus. He said that sooner or later we would have to take France in. He mentioned, however, that he had been against the participation of France in the present conference, which he understood was the opinion of the President and had gathered here was also that of Marshal Stalin. He concluded by saying that we must provide for France in the future to stand guard on the left hand of Germany otherwise Great Britain might again be confronted with the specter of Germany on the Channel at the Channel ports.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he would not like to see France as a participant in the control machinery for Germany, although he had no objection to their being given a zone within the British and American zones.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the control commission will be an extraordinary body under the orders of the governments concerned and that there was no reason to fear that basic policy in regard to Germany would be made by this commission.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out at this point that France was in fact a full member of the European Advisory Commission which was the only Allied body, apart from this Conference, which was considering the German problem.

THE PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

February 5, 1945

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that the three foreign ministers be asked to study the question in relation to the French zone to the control commission.

THE PRESIDENT said that he favored the acceptance of the French request for a zone, but that he agreed with Marshal Stalin that France should not take part in the control machinery, otherwise other nations would demand participation. He went on to say, for example, that as a result of the deliberate German destruction of the dikes that large sections of Dutch farm land had been inundated by salt water and that it would be necessary to give the Dutch farmers compensation for a temporary period from German territory. He said that he understood that it would be at least five years before the flooded lands would be suitable for cultivation. If this was done, and he personally felt that it should be done, the Dutch might well claim a voice in the control machinery for Germany.

MR. EDEN then pointed out that there was no question of any zones for any other power except France, but that France would not accept a zone of occupation within the British and American zones without participation in the control commission.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that Great Britain should speak for France in the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER supported Mr. Eden's theories and said that if France got a zone they must be given representation in the control commission, otherwise, the question of the administration of the French zone and its relation to the other zones would be impossible of solution. He again pointed out that the control commission would be a subordinate body similar to the European Advisory Council.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the control machinery for Germany would not be an advisory body but would be actively engaged every day in the administration of Germany. He added that he felt French participation would serve as a precedent for others.

THE PRIME MINISTER

February 5, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER then suggested that the three Foreign Ministers be asked to study the question in relation to the French zone to the control commission.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the European Advisory Commission had already worked out a definite agreement on a tripartite administration of Germany.

MR. EDEN replied that there was no intention of reversing that decision but that he felt as a practical matter the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the control commission should be considered.

In reply to a question from Mr. Molotov, THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that there was no intention of giving the Belgians or Dutch a zone.

MR. EDEN repeated that the case of France was different and that they would not accept a zone subordinate to British control.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he felt that there was agreement on the fact that France should be given a zone but should not be given participation in the control commission. The three Foreign Ministers should study the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the commission.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he would like to discuss the question of German reparations.

THE PRESIDENT said that in regard to reparations there was first of all the question of the desires and needs of principal allies and then subsequently that of the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc. He said he would like to bring up the question of the Russian desires in regard to the utilization of German manpower.

MARSHAL STALIN

[REDACTED]

February 5, 1945

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they had a plan for reparations in kind but were not ready yet to present any plan in regard to German manpower. He then said that Mr. Maisky would present the Soviet plan.

MR. MAISKY then outlined the Soviet plan for reparations for Germany. He said that the Soviet plan for reparations in kind envisaged two categories: (1) the removal from the national wealth of Germany of plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc. to be completed within a period of two years after the end of hostilities, (2) yearly payments in kind to last for ten years. He said that in order to restore Soviet economy which had suffered so much from German aggression, and to safeguard the future security of Europe, it would be necessary to reduce German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry he meant iron and steel, electrical power and chemical industries. Specialized industry useful only for military purposes should be 100% removed. In this category would fall all aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries, etc. He said that the Soviet Government felt that with 20% of her heavy industry Germany would be in position to cover the economic needs of the country. He said the list of goods to be delivered during the 10 year period could be definitely fixed later on. He further proposed that in the interests of the orderly execution of the reparations plan and for the security of Europe there should be an Anglo-Soviet-American control over German economy which would last beyond the period of the reparations payment. All German enterprises which could be utilized for war purposes should be placed under international control with representatives of the Three Powers sitting on the boards of such enterprises. Mr. Maisky went on to say that in the calculation of losses as a result of German aggression the figures had been so astronomical that a selection and the establishment of a system of priorities for compensation had been necessary. He said that even direct material losses, such as public and private property, factories, plants, railroads, houses, institutions, confiscation of materials, etc. had been so large that no

reparations

February 5, 1945

reparations could cover their loss. For this reason, priorities had been established according to indices, (1) the proportional contribution of any one nation to the winning of the war, (2) the material losses suffered by each nation. He said that those countries which had made the highest contribution to the war and had suffered the highest material losses would come into the first category and all others would fall in the second. Mr. Maisky proposed that there should be set up a special reparations committee of the three governments to sit in Moscow. He concluded that the total reparations shown in withdrawals and yearly payments in kind which the Soviets required would reach a total of ten billion dollars.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he recalled very well the end of the last war and that although he did not participate in the peace settlement he had been very fully informed of the discussions. He remembered well that there had been only two billion pounds extracted from Germany in the form of reparations by the Allies after the last war and that even this would not have been possible had not the United States given Germany credits. He said, for example, that they had taken some old Atlantic liners from the Germans, who had immediately proceeded on credit to build new and better ships. He recognized that the suffering which the Soviet Union had undergone in this war had been greater than any other power, but he felt that the Soviet Union would get nowhere near the sum which Mr. Maisky had mentioned from Germany. He said that at the end of the last war the Allies had also indulged themselves with fantastic figures of reparations but that these had turned out to be a myth. He said that the British Isles had also suffered in this war and that the British Government had disposed of the bulk of its assets abroad despite the generous help of Lend-Lease. He said that the British Isles had to export goods in order to import

food

[REDACTED]

February 5, 1945

food, since they were dependent on imports for one-half of their food supply. He said that there would be no victorious country so burdened in an economic sense as Great Britain and that, therefore, if he could see any benefit to Great Britain in large reparations from Germany he would favor such a course but he very much doubted whether this was feasible. He added that other countries, such as Belgium, Holland and Norway also had claims against Germany. He said he was haunted by the specter of a starving Germany which would present a serious problem for the Allies since we could either say "It serves them right" or endeavor to help them. In the latter case, who would pay for the help. The Prime Minister concluded that if you wished a horse to pull a wagon that you would at least have to give it fodder.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that that was right, but care should be taken to see that the horse did not turn around and kick you.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he remembered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money. He said that we had lent over ten billion dollars to Germany and that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German property that had been sequestered during the war had been turned back to the German owners, but that this time he would seek the necessary legislation to retain for the United States all German property in America. He said that the Germans had no capital, factories, or other equipment that the United States needed but that he did not wish to have to contemplate the necessity of helping the Germans to keep from starving. He said, however, that he would willingly support any claims for Soviet reparations since he felt that the German standard of living should not be higher than that of the Soviet Union. He added that just as we expected to help Great Britain expand her export trade, we would also help the Soviet Union retain the reparations in kind which she required, as well as German manpower to reconstruct the devastated regions, but he felt that the Germans

should be

February 5, 1945

should be allowed to live in order that they might not become a burden on the world. The President concluded, however, that despite his desire to see the devastated areas in all countries, in the Soviet Union, in Great Britain, in France, and elsewhere, restored, he felt that reparations could not possibly cover the needs. He concluded that he was in favor of extracting the maximum in reparations from Germany but not to the extent that the people would starve.

MR. MAISKY then stated that while he appreciated the Prime Minister's points concerning the experiences after the last war in the matter of reparations, he felt that the failure in this respect had been due not to the fact that the reparations had been too heavy but to the transfer problem which was the rock on which the reparations policy was founded. He said that he must add that the financial policies of the United States and Great Britain contributed to the German refusal to pay. He said that the Germans had never paid more than one-quarter of the total reparations figure and had received a great deal more in credits and loans. Mr. Maisky stated that the purpose of reparations in kind was to avoid the problem of transfer. He pointed out that the amount desired by the Soviet Union was equal only to 10% of the present United States budget and equal to about six months' of the British expenditures in the war. The Soviet demands for German reparations equaled about 1-1/2 times the United States budget in peace and about 2-1/2 times the British budget. He said, of course, there was no intention to force Germany into starvation but he pointed out that he did not feel that the Germans had a right to a higher standard of living than that of Central Europe. He said Germany can develop her light industry and agriculture and that since the Germans would have no military expenditures there was no reason why Germany could not give a modest but decent standard of living to her people.

power since she had suffered less
Yugoslavia, or Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER

THE PRIME MINISTER

[REDACTED]

February 5, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the question of reparations should be examined by a sub-commission and that this commission should consider the claims of other countries who bore the facts of Nazi aggression as well.

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the commission should be confined to the representatives of the Three Powers, to which STALIN agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was in agreement, that in the first instance the representatives of the three major powers should consider the question.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt that the commission could accomplish nothing unless it was given general directives from this Conference. He said he felt that the commission composed of the representatives of the three principal Allies must work on the basis that these Powers had contributed most to the common victory and should be given priority in the matter of reparations. He said that although the United States did not need machine tools she might well need raw materials which she could receive from Germany. He mentioned that the United States would take over German property in the United States as a part of her share.

THE PRESIDENT expressed agreement with this view.

MARSHAL STALIN continued that in calculating German capabilities, Germany's post-war resources should be also taken into consideration. Then all factories and farms would work not for war but for peace. He repeated that the Three Powers who had made the most sacrifices and had been the organizers of victory should have first claim on reparations. He stated that he did not include France among these powers since she had suffered less than Belgium, Yugoslavia, or Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER

[REDACTED]

February 5, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Allies had done a great deal of the damage in France.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that France could not expect to get reparations from the Allies. He said that he respected France but that he could not ignore the truth and that at the present moment France only had eight divisions in the war, Yugoslavia twelve and the Lublin Government of the Poles thirteen.

It was then agreed that the question of the main directives to a commission on reparations which would sit in Moscow would be referred to the Foreign Ministers who would report back to the Conference. It was agreed that the next meeting would be 4:00 p.m. tomorrow, February 6, and that the questions of Dumbarton Oaks and Poland would be considered.

[REDACTED]



GERMANY
ZONES OF
OCCUPATION

-  BRITISH
-  SOVIET
-  U S
-  JOINT

6.


February 6, 1945

1st Foreign Secretaries Conference, Livadia
Palace - 12:00 Noon

Press Release

Disarmament of Germany

[Printed FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 655-657] 6




MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

First Foreign Secretary Conference

Present: Mr. Stettinius Mr. Harriman Mr. Matthews Mr. Hiss Mr. Bohlen Mr. Foote Mr. Page Mr. Eden Mr. Cadogan Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Jebb Mr. Dixon Mr. Harrison Major Theakstone Mr. Molotov Mr. Vyshinski Mr. Maisky Mr. Gusev Mr. Novikov Mr. Gorlinski	Date: February 6, 1945 Time: 12 noon Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta
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- Subjects:**
1. Press Release.
 2. Procedure for Studying Dismemberment of Germany.
 3. Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC.



[Printed 655-656]

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February 6, 1945

1. Press Release.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that it had been deemed advisable to issue a preliminary communique on the Crimean Conference. He had requested Mr. Steven Early, the Assistant to the President on press matters, to make a few remarks on this subject. A copy of this release is attached hereto.

During the course of the discussion MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the word "common" be inserted before the word "enemy" and Mr. Stettinius suggested that the words "for meeting" and "immediately" be eliminated. Mr. Molotov agreed to these delinations. He stated that he would have to refer the release to Marshal Stalin and that he hoped to give an answer at the 4:00 o'clock meeting.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the release would be held in strict secrecy until its simultaneous issuance in London, Moscow and Washington on Thursday.

2. The Dismemberment of Germany.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that this topic had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. In his opinion much research and study would be necessary before agreement could be reached, but he hoped that they could come to agreement on the general principles involved. At the present session he would like to suggest that the word "dismemberment" be added after the word "demilitarization" in Article 12 of the surrender instrument for Germany. He also wished that consideration be given to the assignment of this topic to the EAC in London for study.

MR. MOLOTOV

February 6, 1945

MR. MOLOTOV stated that Mr. Stettinius' suggestion regarding the addition of the word "dismemberment" was entirely acceptable.

MR. EDEN stated that he had worked out another formula which included the addition of the words "and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state" which he wished included in the second paragraph of Article 12.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the paragraph commence with the words "In order to secure peace and security of Europe, they will take measures for the dismemberment of Germany." He felt that this reading would reflect the agreement reached at yesterday's plenary session.

MR. EDEN maintained that this wording would commit the three powers to too great an extent before the question had been thoroughly studied. He stated that he would prefer merely to add the words "and the dismemberment." He felt that his proposed draft would not only cover the dismemberment of Germany but also its decentralization.

MR. MOLOTOV continued to press for the Soviet draft.

MR. EDEN maintained that the British Delegation could go no further than the addition of the words "and the dismemberment."

MR. STETTINIUS suggested as a possible alternative a phrase reading to the effect that "including dismemberment to the degree necessary to safeguard the peace and security..." He added, however, that his preference was his original suggestion of inserting the words "and the dismemberment."

MR. MOLOTOV was inclined to prefer the second draft submitted by Mr. Stettinius.

MR. EDEN strongly objected.

MR. MOLOTOV

[Printed 657]

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February 6, 1945

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested rephrasing the paragraph by including the words "for the future peace and security" and eliminating the words "as deemed requisite."

MR. EDEN maintained that he would be unable to accept this draft, since it was too broad. However, he would readily accept Mr. Stettinius' original proposal. The British Government could go no further.

After some discussion as to the merits of Mr. Stettinius' first and second proposals, during which Mr. Molotov mentioned that the second proposal was preferable since it was more definite and more closely reflected what Mr. Churchill had said at yesterday's plenary session, it was decided to sum up the discussion by stating that all three Foreign Secretaries desired the word "dismemberment" included in Article 12 and that Mr. Eden would consult with Mr. Churchill as to whether this course was preferred by him to Mr. Stettinius' second proposal.

3. Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired whether it might not be agreed that the question concerning the dismemberment of Germany might not be referred to the EAC for study.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that this question be taken up at a later time. He said that since it was a specific matter it might be better to establish a special commission to study the question.

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[16-1-43]

PRESS COMMUNIQUE

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, their foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. While their discussions have not progressed as yet beyond the preliminary stages, they have been marked by most encouraging expressions of unity of purpose, frankness and friendship. Meetings are continuing day and night.

The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, for meeting the immediate political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain the peace.

A complete communique will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.

February 6, 1943

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE PRESS RELEASE

February 7, 1945.

Statement for the press and radio released at
4:30 o'clock p.m., Eastern War Time Wednesday,
February 7, 1945

"The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, the three foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

"Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.

"The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

"Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain Peace.

"A communique will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference."

Approved by Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Released simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow.

7.

February 6, 1945

3rd Formal Meeting, Livadia Palace - 4:00 pm
World Security Organization
The Polish Question

Printed FRUS, Conferences at Malta and
Yalta, 660-671

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Third Formal Meeting

Present:	The President	Date:	February 6, 1945
	Mr. Stettinius	Time:	4:00 p.m.
	Admiral Leahy	Place:	Livadia Palace, Yalta
	Mr. Byrnes		
	Mr. Hopkins		
	Mr. Harriman		
	Mr. Matthews		
	Mr. Hiss		
	Mr. Bohlen		

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Bridges
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Subject: 1. World Security Organization.
2. The Polish Question

February 6, 1945

WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the Conference.

MR. STETTINIUS said it had been decided to insert the word "dismemberment" of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional surrender terms, but that Mr. Molotov had had some additional phrases which he wished to see put in.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional words.

MR. STETTINIUS then said that they could report full agreement to insert the word "dismemberment" into Article 12 of the surrender terms but that they would like to have some more time before reporting on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to guard the Western approaches to the Channel.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had spoken on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in the United States would be prepared to support an international organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this might change their attitude in regard to the question of troops. The President then added that he felt the Conference

should

February 6, 1945

should now proceed to the consideration of the United States proposal in regard to Dumbarton Oaks. He felt strongly that all the nations of the world shared a common desire to see the elimination of war for at least fifty years. He said he was not so optimistic as to believe in eternal peace, but he did believe fifty years of peace were feasible and possible. He said that since neither he, Marshal Stalin, nor the Prime Minister had been present at Dumbarton Oaks he would ask the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) who had been chairman of that conference to explain the United States position on the question of voting in the Security Council.

MR. STETTINIUS then read the following statement of the American position on voting in the Council:

"1. Review of Status of this Question.

"It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

"At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

"On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

'C. VOTING

'1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

'2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

'3. Decisions

February 6, 1945

██████████

'3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"2. Analysis of the American Proposal.

"(a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

"(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

"We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

██████████

"The paper

██████████

February 6, 1945

"The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

"3. Reasons for the American Position.

"From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

"First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.

"Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.

"We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

"It is our earnest hope that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President's proposal."

THE PRESIDENT

February 6, 1945

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) might usefully analyze the effect of the United States proposal on the decisions in the Council.

MR. STETTINIUS reported as follows:

"II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

"Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

"I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

- "1. Admission of new members;
- "2. Suspension of a member;
- "3. Expulsion of a member;
- "4. Election of the Secretary General.

"II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

"III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

- "1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

"2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

"III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as "3. What and procedures of settlement;

"IV. Whether

February 6, 1945

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred

"3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

"4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

"IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

"V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

"VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

"The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

"I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

"II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

"III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

"IV. Whether

February 6, 1945

"IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

"V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy."

MARSHAL STALIN inquired what was new in Mr. Stettinius' statement that had not been included in the President's message of December 5, 1944.

THE PRESIDENT replied that there had been no change of any significance.

MR. STETTINIUS said that there had been a minor drafting change (this minor change was explained to MR. MOLOTOV by MR. BOHLEN on the document).

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the question of voting in the Security Council and, therefore, he wished to study the United States proposal and in particular the effect of the drafting change and would be ready to discuss the question tomorrow.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Government had given the most careful consideration to the United States proposals. He had not agreed with the original proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks since he was anxious that the realities of the situation of the Three Great Powers should be considered, but in studying the President's latest proposal his anxieties on that score had been removed. He could thus say that on behalf of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Empire and, he believed, the Self-Governing Dominions the President's new proposals were entirely satisfactory. He said that in the last resort world

peace depended

be necessary

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peace depended on the friendship and cooperation of the three Governments, but that the British Government would consider that they were committing an injustice if reservation were not made for free statement of their grievances by small countries. The matter looks as though the Three Great Powers were trying to rule the world, whereas, our desires are to save the world and save it from a repetition of the horrors of this war. He said he felt that the Three Major Powers should make a proud submission. He said that he had looked into the whole matter as it would affect British interests and would give an illustration of why the British Government does not think the President's proposal would bring any harm to British interests. He said, for example, if China should raise the question of the return of Hongkong under the President's proposal, both China and Great Britain would be precluded from voting in regard to the methods of settlement of this controversy, as listed in the five points of the analysis read by Mr. Stettinius. In the last analysis Great Britain would be protected against any decision adverse to her interests by the exercise of the veto power under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius' analysis.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether or not Egypt, for example, would be on the assembly.

MR. EDEN replied "yes, but not on the Council unless elected."

MARSHAL STALIN then said suppose Egypt raised the question of the return of the Suez Canal.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he hoped that Marshal Stalin would let him finish his illustration in regard to Hongkong.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius' analysis Great Britain would in fact have the right by their veto to stop all action against Great Britain by the Council of the World Organization. He, therefore, felt that it would not

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be necessary for Great Britain to agree to any decision contrary to her own interests and, for example, Great Britain would not be required to return Hongkong unless they felt that this should be done. China should, however, have the right to speak and the same considerations would apply to Egypt if that country had a complaint in regard to the Suez Canal. He concluded that he felt that insofar as the United States was concerned the same considerations would also apply. For example, in the event that Argentina raised a complaint against the United States.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he recalled that in the Tehran Declaration the Three Powers had stated:

"We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world..."

THE PRESIDENT added that he thought this Declaration was pertinent to the discussion in progress.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that since he saw no reason to fear the United States proposals he was glad to associate the British Government with them. He added that because of our great power, which is still protected by the veto if we do not agree, we should allow others to be heard.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he would like to have this document to study, since only hearing it orally it was impossible to catch all of the implications. He said that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals already give the right of discussion in the assembly, but he did not believe that any nation would be satisfied with expressing its opinion. They would want some decision. He said that if Mr. Churchill thought that China after raising the question of Hongkong would be satisfied with merely expressing her opinion, he was mistaken since China would want a decision. The same was true

an opportunity for studying in detail of Egypt

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of Egypt in the possible question of the Suez Canal. He added that it was not a question of one power or three powers desiring to be masters of the world since he felt that the Dumbarton Oaks organization put a brake on that. He said that he would like to ask for further clarification on what powers Mr. Churchill had in mind when he spoke of a desire to rule the world. He said that he was sure Great Britain had no such desire, nor did the United States and that that left only the U.S.S.R.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he had spoken of the three Great Powers who could collectively place themselves so high over the others that the whole world would say these three desired to rule.

MARSHAL STALIN then said ironically that it looks as though two Great Powers have already accepted a document which would avoid any such accusation but that the third has not yet signified its assent. He then went on to say that in his opinion there was a more serious question than the voting procedure or the question of the domination of the world. They all knew that as long as the three of them lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions, but after all, ten years from now none of them might be present. A new generation would come into being not knowing the horrors of the present war. He felt that there was, therefore, an obligation to create for the future generation such an organization as would secure peace for at least fifty years. He said the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future between the three Great Powers and that the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future. The covenant of the new World Organization should have this as its primary task. He said the greatest danger was conflict between the three Great Powers represented here, but that if unity could be preserved there was little danger of the renewal of German aggression. He said, therefore, a covenant must be worked out which would prevent conflicts between the three Great Powers. Marshal Stalin apologized for not having had an opportunity for studying in detail the Dumbarton

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Oaks proposals. He said he had been busy on other matters. He said that as he understood it, there were two categories of disputes involved in Mr. Stettinius' explanation: (1) conflicts which would require the application of sanctions, economic, political or military, and (2) conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means. He said in regard to the first the permanent members had a right to vote even if they were parties to such disputes. Under the second category, however, in conflicts susceptible to settlement by peaceful means, the parties in dispute would not be allowed to vote. He added that we Russians were being accused of spending too much time on the technique of voting, which he admitted. But they attached great importance to this question since all decisions were made by votes and they were interested in the decisions, not in the discussions. He said, for example, if China or Egypt raised complaints against England they would not be without friends or protectors in the assembly.

Both the PRIME MINISTER and MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that under the United States proposal the power of the World Organization could not be directed against any of the permanent members.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he was afraid that any conflict might break the unity of our united front.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he saw the force of that argument, but he did not believe that the world organization would eliminate disputes between powers and that would remain the function of diplomacy.

MARSHAL STALIN said that his colleagues in Moscow could not forget the events of December 1939 during the Finnish war when at the instigation of England and France the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion against the Soviet Union, even going so far as to speak of a crusade.

THE PRIME MINISTER

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THE PRIME MINISTER answered that at that time the British and French Governments were very angry at the Soviet Union and in any event any such action was impossible under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was not thinking of expulsion but of the question of the mobilization of opinion against one country.

THE PRIME MINISTER answered that he thought this might happen to any nation, but he doubted very much if either the President or Marshal Stalin would lead a savage attack against Great Britain and he felt this applied also to the other two countries.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he felt that the unity of the Great Powers was one of our first aims and that the United States policy promoted rather than impaired this aim. He said that should there unfortunately be any differences between the Great Powers, and there might well be, this fact would become fully known to the world no matter what voting procedure was adopted. In any event, there was no method of preventing discussions of differences in the assembly. He said that full and friendly discussions in the Council would in no sense promote disunity, but on the contrary, would serve to demonstrate the confidence which the Great Powers had in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

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The Polish Question

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Polish question should be taken up now or postponed until the next meeting.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped that at least a start could be made today.

THE PRESIDENT said that the United States was farther away from Poland than anyone else here, and that there were times when a long distance point of view was useful. He said that at Tehran he had stated that he believed the American people were in general favorably inclined to the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland, but he felt that if the Soviet Government would consider a concession in regard to Lwow and the oil deposits in the Province of Lwow that would have a very salutary effect. He said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration and would not insist on it. He said that in regard to the government he wished to see the creation of a representative government which could have the support of all the great powers and which could be composed of representatives of the principal parties of Poland. He said one possibility which had been suggested was the creation of a Presidential Council composed of Polish leaders which could then create a government composed of the chiefs of the five political parties--Workers Party, Peasant Party, Socialist Party, etc. He said that one thing must be made certain and that was that Poland should maintain the most friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Poland should maintain friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with the other Allies.

THE PRESIDENT said he had merely put forth a suggestion but he thought if we could solve the

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Polish question it would be a great help to all of us. He added he didn't know personally any members of the London government or Lublin government, but he had met Mr. Mikolajczyk who had made a deep impression on him as a sincere and an honest man.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had consistently declared in Parliament and elsewhere that the British Government would support the Curzon Line, even leaving Lwow to the Soviet Union. He had been criticized for this and so had Mr. Eden, but he felt that after the burdens which Russia had borne in this war the Curzon Line was not a decision of force but one of right. He said he remained in that position. Of course, he added, if the mighty Soviet Union could make some gesture to the much weaker country, such as the relinquishment of Lwow, this act of magnanimity would be acclaimed and admired. He said he was much more interested in sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier line--he wanted to see the Poles have a home where they could organize their lives as they wished. That was an objective that he had often heard Marshal Stalin proclaim most firmly, and he put his trust in those declarations. He said that he therefore had not considered the question of the frontier as a question of vital importance. It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain had gone to war to protect Poland against German aggression at a time when that decision was most risky, and it had almost cost them their life in the world. He said Great Britain had no material interest in Poland, but the question was one of honor and that his government would therefore never be content with a solution which did not leave Poland a free and independent state. The freedom of Poland, however, did not cover any hostile designs or intrigue against the U.S.S.R., and none of us should permit this. It is the earnest desire of the British Government that Poland be mistress in her own house and captain of her soul. He said that the British Government recognized the present Polish government in London but did not have intimate contact with it. He said he had known Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer and had

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found them good and honest men. He inquired whether there might be some possibility of forming a government here for Poland which would utilize these men. If this could be done all the great powers could then recognize it as an interim government until such time as the Poland government by free vote could select and form their own government. He concluded by saying he was interested in the President's suggestion.

At the suggestion of Marshal Stalin, there was a ten-minute intermission.

MARSHAL STALIN then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish question; Mr. Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past greivances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Since it was impossible by the force of Russian armies alone to close from the outside this corridor, it could be done only by Poland's own forces. It was very important, therefore, to have Poland independent, strong and democratic. It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death. It was for this reason that there had been a great change from the policies of the Czars who had wished to suppress and assimilate Poland. In regard to the questions raised here on which we have different opinions, the following might be said:

In regard to the Curzon Line, concessions in regard to Lwow and the Lwow Province, and Mr. Churchill's reference to a magnanimous act on our part, it is necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed this line. The Russians had not been invited and the line was established against their will. Lenin had opposed giving Belyetok Province

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to the Poles but the Curzon Line gives it to Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin's position in regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau? We could not then return to Moscow and face the people who would say Stalin and Molotov have been less sure defenders of Russian interest than Curzon and Clemenceau. It is, therefore, impossible to agree with the proposed modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although it will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from Germany. When he was in Moscow Mr. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear that Poland's frontier would extend to the West Neisse River and I favor the Polish frontier on the West Neisse and ask the conference to support this proposal.

As to the question of the Polish government, Mr. Churchill has said it would be good to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue, for without participation of the Poles it is impossible to create a Polish government. I am called a dictator and not a democrat, but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse to create a Polish government without the Poles being consulted--the question can only be settled with the consent of the Poles. Last autumn in Moscow there was a good chance for a fusion of the various Polish elements and in the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Lublin Poles various points of agreement were reached as Mr. Churchill will remember. Mikolajczyk left for London but did not return since he was expelled from office precisely because he wanted agreement. Artieszewski and Raskiewycz are not only against agreement but are hostile to any idea of an agreement. Artieszewski has characterized the Lublin Poles as bandits and criminals and they naturally pay him back in the same coin. It will be difficult to bring them together. The Warsaw Poles, Beirut and Osobka Morawski, do not even want to talk about any fusion with the London government. I asked them what concessions they might make in this respect and they said they could tolerate Jelikowski or Grabski but they do not even want to hear about Mikolajczyk being prime minister. I am prepared to support any attempt to reach a solution that would offer some

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of success. Should we ask the Warsaw Poles to come here or perhaps come to Moscow? I must say that the Warsaw government has a democratic base equal at least to that of de Gaulle.

As a military man I demand from a country liberated by the Red Army that there be no civil war in the rear. The men in the Red Army are indifferent to the type of government as long as it will maintain order and they will not be shot in the back. The Warsaw, or Lublin, government has not badly fulfilled this task. There are, however, agents of the London government who claim to be agents of the underground forces of resistance. I must say that no good and much evil comes from these forces. Up to the present time they have killed 212 of our military men. They attack our supply bases to obtain arms. Although it has been proclaimed that all radio stations must be registered and obtain permission to operate, agents of the London government are violating these regulations. We have arrested some of them and if they continue to disturb our rear we will shoot them as military law requires. When I compare what the agents of the Lublin government have done and what the agents of the London government have done I see the first are good and the second bad. We want tranquility in our rear. We will support the government which gives us peace in the rear, and as a military man I could not do otherwise. Without a secure rear there can be no more victories for the Red Army. Any military man and even the non-military man will understand this situation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he must put on record the fact that the British and Soviet Governments have different sources of information in Poland and therefore they obtain different views of the situation there. He said it is possible that their reports are mistaken as it is not always possible to believe everything that anyone tells you. He believed, he added, that with the best of all their information he

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could not feel that the Lublin government represents more than one third of the people and would be maintained in power if the people were free to express their opinion. One of the reasons why the British have so earnestly sought a solution had been the fear that the Polish underground army would come into collision with the Lublin government, which would lead to great bloodshed, arrests and deportations which could not fail to have a bad effect on the whole Polish question. The Prime Minister said he agreed that anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished, but he repeated that the British Government could not agree to recognizing the Lublin government of Poland.

The Conference then adjourned until four o'clock tomorrow.

8.

February 7, 1945

2nd Foreign Secretaries Conference, Korea
Villa - 12:00 Noon.

Dumbarton Oaks

Disarmament of Germany

French Zone of Occupation in Germany and
participation in Control Commission

Reparations

[Printed in Conferences at Malta
d Yalta, 699-704]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Second Foreign Secretaries Conference

Present:

Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bliss
Mr. Page

Date: February 7, 1945
Time: 12 noon
Place: Korea's Villa, Yalta

Mr. Eden
Mr. Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Dixon
Mr. Harrison
Major Thesakstone

Mr. Kolotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Malin
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Novikov
Mr. Gorilinski

Subjects:

1. Dumbarton Oaks.
2. The Dismemberment of Germany.
3. Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany.
4. The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to Receive a Zone of Occupation.
5. Reparations.

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1. Dumbarton Oaks.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired at the outset whether there were any questions regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American Delegation had failed to make clear at yesterday's plenary session. He said that if so he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any questions which remained open or which needed to be expanded.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the World Security Organization had not been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued that although he had a few questions to advance he was not prepared to go into this subject at the present time.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points to bring up.

2. The Dismemberment of Germany.

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in Article 12 of the German surrender instrument to the addition of the words "and the dismemberment" after the word "demilitarization." He suggested that a sub-committee consisting of British, American and Soviet representatives be appointed to work out the exact wording of Article 12.

It was decided to authorize Messrs. Vyshinski, Cadogan and Matthews to make a final redraft of Article 12 which would include the addition of the word "dismemberment" and to authorize a commission consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev to study the question of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.

3. Creation of a

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3. Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure
for the Dismemberment of Germany.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that such a commission be set up in London consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a most important matter. If this question were not referred to the EAC the prestige of that body would surely be diminished. He, therefore, thought that the question of taking away this work from the EAC should be carefully considered.

MR. EDEN pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were included in the EAC the French would participate in this work.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr. Winant as the American representative.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the subject under discussion was the study of procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual dismemberment or detail thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over to the EAC.

MR. EDEN remarked that he thought that the body handling this question should go further than merely studying questions of procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he believed, should examine when this separation should take place; should look into boundary questions and measures needed to insure the proper functioning and survival of the new states. What relations should be permitted between them and foreign powers should also be studied. He stated that it might be necessary to request that a report be drawn up on the practicability of the dismemberment of Germany. He also questioned whether the commission was to undertake the type of work referred to in the afore-mentioned terms of reference or merely to decide how this work was to be done.

MR. MOLOTOV

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MR. MOLOTOV stated that he did not believe that there was any need for a special commission at this stage and suggested that the question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He expressed doubt that the foreign secretaries had received any directive to form an actual commission.

MR. EDEN stated that they had not; however they had the power to make recommendations.

MR. MOLOTOV continued that he was not insisting on a commission.

MR. EDEN stated that he felt worried about the absence of the French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on control of the Ruhr and Rhine. He felt that it would be a mistake to keep them out.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the question of French participation be subsequently decided by Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev in London.

MESSRS. STETTINIUS and EDEN stated that this would be agreeable.

MR. EDEN stated that in view of his many activities it might be impossible for him personally to participate in the London discussions.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he of course had the right to deputize someone to represent him.

4. The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to receive a Zone of Occupation.

MR. MOLOTOV submitted a statement on this matter (see attached) and inquired whether it could be used for a basis of discussion.

MR. EDEN stated that since it had been agreed upon that France would receive a zone of occupation he hoped that it might also be agreed that France would participate on the Control Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed the opinion that de Gaulle in

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all probability would refuse to accept a zone if he did not have the same treatment on the Control Commission as the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Even if France were to accept a zone they would always have trouble in administering it if they were not represented on the commission. He maintained that he could not see why it was any more of a departure to have France on the commission than on the EAC. He pointed out that the Prime Minister opposed enlarging the present three-power conferences; however, he could not see how the participation of France on the Control Commission would affect this view.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he felt that at the present stage the question of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to study French participation on the Control Commission it could be done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should be in the hands of the three commanders-in-chief.

It was decided that the three secretaries should submit a report to the plenary session stating that: (a) it had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation; and, (b) with respect to the question concerning the participation of France in the Control Commission, Messrs. Molotov and Stettinius considered it appropriate to submit this question to the consideration of the EAC, while Mr. Eden considered it appropriate to study the question at the present time and to assign to France a place on the Control Commission.

MR. EDEN stated that he believed that if France were admitted to the Control Commission the three foreign secretaries should agree that no other power should be given a zone of occupation.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss that question at the present conference.

5. Reparations

MR. MOLOTOV submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in brief (copy attached). He requested Mr. Maisky to explain the considerations which formed the basis of the Soviet statement.

MR. MAISKY

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MR. MAISKY stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure of 20 billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that this national wealth would be reduced by 40 per cent or less during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of Germany at the termination of the war would amount to 75 billion dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22-23 billion dollars. The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be left to Germany which would secure for that country living standards comparable to those prevailing in Central Europe. These were lower than in Germany but quite decent. With respect to the second item it had been figured that the national income of Germany before the war amounted to 30 billion dollars annually. The war would lower this income by 30-35 per cent and would bring it to the neighborhood of approximately 18-20 billion. The Soviet Government proposed to take one billion dollars annually, or 5-6 per cent from the German national income. This was not a large sum and could be supported by Germany.

MR. EDEN stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime Minister had stated that the test for reparations payments should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He continued that he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there would be no objections to the addition in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr. Eden.

MR. STETTINIUS

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MR. STETTINIUS stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary session had stated that the United States itself would not be interested in large reparations, except with respect to German foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the hope that at this afternoon's plenary session the foreign secretaries could report that the reparation matter had been discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence work on the question of reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that whenever the British and American representatives were prepared he would be ready to continue the discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of those countries. However, in view of their losses, especially at sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr. Stettinius' proposal that the foreign ministers report to the plenary session that the question of reparations had been discussed, would be discussed further, and that a reparations commission would be set up in Moscow which would immediately commence work on this question.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that it would be helpful for the American Delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be discussed at the Crimean Conference or at a later date.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this question was very complicated, that the Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the reparations Commission in Moscow.

MR. MOLOTOV'S interpreter then read a second paper on the creation of the reparations commission (see attached). Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government was prepared to accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet agreed on the principles mentioned in it.

MR. EDEN

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MR. EDEM inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should not also be authorized to study German industry in connection with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference of the commission.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that the commission would deal with German industry only in connection with reparations. The question of security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it was not the principal task of the commission.

MR. STETTINIUS suggested that as a practical measure the German Control Commission should have the responsibility for the control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparations Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policy of the Control Machinery and should establish liaison with it.

MR. MOLOTOV was in agreement with this proposal.

THIS AREA TO BE OCCUPIED BY THE
FRENCH IN CONNECTION WITH THE
COMMISSION REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED
BY THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

REGARDING A SEPARATE ZONE OF OCCUPATION
IN GERMANY TO BE ALLOTTED TO FRANCE

1. It has been found desirable to allot to France a separate zone of occupation in Germany for occupation by French forces.

2. It has been decided that the French occupational authorities shall exercise control in their zone of occupation under the general guidance of the Control Council.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EXACTION OF REPARATIONS
FROM GERMANY

1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have organized victory over the enemy. The Committee shall consist of these countries.

All other countries are to receive reparations secondly.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

(a) Removal in a single payment in the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

(b) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war is fixed at 20 billion dollars.

This amount shall be distributed as follows:

- (a) USSR - 10 billion dollars,
- (b) United Kingdom and U.S.A. - 8 billion dollars,
- (c) All other countries - 2 billion dollars.

REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ALLIED
REPARATION COMMITTEE

The Allied Reparation Committee shall be set up on the following basis:

1. The Committee shall consist of three representatives one from U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and U.S.A. Each representative shall be entitled to call in to assist in the work of the Committee any number of experts.

2. The function of the Committee shall be to work out a detailed plan for exaction of reparations from Germany according to the principles adopted at the Crimean Conference of the Three Powers.

3. The Governments of USSR, USA and the United Kingdom shall determine the moment when the representatives of other Allied Powers will be invited to participate in the Allied Committee as well as define the forms of participation of these Powers in the Committee.

4. The activities of the Committee shall proceed in strict secrecy.

5. The Allied Reparation Committee shall be established in Moscow.

February 7, 1945

4th Formal Meeting, Livadia Palace - 4:00 PM

Dismemberment of Germany

Poland

World Security Organization

Zone of Occupation in Germany for France and

French Participation in Control Commission

[Printed in part in FRUS, Conferences at
[REDACTED] Malta and Yalta, 708-718,
727-728]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Fourth Formal Meeting

Present: The President Date: February 7, 1945
 Mr. Stettinius Time: 4:00 p.m.
 Admiral Leahy Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta
 Mr. Byrnes
 Mr. Hopkins
 Mr. Harriman
 Mr. Matthews
 Mr. Hiss
 Mr. Bohlen

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Bridges
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Subject: 1. Dismemberment of Germany
 2. Poland
 3. World Security Organization.
 4. Zone of Occupation in Germany for France
 and French Participation in the Control
 Commission.

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feel desirable to refer the question to the SAC. Mr. Egan considers it necessary

THE PRESIDENT said in regard to the Polish question he wished again to emphasize that he was less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he was in the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he did not attach any importance to the continuity or legality of any Polish Government since he thought in some years there had in reality been no Polish Government. He added that before proceeding with the Polish question he understood that Mr. Molotov had a report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers today.

MR. MOLOTOV then read the results of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, as follows:

"DECISIONS ADOPTED AT THE MEETING
OF THE THREE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, V. M. MOLOTOV, MR. STETTINIUS
AND MR. EDEN.

February 7, 1945.

"1. Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany.

(a) A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument "unconditional surrender of Germany" having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word "dismemberment."

(b) The study of the question of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Egan, Mr. Winant and F. T. Gusev.

"2. Regarding the Zone of Occupation in Germany for France.

(a) The allotment to France of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupational forces has been agreed upon.

(b) As regards the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission, V. M. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius

feel

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feel desirable to refer the question to the EAC. Mr. Eden considers it necessary to discuss this question now and to give France a place on the Control Commission.

"3. Regarding the Reparations to be Exacted from Germany.

(a) It was agreed that in the paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of sacrifices borne.

(b) It was decided that the residence of the Reparations Committee should be in the City of Moscow. It was agreed that the Committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.

(c) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the matter of the reparations which have been submitted by V. M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the reparations from Germany, and, second, regarding the organization of an Allied Reparations Committee, should be continued at the Crimean Conference."

THE PRESIDENT said that we are all grateful for the productive work of the three Foreign Ministers.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that he joined the President in thanking the Committee for their fruitful work but he said that since he had only heard their report orally he would wish to study the English translation, although, except for one point, he felt that he would be in complete agreement.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the document included Mr. Eden's reservation on France, to which MR. EDEN replied in the affirmative.

THE PRIME MINISTER

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THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Government was unconvinced by the argument that it would be possible to accord a zone to the French without participation in the Control Commission. If the French were given a zone without participation they would cause endless trouble. If we were strict in our zones, they might be lenient in theirs and vice versa. He felt that it was of the utmost importance that there should be uniformity in the treatment of Germany by the three or four Allies. He repeated that he felt the Control Commission for Germany would be a subordinate instrument as was the case in Italy, although we recognized that the German Commission would have more important tasks. He said he wished to make it clear that he did not consider that French participation in the Control Commission would give them any right to attend a conference such as this one, at least for the time being. He said he must state frankly that he found the arguments on the subject somewhat futile since it was obvious that France would accept no zone unless they were given participation in the Control Commission and he for one thought that they were right. He felt it was no good to refer the question to the European Advisory Commission which was a weaker body and particularly as France was represented on the Commission and only a deadlock could result with the French and British on one side and the Russians and Americans on the other. He therefore was of the opinion that the matter should be settled here, but it still required further study.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether the Prime Minister meant that it should be settled now or later.

THE PRIME MINISTER answered that it should be done now, but at some later stage of this Conference.

THE PRESIDENT then observed that would it not be better to postpone it for two or three weeks instead of two or three days.

THE PRIME MINISTER

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THE PRIME MINISTER answered that he felt that once they had separated after this Conference it would be difficult to settle the question.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the three Governments had been able to settle a good many things by correspondence. Marshal Stalin then said that in the European Advisory Commission they could at least have the benefit of the French opinion which was not represented here.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he felt that he could anticipate what would be the French opinion and repeated that he did not wish France to be included in the present club which he felt was very exclusive, at least for awhile. He added, however, that he felt that the fact of permitting France to join the Control Commission would keep them quiet for awhile.

THE PRESIDENT said that he agreed that France should not join this body but he was doubtful whether this would keep them quiet. He then suggested that they go on with the Polish question.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that he had received the President's letter containing the suggestion that they summon here from Lublin two representatives from the Lublin Government and two representatives from other elements of Polish public opinion and that in the presence of these four Poles they should endeavor to settle the question of a new interim government for Poland which would be pledged to hold free elections when conditions permitted. He said he noted that there were three personalities from London, namely, Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, who had been mentioned by the President as possible members of this new government. He said he had received the President's letter only an hour and a half ago and he had endeavored to reach the Lublin Poles by telephone but had been informed that they were away in Cracow and Lutz. He had attempted to ascertain their opinion.

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As to the others, he was not sure that they could be located in time for them to come to the Crimea and he mentioned in this connection especially Vicenta, Witos and Sapieha. The Marshal added that Mr. Molotov has worked out some proposals on the Polish question which appeared to approach the President's suggestions, but that these proposals were not typed out. He suggested, therefore, that they proceed to the consideration of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and he would ask Mr. Molotov to state the views of the Soviet Government.

MR. MOLOTOV said that yesterday we have heard Mr. Stettinius give a full report and explanations of the President's proposals and that this report and explanation had been satisfactory and had made the issue clear to the Soviet Delegation. He said that they had always also followed closely Mr. Churchill's remarks on the subject. He added that after hearing Mr. Stettinius' report and Mr. Churchill's remarks, which had clarified the subject, the Soviet Government felt that these proposals fully guaranteed the unity of the Great Powers in the matter of preservation of peace. Since this had been the main Soviet purpose at Dumbarton Oaks and they felt that the new proposals fully safeguarded this principle, he could state that they were entirely acceptable and that they had no comments to offer. He felt that there was full agreement on this subject. Mr. Molotov said that there was one question raised at Dumbarton Oaks, mainly that of participation of the Soviet Republics as initial members of the World Organization. He said the Soviet views were known as were those of the British and American Governments. He said the Soviet views were based on the constitutional changes which had occurred in February of last year and he did not think that this Conference should ignore this request.

It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks, but they would be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of the Soviet Republics as original members. These three Republics were the Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian and he felt

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the World Organization. He said he thought that this conference could take place at the end of March, and that three or at any rate two should have the right to participate as original members. He said that it was superfluous to explain the size, population and importance of the Ukraine, White Russia or Lithuania or their importance in foreign affairs. He said that as these three Republics had borne the greatest sacrifices in the war and were the first to be invaded by the enemy, it was only fair, therefore, that these three or at any rate two be original members. He said that the Soviet Government put these proposals before the President and the Prime Minister and hoped that they would be accepted.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant members of the Assembly.

MR. MOLOTOV replied "yes," that they should be included among other members of that body. The Dominions of the British Commonwealth have gradually and patiently achieved their place as entities in international affairs. He said he felt that it was only right that three, or at least two, of these Soviet Republics should find a worthy place among the members of the Assembly. Their sacrifices and contributions to the war earned them this place. He said in closing that he wished to repeat that he fully agreed with the President's proposals and withdrew any objections or amendments but would request that three, or at least two, of the Soviet Republics mentioned above be given a chance to become equal members of the World Organization.

THE PRESIDENT said he was very happy to hear from Mr. Molotov the agreement of the Soviet Government to his proposals on voting in the Council. He felt that this was a great step forward which would be welcomed by all the peoples of the world. He said that he thought the next step was to consider the question of summoning a conference to organize the setting up of

the World

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the World Organization. He said he thought that this conference could take place at the end of March, although it might be physically possible to do it within the next four weeks. He added that he had been greatly interested in what Mr. Molotov had said in regard to the participation of the Soviet Republics. He added that the British Empire, the USSR and the United States were very different in structure and in tradition. The British Empire, for example, had many large units, such as Canada, Australia, etc. The USSR had a different national structure. The United States had one language and one Foreign Minister. He felt, therefore, that Mr. Molotov's suggestion should be studied, particularly in the light of the possibility that if the larger nations were given more than one vote it might prejudice the thesis of one vote for each member. He mentioned that certain countries are large in area, though small in population and referred in this connection to Brazil which he said was smaller than the USSR but larger than the United States. On the other hand, there were some countries that were small in area but large in population, such as Honduras and Haiti. He also mentioned the fact that there were a number of nations associated with the United Nations, such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Iceland, and others, which had broken relations with Germany but which were not at war. He concluded with the statement that he felt that the important thing was to proceed with the plans for a conference to set up the World Organization and that the question of the admission of countries not members of the United Nations could be considered either at that time or after the organization was in operation. He said he suggested, therefore, that the question raised by Mr. Molotov should be studied by the Foreign Ministers who might also make recommendations as to the time and place of the conference and as to what nations should be invited.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to express his heartfelt thanks to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov for this great step forward which he felt would bring joy and relief to the peoples of the world. On the question of membership of the Soviet Republics, he said this had been put before us for the first time. He said he must agree with the President that the United States and the British Empire were different, that during the last twenty-five years the Self-Governing Dominions

have taken

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have taken their place in world affairs and have worked for peace and, if he might say so, for the furtherance of Democratic processes. The Dominions had come into the war when Great Britain declared war against Germany, knowing full well the weakness of Great Britain at that time. Great Britain had had no means of forcing them into this decision and into which they knew they could not often be consulted on major matters. He said that Great Britain could not agree to any organization which would reduce the status of the Dominions or exclude them from participation. That is why, Mr. President, the Prime Minister said, he had great sympathy with the Soviet request. His heart went out to mighty Russia which though bleeding was beating down the tyrants in her path. He said he could understand their point of view, as they were represented by only one voice in comparison with the British organization which had a smaller population, if only white people were considered. He was glad, therefore, that the President had made an answer to the Soviet proposal which in no way constituted a final negation. He added, however, that he could not exceed his authority and as he had just heard this proposal he would like to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary and possibly communicate it to London and he asked Marshal Stalin to excuse him as he could not give a precise answer today.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that his recommendations had been somewhat different. He had merely meant that the Foreign Ministers should study the question as well as that of the time and place of the conference and who should be invited.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not disagree with the President's suggestions but he felt that the Foreign Ministers had already had a good deal of work thrust upon them. He said he must speak frankly and say that he foresaw difficulties in attempting to hold a meeting as soon as March. The battle would be at its height and more soldiers would be involved than at any time of the war. British domestic problems would be very pressing and their Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, would be greatly occupied in Parliament. He also wondered whether the state of the world and in Europe in particular was not such as to make very difficult a meeting of all of the United Nations. He doubted whether any representatives at such conference would be able to have behind them the full thought of the vital forces of their countries.

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THE PRESIDENT observed that he had only in mind a meeting to organize the setting up of the world organization, and that the world organization itself would probably not come into being for from three to six months after the conference.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had in mind the fact that some nations in March would still be under the German yoke and would be represented by governments in exile whose authority in regard to their own people would be questionable. Other countries would be starving and in misery, such as Holland. France would be there with a loud voice. There would be other countries represented there who had not suffered at all in the war and who had not lost a man. He wondered how such a gathering could really undertake the immense task of the future organization of the world.

THE PRESIDENT repeated his proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers could consider (1) the Soviet proposal regarding membership, (2) the date and place of the conference, and (3) what nations should be invited.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had no object to the Foreign Ministers discussing this point but he said he must emphasize that this was no technical question but one of great decision. With this qualification, he agreed to the President's proposal.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Foreign Ministers will not make decisions but merely report to the Conference.

There was a short intermission at this point.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should consider the question of Iran and other matters of perhaps secondary importance but which should be considered.

The President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

THE PRESIDENT

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THE PRESIDENT then said, jokingly, that he hoped that forestry would be one of the points considered since he had not seen a tree in his visit last year to Tehran. He went on to say that he thought Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if we are to bring about expansion of world trade and greater exchange of goods. He said that Persia did not have the purchasing power to buy foreign goods, and if expansion of world trade was to occur measures must be considered for helping those countries like Persia that did not have any purchasing power. He mentioned that before the advent of the Turks, Persia had had plenty of timber and thus plenty of water and her people had been reasonably prosperous, but that he personally had never seen a poorer country than Persia was at the present time. He therefore very much hoped that the new world organization would conduct a world-wide survey with a view to extending help to countries and areas that did not have sufficient purchasing power, either in cash or in foreign exchange.

THE PRESIDENT added that there was a parallel, he thought, in Europe in that certain countries had adequate supplies of power, such as coal and water power, and those countries had cheap and abundant electric power, whereas other countries within fifty miles had neither. He felt that this situation was wrong. He mentioned that in the Soviet Union and its various republics consideration had been given to the problem of a country as a whole, and in the United States the TVA had the same idea. He mentioned that in the region of the TVA electric current was sold at the same price throughout the area. He concluded that, having said his piece, he would now refer to Mr. Molotov for his proposals in regard to the Polish question.

MR. MOLOTOV then read his proposals in regard to the Polish question, as follows:

1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

2. It was

2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western).
3. It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish emigré circles. *
4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.
5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.
6. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Governments.

After reading the proposals, Mr. Molotov said he would like to add that they had attempted to reach the Poles in Poland by telephone but they had been unable to do so and it was apparent that time would not permit the carrying out of the President's suggestion to summon the Poles to the Crimea. He said he felt that the proposals he had just put forward went far toward meeting the President's wishes.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he must say he felt progress had been made in the light of Mr. Molotov's suggestions. He said there was just one word he did not like and that was "emigré". He said he did not see any necessity to go to emigrés since you could find enough Poles in Poland for the purpose. He repeated what he had said yesterday, namely that he did not know any of the Poles in the Poland government in London and he knew only Mr. Mikolajczyk. He concluded by saying

he would

*See amendment Page 14.

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he would like to have an opportunity, with Mr. Stettinius, to study Mr. Molotov's proposals, to which Marshal Stalin agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he shared the President's dislike of the word "emigré". The word had originated during the French revolution and meant in England a person who had been driven out of a country by his own people. He said in the case of the Poles this wasn't true, since they had left their country as a result of the brutal German attack. He therefore preferred in place of the word "emigré" to refer to them as "Poles temporarily abroad". He said in regard to the second point of Mr. Molotov's proposals he would always support the movement of Polish frontiers to the west since he felt they should receive compensation, but not more than they can handle. He said it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it got indigestion. He said he felt that there was a considerable body of British public opinion that would be shocked if it were proposed to move large numbers of Germans, and although he personally would not be shocked he knew that that view existed in England. He said he felt if it were confined to East Prussia, six million Germans probably could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line west of the Neisse would create quite a problem in this respect.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that most Germans in those areas had already run away from the Red Army.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this, of course, simplified the problem, and in regard to the question of space in Germany for these deported persons he felt that the fact that Germany had had six to seven million casualties in this war and would probably have a million more would simplify that problem.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Germans might well have one or possibly two million more casualties.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he wasn't afraid of the problem of transfer of populations provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the Poles to handle it and the capability of the Germans to receive them. He felt, however, that it needs study, not only

in principle

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in principle but as a practical matter. He said he had one other comment. In the Soviet proposal some reference should be made to other democratic leaders from within Poland itself.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and the words "and from inside Poland" were added at the end of paragraph 3 of the Soviet statement.

THE PRIME MINISTER then concluded that he agreed with the President that it would be well to sleep on this problem and take it up tomorrow, but he did feel that some progress had been made.

At the President's suggestion the meeting was adjourned until four o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded at your own expense later on. The world, and in such a case, perhaps my temporary government which will give your word because we know of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that my people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding of even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot maintain the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard us as a hopeless division of our work here if we parted with an open

Marshal Y. I. Stalin,

Moscow,

The Crimea.

[Printed 727-728]

Attachment to Notes, Fourth Formal Meeting of Crimean Conference,

4 P.M., February 7, 1945

February 6, 1945.

My dear Marshal Stalin:

I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open

an obvious

Marshal V. I. Stalin,

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The Crimea.

and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Beirut and Mr. Osybka Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurkowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Roser, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the walter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (Signed)

[REDACTED]

10.

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3rd Foreign Secretaries Conference, Vorontsov
Villa - 12:00 Noon

World Security Organization

Yugoslavian Frontiers

Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary

Reparations

Iran

[Printed Conferences at ¹⁰
Malta and Yalta, 734-740]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Third Meeting of Foreign Secretaries

Present: Mr. Stettinius Date: February 8, 1945
 Mr. Matthews Time: 12 noon
 Mr. Hiss Place: Vorontsov Villa, Alupka
 Mr. Page

Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Major Theakstone

Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Gorlinski

- Subjects: 1. World Security Organization.
 2. Yugoslavian Frontiers
 3. Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary
 4. Reparations
 5. Iran

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1. World Security Organization

MR. EDEN, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points viz-a-viz the World Security Organization; first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet Republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.

MR. STETTINIUS interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.

MR. EDEN inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the Associated Nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr. Molotov's references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals

there was a

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there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the World Security agenda.

MR. EDEN stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the conference in the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself were getting a little jealous in never having any large conferences in London. If Mr. Molotov and he were to go to the United States for this conference, he hoped that there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

MR. STETTINIUS and MR. MOLOTOV supported Mr. Eden's views with respect to a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

MR. EDEN continued that since some time would be needed to get the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the lawyers would need possibly two weeks before the conference opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United States. After some discussion it was agreed by MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN that the conference should open on April 25.

MR. MOLOTOV had previously accepted the invitation to hold the conference in the United States.

MR. EDEN

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MR. EDEN stated that he wished to make a few observations on the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an appropriate moment.

MR. MOLOTOV interjected "The sooner the better." Mr. Molotov then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals each Government had one vote. However, Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them from being individual members of the assembly. He said that amendments had been made to the Soviet constitution which gave the Soviet Republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The Soviet Union was a union of states. The constitution had now been revised to increase the rights of the Republics. The development of relations between the Republics and foreign states, which had already begun, was in this direction and was developing according to democratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian Republic. He urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached on this question today.

MR. MOLOTOV then referred to Mr. Stettinius' statement that only those nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government, for example, should be invited.

MR. EDEN immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.

MR. MOLOTOV continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.

MR. STETTINIUS

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MR. STETTINIUS gave Mr. Molotov such a list and pointed out that although Equador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on the membership of the organization it should be reported accordingly.

MR. EDEN stated that only the question of the membership of the two Soviet Republics remained open.

MR. CADOGAN pointed out that if a conference were called to complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the original members of the organization could be excluded from the conference.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the United Nations should meet to complete the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting. He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting of the assembly.

MR. EDEN suggested as a possible procedure that the United Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was quite ready to agree to this proposal.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested an amendment to Mr. Eden's proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to grant admission to the assembly to two or three Soviet Republics.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States

would be

February 8, 1945

would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.

MR. STEFFINIUS stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.

MR. EDEN suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and to report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.

2. Yugoslavian Frontiers.

MR. EDEN stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet Delegation on the question.

3. Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary.

MR. EDEN stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached viz-a-vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.

4. Reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired as to when the American and British Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.

MR. STEFFINIUS

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February 8, 1945

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he would be ready tomorrow.

MR. EDEN added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.

5. Iran.

MR. EDEN recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran. He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle -- otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. No one desired that. For this reason he urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it was no part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from Northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Union's obtaining oil concessions if and when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the matter concerning oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was provided for in the Declaration on Iran. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. He believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Tehran Declaration.

MR. MOLOTOV

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MR. MOLOTOV maintained that there were two different questions involved, i. e. those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.

With respect to the oil concessions, MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahi what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahi's reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Tehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.

During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.

Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why they should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone -- that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.

MR. STETTINIUS

February 8, 1945

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the United States had no wartime treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden's proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.

MR. EDEN remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the United States Government took the same position.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.

MR. EDEN stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.

12.

February 8, 1945

Meeting of the President, Harriman, Stalin and
Molotov, Livadia Palace - 3:45 PM
Use of Airfields and Survey of Bomb Damage in
Eastern and Southeastern Europe

[Printed 767, Conferences at Malta
and Yalta]

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Meeting of the President with Marshal Stalin

Present:	The President	Date:	February 8, 1945
	Mr. Harriman	Time:	3:40 P.M.
	Mr. Bohlen	Place:	Livadia Palace, Yalta
	Marshal Stalin		
	Mr. Molotov		
	Mr. Pavlov		

Subject: Use of airfields and survey of bomb damage
in Eastern and Southeastern Europe

[REDACTED]

February 8, 1945

THE PRESIDENT said he had two questions of a military nature relating to Europe which he wished to take up with the Marshal. He then handed to Marshal Stalin two papers in English which were translated into Russian.

The first was a request that the United States Air Force be allowed to use certain airfields in the vicinity of Budapest in order to carry out bombing operations against the Germans. The President said that at the present time the American bombers based in Italy had to make a long and hazardous flight over the Alps in order to reach Germany.

The second paper contained a request that a group of United States experts be permitted to make surveys of the effects of bombing in the areas liberated or occupied by the Red Army in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, similar to the surveys that had been made at Ploesti. The paper asked that this group be permitted to proceed at once since it was important to examine the damage while the evidence was still fresh and the people who had been there during the bombing still were on the spot.

MARSHAL STALIN said he could grant both these requests and would immediately give the necessary orders.

13.

February 8, 1945

Meeting of the President, Harriman, Stalin and
Molotov, Livadia Palace - 3:47 PM

Sale of Ships to Soviet Union after the War
Far East - Political *

[Printed 767-771, Conferences at
Malta and Yalta]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Meeting of the President with Marshal Stalin

Present: The President
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

Date: February 8, 1945
Time: 3:45 P.M.
Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

- Subjects:
1. Sale of Ships to the Soviet Union after the War
 2. Far East: Russian Desires
 3. Far East: Trusteeships
 4. Internal Conditions in China

February 8, 1945

1. Sale of Ships to the Soviet Union after the War

MARSHAL STALIN mentioned that Mr. Stettinius had told Mr. Molotov there was a possibility that the United States would have surplus shipping property after the war which might be sold to the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT said that this would require some changes in legislation which he hoped to work out so that surplus shipping after the war not needed by the United States and Great Britain could be transferred on credit without any interest. He said after the last war the mistake had been made of attempting to charge interest for the disposal of surplus property but it had not worked. His idea was to transfer the ships for a fixed sum on credit which would include the cost of the ship less the cost of depreciation, so that in twenty years the entire credit would be extinguished. He said that the British had never sold anything without commercial interest but that he had different ideas.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed gratification at the President's statement and said this shipping would greatly ease the task of the Soviet Union in the future.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he hoped the Soviet Union would interest itself in a large way in the shipping game.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he thought the President's idea was a very good one and also that Lend-Lease was a remarkable invention, without which victory would have been delayed. He said that in former wars some allies had subsidized others but this had offended the allies receiving the subsidies and had led to difficulties. Lend-Lease, however, produced no such resentment, and he repeated his opinion of the extraordinary contribution of Lend-Lease to the winning of the war.

THE PRESIDENT replied that four years ago, when having a rest on his small yacht, he had thought and thought of a way to help the Allies and at the same time avoid the difficulties inherent in loans, and had finally hit upon the scheme of Lend-Lease.

February 8, 1945.

2. Far East: Russian Desires

Following the discussion of certain military questions involved in the Far East, MARSHAL STALIN said that he would like to discuss the political conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan. He said he had already had a conversation on this subject with Ambassador Harriman.

THE PRESIDENT said he had received a report of this conversation, and he felt that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands going to Russia at the end of the war. He said that in regard to a warm water port in the Far East for the Soviet Union, the Marshal recalled that they had discussed that point at Tehran. He added that he had then suggested that the Soviet Union be given the use of a warm water port at the end of the south Manchurian railroad, at possibly Dairen on the Kwantung peninsula. The President said he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss this matter with Marshal Chiang Kai Shek, so therefore he could not speak for the Chinese. He went on to say that there are two methods for the Russians to obtain the use of this port; (1) outright leasing from the Chinese; (2) making Dairen a free port under some form of international commission. He said he preferred the latter method because of the relation to the question of Hong Kong. The President said he hoped that the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port. He said he knew Mr. Churchill would have strong objections to this suggestion.

MARSHAL STALIN said there was another question and that involved the use by the Russians of the Manchurian railways. He said the Czars had use of the line running from Manchouli to Harbin and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the line from Harbin running east to Nikol'sk-Ussurisk connecting there with the Khabarovsk to Vladivostok line.

THE PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

February 8, 1945

THE PRESIDENT said that again, although he had not talked with Marshal Chang Kai Shek on the subject, there were again two methods of bringing this about: (1) to lease under direct Soviet operation; (2) under a commission composed of one Chinese and one Russian.

MARSHAL STALIN said that it is clear that if these conditions are not met it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan. They understood clearly the war against Germany which had threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union, but they would not understand why Russia would enter a war against a country with which they had no great trouble. He said, however, if these political conditions were met, the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chang Kai Shek and he felt that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in twenty-four hours.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and said he did not think it was necessary yet to speak to the Chinese and that he could guarantee the security of the Supreme Soviet. He added that it would be well to leave here with these conditions set forth in writing agreed to by the three powers.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that he thought that this could be done.

MARSHAL STALIN went on to say that in regard to the Chinese, T. V. Soong was expected to come to Moscow at the end of April, and he said that when it was possible to free a number of Soviet troops in the west and move twenty-five divisions to the Far East he thought it would be possible to speak to Marshal Chang Kai Shek about these matters.

MARSHAL STALIN said that in regard to the question of a warm water port the Russians would not be difficult and he would not object to an internationalized free port.

3. Trusteeships

February 8, 1945

3. Trusteeships

THE PRESIDENT then said he wished to discuss the question of trusteeships with Marshal Stalin. He said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, and American and a Chinese representative. He said the only experience we had had in this matter was in the Philippines where it had taken about fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be from twenty to thirty years.

MARSHAL STALIN said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea.

THE PRESIDENT replied in the negative, to which Marshal Stalin expressed approval.

THE PRESIDENT then said there was one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he felt that they might resent this.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might "kill us". In his opinion he felt that the British should be invited.

THE PRESIDENT then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indochina. He added that the British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indochina, and it was not his opinion that Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added that he thought Indochina was a very important area.

THE PRESIDENT

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February 8, 1945.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike. He added that France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony. He said that General de Gaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indochina.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired where de Gaulle was going to get the troops.

THE PRESIDENT replied that de Gaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships, but the President added that up to the present he had been unable to find the ships.

4. Internal Conditions in China

THE PRESIDENT said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed the opinion that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai Shek and although there were some good people in the Comintern he did not understand why they were not brought forward.

THE PRESIDENT said General Wedemeyer and the new Ambassador, General Hurley, were having much more success than their predecessors and had made more progress in bringing the communists in the north together with the Chungking government. He said the fault lay more with the Comintern and the Chungking Government than with the so-called communists.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not understand why they did not get together since they should have a united front against the Japanese. He thought that for this purpose Chiang Kai Shek should assume leadership. He recalled in this connection that some years ago there had been a united front and he did not understand why it had not been maintained.

14.

February 8, 1945

Meeting of the President, Harriman, Stalin and
Molotov, Livadia Palace - 4:00 PM
Air Bases

[Printed 766-767, Conferences at Malta
and Yalta]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Present: The President Date: February 8, 1945.
 Mr. Harriman Time: 3:30 PM
 Mr. Bohlen Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta

 Marshal Stalin
 Mr. Molotov
 Mr. Pavlov

Subject: Air Bases in the Far East

February 8, 1945

THE PRESIDENT said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their army and he hoped by intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not object to the United States having bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. He said the first was on the lower reaches of the Amur River and the second at its mouth. He said that in regard to the bases on Kamchatka he thought we would have to leave that until a later stage since the presence of the Japanese Consul there made it difficult at this time to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate, he added, the other two bases in the Maritime Provinces were nearer.

MARSHAL STALIN added that there had been one phrase in regard to "commercial routes" in the President's letter on the subject which had not been clear to him.

THE PRESIDENT said he had had in mind the importance of the supply routes across the Pacific and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet Union and he felt that once war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union it would become very important but also very difficult to get by the Japanese Islands.

MARSHAL STALIN indicated that he recognized the importance of these supply routes and again repeated that he had no objection to the establishment of American bases in the Maritime Provinces.

THE PRESIDENT handed the Marshal a paper in which it was requested that the Soviet staff be instructed to enter into planning talks with the United States staff.

MARSHAL STALIN indicated that he would give the necessary instructions.

15.

February 8, 1945

5th Formal Meeting, Livadia Palace - 4:15 PM

Poland

Declaration on Liberated Areas

[Printed Conferences at Malta & Yalta,
██████████ 771-782, 792-793]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Fifth Formal Meeting

Present: The President Date: February 8, 1945
Mr. Stettinius Time: 4:00 p.m.
Admiral Leahy Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Hiss

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Bridges
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Subjects: World Security Organization
Poland
Periodic Meetings of Foreign Ministers
Yugoslavia and Greece

██████████

February 8, 1945

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by stating that he understood the Foreign Secretaries could report complete success and he wished to congratulate them on their work and to ask Mr. Eden to report to the Conference.

MR. EDEN then read the report of that morning's meeting of the Foreign Secretaries:

"Report by Foreign Secretaries to Plenary Meeting of Conference on World Organization questions.

1. The Foreign Secretaries met on February 8th

(a) To consider the question of membership of the World Organization of two (or three) of the Republics of the Soviet Union,

(b) To recommend what states should be invited to the proposed United Nations Conference, and

(c) To recommend the time and place at which that Conference should be held.

2. It was decided to make the following recommendations to the Plenary Meeting:

(a) The United Nations Conference on the proposed World Organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America,

(b) The United Nations, as they existed on February . . . , 1945, i. e. those who had at that date signed the United Nations Declaration, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. It will be for the Conference to determine the list of original members of the Organization. At that stage the Delegates of the U.K. and U.S.A. will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. The Foreign Ministers' meeting has established a sub-committee to examine further details in connection with the proposals for a World Organization and will report shortly to the Plenary Meeting.

N.B. The

February 8, 1945

"N.B. The blank represents the date of the end of the Conference."

MR. EDEN concluded by saying that they were glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the meeting on April 25 in the United States. He added that he hoped that the next meeting of Foreign Ministers would, therefore, take place in London. Mr. Eden stated, in commenting on the report, that the British Delegation did not think it right for others to share the status of United Nations membership merely in order to participate in the Conference, but he understood that the United States Delegation had other views. He said a sub-committee was considering the details.

MARSHAL STALIN said that among the states which would be represented at the conference there were ten who had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He said that it was somewhat strange for the Soviet Government to attempt to build future world security with states which did not desire to have diplomatic relations with it. He asked what could be done about this matter.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he knew that most of these states would like to have relations with the Soviet Union but had just not gotten around to doing anything about it. There were a few, however, where the reasons were different and where the influence of the Catholic Church was very strong. He said that he would like to point out, however, that the Soviet Union had sat down with these states at Bretton Woods and UNRRA conferences.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was correct but that at this conference they were to consider the vital question of the establishment of world security.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he would have to go back a bit into history. Three years ago the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, had told these few American Republics that it was not necessary to declare war on Germany but only to break diplomatic relations. Therefore, there were five or six South

American

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February 8, 1945

American countries who felt that they had taken the advice of the United States Government and were, therefore, in good standing. It was a fact, he added, that these states had helped us a great deal in the war effort. He said, speaking frankly, this advice had been a mistake and that a month ago the Secretary of State had brought up with him this embarrassing question. As a result he had sent letters to the presidents of these six countries urging them to declare war against the common enemy. Ecuador had already done so and Peru's declaration could be expected at any time, and he hoped the others before long.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired about Argentina.

THE PRESIDENT said that we are considering a conference of United Nations and Associated Nations who had helped in the war effort.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had no love for Argentina but he felt that there was a contradiction in logic. He inquired what was the criteria for admission of states and mentioned in this connection Turkey. He said he felt there were nations who had really waged war and had suffered, and there were others who had wavered and and speculated on being on the winning side.

THE PRESIDENT replied that it was his idea that only those Associated Nations who had declared war should be invited and he suggested that the time limit should be the first of March.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed with this suggestion.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he recommended the President's suggestion that only those countries who had declared war would be invited. He said he sympathized with the point of view of Marshal Stalin and pointed out that many countries had played a poor part. He felt, however, there would be some advantage of having a whole new group of nations declare war on Germany for the effect on German morale.

THE PRESIDENT

February 8, 1945

THE PRESIDENT remarked that in addition to the South American countries there was, of course, Iceland, the newest of the United Nations Republics.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in the case of Egypt, she had on two occasions wished to declare war but had been advised against it by the British Government, who had felt that it would be more useful and convenient to have Egypt a non-belligerent in order to protect Cairo from systematic bombings. He said that the Egyptian army had rendered good service to the cause. They had maintained good order, guarded bridges, etc. He felt that if Egypt now desired to declare war she should have the opportunity. He said Iceland had rendered valuable service at a time when the United States had not entered the war and had permitted the entry of British and United States troops, thus violating her neutrality in a marked manner, at the same time assuring a vital lane of communications to the British Isles.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that this did not apply to former enemy states who had recently declared war on Germany.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER heartily agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he certainly did not include Eire among the possible candidates, since they still maintained German and Japanese missions. He said he would refer to a new one that would not be greeted with universal approbation, namely Turkey. Turkey, however, had made an alliance with Great Britain at a very difficult time, but after the war had been in progress she had discovered she would not be up-to-date for modern war. Her attitude had been friendly and helpful, although she had not taken the chance provided them a year ago to enter the war.

MARSHAL STALIN

February 8, 1945

MARSHAL STALIN replied that if Turkey declared war before the end of February he agreed to her being invited to the conference.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed gratification with the Marshal's attitude.

THE PRESIDENT then said that there remained the question of Denmark, that they had been over-run by the enemy in one night and that the King had been virtually a prisoner and that only the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. de Kauffman had voiced the sentiments which he knew all Danes felt and had repudiated the actions of his government.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that he thought Denmark should wait.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and the latter added that once she was liberated she would certainly have the right to join the organization.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked, however, that Denmark had let the Germans in.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he hoped that in the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers it would be possible to name the Soviet Republics, that is, the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics. This was accepted.

MR. MOLOTOV then asked would it not facilitate the admission of these two Soviet Republics as members of the assembly if they signed the United Nations Declaration before the first of March.

THE PRESIDENT reverting to the list of countries to be invited to the conference proposed that it be the United Nations, the Associated Nations and Turkey, provided the latter declared war before the first of March and signed the United Nations Declaration.

THE PRIME MINISTER

February 8, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that it would not seem quite right to him to take in small countries who had done so little, simply by the expedient of their declaring war and to exclude the two Soviet Republics from the meeting. He said he had very much in mind the martyrdom and sufferings of the Ukraine and White Russia.

MARSHAL STALIN said he also thought it was illogical and stated that although the three Powers had agreed to recommend that the Ukraine and White Russia be members of the assembly, might not the fact that they had not signed the United Nations Declaration serve as an excuse for excluding them.

THE PRESIDENT AND MR. STETTINIUS assured Marshal Stalin that this would not occur.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that he had preferred confining the conference to the United Nations but if others would be added he thought the Soviet Republics should also be added.

MARSHAL STALIN said "I don't want to embarrass the President, but if he will explain his difficulties we will see what can be done."

THE PRESIDENT then said that it was a technical question but an important one. Up to the present they had been discussing the question of invitations to separate states, that is, new countries to be added to the list but that now it was not a question of a new country but of giving one of the Great Powers three votes instead of one in the assembly and that he felt that was a matter which would be put before the conference and that we had all three agreed to support the Soviet request.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired would it not be all right if the Ukraine and White Russia signed the United Nations Declaration.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he did not think this would overcome the difficulty.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had read in a paper on Poland that he did not think it had been studied by the other delegations. He said

MARSHAL STALIN

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February 8, 1945

MARSHAL STALIN then said he withdrew his proposal.

THE PRESIDENT expressed gratification at the Marshal's decision.

THE PRIME MINISTER then remarked that he had had time to study yesterday's report of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and that he could give it his approval.

THE PRESIDENT then turned to the question of the proposals which he had sent to the British and the Soviet Delegations this morning in regard to Poland. He said he had noticed they were very close to those of Mr. Molotov but would like to have his comments.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether the last point of the President's proposal in regard to the recognition of a Government of National Unity would mean that the London Government would then disappear.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that when we recognize the new government, we would of course withdraw our recognition of the London Government.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that when we recognized the new government, what would happen then to the property and resources of the London Government. Would they remain in the possession of Arcieszewski?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he thought that the withdrawal of recognition would take care of that and,

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the property would go to the new government.

There was then declared a short recess.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the British had put in a paper on Poland but that he did not know whether it had been studied by the other Delegations. He said

that with

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that with some slight amendments, if a decision in principle was reached he was prepared to accept the President's proposals which have been under discussion.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had some observations to make on the President's proposals. He said that their proposals made yesterday had been based on certain realities existing in Poland. It was impossible to ignore the existence of the present Polish government and he said that the Soviet Government had felt that it would be useful to have discussions on the basis of enlarging that government with the addition of other democratic elements from within Poland and abroad. He said that the Lublin, or Warsaw, government stands at the head of the Polish people and enjoys great prestige and popularity in the country. The Poles would never agree to any solution which would greatly change the Provisional Government. We might have some success if we start from the basis that the present Provisional Government should be enlarged. The people who now compose the Polish Provisional Government have been closely connected with the great events of the liberation of Poland, but Messrs. Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Witos have not been directly connected with these events. Therefore, if we wish to achieve a practical result it should be done on the basis of the enlargement of the present government, but how many and who they should be is the subject we should talk about. He said his observations apply not only to the question of a new government but also to the proposed presidential committee. It was a difficult question, admittedly, but it stemmed from the Polish people, and he said he had grave doubts as to whether it would be feasible. He said we might be creating additional difficulty through a presidential committee since there already existed a national council, *Kawaya Rada*, which of course could be enlarged. He was sure, however, that it was better to discuss the whole question on the basis of the existing situation. It must be borne in mind that both the National Council and Provisional Government are temporary, and he had noted in all three proposals one common point of view, namely the holding of free elections in Poland, but during the temporary period pending such elections it was extremely important to insure stable rule in Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV

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MR. MOLOTOV said in regard to the question of frontiers he was glad to note the complete agreement on the eastern boundary, namely the Curzon Line with slight modifications, but he also noted that on the western boundary there was no unanimity. He said that they knew that the Provisional Government stood for the western frontier as outlined in the Soviet proposals. He added that they will have to ask the Poles about this, but he was in no doubt that they would categorically support this frontier.

MR. MOLOTOV said with reference to negotiations in Moscow between himself, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr we are all agreed it would be desirable to have these three talk with the Poles. He said that in so far as he knew, the Provisional Government always sent three persons to speak for the Government--Beirut, Osobka Morawski, and General Rola-Zamyerski. As for the Poles from the other side, it seems to him that the President's proposals yesterday seemed more acceptable. He said he did not exclude the possibility that some Poles from abroad could be involved, but he is not a bit sure about Mikolajczyk, especially after the autumn talks in Moscow. Yesterday the President had proposed five names. He thought it would be a good idea to invite the three members of the Provisional Government mentioned above and two from the President's list of other Poles submitted yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant that the presidential committee or an interim government should be avoided.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he thought it would be better to avoid the presidential committee and to enlarge the National Council and the Provisional Government. He and Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald could discuss the question of how to enlarge the Council and Government with three representatives from the Polish Provisional Government and two persons from the President's list of other Poles. The results of these discussions could then be submitted to the three Governments. He concluded that he had only discussed the American proposals and had not touched on the Prime Minister's ideas.

THE PRIME

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that we were now at the crucial point of this great conference. He said we would be found wanting by the world should we separate recognizing different Polish governments. This would be accepted by the world as evidence of a breach between Great Britain and the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand, with lamentable consequences in the future. It was stamping this conference with a seal of failure, and nothing else we did here would overcome it. He admitted, on the other hand, that we take different views of the same basic facts. According to the information of the British Government, the Lublin, or Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the overwhelming masses of the Polish people, and it is certainly not accepted abroad as representative of the people. If the British Government brushed aside the London government and went over to the Lublin government there would be an angry outcry in Great Britain. There was, in addition, the problem of the Poles outside Poland. He reminded the conference that on the Western and Italian fronts there was a Polish army of about 150,000 men who had fought steadily and very bravely for our cause. He did not believe that this army would be reconciled to the transfer of the British Government's support from the government with which it had dealt since the beginning of the war. It would be regarded as an act of betrayal of Poland. As Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov knew, he had no special feeling for the Polish government in London, which in his opinion had been foolish at every stage, but a formal act of transfer of recognition would cause the very greatest consequences. He pointed out that the group forming the new provisional government was only about one year old.

THE PRIME MINISTER made it clear that, speaking only for Great Britain, it would be said that the British Government had given away completely on the frontiers, had accepted the Soviet view and had championed it. To break altogether with the lawful government of Poland which had been recognized during all these five years of war would be an act subject to

the most

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the most severe criticism in England. It would be said that we did not know what was going on in Poland-- that we could not even get anyone in there to find out what was going on and that we had accepted in toto the view of the Lublin government. Great Britain would be charged with forsaking the cause of Poland and he was bound to say that the debates in Parliament would be most painful and he might add most dangerous to Allied unity. He added that all the above was on the supposition that they might find it possible to agree to Mr. Molotov's proposal. He said if they were to give up the London government it must be evident that a new start had been made on both sides from equal terms. Before such transfer of recognition His Majesty's Government would have to be convinced that a new government, representative of the Polish people, had been created, pledged to an election on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the participation of all democratic parties and the right to put up their candidates. When such elections were held in Poland, he said Great Britain would salute the government which emerges without regard for the Polish government in London. He concluded with the statement that it is the interval before such elections that is difficult and alarming.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that perhaps the talks in Moscow might give some result, but it was very difficult to discuss the Polish question without participation with the Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked it was frightfully important that agreement should be reached on the question and that we should part over a signed agreement.

THE PRESIDENT said we were all agreed on the necessity of free elections and that the only problem was how Poland was to be governed in the interval.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had heard complaints from the Prime Minister that he had no information in regard to the situation in Poland. Mr. Churchill could

get this

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get this information and he did not see why Great Britain and the United States could not send their own people into Poland. He said in regard to the popularity of the Provisional Government he could assure the conference that the people running the government were popular. The three leaders, Beirut, Osobka Morawski and Rola-Zamyski had not fled from Poland but had stayed on in Warsaw and had come from the underground. It is necessary to bear in mind the psychology of people under occupation--their sympathies are with those who stayed and not with those who left the country. Marshal Stalin said that he did not claim that the men in the Provisional Government were geniuses--indeed, it is possible that there are cleverer people in the Polish government in London--he did not know. Perhaps the feeling of the Polish people in this respect was somewhat primitive, but it exists. What puzzles the Polish people is that a great event--the liberation of their country by the Red Army has occurred. This changes the mentality of the people. For many years the Poles had hated the Russians and with reason, since three times the Czarist government had participated in the partitioning of Poland. With the advance of the Soviet troops the liberation of Poland had changed the attitude of the Polish people toward Russia and old resentments had disappeared and good will had taken their place. He said it was his impression that the driving out of the Germans by the Red Army had been received by the Poles in the light of a great national holiday. The people had been surprised that the Polish government in London had not had any part in this great holiday. They inquire, "We of the National Council and Provisional Government participated in this holiday, but where are the London Poles?" These two circumstances lay at the base of the great popularity of the members of the Provisional Government, although they may not be great men. He said he did not think we could ignore these facts nor fail to take into account the feelings of the people. Mr. Churchill worries that we will leave here without an agreement. What therefore can we do? We have different information--the best method,

therefore,

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therefore, would be to summon the Poles from the different camps and to learn from them. It would, of course, be better if free elections could be held right off, but up to now the war has prevented this, but the day is drawing near, however, when such elections could take place and the people could express their view in regard to the Provisional Government. He said he saw little difference between the position of de Gaulle and that of the Polish Provisional Government. Neither had been elected, and he could not say which one enjoyed the greatest degree of popularity--yet we all had dealt with de Gaulle and the Soviet Government concluded a treaty with him. Why should we be so different with regard to the Polish government, and why could we not deal with an enlarged Polish government. He added that de Gaulle had done nothing to arouse popular enthusiasm, whereas the Polish government had carried out a number of land reforms that had been most popular. The situation is not so tragic as Mr. Churchill pictured it. He felt the situation could be settled if we concentrated on the essential points. He said it would be better to deal with the reconstruction of the Provisional Government rather than attempt to set up a new one. He said he felt Mr. Molotov was right, and rather than a presidential committee we might agree on increasing the Provisional Government.

THE PRESIDENT asked how long it would be, in the Marshal's opinion, before elections could be held in Poland.

MARSHAL STALIN replied it might be possible in a month provided no catastrophes occurred on the front and the Germans began to beat them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said of course they would welcome free elections but would not ask for anything that would hamper military operations.

THE PRESIDENT proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers for study, and this was agreed to.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he thought Marshal Stalin could pick this.

THE PRIME

MARSHAL

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THE PRIME MINISTER said there was one small matter he wished to bring up before adjournment, and that was the periodic meeting of Foreign Ministers every three months.

THE PRESIDENT said he was in favor of this idea, but he knew that Mr. Stettinius was very busy with some of the Latin American countries and he felt it would be best to say they would meet when necessary and not fix any definite period for the meetings.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped that the first of these meetings could be in London, to which the President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he had one small matter which he would like to bring up. He would like to know what is holding back the formation of a unified government in Yugoslavia. He would also like to know what was going on in Greece. He said he had no intention of criticizing British policy there but he would merely like to know what was going on.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Greece would take a great deal of time to explain and he would reserve it for the next meeting. He said in regard to Yugoslavia that the King had been persuaded, or even forced, to agree to a regency. Subasic was leaving soon, if he had not left already, for Yugoslavia to appoint the regents and form the government. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Eden tells him that there are two slight amendments, which he will take up with Mr. Molotov, to the agreement reached between Subasic and Tito. He added that he had always made it plain, both privately and publicly, that if the King would not agree to a regency he would be by-passed. He felt that in regard to the two amendments, if Marshal Stalin had said two words to Tito the matter would be settled.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Tito is a proud man and he now was a popular head of a regime and might resent advice.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he felt that Marshal Stalin could risk this.

MARSHAL

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MARSHAL STALIN answered that he was not afraid.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in regard to Greece he was hopeful peace would come on the basis of amnesties except for those who committed crimes against the laws of war. He doubted that a government of all the parties could be established since they hated each other so much.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Greeks had not yet become used to discussion and therefore they were cutting each others throats.

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded he would be glad to give information on Greece. He said that recently Sir Walter Citrine and five members of the trades unions had gone to Greece and they might have their report. He said that they had had rather a rough time in Greece and they were very much obliged to Marshal Stalin for not having taken too great an interest in Greek affairs.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he had no intention of criticizing British actions there or interfering in Greece, but merely would like to know what was going on.

The conference adjourned until four p.m. tomorrow.

It was proposed that Mr. ... and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr be authorized by ... of the three Governments to invite to Warsaw Mr. ... Mr. ... Bishop Sapieha, Mr. ... Mr. ... and Mr. ... to form a Polish Government of National Unity along the following lines:

"1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three, possibly consisting of Mr. ... Mr. ... and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential Office of the Polish Republic.

"2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representatives leaders from the present Polish provisional government in Warsaw; from other democratic circles inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.

"3. This interim

Counter proposal circulated by the United States
Delegation to the Soviet and British Delegations
of February 8, 1945.

"The proposals submitted by Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish question in reply to the President's letter to Marshal Stalin dated February 6, 1945, have been given careful study.

"In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived to point One of the Soviet proposals, namely, that the Eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometers.

"In regard to point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia South of the Koenigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the Western boundary of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.

"In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future Government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr be authorized on behalf of the three Governments to invite to Moscow Mr. Beirut, Mr. Osobka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vicente Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski to form a Polish Government of National Unity along the following lines:

"1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three, possibly consisting of Mr. Beirut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office of the Polish Republic.

"2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish provisional government in Warsaw; from other democratic elements inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.

"3. This interim

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"3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the holding of free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution under which a permanent Government would be elected.

"4. When a Polish Government of National Unity is formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland."

[REDACTED]

16.

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Marshal Stalin's Dinner for the President, the
Prime Minister, etc., Koreans - 9:00 PM
General Conversation

[Printed, 797-799, Conferences at
[REDACTED] Malta + Yalta]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Dinner Given by Marshal Stalin

Present: The President
Mr. Stettinius
Admiral Leahy
Justice Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Flynn
Mrs. Boettger
Miss Kathleen Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

Date: February 8, 1945
Time: 9:00 P.M.
Place: Koreis Villa, Yalta

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Alan Brooke
Chief Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. B. Cunningham
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Field Marshal Alexander
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
General Sir Hastings Ismay
Mrs. Oliver

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Beria
Admiral Kuznetsov
General Antonov
Air Marshal Khudyakov
Ambassador Gromyko
Ambassador Gusev
Mr. Malady
Mr. Pavlov

Subject: General Conversation.

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The atmosphere of the dinner was most cordial, and forty-five toasts in all were drunk. Marshal Stalin was in an excellent humor and even in high spirits. Most of the toasts were routine--to the armed forces of the representative countries and the military leaders and the continuing friendship of the three great powers.

MARSHAL STALIN proposed a toast to the health of the Prime Minister, who he characterized as the bravest governmental figure in the world. He said that due in large measure to Mr. Churchill's courage and staunchness, England, when she stood alone, had divided the might of Hitlerite Germany at a time when the rest of Europe was falling flat on its face before Hitler. He said that Great Britain, under Mr. Churchill's leadership, had carried on the fight alone irrespective of existing or potential allies. The Marshal concluded that he knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important to the future history of the world. He drank a toast to Mr. Churchill, his fighting friend and a brave man.

THE PRIME MINISTER, in his reply, toasted Marshal Stalin as the mighty leader of a mighty country, which had taken the full shock of the German war machine, had broken its back and had driven the tyrants from her soil. He said he knew that in peace no less than in war Marshal Stalin would continue to lead his people from success to success.

MARSHAL STALIN then proposed the health of the President of the United States. He said that he and Mr. Churchill in their respective countries had had relatively simple decisions. They had been fighting for their very existence against Hitlerite Germany but there was a third man whose country had not been seriously threatened with invasion, but who had had perhaps a broader conception of national interest and even though his country was not directly imperilled had been the chief forger of the instruments which had lead to the mobilization of the world against Hitler. He mentioned in this connection Lend-Lease as one of

the President's

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the President's most remarkable and vital achievements in the formation of the Anti-Hitler combination and in keeping the Allies in the field against Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT, in reply to this toast, said he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between our three countries. He said that great changes had occurred in the world during the last three years, and even greater changes were to come. He said that each of the leaders represented here were working in their own way for the interests of their people. He said that fifty years ago there were vast areas of the world where people had little opportunity and no hope, but much had been accomplished, although there were still great areas where people had little opportunity and little hope, and their objectives here were to give to every man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of security and wellbeing.

In a subsequent toast to the alliance between the three great powers, MARSHAL STALIN remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the Allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said he felt we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us. He said that in the modern world the function of leadership was to lead the people out from the forests into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness. He felt this prize was nearer our grasp than anytime before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness.

JUSTICE BYRNES proposed a toast to the common man all over the world. He said there had been many toasts
to leaders

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and officials and while we all shared these sentiments we should never forget the common man or woman who lives on this earth.

MISS HARRIMAN, replying for the three ladies present, then proposed a toast to those who had worked so hard in the Crimea for our comfort, and having seen the destruction wrought by the Germans here she had fully realized what had been accomplished.

17.

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4th Foreign Secretaries Conference, Livadia
Palace - 12:00 Noon

Poles
Reparations
Dumbarton Oaks
Iran
Yugoslavia

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1. Points still before the Foreign Secretaries.

MR. STETTINIUS, who presided, stated that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review of the unfinished items. He stated these were as follows:

(a) The Report of the February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters.

This report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday's plenary session.

(b) Report by the Sub-Committee on the Form of Invitations and Other Details of Arrangements for the United Nations Conference.

(c) Reparations.

The American Delegation desired to submit a paper on this matter today.

(d) Poland.

The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Secretaries.

(e) Iran.

(f) Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers.

After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.

2. The Polish Question.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one important point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in the World Organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great

importance

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importance at this time to the United States. He hoped with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled before the Crimean Conference broke up.

MR. STETTINIUS then read the following statement:

"After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

"I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative "Provisional Polish Government" and we speak of the formation of a "Government of National Unity." All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

"The following formula might therefore be considered:

"That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed 'The Provisional Government of National Unity'; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This 'Government of National Unity' would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage.

and secret

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and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

"When a 'Provisional Government of National Unity' is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel prepared to reply to the oral statement.

MR. EDEN said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius' proposal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British.

As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United States of America. It was for that reason that the document which he had put forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary.

If agreement were reached here, this would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon recognition of the London Government and such abandonment

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abandonment would be much easier for it if it were not made in favor of the existing Lublin Government but in favor of a new Government.

The British Government had considerable Polish forces fighting with it - about 150,000 at present - and these forces would increase as more Poles were liberated or escaped from Switzerland. It naturally desired very much to carry them along in any settlement. The task would be easier if a fresh start were made.

He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It had been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr. Mikolajczyk in the Lublin Government. He was not convinced of that. But in any case the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Government would do more than anything else to add to the authority of that Government, and to convince the British people of its representative character.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that while the American document was being translated he wished to make some comments. Although he could not, of course, go farther than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had stated that the Polish situation was temporary and could not last for a long time. In the Russian opinion the most important question was the holding as soon as practical of general elections in Poland. These elections would give a basis for a permanent Government and do away with all the difficulties that were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had referred to the provisional period as lasting perhaps one month, whereas the Prime Minister had mentioned two. In any event, it would be a short interval. However, at the present time it was not only a question of Poland but also the rear of the Red Army. Even for a short period, it was essential to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to take this military situation into consideration. If there were any obstacles in the rear of the Red Army an impossible situation would arise. That was why Mr. Molotov had suggested yesterday that the reorganization of the Polish Government should be on the basis of the present Lublin Government with democratic elements from within and without the country added to it.

With respect

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With respect to Mikolajczyk, MR. MOLOTOV stated that it might be a mistake to say that he was unacceptable. The Poles themselves must decide this. Conversations must be held with the Poles in and out of Poland. Perhaps the Mikolajczyk question was not as acute as it appeared. However, it could not be cleared up in the Crimea without consulting the Poles. Furthermore, reorganization of the Polish Government could not be undertaken without speaking to the Poles. The Moscow Commission made up of the British and American Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov would have serious tasks to perform. They should discuss the entire question with the Poles and make clear to them the basis reached in the Crimea on the Polish question.

MR. EDEN said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to his remarks on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he felt sure that British opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Government they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he supported Mr. Eden's views in full in this respect.

After a brief interruption, MR. MOLOTOV, on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new American considerations until he had consulted Marshal Stalin. He hoped to be able to do this by four o'clock. However, at the present time, he would like to make a few preliminary comments.

Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.

Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied Ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The Ambassadors would

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would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important - the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.

MR. EDEN stated that the three Allied Governments considered that a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which could be more broadly representative than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This Government should be comprised of members of the Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.

MR. EDEN felt that this Government should be called the Provisional Government of National Unity.

MR. MOLOTOV continued to stress the advisability of forming the new Government on the basis of the Lublin Government. Otherwise an unstable situation would be established in the rear of the Red Army. This Government would include other representatives from Poland and from without the country.

MR. STETTINIUS maintained that it would be preferable to start with an entirely new Government and stated that unless the Foreign Ministers could get away from the words "existing Polish Government", no agreement could be reached on this question. He suggested that Mr. Molotov give consideration to a formula which would state that the Polish Government should be based upon the old and also on the democratic leaders which will be brought in.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period should be created in which there were no Government in Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the air and a period of instability would be created in Poland.

MR. STETTINIUS

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MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the present Polish Government would continue until the new Government was formed.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations were proceeding on a change in government and that the present government would not endure. This would create a situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red Army.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that Mr. Eden's formula avoided this situation.

MR. MOLOTOV, however, adhered to his former position of insisting that the new Polish Government be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with the Poles themselves before any decision could be reached.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to Mr. Molotov's reactions with respect to the name of the new Polish Government.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that this could be taken up at a later date.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that under present circumstances it would probably be best to report to the plenary session that the Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish Government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the American Delegation and that although they had not yet reached an agreement on the matter they had decided to continue discussions at a later date.

MR. HARRIMAN asked Mr. Molotov to consider a redraft of the American formula which would contain the words "based on the old and also on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland."

MR. MOLOTOV's reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared to prefer the wording "based on the old government and with the calling in of representatives...."

[REDACTED]

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3. Reparations.

Mr. STETTINIUS stated that Mr. Molotov had presented to him through Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Maisky a document on the principles of exacting reparations payments from Germany. He wished now to present some counter proposals which were fundamentally based on the Soviet principles. He then read the following statement:

"1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

"2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

"(a) Removal in a single payment in the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

"These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

"(b) Annual deliveries of commodities during ten years after the end of the war.

"3. The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war shall be the first subject of study by the Moscow Commission. In this study the Commission

will take

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will take into consideration the effect of whatever common steps ought to be taken for the elimination or reduction of output of various important German industries, from the standpoint of the total decentralization of Germany. The Commission should take into consideration in its initial studies the Soviet Government's suggested total of twenty billion dollars for all forms of reparation."

MR. MAISKY pointed out that Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American proposals were acceptable. However paragraph 3 should be more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of \$20,000,000,000 "as a basis" for its studies. The final figures arrived at by the Commission might be a little more or less than \$20,000,000,000; however, the Soviet Delegation urged that this figure be accepted as the basis.

MR. EDEN stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a basis.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Delegation was thinking only of the Soviet Union. Mr. Maisky's Commission had done good work -- it had only one defect, that of minimalism.

MR. STETTINIUS urged that the question of setting a figure be left to the Commission. He continued that he of course could not commit the United States but that he felt that Mr. Maisky's figure was reasonable.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars, which would go to the Soviet Union.

As a counter-proposal MR. STETTINIUS suggested that it merely be stated that 50% of the total sum of reparations collected which would be not specified would go to the Soviet Union.

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MR. MOLOTOV stated that he did not object to this suggestion; however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less than 50% of the amount collected. He again stressed the importance of including a figure in the statement.

MR. EDEN said that his Government well understood the suffering and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like the Commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount of German reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring to supersede the work of the Commission but only to give it guidance.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government had in mind.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that reparations should be based on 1936 prices since destruction had been in pre-war values.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in mind additions of 15% to 20%.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this was likely.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of Germany on payment of reparations.

MR. MAISKY replied that it would not have any effect on the removal from the national wealth of Germany of German equipment located inside and outside of the country at the termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in the post war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken this into consideration in drawing up its report.

After some discussion the Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a

basis for

basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

MR. EDEN stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

4. Dumbarton Oaks.

MR. STETTINIUS presented copies of the draft invitation (see attached) to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and stated that it was his understanding that the United States would consult with China and France before the invitations were issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been discussed in the Crimea.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN agreed to this.

It was pointed out that some differences existed in the invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft. It was suggested that the invitation be referred back to the sub-committee which would report as soon as possible to the Foreign Ministers. He explained that he had placed the draft before the meeting in order to get the Foreign Ministers consideration of the general principles at this stage so that time could be saved. Without decisions of the Foreign Ministers the sub-committee could not complete its work.

It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.

MR. STETTINIUS explained that he did not contemplate any detailed discussions on particular islands or territories but wished to establish the right of the organization to deal with the problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.

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MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN indicated agreement.

5. Iran.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired whether Mr. Eden wished to bring up the subject of Iran.

MR. EDEN stated that he had submitted a paper on this question.

MR. STETTINIUS remarked that the American Delegation was in entire agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr. Eden yesterday.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not had time to give study to Mr. Eden's paper. The subject was consequently no longer discussed.

6. Yugoslavia.

MR. MOLOTOV referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and to the Subasic-Tito agreement. He stated that he could not understand the British desire to supplement this agreement when steps had not been taken to put the original agreement into force. He proposed that the original agreement be executed and that following this subsequent questions be discussed.

MR. EDEN maintained that the amendments to the agreement which had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable in nature and provided for a more democratic Yugoslavia. He could see no harm in the application.

MR. MOLOTOV continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be served by the submission of supplementary agreements until the original agreement had been effected.

MR. STETTINIUS suggested that representatives of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation. The British and Russian Ministers agreed to this proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be desirable to state that it had been agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Subasic-Tito agreement should be fully executed.

[Printed 817]

Attachment to Memorandum of Fourth Meeting of Foreign Secretaries - February 9, 1945 - See Page 12

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of _____ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at _____ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. VOTING

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

The above named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to territorial trusteeships and dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to these subjects.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _____ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

[Printed 821-822, 825]

Attachment to Memorandum of Fourth Meeting of
Foreign Secretaries, February 9, 1945

February 9, 1945

REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
February 9, 1945

1. The Polish Question:

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

2. Reparations:

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the type of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached

agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

3. Dumbarton Oaks:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the subjects of territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

It was also agreed that these subjects should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

4. Iran:

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

[Printed 821-822, 825]

- 3 -

5. Yugoslavia:

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

18.

February 9, 1945

President's lunch for Mr. Churchill, Livadia
Palace - 1:00 PM

No notes available

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDA - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

FEBRUARY 9, 1945

The President's luncheon for the Prime Minister at
Livadia Palace - 1:00 PM

(No notes available)

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

19.

February 9, 1945

6th Formal Meeting of Crimean Conference,
Livadia Palace - 4:00 PM

Poland

Trusteeships and Dependent Territories

Yugoslavia

Declaration on Liberated Europe

War Criminals

[Printed Conferences at Malta and Yalta,
841-850, [REDACTED] 815-816, 862]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Sixth Formal Meeting

Present:	The President	Date: February 9, 1945
	Mr. Stettinius	Time: 4:00 P.M.
	Admiral Leahy	Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta
	Mr. Hopkins	
	Mr. Byrnes	
	Mr. Harriman	
	Mr. Matthews	
	Mr. Bohlen	
	Mr. Hiss	

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Bridges
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Subjects: Poland
Trusteeships and Dependent Territories
Yugoslavia
Declaration on Liberated Europe
War Criminals

[REDACTED]

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THE PRESIDENT said he understood the Foreign Ministers had another report to make, and he would ask Mr. Stettinius, who presided today, to give it.

MR. STETTINIUS then reported on the results of the discussion concerning the Polish question as follows:

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American Delegation.* This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

*A copy of this memorandum is attached.

It was decided, at Mr. Churchill's request, that the Polish question would be discussed before Mr. Stettinius proceeded with the balance of his report.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Delegation accepted as a basis of discussion the proposal put forward this morning at the meeting by Mr. Stettinius. He said the Soviet Delegation was very anxious to come to an agreement and he believed that this could be done with certain amendments to Mr. Stettinius' proposal. First, he offered an amendment which dealt with the first sentence of the formula. He suggested that in place of the sentence in Mr. Stettinius' draft that the following be substituted:

The present

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The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.

He added that the next two sentences remained unchanged, but he had a slight amendment to the last sentence, namely that the words "non-Fascist and anti-Fascist" be added before the words "democratic parties". He then said that he felt the last sentence dealing with the responsibilities of the Ambassadors of the three Governments in Warsaw to observe and report on the carrying out of the free elections should be eliminated since he felt certain this would be offensive to the Poles and would needlessly complicate the discussions. He said that it was the first duty of Ambassadors anyway to observe and report, and therefore no such statement is necessary. He concluded that with these slight amendments Mr. Stettinius' proposal made this morning was acceptable.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had one more request, and that was that the Subasic-Tito agreement in regard to Yugoslavia would be put into effect. He said that the Prime Minister, in messages to Marshal Stalin, had urged this, that there had been a series of delays, and he felt that agreement should be reached here. He felt that agreement should be reached here at this conference to put this agreement immediately into effect irrespective of the wishes of the King.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied he thought that the Yugoslavia question was virtually settled and would take no time, but he thought it better to proceed immediately to discuss the Polish question. He said he was glad to see that an advance had been made at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and to hear Mr. Molotov's proposal on the urgent, immediate and painful problem of Poland. He said he wished to make some general suggestions that he hoped would not affect the movements the President had in mind. He said that here, in a general atmosphere of agreement, we should not put our feet in the stirrups and ride off. He said that he felt it would be a great mistake

to hurry

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to hurry this question--it is better to take a few days of latitude than to endanger bringing the ship into port. He said it was a great mistake to take hurried decisions on these grave matters. He felt he must study the Polish proposals before giving any opinion.

THE PRESIDENT then proposed that Mr. Stettinius should finish his report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers this morning and then the conference would adjourn for half an hour in order to study Mr. Molotov's amendments to the Polish proposals.

MARSHAL STALIN and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that he felt that this great prize should not be imperilled by too much haste, and he definitely did not want to leave this conference without an agreement on the subject, which he felt to be the most important we had before us.

MR. STETTINIUS then read the following report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the results of their discussions on reparations:

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should

be twenty

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be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden reserved his position to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the matter of providing machinery in the World Organization for dealing with territorial trusteeships and dependent areas, as follows:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

THE PRIME MINISTER interrupted with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he had not been consulted nor had he heard of this subject up to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire. As long as he was Minister, he would never yield one scrap of their heritage. He continued in this vein for some minutes.

MR. STETTINIUS explained that this reference to the creation of machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire, but that it had in mind particularly dependent areas which would be taken out of enemy control, for example, the Japanese islands in the Pacific. He said that it was felt that provision had to be made for machinery to handle this question of trusteeship for dependent areas taken from the enemy and he repeated that this was not intended to refer to the British Empire.

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THE PRIME MINISTER accepted Mr. Stettinius' explanation but remarked it would be better to say it did not refer to the British Empire. He added that Great Britain did not desire any territorial aggrandizement but had no objection if the question of trusteeship was to be considered in relation to enemy territory. He asked how Marshal Stalin would feel if the suggestion was made that the Crimea should be internationalized for use as a summer resort.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would be glad to give the Crimea as a place to be used for meetings of the three powers.

MR. STETTINIUS then completed reading the report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, as follows:

Trusteeships (continued)

It was also agreed that this subject should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

Iran

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

Yugoslavia

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and

Mr. Molotov

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Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked if the Soviet Government had agreed to the two amendments proposed by Mr. Eden in regard to the Subasic-Tito agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it was a question of putting the agreement speedily into effect and that amendments meant more delays. He said that it would be better to ask Tito and Subasic concerning the amendments after the agreement had gone into effect.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether it was too much to ask that legislative acts of the temporary authorities be subject to confirmation by democratic processes.

MARSHAL STALIN said that delays were very undesirable and that if the British proposed two more amendments the Soviet Government might propose some of their own. In the meantime, the government of Yugoslavia was held in the balance.

THE PRIME MINISTER said you couldn't say this, as Tito was a dictator and could do what he wants.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Tito is not a dictator but the head of a national committee without any clear government, and this is not a good situation.

MR. EDEN

[REDACTED]

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MR. EDEN replied that it was not a question of amendments before the agreement went into force but merely that this conference request that they be adopted. He said that Subasic was going to ask for it anyway and as Tito would agree everything would be all right.

MARSHAL STALIN said the first of the British amendments provided that any former members of the Shupsholing who had not collaborated with the Germans should be included in the anti-Fascist Vetch, and the second suggested that all legislative acts of the anti-Fascist Vetch should be confirmed by a regularly elected body. He said that he agreed with these amendments and found them good, but first he would like the government to be formed and then propose the amendments to it.

MR. EDEN remarked that he felt if we could agree here on the amendments then we could ask Tito after the agreement was in force to adopt them.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed to this proposal. He added that he thought it would be a good idea to send a telegram stating the desires of the three powers to have the agreement put into effect irrespective of the King's wishes.

THE PRIME MINISTER and **MR. EDEN** explained that the question of the King had been settled and anyway wasn't important, and Subasic was on his way to Yugoslavia, unless weather had prevented him, to put the agreement into effect. The Prime Minister added that he thought we should here agree to advise the adoption of the amendments.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had already agreed, and as a man of his word he would not go back on it.

There was then a half-hour intermission for the study of the Polish proposals.

THE PRESIDENT

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THE PRESIDENT said that after studying Mr. Molotov's amendment we were now very near agreement and it was only a matter of drafting. He said that for those governments which still recognized the London government the use of the words "Provisional Government" was somewhat difficult, and he felt that the first words of Mr. Molotov's amendment might read "The Government now operating in Poland". He said he felt it was very important for him in the United States that there be some gesture made for the six million Poles there indicating that the United States was in some way involved with the question of freedom of elections, and he therefore felt that the last sentence concerning the reports of the Ambassadors was important. He repeated that he felt, however, that it was only a matter of words and details and the three Foreign Ministers might meet tonight to discuss it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he agreed with the President that progress had been made, but he felt that the draft might be tied up by the Foreign Ministers this afternoon. He said that he had two points now that he wished to emphasize. He felt it was desirable to mention in the beginning the new situation that had been created as a result of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army which called for a government more broadly based. He said this might be an ornament but nevertheless an important ornament. He said the second question was more important and related to the last sentence of the United States draft. He said he would make an appeal to Marshal Stalin in that one of the great difficulties in the Polish situation was the lack of accurate information, and we were thus called on to make a decision of great responsibility on the basis of inadequate information. He said that we know that there are bitter feelings among the Poles and fierce language had been used by Osobka Morawski in regard to the London government, and that he understood the Lublin government had declared its intention to try as traitors the members of the Polish Home Army and the underground forces. He said these reports caused great anxiety and perplexity in England, and he hoped these two points would be considered with Marshal Stalin's usual patience and kindness.

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THE PRIME MINISTER continued that he personally would welcome observers of the three powers in any area where they appeared needed. He therefore felt that the last sentence of the United States draft in regard to responsibilities of the Ambassadors was very important. He said that he understood that Tito would have no objection to foreign observers when elections were to be held in Yugoslavia, and the British would welcome observers from the United States and the Soviet Union when elections were held in Greece, and the same would apply to Italy. He said these were not idle requests, since, for example, he knew in Egypt that whatever government held the elections won. He recalled that King Farouk for this reason refused to permit Nahas Pasha to hold an election while the latter was prime minister.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he understood the Egyptian elections where he had heard that the very greatest politicians spent their time buying each other, but this could not be compared with Poland since there was a high degree of literacy in Poland. He inquired as to the literacy in Egypt, and neither the Prime Minister or Mr. Eden had this information at hand.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that he did not mean to compare Poland with Egypt, but he had to give the House of Commons real assurance that free elections would be held. For instance, would Mikolajczyk be allowed to take part in these elections?

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that Mikolajczyk was a member of the Peasant Party which wasn't a Fascist party and therefore he could take part in the elections.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested this question be considered by the Foreign Ministers tonight.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he thought this was a matter which should be discussed in the presence of the Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought this was a matter which was necessary to carry through and that it was important to assure the House of Commons that

free

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free elections would be held in Poland, and, aside to Mr. Eden, he remarked that this was his duty although he had little interest in the Poles.

MARSHAL STALIN, in reply to this observation, said they were good people and in olden times many of them were scientists. He mentioned Copernicus in this connection. He admitted that they were still quarrelsome and there were still some Fascist elements in Poland, and that was why "non-Fascist, etc." had been added to the term "democratic parties".

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to add one word. He felt that the elections was the crux of the whole matter, and since it was true, as Marshal Stalin had said, that the Poles were quarrelsome people not only at home but also abroad, he would like to have some assurance for the six million Poles in the United States that these elections would be freely held, and he said he was sure if such assurance were present that elections would be held by the Poles there would be no doubt as to the sincerity of the agreement reached here.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he had before him the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and Mr. Molotov had one small change to propose. He said that in the fourth paragraph, after the part about consulting the other United Nations, he suggested adding the following:

In this connection, support will be given to the political leaders of those countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.

Marshal Stalin remarked that with this slight amendment he found the Declaration acceptable.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Declaration would of course apply to any areas or countries where needed as well as to Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not dissent from the President's proposed Declaration as long as it was clearly understood that the reference to the Atlantic

Charter

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[REDACTED]

Charter did not apply to the British Empire. He said he had already made plain in the House of Commons that as far as the British Empire was concerned the principles already applied. He said he had given Mr. Willkie a copy of his statement on this subject.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if that was what had killed Mr. Willkie.

THE PRESIDENT said that in earlier drafts France had been included but was not absent.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that three powers were better than four.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it might be possible to ask France to associate itself with the Declaration.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that this matter be considered by the three Foreign Ministers tonight.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Prime Minister need have no anxiety that Mr. Molotov's amendment was designed to apply to Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was not anxious about Greece--that he merely desired that everybody should have a fair chance and do his duty.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought it would have been very dangerous if he had allowed other forces than his own to go into Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would welcome a Soviet observer in Greece.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had complete confidence in British policy in Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed gratification in this statement.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that they should touch on, at this conference, the question of war criminals--that is, those whose crimes had no geographical limitation.

MR. MOLOTOV

[REDACTED]

February 9, 1945

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether his amendment to the Declaration was acceptable.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he thought it should be considered by the Foreign Ministers.

MARSHAL STALIN said that we could then consider it agreed that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go into effect immediately.

THE PRIME MINISTER concurred.

MARSHAL STALIN made some reference to sending a telegram to Tito but the suggestion was not pursued.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he personally had drafted the Declaration on German atrocities issued by the Moscow Conference which dealt with the subject of the main criminals whose crimes had no geographical location. He said it was an egg that he had laid himself and he thought a list of the major criminals of this category should be drawn up here. He said he thought they should be shot once their identity is established.

MARSHAL STALIN asked about Hess.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought that events would catch up with Hess. He said he believed these men should be given a judicial trial.

MARSHAL STALIN replied in the affirmative. He then asked if the war criminal question applied to prisoners of war.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it did if they had violated the laws of war. He said that we should merely have an exchange of views here and no publicity should be given to the matter.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired if the offensive on the Western Front had begun.

THE PRIME MINISTER said yes--about 100,000 British launched an attack yesterday morning and made an advance of about 3,000 yards over a five-mile front. He said the defense had been weak except in two villages, and

forces

[Printed Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 815-816]

February 9, 1945.

SUGGESTIONS IN REGARD TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENTAL QUESTION

This is Attachment to Notes of 6th
Formal Meeting of Crimean Conference February 9, 1945.

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative "Provisional Polish Government" and we speak of the formation of a "Government of National Unity". All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed "The Provisional Government of National Unity"; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This "Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a "Polish Government of National Unity" is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

[Printed 862]

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

This is Attachment to Notes of 6th
Formal Meeting of Crimean Conference February 9, 1945.

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter -- the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live -- the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When,

[Printed 862]

-2-

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

20.

February 9, 1945

5th Foreign Secretaries Conference, Korea -
10:30 PM

Poland

Declaration on Liberated Areas

[Printed 866-871, Conf. at Malta & Yalta] 20

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Fifth Meeting of Foreign Secretaries

Present: Mr. Stettinius Date: February 9, 1945
 Mr. Harriman Time: 10:30 PM
 Mr. Matthews Place: Korea
 Mr. Bohlen

 Mr. Eden
 Sir Alexander Cadogan
 Mr. Jebb
 Mr. Frank Roberts
 Mr. Allen

 Mr. Molotov
 Mr. Vyshinski
 Mr. Gromyko
 Mr. Gusev
 Mr. Golinski

Subjects: Poland

 Declaration on Liberated Areas

February 9, 1945

██████████
candidates.

"When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition."

The one important point on which considerable discussion failed to produce agreement was with respect to the addition of a further sentence along the following lines:

"The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

MR. STETTINIUS and MR. EDEN emphasized the importance of the inclusion of some such sentence if recognition is to be transferred from the London Government because of its effect on public opinion in their respective countries. MR. MOLOTOV insisted that this was a point that could be discussed with the Poles by the commission of three in Moscow but could not be included without such discussion as it would offend their sensibilities. MR. STETTINIUS then proposed a variation of that sentence, reading as following:

"The three governments recognizing their responsibility as a result of the present agreement for the future right of the Polish people freely to choose the government and institutions under which they are to live, will receive reports on this subject from their ambassadors in Warsaw."

MR. MOLOTOV had the same objections to this sentence. It was left that the question would be put up to the Big Three Meeting this afternoon.

The second point discussed concerned Mr. Molotov's proposed addition to the draft declaration on liberated areas. He proposed that the following

clause

February 9, 1945

clause be added at the conclusion of the third from last paragraph:

"And in this connection support should be given to the political leaders of these countries who took an active part in the struggle against the German invaders."

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he could not accept this addition and that it did not appear pertinent to the declaration. He said that it appeared like too much interference in the affairs of these countries and involved taking decisions on who had collaborated with the enemy, which should be left to the peoples of these countries themselves. MR. EDEN expressed full concurrence with those views. It was agreed likewise to refer this to the next session of the Big Three.

[REDACTED]

[Printed 869-870]

February 8, 1945

Revised Formula for Poland.

1. It was agreed that the Curson Line should be the eastern frontier of Poland with adjustments in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favour of Poland.

2. It was decided that the territory of Poland in the west should include the free city of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It was understood that the Germans in the said regions should be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany should at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

3. Having regard to the recent liberation of western Poland by the Soviet armies it was deemed desirable to facilitate the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government based upon all the democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poles abroad. That Government should be so constituted as to command recognition by the three Allied Governments.

4. It was agreed that the establishment of such a provisional Government was the primary responsibility of the Polish people, and that, pending the possibility of free elections, representative Polish leaders should consult together on the composition of this provisional Government. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the task of approaching such leaders and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the provisional Polish Government, thus established, should as soon as possible hold free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic parties should have the right to participate and to promote candidatures, in order to ensure the establishment of a Government truly representative of the will of the Polish people.

[Printed 870-871]

British revised formula submitted at the meeting
of Foreign Secretaries after the Plenary Session
of February 9, 1946.

"A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. This Government should be based upon the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland and upon other democratic Polish leaders from within Poland and from abroad. This new Government should be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr should be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the re-organization of the present Government along the above lines. This "Provisional Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections, all democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed, which the three Governments can regard as fully representative of the Polish people, the three Governments will accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

February 10, 1945

6th Foreign Secretaries Conference, Vorontsov
Villa - 12:00 Noon

The Polish Formula

Declaration on Liberated Europe

Yugoslavia

Reparations

Communique on the Crimean Conference

World Organization

Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

Yugoslav-Italian Frontier

Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations

IRNA

[Printed 871-877, 862-863, 884-893] 21

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION -- CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Sixth Foreign Secretaries Conference.

Present: Mr. Stettinius Date: February 10, 1945
 Mr. Harriman Time: 12:00 noon
 Mr. Matthews Place: Vorontsov Villa, Alupka
 Mr. Hiss
 Mr. Bohlen
 Mr. Page

Mr. Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Dixon
Major Theakstone

Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Pavlov

- Subject: 1. The Polish Formula.
 2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.
 3. Yugoslavia.
 4. Reparations.
 5. Communique on the Crimean Conference.
 6. World Organization.
 7. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.
 8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.
 9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.
 10. Iran.

February 10, 1945

MR. EDEN, who presided, opened the meeting.

1. The Polish Formula.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the American experts as well as the President had given serious study to the Polish formula and that the American Delegation was prepared to withdraw the last sentence, which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his Ambassador on the question.

Later in the conversation MR. EDEN stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop this last sentence.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he, of course, preferred the document as it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had several amendments to the formula. He proposed that "as soon as practicable" be changed to "as soon as possible." He also proposed that the last part of the last paragraph be drafted to read: "the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union."

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he could not agree with this second change.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that a special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

MR. EDEN said that the Government referred to in the formula was a new government and that it was most necessary that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

MR. STETTINIUS

February 10, 1945

MR. STETTINIUS supported Mr. Eden and added that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principle of a new Polish Government.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night's and today's discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the plenary session.

There is attached a copy of the formula on Poland as discussed in today's meeting (attachment no. 1).

2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 9. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs. The text of this Declaration, with Mr. Molotov's amendment is attached hereto. (attachment no. 2).

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words "they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration," be replaced by the words "they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation."

MR. STETTINIUS and MR. EDEN agreed to this formula.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to the status of Mr. Molotov's amendment of February 9.

MR. MOLOTOV

February 10, 1945

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent recurrences similar to those in Greece.

MR. EDEN inquired whether the British proposals regarding French association were acceptable.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not had sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four o'clock meeting.

MR. STETTINIUS observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the Declaration. A copy of this Declaration is attached. (See Attachment No. 3)

3. Yugoslavia.

MR. EDEN stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the Regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin's proposal might be accepted to the effect that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether any mention should be made of Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communique.

MR. EDEN suggested that both courses might be advisable.

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they expedite the coming into force of the agreement.

MR. EDEN stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.

4. Reparations.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to reserve the position of the British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims. He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as soon as possible.

MR. MAISKY

February 10, 1945

MR. MAISKY interjected that unless the British agreed to the American draft submitted February 9, the Commission would have no basis, no directives for its work.

MR. EDEN stated that he agreed on the principles involved in the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal of property from Germany and the annual contributions. However, he wished to submit a redraft of the proposals. (see attachment no. 4)

MR. EDEN stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile -- the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government also felt that the question of labor should be considered by the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements should be made without prejudices to the restitution of looted property.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed to this last statement.

MR. MAISKY stated that Mr. Eden's reply was very disappointing. Its whole spirit was to take from Germany as little as possible.

MR. EDEN interjected that this was not the case; however, he could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

MR. MAISKY stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated removals. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the easiest way out was to accept the formula agreed upon

by the

February 10, 1945

by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the Commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, MR. MAISKY maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

MR. EDEN maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements could be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.

MR. EDEN inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

MR. MAISKY replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

MR. EDEN stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o'clock meeting.

5. Communique on the Crimean Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether any thought had been given to the communique on the Conference.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the American Delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon's agenda be the question of a communique and that the drafting of a communique be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN agreed to this suggestion.

6. World Organization.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to submit a report (see attachment no.5)

February 10, 1945

attachment no. 5) of the sub-committee.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report, i.e., regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.

MR. EDEN and MR. STETTINIUS also agreed.

7. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.

MR. EDEN stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not wish a repetition of "Athens". He wished to submit a small paper on the question (see attachment 6).

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.

9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.

In accordance with Mr. Eden's suggestion, MR. MOLOTOV stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating

militarily against

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1945

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militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections to such a treaty.

MR. EDEN stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between ex-enemy and friendly states.

MR. EDEN questioned this.

MR. MOLOTOV continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

MR. EDEN maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the armistice period had terminated.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden's views.

MR. EDEN inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no power to speak for them.

MR. EDEN reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice and was not free to do what it wished.

MR. STETTINIUS suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

MR. MOLOTOV

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[Printed 877]

-9-

February 10, 1945

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

10. Iran.

MR. EDEN inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

MR. EDEN inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communique on Iran.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this would be inadvisable.

MR. STETTINIUS urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he opposed this idea.

MR. EDEN suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and re-examined during the present meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV opposed this suggestion.

[Printed 883]

Attachment No. 1 to notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries Conference
February 10, 1946.

TEXT OF FORMULA ON POLAND SO FAR AGREED BY THE THREE
FOREIGN MINISTERS

A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity." Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

When a "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity" has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.

[Printed 862-863]

Attachment No. 2 to notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries Conference
February 10, 1945.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter -- the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live -- the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When,

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

Amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at Plenary Session of Feb. 9:

At the end of the fourth paragraph, omit the period, insert a comma, and add the following:

"and strong support will be given to those people in these countries who took an active part in the struggle against German occupation."

[Printed 884]

~~SECRET~~
Attachment No. 3 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries
Conference, February 10, 1946

BRITISH DRAFT OF LAST PARAGRAPH OF DECLARATION ON
LIBERATED EUROPE

In issuing this Declaration the three Powers
express the hope that the Provisional Government of
the French Republic may be associated with them in
the action and the procedure suggested.

[Printed 885]

Attachment No. 4 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries Conference, February 10, 1948.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EXACTION OF REPARATION FROM GERMANY.

1. The proportions in reparation allotted to the claimant countries shall be determined according to their respective contributions to the winning of the war and the degree of the material loss which they have suffered. Account shall be taken of deliveries made to the claimant countries by other enemy countries.

2. Reparation is to be exacted from Germany in the three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory. These removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. Subject to the fulfilment of these aims Germany's industrial capacity will not be reduced to a point which would endanger the economic existence of Germany and the execution of such obligations as may be imposed on her.

(b) Annual deliveries from current production for a period to be considered.

(c) Use of German labor and lorry service.

3. In fixing the amount of reparation to be exacted under paragraph two above account shall be taken of any arrangements made for the dismemberment of Germany, the requirements of the occupying forces, and Germany's need to acquire from time to time sufficient foreign currency from her exports to pay for her current imports and the pre-war claims of the United Nations on Germany.

[Printed 885-886]

Attachment No. 8 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries
Conference, February 10, 1945

REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

[Printed 886]

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of _____ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at _____ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

*C. VOTING

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

[Printed 886]

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.*

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _____ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

[Printed 887]

Attachment No. 6 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries
Conference, February 10, 1946

BRITISH STATEMENT ON AUSTRO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the Styrian portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the plebiscite held in 1919. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Carinthia and establish control over it. It would be invidious for H.M.G. to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we must try to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its maintenance and observance by Yugoslavia.

It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:

(a) that pending the final peace settlement the 1937 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia shall be restored.

(b) that the integrity of this frontier is the joint interest of the three powers, and that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. will support any action which H.M.G. may see fit to take to preserve its integrity.

(c) that the three powers should jointly inform the Yugoslav Government of decisions (a) and (b) above and request the Yugoslav Government to give an undertaking to preserve this frontier.

[Printed 888-889]

Attachment No. 7 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries
Conference, February 10, 1945

NOTES FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE IN REGARD
TO VENEZIA GIULIA

I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.

We had originally intended to set up Allied Military Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier but we now have doubts whether this would be a very satisfactory course for the following reasons. Tito has not yet put his views in writing but he has made it pretty clear that he will not agree to such a proposal. He certainly intends to administer himself the considerable areas which he claims for Yugoslavia and part of which are already controlled by his Partisans. Even if under extreme pressure he was forced to accept Allied (British) Military Government his Partisans would remain in arms throughout the district and it would be a miracle if sooner or later they did not obstruct our Military administration. We should then have to take forceful measures to assert our authority and fighting might begin. Alternatively there might be clashes between the Yugoslav Partisans and the Italian Partisans, both trying to hold as much territory as they could. In that case also we should have to intervene to keep the peace by force. I would therefore ask my colleagues to agree to establish some body for the purpose of working out a provisional line of demarcation in the Venezia Giulia between the area to be controlled by Tito and the area over which we should establish Allied Military Government. We have made an attempt ourselves to draw up such a line based for the most part of ethnic considerations. But obviously we cannot jointly agree on a line now, all we can do is agree to the principle that there should be such a line and that some body of technicians should be established for the purpose of determining it. After that it would no doubt be for His Majesty's

Government

██████████

Government to obtain Tito's acceptance of it. But if they do this His Majesty's Government would like to be able to say that both their Allies agree with the proposal.

Finally I would point out that in any case, even if the area west of my suggested provisional line is allotted to Tito, it will be necessary, in the early stages at any rate, for our Supreme Commander to make use of the communications from Trieste northwards in which case he would have to take suitable measures to that end. It might later be possible for him to arrange for his communications to Austria to pass further to the west.

████████████████████

[Printed 889-890]

Attachment No. 8 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries
Conference, February 10, 1946

ALLIED (SOVIET) CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA

His Majesty's Government regard it as essential
(a) that their representatives in Bulgaria should enjoy
reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and
(b) that decisions about which they have not been
consulted should not be taken in their name. In the
case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt
with in the "Statutes of the Allied Control Commission
in Hungary", and His Majesty's Government suggest
that identical Statutes should be adopted for the
Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the
points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was
delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11th,
1944.

His Majesty's Government also consider that
during the first period there should be prior consulta-
tion with the British and American representatives
and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged
to take any unilateral action on military grounds not
covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their
sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet
Government only.

During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion
of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty's Government
wish to ensure that

(a). The British and American representatives
should take their places in the Control Commissions
as full members and should have the right to attend
all their meetings and to participate fully in the
consideration of all questions before the Commissions.
They should also have the right of direct access to the
Bulgarian authorities.

(b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commission
should be unanimous and its name and authority should
be used only where the representatives of all three
powers are in agreement.

If the

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT TO THE
VICEDIRECTOR NO. 8 TO NOTES OF CPT KENNETH

98-9886 [b] [b]

[REDACTED]

If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Government or taking action which has not been approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

(c) The extent to which the British and Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commission will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any sub-committee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

(d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commission on the spot.

[REDACTED]

[Printed 890-891]

Attachment No. 9 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries
Conference, February 10, 1945

YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

His Majesty's Government recently communicated to the Soviet Government an expression of their views regarding a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In replying to this communication, the Soviet Government informed His Majesty's Government that they were aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the conclusion of a pact of alliance and mutual assistance were proceeding and added that their attitude towards this was favourable. The Soviet Government, however, considered that the question of a Balkan federation, and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, was not at present actual and was of no practical importance.

While His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that the Soviet Government do not consider the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation to be actual at present and that they regard the matter as of no practical importance, they are disturbed to learn that a pact of alliance and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is under negotiation and that the attitude of the Soviet Government towards these negotiations is favourable.

His Majesty's Government cannot but regard the pact now under negotiation as open to the same objections which they felt in regard to a possible federation. In their view an enemy state whose status is still regulated by an armistice regime must be debarred from entering into special treaty relations with another state, more particularly with another state with which she is still technically in a state of war except with the explicit permission of all the victorious Powers with whom the armistice was concluded.

Quite apart from the important question of principle involved, His Majesty's Government are also anxious regarding the effect of the pact now under negotiation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria upon the interests of Greece which has hitherto not received from Bulgaria

the full

CONSULTATION REPORT NO. 101 1945
APPENDIX No. 3 to Report of the Technical Commission

CP8 [initials]

[REDACTED]

the full reparation to which she is entitled under the terms of the armistice. This aspect of the matter is treated in greater detail in a separate aide-memoire.

His Majesty's Government accordingly consider that a communication should be made to the Bulgarian Government by all the victorious Powers with whom she recently concluded an armistice, stating that they cannot agree to her entering into special treaty relations with Yugoslavia at this stage and that full reparation must be made to Greece before there can be any question of such negotiations being resumed. His Majesty's Government consider that Marshal Tito should simultaneously be informed of the objections seen by the victorious Powers to the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn the views of the Soviet Government upon this matter as soon as possible.

[REDACTED]

[Printed 891-893]

Attachment No. 10 to Notes of 6th Foreign Secretaries
Conference, February 10, 1946

GREEK CLAIMS UPON BULGARIA, MORE PARTICULARLY
IN REGARD TO REPARATIONS

His Majesty's Government are concerned regarding the position in regard to Greek claims against Bulgaria. On the occasion of the signature of the Armistice with Hungary, the Soviet Government informed the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments that they might send representatives to be accredited to the Hungarian Control Commission for the purpose of dealing with all questions affecting their particular government.

On January 23rd the Greek Government, with the support of His Majesty's Embassy in Moscow, approached the Soviet Government with a request for facilities in Bulgaria similar to those granted to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments in Hungary. No reply has, however, yet been vouchsafed to this request by the Soviet Government.

The Greek people have suffered very seriously from Bulgarian depredations and are in the view of His Majesty's Government entitled to early satisfaction and to immediate reparation deliveries of which Greece stands in urgent need. The Greek Government have already presented to the Bulgarian Control Commission a list of commodities necessary to the Greek economy and due to them in virtue of the Bulgarian Armistice Agreement, the delivery of which to Greece in the immediate future is essential to the maintenance of Greek economy. Deliveries which are more urgently required comprise, *inter alia*, food stuffs, locomotives, agricultural implements and live-stock. Furthermore, in view of the decision incorporated in the Hungarian armistice terms allotting to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fixed sums payable in commodities as reparations over a period of six years, it is in the view of His Majesty's Government equitable that similar arrangements should be made to fix a lump sum due to Greece by Bulgaria to be paid similarly in commodities over a period of six years. In the view of His Majesty's Government a corresponding sum

should

19-198 [banned]

should be allocated to Yugoslavia which has also suffered from Bulgarian occupation. In this connection His Majesty's Government desire to make it clear that, while they are in general opposed to the fixing of lump sums for reparations to be exacted from enemy countries, they consider it only equitable, in view of the fact that lump sums have been allocated to the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments under the Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian Armistices, that a similar lump sum should now be allocated to Greece and Yugoslavia under the Bulgarian Armistice.

His Majesty's Government accordingly trust that the Soviet Government will accede to the proposals put to them on January 23rd with the support of His Majesty's Government concerning Greek representation on the Control Commission in Bulgaria. They further trust that the Soviet Government will agree to give explicit instructions to the head of the Control Commission in Bulgaria that immediate deliveries must be made to Greece in accordance with the terms of the armistice and that the list already presented by the Greek Government to the Soviet Government is to be taken as the basis for determining the nature and amounts of commodities to be delivered. Finally His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that immediate consideration should be given to the question of fixing the total Bulgarian reparation liability to Greece and Yugoslavia, if necessary in terms of money.

22.

February 10, 1945

Mr. Harriman's meeting with Mr. Molotov,
Koreis - 2:00 PM
Far East - Political

[Printed in Conferences at Malta & Yalta, 874-897]

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Conversations February 10, 1945, regarding the Far East

1st Conversation

Present: Mr. Harriman Date: February 10, 1945
Mr. Molotov Time: 2:00 PM
Mr. Pavlov Place: Koreis

2nd Conversation

Present: The President Date: February 10, 1945
Mr. Harriman Time:
Place: Livadia Palace

3rd Conversation

Present: The President Date: February 10, 1945
Mr. Harriman Time: 4:30 PM
Place: Livadia Palace
Marshall Stalin

Subject: The Far East - Political

Note: Dictated by Mr. Harriman

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 10, 1945

At Mr. Molotov's request I called on him at Koresis at 2:00 p.m. He handed me in English translation the draft of Marshal Stalin's political conditions for Russia's entry in the war against Japan as discussed with the President on February 8.

I explained to Molotov that there were three amendments I believed the President would wish to make before accepting:

2. b) should indicate Stalin's readiness to accept the President's proposal that Port Arthur and Dairen should be free ports and 2. c) should cover the alternative of the railways being operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission, both of which Marshal Stalin had agreed to. In addition I said I felt sure that the President would not wish to dispose finally of these two matters in which China was interested without the concurrence of the Generalissimo.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the first two points but it took me some time to explain to Molotov the reasons for the last. I agreed to submit to Molotov the President's suggested revisions.

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On my return to Livadia I showed the President the proposed draft (copy attached) with the amendments covering the points mentioned (copy of amendments attached). The President approved and authorized me to resubmit them to Mr. Molotov, which I did.

#####

After the formal Conference meeting in the afternoon between the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin and their associates, Marshal Stalin came to me to explain the further changes he had in mind for the Agreement. He said that he was entirely willing to have Dairen a free port under international control, but that Port Arthur was different, it was to be a Russian naval base and therefore Russia required a lease.

I suggested

February 10, 1945.

I suggested to Marshal Stalin that he take the opportunity to discuss this matter at once with the President, which he thereupon did.

THE PRESIDENT agreed to Marshal Stalin's revised proposal regarding the ports as above.

MARSHAL STALIN then explained that he agreed it would be more appropriate for the Manchurian Railroads to be operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission. He further agreed in the need for concurrence of the Generalissimo on these matters but stated that the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to status quo in Outer Mongolia.

THE PRESIDENT asked Marshal Stalin whether he (Stalin) wished to take these matters up with T. V. Soong when he came to Moscow or whether Stalin wished the President to take them up with the Generalissimo.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that as he was an interested party he would prefer to have the President do it.

THE PRESIDENT then asked when the subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo, having in mind the question of secrecy.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would let the President know when he was prepared to have this done.

THE PRESIDENT said that he would send an army officer from Washington through Moscow to Chungking with a letter of instructions to Ambassador Hurley in order to insure secrecy.

At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion. I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalin whether he would undertake to draft the further revisions, to which he replied in the affirmative.

W. A. Harriman

3 Attachments

[Printed 896]

Attachment to Memorandum of Conversations regarding the
Far East - February 10, 1945.

Draft of Marshal Stalin's political conditions
for Russia's entry in the war against Japan

The leaders of the three Great Powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. Status quo in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) should be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:
 - a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,
 - b) possession of Port-Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored,
 - c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kuril islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

[Printed 896-897]

Attachment to Memorandum of Conversations Regarding Far East
February 10, 1945.

Mr. Harriman's suggested changes in Marshal
Stalin's draft of Russia's political conditions for
Russia's entry in the war against Japan

Item 2. b):

possession lease of the port areas of Port-
Arthur and Dairen ~~on-lease~~ should be restored, or these
areas should become free ports under international control.

Item 2. c):

Add the following after the word "Manchuria;" at
the end of the paragraph "or these railroads should be
placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet
Commission."

Item 3.:

Add final paragraph:

"It is understood that the agreement concerning
the ports and railways referred to above requires the
concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek."

Note: Portions crossed out are deletions and
portions underlined are additions to original document.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three Great Powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the

of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

February 11, 1945 (in script)

I. STALIN (Signed)
Franklin D. Roosevelt (s)
Winston S. Churchill (s)

February 10, 1945

7th Formal Meeting of Crimean Conference,
Livadia Palace - 4:00 PM

Poland

Declaration on Liberated Europe

French Participation in Control Commission
for Germany

Yugoslavia

Dumbarton Oaks: Reparations from Germany,
Dardanelles

[Printed in Conferences at Malta + Yalta, 897-906]

-2-

February 10, 1945

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.

MR. EDEN said that he had to report agreement on the future Government of Poland, that there had been two questions involved which he would refer to later but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Molotov. The new formula was as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER

February 10, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He said we are all agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the Western Niesse. He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at all.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he thought that there should be some statement on the Eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and repeated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole situation insofar as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some statement on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to the Eastern frontier.

THE PRESIDENT then said that
mind in regard to the question of
pation in the Central Commission. He now agreed with

THE PRIME MINISTER

The view of

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the West but that the opinion of the New Polish Government of National Unity would be sought.

THE PRESIDENT said he had no objection in principle to such a statement but he thought the Prime Minister should draft it.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish statement.

MR. EDEN, continuing his report, said that in regard to his declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Delegation had proposed an amendment in regard to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments should immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations. Mr. Eden said that he proposed a draft that the three Governments should immediately consult together upon the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal Stalin said he accepted the British suggestion.

MR. EDEN then said there was a note which he wished to attach to this declaration, namely, that the French should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration and that his note would merely state that in issuing this declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the hope that the Provisional Government of France would associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged therein.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French participation in the Control Commission. He now agreed with

the views of

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1945

the views of the Prime Minister that it would be impossible to give France an area to administer in Germany unless they were members of the Control Commission. He said he thought it would be easier to deal with the French if they were on the Commission than if they were not.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had no objections and that he agreed to this.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that there should be a joint telegram sent to DeGaulle informing him of these decisions to which there was general agreement.

MR. EDEN said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal Tito and Subasic suggesting that the agreement which they had reached be immediately put into effect as the basis for the formation of a unified Government of Yugoslavia.

THE PRESIDENT said he was not sure whether he would be able to join in the statement on Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him he agreed that it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with it.

After some discussion MARSHAL STALIN suggested that the telegram to Marshal Tito and Subasic should say that the heads of the three Governments have agreed that the agreement between Tito and Subasic should be put immediately into effect and that as soon as a new Government was formed the two amendments proposed by the British should be put into effect. He said he thought it was inconsistent to put more in the communique than there was in the telegram.

THE PRIME MINISTER

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped that both of the two amendments proposed by the British could be in the communique.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought it would be better to confine the telegram and reference in the communique to the entry into force of the Tito-Subasic agreement.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the British people would be more reconciled to the Government and it would have a better reception if the two amendments were included.

After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden MARSHAL STALIN said he thought that three points could be included in the telegram: (1) that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go immediately into force, (2) that the members of the Skupshina who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch, and (3) that the actions of the anti-fascist Vetch would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly. He added that he thought these three points could go into the communique.

MR. EDEN said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations, but he did not feel that it was necessary to bother the Conference with these small matters. He went on to say that in regard to reparations the British Government still had reservations in regard to the Soviet proposals.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention figures and that that should be left to the reparations committee to determine.

THE PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1945

THE PRESIDENT said that he was afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures were mentioned that the American people would believe that it involved money.

MARSHAL STALIN explained that the sum mentioned was only the expression of the value of the reparations in kind.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard to reparations but that he could not agree to the inclusion of a definite sum.

MARSHAL STALIN said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the matter. He did not understand why there should be any confusion in regard to payment in money since the Soviet Union had concluded three treaties with Finland, Rumania and Hungary in which the value of reparations in kind were definitely stated and that there had been no confusion as far as he knew on this subject. He said that if the British felt that the Russians should receive no reparations at all, it would be better to say so frankly. He said he had heard a great deal of talk at the Conference that the Russians would receive reparations in kind in the form of factories and plants but that no decision had been reached. He said he thought that two decisions might be taken by the Conference: (1) that it was agreed in principle that Germany should pay reparations and (2) that the Reparations Commission to sit in Moscow should fix the amount and should take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be twenty billion dollars of reparations, with fifty per cent to the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1946

THE PRESIDENT said he feared the word "reparations" somewhat since he thought the people in America would think it meant reparations in cash.

Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term "compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war" instead of "reparations."

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Moscow commission would have the duty of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the British Government could not commit itself to any figure.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that there was no commitment involved but it might be said that the Commission might take as material for discussion the American-Soviet formula.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read a telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they considered it inadmissible to state any figure until an investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It was equal to Germany's export trade in times of peace and it was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that some of these reparations would come from Germany's capital assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for Germany to pay her bills. The payments would more than cover German imports and if these imports were not given a priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other countries would be paying for German reparations to those countries receiving them.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not want to go into the circumstances of the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure to be used as a basis for discussions -- it could be reduced or increased by the Commission in Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT

February 10, 1945

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that the whole matter be left to the Commission in Moscow.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay reparations which would be stated by the three Governments here.

MR. MOLOTOV said that yesterday Mr. Stettinius had analyzed the results of the meeting and had reported full agreement on the first two points of the Soviet proposal. Now the question was what countries should receive reparations and the type of reparations and differences only appeared between the United States and the Soviet Delegation on the one hand and the British on the other in regard to the naming of a sum.

MR. EDEN said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government felt that even the naming of a sum as the basis of discussions would commit them. He said he proposed that the Moscow Commission be instructed to examine the report of Mr. Maisky, made at the Crimean Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. MAISKY both replied that to refer a question put by the Crimean Conference to a lesser body would be utterly illogical.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that no agreement had been reached as to the mention of a sum.

MR. EDEN added that the first two points referred to by Mr. Molotov were agreed upon but not the last which related to the sum.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he was willing to propose the following formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the

amount of

February 10, 1945

amount of reparations. This was agreed to by the Conference.

There was then a short intermission.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether they could discuss the British text of the paragraph on frontiers to be added to the Polish statement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not yet received the Russian translation.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles. He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist just as the Japanese Emperor was not present at this Conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect, but he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to prejudge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. This was a question which an appropriate organization could consider and he thought that the three Foreign Ministers who were to meet periodically -- every two or three months -- might well consider this matter at their first meeting and report to their respective cabinets.

THE PRESIDENT

February 10

THE PRESIDENT said he had one general observation to make and that was that in the United States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other frontiers in the world would eventually be without forts or armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Marshal Stalin had reminded them of the question of the Straits when they were in Moscow last autumn. They had said then that they were in sympathy with the revision of the treaty and had suggested to the Soviet Government that a note be sent on the subject but none has as yet been received. He said that he thought that the method proposed by Marshal Stalin was a wise one. The British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not be dependent on the narrow exit. He said if the matter is brought up at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers he hoped the Russians would make their proposals known. In the meantime, it might be well to inform the Turks that the matter of revision of the Montreux Convention would be under consideration. This was particularly true if the Allies desired them to come into the war on their side. Mr. Eden reminded him that he had mentioned the matter several times to the Turkish Ambassador in London. He said it might be advisable to give the Turks at the same time some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed.

MARSHAL STALIN replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed.

THE PRESIDENT agreed to this.

MARSHAL STALIN said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United Nations Conference and discuss the question of the Straits.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought that this matter affected the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers

had a

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had a meeting in London that that would be the proper place to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles and then the Russian Government had made available an armed force to help but it did not succeed.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks were on the verge of surrender.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that by that time he was out of the government because of the Dardanelles campaign and had had nothing to do with that decision.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired who was taking down decisions reached at this conference.

MR. EDEN replied there would be an agreed upon communique as well as a list of the decisions taken.

THE PRESIDENT then said he wished to propose some small amendments in the paragraph regarding frontiers in the Polish statement. He said these amendments were necessary for American Constitutional reasons. He suggested that instead of the first words "The three powers" he would like to substitute "The three heads of government" and that in the second sentence the words "three powers" be eliminated, and in the last sentence the word "feel" instead of "agree" should be used.

These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the following text approved:

"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curson Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

MR. MOLOTOV said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the second sentence "with the return to Poland of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder".

THE PRESIDENT inquired how long ago these lands had been Polish.

MR. MOLOTOV said very long ago, but they had in fact been Polish.

THE PRESIDENT

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THE PRESIDENT said this might lead the British to ask for the return of the United States to Great Britain.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that at the present the draft said nothing specific about frontiers, which he thought was very important for the Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would prefer not to mention the frontier in the west since he shared the same difficulties the President had spoken of.

MR. EDEN said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought it might be worthwhile considering this wording.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the British draft as it had been.

The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.

THE PRESIDENT then remarked he would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at three o'clock in the afternoon.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done by then, particularly the communique and the final text of the documents.

There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden concerning the possibility of preparing the communique before the time set for the President's departure.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that there was very little time and he felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be cancelled.

After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communique should come to the Villa and report at ten o'clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.

The meeting then adjourned.

[REDACTED]

24.

February 10, 1945

Prime Minister's dinner for Marshal Stalin and
the President, Vorontsov Villa - 9:00 PM

Reparations from Germany

Communique

British and American Politics

Jewish Problem

[Printed in part in Conferences at Malta + Yalta, 1945]

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Dinner Given by the Prime Minister

Present: The President
Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Bohlen

Date: February 10, 1945
Time: 9:00 P.M.
Place: Vorontsov Villa,
Alupka

The Prime Minister
Mr. Eden
Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

Subjects: Reparations from Germany
Communique
British and American Politics
Jewish problems

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1945

At the beginning of dinner the conversation was general.

THE PRIME MINISTER then proposed a toast to the King of England, the President of the United States, and to Mr. Kalinin, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and he asked the President as the only Head of State present to reply to this toast.

THE PRESIDENT replied that the Prime Minister's toast brought back many memories--that he recalled the first year as President of the United States in the summer of 1933. His wife had gone down in the country to open a school, and on the wall there had been a map on which there had been a great blank space. He said the teacher had told his wife that it was forbidden to speak about this place, and this place had been the Soviet Union. He said he had then decided to write a letter to Mr. Kalinin asking him to send someone to the United States to open negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

MARSHAL STALIN, in his conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, emphasized the unsatisfactory nature of the reparations question at the conference. He said he feared to have to go back to the Soviet Union and tell the Soviet people they were not going to get any reparations because the British were opposed to it.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, on the contrary, he very much hoped that Russia would receive reparations in large quantities, but he remembered the last war when they had placed the figure at more than the capacity of Germany to pay.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he thought it would be a good idea to put some mention of the intention to make Germany pay for the damage it had caused the Allied Nations, and also some reference to the Reparations Commission, in the communique.

THE PRIME MINISTER and THE PRESIDENT agreed to the inclusion of these statements in the communique.

THE PRIME

[Printed, 922-923]

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THE PRIME MINISTER then proposed a toast to the health of Marshal Stalin. He said he hoped that the Marshal had a warmer feeling for the British than he had had, and that he felt that the great victories which his armies had achieved had made him more mellow and friendly than he had been during the hard times of the war. He said he hoped that the Marshal realized that he had good and strong friends in those British and American representatives assembled here. We all hoped, he continued, that the future of Russia would be bright, and he said he knew Great Britain, and he was sure the President, would do all they could to bring this about. He said he felt that the common danger of war had removed impediments to understanding and the fires of war had wiped out old animosities. He said he envisaged a Russia which had already been glorious in war as a happy and smiling nation in times of peace.

MR. STETTINIUS then proposed a toast to his predecessor, Mr. Cordell Hull, who he said had been an inspiration to us all in his labors for the creation of a peaceful and orderly world. He concluded by saying that Mr. Hull was a great American and great statesman.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he recalled that there had been an organization in the United States called the Klu Klux Klan that had hated the Catholics and the Jews, and once when he had been on a visit in a small town in the South he had been the guest of the president of the local Chamber of Commerce. He had sat next to an Italian on one side and a Jew on the other and had asked the president of the Chamber of Commerce whether they were members of the Klu Klux Klan, to which the president had replied that they were, but that they were considered all right since everyone in the community knew them. The President remarked that it was a good illustration of how difficult it was to have any prejudices--racial, religious or otherwise--if you really knew people.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt that this was very true.

After considerable discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to English politics, in which the latter said he did not believe the Labor Party would ever be successful in forming a government in England, THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion any

leader

February 10, 1945

leader of a people must take care of their primary needs. He said he remembered when he first became President the United States was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing and shelter, but he had said, "If you elect me President I will give you these things", and since then there was little problem in regard to social disorder in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT then said he desired to propose a toast to the Prime Minister. He said that he personally had been twenty-eight years old when he entered political life, but even at that time Mr. Churchill had had long experience in the service of his country. Mr. Churchill had been in and out of the government for many, many years, and it was difficult to say whether he had been of more service to his country within the government or without. The President said that he personally felt that Mr. Churchill had been perhaps of even greater service when he was not in the government since he had forced the people to think.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would face difficult elections in the near future in England since he did not know what the Left would do.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he felt that Left and Right now were parliamentary terms. For example, under classical political concepts, Deladier, who was a radical socialist, had been more to the left than Mr. Churchill, yet Deladier had dissolved the trade unions in France, whereas Mr. Churchill had never molested them in England. He inquired who, then, could be considered more to the left?

THE PRESIDENT said that in 1940 there had been eighteen political parties in France and that within one week he had had to deal with three different prime ministers in France. He said that when he had seen de Gaulle last summer he had asked him how this had happened in French political life, and de Gaulle replied that it was based on a series of combinations and compromises, but he intended to change all that.

THE PRIME

[Printed in part, 923-924]

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February 10, 1945

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that Marshal Stalin had a much easier political task since he only had one party to deal with.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that experience had shown one party was of great convenience to a leader of a state.

THE PRIME MINISTER said if he could get full agreement of all the British people it would greatly facilitate his task, but he must say that during the Greek crisis he had lost two votes in Parliament and the opposition had consisted of only eleven votes against him. He said he had accosted those Members of Parliament who had deserted him and had asked them to have the courage of their convictions. He added that they had been very unhappy because they had had this stand against the government. He concluded that he didn't know what would be the result of the election in England but he knew he and Mr. Eden would continue to support the interests of Russia and the United States no matter who was in power.

THE PRIME MINISTER then remarked that although he had had great difficulty with Mr. Gallagher, the Communist member in the House of Commons, he nevertheless had written him a letter of sympathy when he lost his two foster children in the war. He added that he felt that British opposition to Communism was not based on any attachment to private property but to the old question of the individual versus the state. He said that in war the individual of necessity is subordinate to the state and that in England any man or woman between the ages of eighteen and sixty was subject to the government.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he did not believe the Labor Party could ever form a government in England. He asked the President whether there was any labor party in a political sense in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT replied that labor was extremely powerful in the United States but there was no one specific party.

THE PRIME MINISTER in an aside to the President said he did not have a very high opinion of Ernest Bevin,

who

February 10, 1945

who he felt had merely been waiting during the war for the worst catastrophes to happen.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he thought more time was needed to consider and finish the business of the conference.

THE PRESIDENT answered that he had three Kings waiting for him in the Near East, including Ibn Saud.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether the President intended to make any concessions to Ibn Saud.

THE PRESIDENT replied that there was only one concession he thought he might offer and that was to give him the six million Jews in the United States.

MARSHAL STALIN said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one--that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Virovidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

THE PRESIDENT said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty.

During the course of the conversation, MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Soviet Government would never have signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939 had it not been for Munich and the Polish-German treaty of 1934.

MARSHAL STALIN came over and spoke to the President and said he did not think they could complete the work of the conference by three o'clock tomorrow.

THE PRESIDENT replied that if necessary he would wait over until Monday, to which Marshal Stalin expressed gratification.

It was tentatively agreed that there would be a plenary session tomorrow at twelve noon, after which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin would lunch with the President.

25.

February 11, 1945

8th Formal Meeting of Crimean Conference,
Livadia Palace - 12:00 Noon



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Eighth Formal Meeting


Present:	The President	Date: February 11, 1945
	Mr. Stettinius	Time: 12:00 noon
	Admiral Leahy	Place: Livadia Palace, Yalta
	Mr. Hopkins	
	Mr. Byrnes	
	Mr. Harriman	
	Mr. Matthews	
	Mr. Bohlen	
	Mr. Hiss	
	Mr. Foote	

The Prime Minister
 Mr. Eden
 Sir Alexander Cadogan
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
 Mr. Jebb
 Mr. Bridges
 Mr. Wilson
 Mr. Dixon
 Major Birse

Marshal Stalin
 Mr. Molotov
 Mr. Vyshinski
 Mr. Maisky
 Mr. Gusev
 Mr. Gromyko
 Mr. Pavlov

- Subjects: 1. Communique on Close of Conference
 2. Reparations
 3. Japan

NOTE: No report was written up on this Conference.



[Printed in Conferences at Malta + Yalta, 926, 930, 931]

C-O-N-F-E-R-E-N-C-E

February 12, 1945

LAST PLENARY SESSION

At the last Plenary Session, the communique was discussed and most of the conversation dealt with the details of language, the results of which are apparent in the final communique agreed upon. When the Soviet suggested that in the part on voting procedure, that no reference be made to the fact that the proposal accepted was put forward by the President, Marshal Stalin stated that there would be no objection to the President, or any other American Official, making it public that the United States' proposal had been adopted, but he felt such a reference did not properly belong in a communique. The Soviet suggestion was adopted.

LUNCHEON

At the luncheon, which was attended by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin; the three Foreign Secretaries, Ambassador Harriman, Clark Kerr, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, and three interpreters, the conversation was general and personal. At one point, however, Marshal Stalin made an obvious reference to Iran, and stated in his opinion, any nation which kept its oil in the ground and would not let it be exploited, was, in fact, "working against peace."

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO APPROVE THE "SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE."

At this meeting, the discussion was almost entirely related to language and drafting problems. Mr. Eden, supported by Mr. Stettinius, proposed that Saudi Arabia be included among those countries which, if they declared war on the common enemy before March 1st, would be invited to attend the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. Mr. Molotov said that he could not accept that proposal without reference to Marshal Stalin, and suggested that, since time was so short, that it would be reserved for possible future consideration. Mr. Molotov's suggestion was accepted.

26.

Documents submitted in regard to the Polish
Question.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED IN REGARD TO
THE POLISH QUESTION

1. Letter dated February 6, 1945 from the President to Marshal Stalin.
2. Soviet proposals in reply to the President's letter, submitted to the Conference by Mr. Molotov on February 7, 1945.
3. Counter proposal circulated by the United States Delegation to the Soviet and British Delegations of February 8, 1945.
4. British proposal submitted February 8, 1945.
5. Informal suggestions submitted by the Secretary of State to the meeting of Foreign Secretaries on February 9, 1945.
6. United States formula with amendments suggested by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session, February 9, 1945.
7. British revised formula submitted at the meeting of Foreign Secretaries after the Plenary Session of February 9, 1945.
8. Text of formula so far agreed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the evening meeting, February 9, 1945.
9. Declaration on Poland.

"I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable measure of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

"You said

[Printed in Conferences at Malta
and Yalta, 727-728]

1. Letter dated February 6, 1945 from the President
to Marshal Stalin.

"My dear Marshal Stalin:

"I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

"In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

"I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

"You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

"I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

"You said

"You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

"Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Beirut and Mr. Osobka-Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

"I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

"It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

[REDACTED]

2. Soviet proposals in reply to the President's letter, submitted to the Conference by Mr. Molotov on February 7, 1945.

"1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

"2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western).

"3. It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish emigré circles and from inside Poland.

"4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.

"5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.

"6. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Governments."

[Printed 792-793]

3. Counter proposal circulated by the United States Delegation to the Soviet and British Delegations of February 8, 1945.

"The proposals submitted by Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish question in reply to the President's letter to Marshal Stalin dated February 6, 1945, have been given careful study.

"In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived to point One of the Soviet proposals, namely, that the Eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometers.

"In regard to point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia South of the Koenigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the Western boundary of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.

"In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future Government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr be authorized on behalf of the three Governments to invite to Moscow Mr. Beirut, Mr. Osobka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vicente Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski to form a Polish Government of National Unity along the following lines:

"1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three, possibly consisting of Mr. Beirut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office of the Polish Republic.

"2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish provisional government in Warsaw; from other democratic elements inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.

"3. This interim

[REDACTED]

"3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the holding of free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution under which a permanent Government would be elected.

"4. When a Polish Government of National Unity is formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland. "

[Printed 869-870]

February 8, 1945

4. British proposal submitted February 8, 1945.

Revised Formula for Poland.

1. It was agreed that the Curson Line should be the eastern frontier of Poland with adjustments in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favour of Poland.

2. It was decided that the territory of Poland in the west should include the free city of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It was understood that the Germans in the said regions should be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany should at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

3. Having regard to the recent liberation of western Poland by the Soviet armies it was deemed desirable to facilitate the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government based upon all the democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poles abroad. That Government should be so constituted as to command recognition by the three Allied Governments.

4. It was agreed that the establishment of such a provisional Government was the primary responsibility of the Polish people, and that, pending the possibility of free elections, representative Polish leaders should consult together on the composition of this provisional Government. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the task of approaching such leaders and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the provisional Polish Government, thus established, should as soon as possible hold free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic parties should have the right to participate and to promote candidatures, in order to ensure the establishment of a Government truly representative of the will of the Polish people.

[Printed, 815-816]

5. Informal suggestions submitted by the Secretary of State to the meeting of Foreign Secretaries on February 9, 1945.

"After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

"I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative 'Provisional Polish Government' and we speak of the formation of a 'Government of National Unity'. All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

"The following formula might therefore be considered:

"That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed 'The Provisional Government of National Unity'; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This

'Government of

8128



'Government of National Unity' would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

"When a 'Provisional Government of National Unity' is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

of the present Government along the above lines. This 'Government of National Unity' would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all non-fascist and anti-fascist democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Government of National Unity has been formed in the way set out above, the three Governments will accord it recognition."

[D. 370-87]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. United States formula with amendments suggested by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session, February 9, 1945.

"The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, upon which this Government will be called the National Provisional Government of Poland. Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This 'Government of National Unity' would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all non-fascist and anti-fascist democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Government of National Unity has been formed in the way set out above, the three Governments will accord it recognition."

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed, which the three Governments can regard as fully representative of the Polish people, the three Governments will accord it recognition. The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, will be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the above in regard to free and unfettered elections."

[Printed, 870-871]

7. British revised formula submitted at the meeting of Foreign Secretaries after the Plenary Session of February 9, 1945.

"A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. This Government should be based upon the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland and upon other democratic Polish leaders from within Poland and from abroad. This new Government should be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr should be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the re-organization of the present Government along the above lines. This "Provisional Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections, all democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed, which the three Governments can regard as fully representative of the Polish people, the three Governments will accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

B. Text of Formula so far Agreed by the Three Foreign Ministers at the Evening Meeting, February 9, 1945.

"A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.' Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

"When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition."

9. Declaration on Poland.

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favour of Poland. It is recognised that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

27.

The President's correspondence with the Prime
Minister and Marshal Stalin

[REDACTED]

February 11, 1945

MEMORANDA - CRIMEAN CONFERENCE:

The President's Correspondence in connection with Conference

- February 6, 1945 - Letter to Marshal Stalin re Poland
- February 10, 1945 - Letter to Marshal Stalin re World Security Organization
- February 10, 1945 - Letter to the Prime Minister re World Security Organization
- February 11, 1945 - Letter from the Prime Minister re * World Security Organization
- February 11, 1945 - Letter from Marshal Stalin re *World Security Organization
- February 11, 1945 - Letter to the Prime Minister re Italy.

*Includes signed original.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

February 6, 1945.

My dear Marshal Stalin:

I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was

Marshal V. I. Stalin,
Kremln,
The Crimea.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Beirut and Mr. Osobka Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutseba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as
Mr. Mikolajczyk

Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Homer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (signed)

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1945.

My dear Marshal Stalin:

I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure whole hearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would

Marshal I. V. Stalin,
Koreis, The Crimea.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date NOV 7 1973

- 2 -

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (Signed)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date NOV 7 1973

[REDACTED]

February 10, 1945.

Dear Winston:

As I said the other day, I am somewhat concerned over the political difficulties I am apt to encounter in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only a single vote in the Assembly. I understand from our conversation that you would have no objection if I found it necessary to work out some way of giving the United States additional votes in order to insure parity. I am writing you this letter since I know you understand so well our political situation in the United States and I hope in reply to this letter you can give me your agreement to this suggestion if I find it necessary for our public opinion to make some proposal along those lines at the forthcoming United Nations Conference.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have written to Marshal Stalin on the same subject.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (Signed)

The Right Honorable
Winston S. Churchill, C.E., M.P.,
Vorontsov Villa, Crimea.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 7 1973
By W. J. Stewart

PRIME MINISTER

10 Downing Street
Whitehall.

February 11, 1945

My dear Franklin,

I have given consideration to your letter of February 10 about the political difficulties which might arise in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three Great Powers will have only one vote in the Assembly.

Our position is that we maintained the long-established representation of the British Empire and Commonwealth; that the Soviet Government are represented by its chief member, and the two republics of the Ukraine and White Russia; and that the United States should propose the form in which their undisputed equality with every other Member State should be expressed.

I need hardly assure you that I should do everything possible to assist you in this matter.

Yours very sincerely,
(signed) Winston Churchill

The President of the United States
of America.



10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

February 11, 1945.

My dear Franklin,

I have given consideration to your letter of February 10 about the political difficulties which might arise in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three Great Powers will have only one vote in the Assembly.

Our position is that we maintain the long-established representation of the British Empire and Commonwealth; that the Soviet Government are represented by its chief member, and the two republics of the Ukraine and White Russia; and that the United States should propose the form in which their undisputed equality with every other Member State should be expressed.

I need hardly assure you that I should do everything possible to assist you in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

The President of the United States
of America. *Winston Churchill*

И. В. СТАЛИН

Кореиз, "11" февраля 1945 г.

Уважаемый г-н Рузвельт,

Получил Ваше письмо от 10 февраля. Я совершенно согласен с Вами, что, поскольку число голосов Советского Союза увеличивается до трех в связи с включением в список членов Ассамблеи Советской Украины и Советской Белоруссии, - следует также увеличить количество голосов для США.

Я думаю, что можно было бы довести количество голосов США до трех, как у Советского Союза и его двух основных Республик. Если это понадобится, я готов официально поддержать это свое предложение.

С глубоким уважением



Президенту Франклину Д. РУЗВЕЛЬТУ.
"Ливадия", Крым.

C O P Y

TRANSLATION

I. V. STALIN

Koreis, February 11, 1945

Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

I have received your letter of February 10. I entirely agree with you that, since the number of votes for the Soviet Union is increased to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the assembly, the number of votes for the USA should also be increased.

I think that the number of votes for the USA might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two basic Republics. If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.

With sincere respects

(signed) I. Stalin

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Livadia Palace,
Yalta, Crimea

C O P Y

FDR

February 11, 1945.

Dear Winston:

You have expressed some concern with regard to our different viewpoints concerning the policy to be pursued about Italy. I am happy to tell you that Mr. Matthews on behalf of the Department of State went over the ground on this matter with Alec Cadogan yesterday afternoon. As a result of their conversation, Matthews reports that although there are naturally some differences in emphasis in our respective viewpoints, there seems to be no basic reason for any quarrel between us. I find that we are both in accord with the important fact that whatever the Italian attitude and action have been in the past few years, we are faced with a real problem of the future. Italy is and will remain an important factor in Europe whatever we may think of the prospect. It is surely in our joint interest for us to do whatever we properly can to foster her gradual recuperation by developing a return to normal democratic processes, the development of a sense of her own responsibilities and the other steps so necessary in preparing the long hard road of Italy's return to the community of peace-loving democratic states. To this end I believe we are both agreed that we must give her both spiritual and material food. I am impressed with the dangers for us both in Italy's present condition of semi-servitude and of the fact that those who fish in troubled waters will be the only ones to gain from her present conditions approaching despair. I know that our soldiers share this view and feel that there is definite inherent danger in the situation to our joint military operations.

I believe that some constructive steps should be taken to move away from the present anomalous situation of onerous and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today. I hope the Foreign Office and the State Department will be able to work out some mutually satisfactory procedure to remedy this situation. As you know, we accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive to General Alexander along the lines suggested by Mr. MacMillan. Although we felt that the directive was greatly watered down and much of its substance lost, we went along with you in the hope that we may reach some agreement on further steps in the near future.

At any rate, I want you to know that we are determined to pull together with you in Italy as we are in other areas, and that we believe that by full and continuous consultation and goodwill on both sides there is no danger of any serious split between us on this important question.

Most sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Right Honorable
 Winston S. Churchill, C.H., M.P.,
 Vorontsov Villa, Crimea.

28.

Protocol on German Reparation

Printed in FRUS, Conferences at
Malta and Yalta, 1942-1945.

K

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Record.

The original document has been delivered to the Secretary of State by me this date in accordance with the President's directive of 29 January 1946 to Fleet Admiral Leahy.

George M. Elsey

GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.

P R O T O C O L
ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS
AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN
REPARATION IN KIND

The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind are to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow.

It will

It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

k. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

Ernest W. Marshall

Franklin D. Roosevelt

H. G. Auer

28

PROTOCOL

ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN REPARATION IN KIND

The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind are to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

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The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

(signed) Winston S. Churchill

(signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt


(signed) I. Stalin

29.

Protodol of the Proceedings of the Crimean
Conference

U

President
29



PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from the 4th-11th February came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945; and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey).

When the Conference on World Organisation is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the

PROJECT OF THE MEMORANDUM

- (3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.
- (4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of _____ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 28th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been
supplemented

supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. VOTING

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting*.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _____ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments*.

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject
to its

to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distress peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

*The United Kingdom, the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the

and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security.*

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL ^{Council} ~~COMMISSION~~
FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control ^{Council} Commission for Germany.

V. REPARATION

Title to be added as in Protocol

The following Protocol has been approved:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation

2. Reparation in kind ^{is} ~~are~~ to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

*The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of
the Soviet

the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.*

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

VII. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of ^{part of} Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S FIRST STATEMENT

reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments

ments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

Anti Fascist Assembly of
(i) that the ~~National Liberation Committee~~ (AUNOD) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupatina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament, and

(ii) that

Assembly of (11) that legislative acts passed by the *Anti-Fascist*
National Liberation ^(AUNOS) ~~Committee~~ will be subject to
subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;
and that this statement should be published in the
communiqué of the Conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) the Control

- (a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
- (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
- (c) Oil equipment in Roumania.

XII. ~~PERSE~~ IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in ^{Iran}~~Perse~~. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to ^{their}~~the three~~ Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

(14) THE CONTROL
-70-

The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by
the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference,
February 11, 1945.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr. (Signed)

V. Molotov (Signed)

Anthony Eden (Signed)

30.

Communique on Crimean Conference

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Record.

The original document has been delivered to the Secretary of State by me this date in accordance with the President's directive of 29 January 1946 to Fleet Admiral Leahy.

George M. Elsey

GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea.

In addition to the three Heads of Government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the President;

Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;

Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization;

General of the Army George C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army;

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet;

Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;

Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator

Major General L. S. Kuter, U.S.A., Staff of Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces;

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;

Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;

Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors.

For the Soviet Union:

V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

Admiral Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy

Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff
of the Red Army

A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the USSR

I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

Marshal of Aviation Khydyakov

F. T. Gousev, Ambassador in Great Britain

A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U. S. A.

For the United Kingdom

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport

Sir A. Clark Kerr, H.M. Ambassador at Moscow

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs

Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief
of the Air Staff

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord

General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister
of Defense,

together with

Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre

Field Marshal Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff
Mission at Washington

Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington
together with military and diplomatic advisors.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference:

THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been inter-changed. The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and

II
(continued)

swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organisations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

III

REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied Countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

IV

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter -- the right of all peoples to choose the form of government

11

V
(Continued)

under which they will live -- the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

V
(Continued)

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

VI

POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall

be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

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VII

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the Agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed, *it should declare that:* ev4)

(i) The Anti-fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and

(ii) legislative acts passed by the *Anti-Fascist Assembly of* National Liberation *Committee (AUNOV)* will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan question.

VIII

MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on world organization.

IX

UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized - a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want".

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Winston S. Churchill

Franklin D. Roosevelt
U. S. S. R.

February 11, 1945

Original removed for display in
Main Gallery Nov. 1990

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Record.

The original document has been delivered to the Secretary of State by me this date in accordance with the President's directive of 29 January 1946 to Fleet Admiral Leahy.

George M. Elsey

GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.

КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ РУКОВОДИТЕЛЕЙ ТРЕХ СОВЯЗНЫХ ДЕРЖАВ -
СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА, СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ И
ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ В КРЫМУ.

За последние 8 дней в Крыму состоялась конференция руководителей трех союзных держав - Премьер-Министра Великобритании г-на У.Черчилля, Президента Соединенных Штатов Америки г-на Ф.Д.Рузвельта и Председателя Совета Народных Комиссаров СССР И.В.Сталина.

В работах конференции принимали участие:

от Советского Союза -

Народный Комиссар Иностранных Дел СССР В.М.Молотов, Народный Комиссар Военно-Морского Флота Н.Г.Кузнецов, Заместитель Начальника Генерального Штаба Красной Армии генерал армии А.Я.Антонов, Заместители Народного Комиссара Иностранных Дел СССР А.Я.Вышинский и И.М.Майский, Маршал авиации С.А.Худяков, Посол в Великобритании Ф.Т.Гусев, Посол в США А.А.Громико;

от Соединенных Штатов -

Государственный Секретарь г-н Э.Стеттинус, Начальник Штаба Президента адмирал флота В.Легг, Специальный Помощник Президента г-н Г.Гопкинс, Директор Департамента Военной Мобилизации судья Дж.Бирнс, Начальник Штаба Американской Армии генерал армии Дж.Маршалл, Главнокомандующий Военно-Морскими Силами США адмирал флота Ф.Флинг, Начальник Снабжения Американской Армии генерал-лейтенант

Е.Саморевал, Администратор по военно-морским вопросам вице-адмирал Е.Лави, генерал-майор А.Кутер, Член в СССР г-н Д. Гурман, Директор Императорского Офицера Государственного Департамента г-н Ф.Миттля, Заместитель Директора Канцелярии по специальным политическим делам Государственного Департамента г-н А.Хесс, Начальник Государственного Секретариата г-н Ч.Ванн, вместе с политическими, военными и техническими советниками;

II. Военно-морские

Министр Иностранных Дел г-н А.Клей, Министр Военного Транспорта лорд Лесер, Член в СССР г-н А.Кур, Заместитель Министра Иностранных Дел г-н А.Кадоган, Секретарь Военного Кабинета Ф.Браунер, Начальник Императорского Генерального Штаба фельдмаршал А.Брун, Начальник Штаба Военных Сил Морских сил г-н Ч.Буртон, Морской Лорд адмирал флота Э.Кемпбелл, Начальник Штаба Морского Обороны генерал Г.Линей, Верховный Советский Командующий на Средиземноморском театре фельдмаршал Александр, Начальник Квартала ой Военной Миссии в Вашингтоне фельдмаршал Вильсон, Член Британской Военной Миссии в Вашингтоне адмирал Сомервилл.

О результатах работы Крымской Конференции Президент США, Премьер Совета Советских Социалистических Республик и Премьер Министр Великобритании сделали следующие заявления:

1.

РАЗГРОМ ГЕРМАНИИ.

Мы рассмотрели и определили военные планы трех союзных держав в целях окончательного разгрома общего врага. Военные планы трех союзных наций в продолжение всей Конференции неоднократно встречались на совещаниях. Эти совещания были в высшей степени удовлетворительны со всех точек зрения и привели к

Более тесной координации военных усилий трех союзников, чем это было когда-либо раньше. Был произведен взаимный обмен самой полной информацией. Планы полностью согласованы и детально спланированы сроки, размеры и координация новых и еще более мощных ударов, которые будут нанесены в сердце Германии нашими армиями и военно-воздушными силами с востока, запада, севера и юга.

Наши совместные военные планы станут известны только тогда, когда мы их осуществим, но мы уверены, что очень тесное рабочее сотрудничество между тремя нашими штабами, достигнутое на настоящей конференции, поведет к ускорению конца войны. Совещания трех наших штабов будут продолжаться и всякий раз, как в этом возникнет надобность.

Нацистская Германия осуждена. Германский народ, пытаясь продолжать свое безнадежное сопротивление лишь делает для себя тяжелее цену своего поражения.

II.

ОККУПАЦИЯ ГЕРМАНИИ И КОНТРОЛЬ НАД НЕЙ.

Мы договорились об общей политике и планах принудительного осуществления условий безоговорочной капитуляции, которые мы совместно предпиаем нацистской Германии после того, как германское вооруженное сопротивление будет окончательно сокрушено. Эти условия не будут опубликованы пока не будет достигнут полный разгром Германии. В соответствии с согласованным планом вооруженные силы трех держав будут занимать в Германии особые зоны. Планом предусмотрена координированная администрация и контроль, осуществляемые через Центральную Контрольную Комиссию, состоящую из Главнокомандующих трех держав, с местом пребывания в Берлине. Было решено, что Франция будет приглашена тремя державами, если она это пожелает,

взять на себя зону оккупации и участвовать в качестве четвертого члена Контрольной Комиссии. Размеры французской зоны будут согласованы между четырьмя заинтересованными правительствами через их представителей в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии.

Нашей непреклонной целью является уничтожение германского милитаризма и нацизма и создание гарантий в том, что Германия никогда больше не будет в состоянии нарушить мир всего мира. Мы полны решимости разоружить и распустить все германские вооруженные силы, раз и навсегда уничтожить германский генштаб, который неоднократно содействовал возрождению германского милитаризма, изъять или уничтожить все германское военное оборудование, ликвидировать или взять под контроль всю германскую промышленность, которая могла бы быть использована для военного производства; подвергнуть всех преступников войны справедливому и быстрому наказанию и возместить в натуре возмещение убитых за разрушения, причиненные немцами; стереть с лица земли нацистскую партию, нацистские законы, организации и учреждения; устранить всякое нацистское и милитаристское влияние из общественных учреждений, из культурной и экономической жизни германского народа и принять совместно такие другие меры в Германии, которые могут оказаться необходимыми для будущего мира и безопасности всего мира. В наши цели не входит уничтожение германского народа. Только тогда, когда нацизм и милитаризм будут искоренены, будет надежда на достойное существование для германского народа и место для него в сообществе наций.

II.

РЕПАРАЦИИ С ГЕРМАНИИ.

Мы обсудили вопрос об ущербе, причиненном в этой войне Германской союзным странам, и признали справедливым обязать Германию возместить этот ущерб в натуре в максимально возможной мере.

Будет создана Комиссия по возмещению убытков, которой поручается также рассмотреть вопрос о размерах и способах возмещения ущерба, причиненного Германской союзным странам. Комиссия будет работать в Москве.

17.

КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ.

Мы решили в ближайшее время учредить совместно с нашими союзниками всеобщую международную организацию для поддержания мира и безопасности. Мы считаем, что это существенно как для предупреждения агрессии, так и для устранения политических, экономических и социальных причин войны путем тесного и постоянного сотрудничества всех миролюбивых народов.

Основы были заложены в Думбартон-Оксе. Однако, по важному вопросу о процедуре голосования там не было достигнуто соглашения. На настоящей Конференции удалось разрешить это затруднение. Мы согласились на том, что 25 апреля 1945 г. в Сан-Франциско, в Соединенных Штатах, будет созвана конференция Объединенных Наций для того, чтобы подготовить Устав такой организации, соответствующий положениям, выработанным во время неофициальных переговоров в Думбартон-Оксе.

С правительством Китая и Временным Правительством Франции будут немедленно проведены консультации и к ним будет направ-

лено обращение принять участие совместно с Правительствами Соединенных Штатов, Великобритании и Совета Советских Социалистических Республик в приглашении других стран на конференцию.

Как только консультации с Италией и Францией будут закончены, текст предложения о процедуре голосования будет опубликован.

У.

ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ ОБ ОСВОБОЖДЕННОЙ ЕВРОПЕ.

Мы составили и подписали Декларацию об освобожденной Европе. Эта Декларация предусматривает согласование политики трех держав и совместные их действия в разрешении политических и экономических проблем освобожденной Европы в соответствии с демократическими принципами. Ниже приводится текст Декларации:

*Премьер Совета Советских Социалистических Республик, Премьер-Министр Соединенного Королевства и Президент Соединенных Штатов Америки проконсультировались между собой в общих интересах народов своих стран и народов освобожденной Европы. Они совместно заявляют о том, что они договорились между собой согласовывать в течение периода временной неустойчивости в освобожденной Европе политику своих трех правительств в деле помощи народам, освобожденным от господства нацистской Германии и народам бывших государств-сателлитов оси в Европе при разрешении или демократическими способами их насущных политических и экономических проблем.

Установление порядка в Европе и переустройство национальной экономической жизни должно быть достигнуто всеми путями, которые позволят освобожденным народам уничтожить последние следы

национа и фашизма и создать демократические учреждения по их собственному выбору. В соответствии с принципом Атлантической Хартии о праве всех народов избирать форму правительства, при которой они будут жить, должно быть обеспечено восстановление суверенных прав и самоуправления для тех народов, которые были лишены этого агрессивными нациями путем насилия.

Для улучшения условий, при которых освобожденные народы могли бы осуществлять эти права, Три Правительства будут совместно помогать народам в любом освобожденном европейском государстве или в бывшем государстве-сателлите оси в Европе, где, по их мнению, обстоятельства этого потребуют: а) создавать условия внутреннего мира; б) проводить основные мероприятия по оказанию помощи нуждающимся народам; в) создавать временные правительственные власти, широко представляющие все демократические элементы населения и обязанные возможно скорее установить путем свободных выборов правительство, отвечающее воле народа, и г) способствовать, где это окажется необходимым, проведению таких выборов.

Три Правительства будут консультироваться с другими Объединенными Нациями и с временными властями или с другими правительствами в Европе, когда будут рассматриваться вопросы, в которых они прямо заинтересованы.

Когда, по мнению Трех Правительств, условия в любом европейском освобожденном государстве или в любом из бывших государств-сателлитов оси в Европе сделают такие действия необходимыми, они будут немедленно консультироваться между собой о мерах по осуществлению совместной ответственности, установленной в настоящей Декларации.

Этой Декларацией мы снова подтверждаем нашу веру в принципы Атлантической Хартии, нашу верность Декларации Объединенных Наций и нашу решимость создать, в сотрудничестве с другими миролюбивыми нациями, построенный на принципах права международный порядок, посвященный миру, безопасности, свободе и всеобщему благосостоянию человечества.

Надавая настоящую Декларацию, три державы выражают надежду, что Временное Правительство Французской Республики может присоединиться к ним в предложенной процедуре.

О ПОЛЬШЕ.

Мы приняв на Крымскую Конференцию разрешить наши разногласия по польскому вопросу. Мы полностью обсудили все аспекты польского вопроса. Мы вновь подтвердили наше общее желание видеть устоявшейся сбалансированную, свободную, независимую и демократическую Польшу, и в результате наших обсуждений мы согласились об условиях, на которых новое Временное Польское Правительство Национального Единства будет сформировано таким путем, чтобы получить признание со стороны трех великих держав.

Достигнуто следующее соглашение:

"Новое правительство создается в Польше в результате полного освобождения ее Красной Армией. Это требует создания временного Польского Правительства, которое и оно бы более широкой базой, чем это было возможно раньше, до недавнего освобождения Западной части Польши. Действующее ныне в Польше Временное Правительство должно быть построено реорганизовано на более широкой демократической базе с включением демократических деятелей из самой Польши и польков из-за границы. Это новое правительство должно быть называться Польским Временным Правительством Национального Единства.

^{В.М.}
 Г-н Молотов, г-н Гарриман и сэр Арчибалд Кларк Керр уполномочиваются пропозитивироваться в Москве, как Комиссия, в первую очередь с членами теперешнего Временного Правительства и с другими польскими демократическими лидерами как из самой Польши, так и из-за границы, имея в виду реорганизацию теперешнего Правительства на указанных выше основах. Это Польское Временное Правительство Национального Единства должно принять обязательство провести свободные и ничем не воспрепятствованные

выборы, как можно скорее, на основе всеобщего избирательного права при тайном голосовании. В этих выборах все антинацистские и демократические партии должны иметь право принимать участие и выставлять кандидатов.

Когда Польское Временное Правительство Национального Единства будет оформлено должным образом в соответствии с вышеуказанным, Правительство СССР, которое поддерживает в настоящее время дипломатические отношения с иными Временным Правительством Польши, Правительство Соединенного Королевства и Правительство США установят дипломатические отношения с новым Польским Временным Правительством Национального Единства и обменяются послами, по докладам которых соответствующие правительства будут осведомлены о положении в Польше.

Три главы правительств считают, что Восточная граница Польши должна идти вдоль линии Керзона с отступлениями от нее в некоторых районах от пяти до восьми километров в пользу Польши. Главы Трех Правительств признают, что Польша должна получить существенные приращения территории на Севере и на Западе. Они считают, что по вопросу о размере этих приращений в надлежащее время будет опрошено мнение нового Польского ^{Временного} Правительства Национального Единства и что, вслед за тем, окончательное определение Западной границы Польши будет отложено до мирной конференции*.

УП. О ПРОСЛАВНИ

Мы признали необходимым рекомендовать Маршалу Тито и др-цу Жубаичу немедленно ввести в действие заключенное между нами Соглашение и образовать Временное Об"единенное Правительство на основе этого Соглашения.

Было решено также рекомендовать, чтобы новое Югославское Правительство, как только оно будет создано, заявило:

I. что Антифашистское Вече Национального Освобождения Югославии будет расширено за счет включения членов последней югославской Скупщины, которые не скомпрометировали себя сотрудничеством с врагом, и таким образом будет создан орган, именуемый временным парламентом;

II. что законодательные акты, принятые Антифашистским Вечем Национального Освобождения будут подлежать последующему утверждению Учредительным Собранием.

Была также сделан общий обзор других балканских вопросов.

УШ.

СОВЕЩАНИЯ МИНИСТРОВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ

В течение всей конференции, кроме ежедневных совещаний Глав Правительств и Министров Иностранных Дел, каждый день имели место отдельные совещания трех Министров Иностранных Дел с участием их советников.

Эти совещания оказались чрезвычайно полезными и на Конференции было достигнуто соглашение о том, что должен быть создан постоянный механизм для регулярной консультации между тремя Министрами Иностранных Дел. Поэтому Министры Иностранных Дел будут встречаться так часто, как это потребуются, вероятно, каждые 3 или 4 месяца. Эти совещания будут происходить поочередно в трех столицах, причем первое совещание должно состояться в Лондоне после Конференции Объединенных Наций по созданию Международной Организации Безопасности.

ЕДИНСТВО В ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ МИРА, КАК И В ВЕДЕНИИ ВОЙНЫ.

Наше совещание в Криму вновь подтвердило нашу общую решимость сохранить и усилить в предстоящий мирный период то единство целей и действий, которое сделало в современной войне победу возможной и несомненной для Объединенных Наций. Мы верим, что это является священным обязательством наших Правительств перед своими народами, а также перед народами мира.

Только при продолжающемся и растущем сотрудничестве и взаимопонимании между нашими тремя странами и между всеми миролюбивыми народами может быть реализовано высшее стремление человечества - прочный и длительный мир, который должен, как говорится в Атлантической Хартии, "обеспечить такое положение, при котором все люди во всех странах могли бы жить всю свою жизнь, не зная ни страха, ни нужды".

Победа в этой войне и образование предполагаемой международной организации предоставят самую большую возможность во всей истории человечества для создания в ближайшие годы наилучших условий такого мира.

Winston Churchill

Franklin D. Roosevelt

U. S. Army

1945. 11. 21. 11. 21. 11. 21.


31.

February 11, 1945

Agreement regarding Japan

1. Signed English Text
2. Signed Soviet Text

Printed in FRUS, Conferences at Malta and
Yalta, 984


Agreement regarding Japan

- 1/ Signed English Text
- 2/ Signed Soviet Text

AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three Great Powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests

of the

of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

February 11, 1945

H. G. G. G.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО.

СОГЛАШЕНИЕ.

Руководители трех Великих Держав - Советского Союза, Соединенных Штатов Америки и Великобритании -согласились в том, что через два-три меслца после капитуляции Германии и окончания войны в Европе Советский Союз вступит в войну против Японии на стороне Союзников при условии:

1. Сохранения *status quo* Внешней Монголии (Монгольской Народной Республики);

2. Восстановления принадлежавших России прав, нарушенных вероломным нападением Японии в 1904 г., а именно:

а) возвращения Советскому Союзу южной части о.Сахалина и всех прилегающих к ней островов;

б) интернационализация торгового порта Дайрена с обеспечением преимущественных интересов Советского Союза в этом порту и восстановление аренды на Порт-Артур, как на военно-морскую базу СССР;

с) совместной эксплуатации Китайско-Восточной железной дороги и Джин-Манчжурской железной дороги, дающей выход на Дайрен, на началах организации смешанного Советско-Китайского Общества с обеспечением преимущественных интересов Советского Союза, при этом имеется в виду, что Китай сохраняет в Манчжурии полный суверенитет.

3. Передачи Советскому Союзу Курильских островов.

Предполагается, что соглашение относительно Внешней Монголии и вышеупомянутых портов и железных дорог потребует

согласия генералиссимуса Чан Кай-ши. По совету Маршала И.В.Сталина Президент примет меры к тому, чтобы было получено такое согласие.

Главы Правительств трех Великих Держав согласились в том, что эти претензии Советского Союза должны быть безусловно удовлетворены после победы над Японией.

Со своей стороны Советский Союз выражает готовность заключить с Национальным Китайским Правительством пакт о дружбе и союзе между СССР и Китаем для оказания ему помощи своими вооруженными силами в целях освобождения Китая от японского ига.

1945. 11 февраля

И. Г. Сталин.

Winston Churchill

Winston S. Churchill