Battle of Zinjibar (2011–2012)
Military confrontation in Zinjibar, Yemen (2011–2011) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Battle of Zinjibar was a battle between forces loyal to Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh and Islamist militant forces, possibly including elements of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for control of the town of Zinjibar and its surroundings as part of the wider insurgency in the self-declared Al-Qaeda Emirate in Yemen. Many of the Islamist forces operating in Abyan province refer to themselves as Ansar al-Sharia ("Partisans of Sharia").
| Battle of Zinjibar | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen, the Yemeni revolution and the Yemeni crisis | |||||||
 Yemeni soldiers entering the provincial government headquarters in Zinjibar on 12 June 2012 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
|
Yemen Supported by: United States Saudi Arabia[1] | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Ali Abdullah Saleh (until February 2012) Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (after February 2012) Mohammed Nasser Ahmed Salem Ali Qatan (after March 2012) Mohammed al-Sawmali |
Nasir al-Wuhayshi Jalal Baleedi Qasim al-Raymi Said Ali al-Shihri | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
| Military of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
2,000 soldiers (June 2011)[7] 20,000 soldiers (May 2012)[8] |
300 fighters (May 2011)[9] 700–1,000 fighters (January 2012)[10] 2,000 fighters (May 2012)[11] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1,000+ killed[12] | 600+ killed[12] | ||||||
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Background
Summarize
Perspective
Beginning in January 2011, the Yemeni revolution caused widespread unrest across Yemen as protestors demanded the resignation of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh.[13] After numerous high-ranking army generals defected to the opposition in late March, threats of a conflict between the pro and anti-Saleh factions of the military brew. Saleh redeployed most army personnel and US-trained counterterrorism forces stationed in other locations, including in southern Yemen, to the capital of Sanaa and other urban areas in order to maintain control of the situation.[14][15]
AQAP's traditional strongholds are positioned in southern Yemen, including Abyan Governorate, where it took refuge in the rugged, mountainous terrain.[16][17] Many tribes in the region (previously encompassing the state of South Yemen) had resented the central Yemeni government ever since its victory in the 1994 civil war over the southern secessionists, allowing for AQAP members to seek protection from them.[17][18] The vast inequalities in the south compared to the north after the conclusion of the war lead to a rise in tribal customs as well as Islamic extremism.[13]
Prior to the revolution, AQAP had never attempted to control and administer terrority, instead remaining in their remote hideouts.[19] However, the government's preoccupation with the revolution left several areas of the country, particularly the south, in a state of lawlessness and vulnerability, allowing for it to exploit the security gap.[14][18] On 27 March, AQAP militants raided the town of Jaʽār, sparking brief clashes with local army forces before they fled their posts and retreated to Zinjibar. The group had consolidated control over the town, located just 20 kilometers south of Zinjibar, by the next day.[20][21] By the end of the month, AQAP had declared the "Islamic Emirate of Abyan",[22][14] and had made Jaʽār its capital and a staging ground for its activities.[21] On 18 April, AQAP sharia official Abu Zubayr Adel al-Abab said in an interview that the groups militants identified themselves as members of a group called Ansar al-Sharia,[17] stating "the name Ansar al-Sharia is what we use to introduce ourselves in areas where we work to tell people about our work and goals, and that we are on the path of Allah."[23]
In a televised speech on 21 May in which he promised his resignation, Saleh warned the US and Europe that "al-Qaeda is coming and it will take control," and that "future will be worse than the present."[24] Two days later, open fighting broke out in Sanaa between security forces and pro-opposition tribesmen after Saleh reneged on his promise to resign. The conflict lead to fears of the revolution transitioning into a civil war, with additional troops being deployed to the capital to protect the presidential palace and other infrastructure.[16][25] Several analysts and commentators predicted that the regime's focus on its survival would give AQAP further ability to expand its operations.[26][16] AAS's takeover of Zinjibar occurred amid the battle in Sanaa.[17]
Battle
Summarize
Perspective
May 2011: Ansar al-Sharia takeover
On 27 May, an estimated 300[27] fighters from AAS descended from the mountains outside Zinjibar and entered the city unopposed.[4][28] Though a brief defense was mounted, the surprise attack caused chaos as security forces, including police officers and army soldiers, quickly abandoned their posts and fled the city.[16][29][30] The governor of Abyan reportedly requested help before realizing that all local security commanders had fled.[28] The militants had full control of the city by the end of the day,[27] seizing all government buildings,[31] freeing dozens of prisoners[32] and looting the central bank[13] while driving freely through the streets.[33] By the next day, hundreds of militants were controlling Zinjibar's main streets and were calling on residents by loudspeaker to go out and reopen their shops.[29][31] The governor, the security chief, the head of an army brigade and other local officials had left the city.[4][5] AAS further consolidated its control during the night, capturing six army tanks and several armoured military vehicles.[34]
The only army unit which remained to defend against the militants was the 25th Mechanized Brigade, based on the eastern side of Zinjibar.[9] The militants proceeded to besiege the headquarters of the brigade in order to force it to surrender.[31][35] Gen. Mohammed al-Sawmali remarked that, within the first few days of fighting, soldiers from the Central Security Forces (CSF) and other units had abandoned their posts, allowing the militants to seize artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, tanks and armoured vehicles.[5] On 29 May, the army had begun shelling the militants with artillery,[16] and on 30 May the Yemeni Air Force began launching airstrikes on the city.[36] Residents estimated that 200 homes were destroyed by the air raids.[4] Hundreds of families fled the fighting as locals were trapped in their homes without water.[30]
June 2011: Militant entrenchment and al-Wahda Stadium battle
Local residents described hundreds of Islamists entering the town after its capture in order to join AAS. Among the militants included Yemenis, non-Yemenis such as Saudis, Somalis and Sudanese, and members of AQAP.[28] The United States intensified its drone strike campaign, with the support of Saudi Arabian intelligence, in order to bolster the Yemeni military's efforts and prevent AAS from consolidating power.[37][38][21] On 3 June, a US drone strike in Zinjibar killed two high-ranking AQAP leaders, Ali Abdullah Naji al-Harithi and Ammar al-Waeli, along with four civilians according to witnesses.[39][9][38]
Three brigades from Aden and Lahij Governorates were brought in to participate in the battle. Army forces advanced overnight towards Zinjibar in preparation to storm it on 7 June.[40] Clashes followed at the gate to the city with both sides exchanging machine gun, mortar and artillery fire, the latter allegedly being acquired by the militants from CSF deserters according to Gen. Sawmali.[41][5] Nine soldiers and six militants were killed in the fighting.[40] Between late 6 June and 7 June, the Yemeni military claimed to have killed 30 militants in and around Zinjibar, including an AQAP commander for Marib Governorate, Hassan al-Aqili.[42] On 11 June, AAS attempted a raid on the base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, though it was repelled and lead to the deaths of 18 militants and nine soldiers.[43][44] Gen. Sawmali stated in a July interview that the attack "represented the greatest attempt by al-Qaeda to gain control of the brigade. Following this, they continued to lay ambushes, target our men with snipers, and carry out intermittent light attacks, but not on the previous scale."[35]
By mid-June, security officials estimated 700 militants being present in Zinjibar and its surrounding areas. The city was described as a ghost town with widespread destruction, no water or electricity, and most of its residents having fled to Aden.[17] Clashes in the city on 12 June killed three soldiers, including Col. Salem al-Zuba.[45] Despite the Yemeni government claiming advances in the battle,[46] by 21 June the army had pulled back the 119th Infantry Brigade and 201st Mechanized Brigades three kilometers from the front lines in a reported "tactical move."[47] On 27 June, an official reported that 35 homes in the city have been destroyed in government shelling over the previous two weeks alone.[48]
On the morning of 29 June,[49] a group of about 300 militants armed with machine guns, Katyusha-type rockets and rocket-propelled grenades, launched an assault on security forces stationed the al-Wahda Stadium, approximately five miles east of Zinjibar.[7][50] The stadium possessed significant strategic importance due to its proximity to the base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, which was using it to store food and other provisions.[7] Fighting over the day ended in the stadium's capture by AAS,[49] leaving at least 30 soldiers and 14 militants dead.[51] During the battle, a Yemeni airstrike accidentally hit a civilian bus, killing five people and injuring 20.[7] The capture of the stadium exposed on two fronts the military's main staging ground for raids on Zinjibar.[52][53] In response, the military launched a counteroffensive on 30 June, retaking the stadium during the day in clashes which left an additional five soldiers dead.[50]
July–September 2011: Army-tribal offensive
Fighting over the al-Wahda Stadium continued into 1 July, resulting in the militants recapturing it by evening.[54][55] The next day, AAS released 25 soldiers it had captured during the battle for the stadium and executed 16 others.[56] The 25th Mechanized Brigade pleaded that the government send reinforcements to lift the siege. During this time, the militants had intensified their attacks on the base.[57] Both Gen. Sawmali and Deputy Information Minister Abdo al-Janadi confirmed that during the siege, the US had airdropped essential supplies for the brigade at least once.[35][58][59] Despite success militarily, AAS was losing support from local tribes in Abyan due to the widespread displacement and destruction happening in Zinjibar. By mid-July, armed tribesmen in multiple AAS-controlled Abyan towns were attempting to push out the militants.[60]
On 17 July, the Yemeni military launched an offensive in Zinjibar, with reinforcements including tanks, rocket launchers, and 500 extra soldiers, primarily from the 119th Infantry Brigade,[9] being sent to the city along with 450 pro-government tribal fighters.[61] Backed by heavy tank shelling and rocket attacks from naval ships off the coast, the government reinforcements moved in to lift the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade. Dozens were injured in clashes as army and tribal forces entered Zinjibar from the east. Clashes were also reported near the al-Wahda Stadium.[62] On 19 July, Yemeni artillery killed two high-ranking AQAP leaders near the city, Ayad al-Shabwani and Awad Mohammed Saleh al-Shabwani.[63] By 20 July, the 119th Infantry Brigade was fighting overnight battles in the al-Khamila and Dio districts of western Zinjibar,[9] as units from the 31st Armoured Brigade and the 119th Infantry Brigade were launching rocket attacks at militant hideouts in al-Kawd.[63] On 22 July, tribal forces secured the road from Shabwah Governorate to Shuqrah in Abyan, a main highway leading to Zinjibar.[64] By 25 July, the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade had been partially broken, though supplies were still low.[65]
A major setback in the offensive occurred as result of a friendly-fire incident on 29 July, in which a Yemeni warplane at least three consecutive airstrikes on a government communications building shortly after tribal forces had pushed AAS militants out of it during their advance east towards the city.[9][66] The strikes killed 40 people, including two colonels, a lieutenant colonel, a major and a powerful sheik from the Nahee tribe.[67] Tribal commander Mohammed Gaadani said that the incident ruined tribal morale and trust in the Yemeni government.[67][68] In response to the attack, tribal forces withdrew from the battle to bury their dead as the militants resolidified control over Zinjibar. Participating tribes debated as to whether they would rejoin the offensive.[67]
By August, Zinjibar had been besieged by the 119th Infantry Brigade from the west and the 25th Mechanized Brigade from the east.[69] The 39th Armoured Brigade also began providing artillery support from its base in the nearby town of Dofas. Fighting intensified early in August between the 119th Infantry Brigade and AAS in al-Khamila and Dio districts.[9] On 1 August, suspected US drone strikes struck the al-Wahda Stadium, Mudiyah and al-Khamila, killing 16 militants.[70] On 3 August, Mohammed Gaadani announced that the tribes had decided to rejoin the offensive. A local official confirmed that tribal fighters had returned to their positions around Zinjibar and were aiding the 25th Mechanized Brigade in the east.[71][69] A round of airstrikes early on 24 August killed 30 militants near Zinjibar, while eight soldiers were killed in ground fighting near the city.[72]
Clashes intensified in Dofas later in the month. From 20 to 27 August, AAS fighters launched five attacks on army forces stationed at Dofas,[73] including a 23 August attack on the 201st Mechanized Brigade which killed seven soldiers and a 27 August ambush which killed another seven.[74] On 28 August, 10 soldiers and 26 militants were killed, while 38 militants and 30 soldiers were wounded in fighting primarily centered in Dofas.[75] An official said that government forces had secured "an area west of Zinjibar" for the first time since March."[76] On 29 August, six militants were killed as army forces advanced on al-Matla, 10 kilometers south of Zinjibar.[77] By the end of the month, the army had recaptured the towns of Dofas, al-Kawd and al-Matla on Zinjibar's outskirts, as well as the road linking it to Aden.[78]
By the beginning of September, government forces were advancing towards the city on two fronts. On the eastern front, the al-Wahda Stadium was recaptured by the army before it advanced to the Shaddad Fort and linked up with the adjacent base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade.[79] The advance came amid a barrage of US drone strikes which freed a besieged military unit, likely the 25th Mechanized Brigade.[80] On the south, the army was clashing with AAS five kilometers away from the city.[79] Government forces had seized the main entrances to Zinjibar and were beginning to advance into the city.[81] On 10 September, the government announced that it had recaptured all of Zinjibar and had broken the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade.[82] Local witnesses reported hundreds of government troops entering the city and that a portion of it was secured, but fighting continued in other parts of the city.[83][82] A military official confirmed that government forces had captured only the eastern part of Zinjibar and that fighting continued in other neighbourhoods of the city.[84]
October 2011–January 2012: Stalemate
A standoff between government and militant forces ensued after the conclusion of the offensive in September.[85] AAS remained in control of more than half of the city, including its center.[10] It also controlled access points to the city in the north towards Ja'ār and in the east towards Shuqrah, attempting to cut off supply lines to the military in December.[85] The group move highly organized cells and played messages on loudspeakers outside of the base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade.[10]
In the beginning of October, government forces attempted to advance into eastern Zinjibar, leading to the deaths of 25 militants and 20 soldiers by 2 October.[86][59] During the campaign, a Yemeni aircraft struck an abandoned school used as shelter by the 119th Infantry Brigade, an anti-Saleh military unit. AAS militants later executed wounded soldiers at the site, with at 30 soldiers being found dead in the aftermath.[87] By mid-October, AAS had repelled the Yemeni Army's advances. The headquarters of the 39th Armoured Brigade was attacked with mortar shells from the Hassan Stadium and Qal’at Shaddad, forcing the unit to withdraw from the city.[88][89] In November, AAS took control over al-Kawd, only several miles south of Zinjibar.[90] In December, reports emerged of hundreds of militants arriving from Azzan in Shabwah among other areas in order to reinforce AAS positions in Zinjibar.[91]
In mid-January 2012, around 2,500 displaced residents returned to Zinjibar in a vehicular convoy agreed upon by both AAS and the Yemeni government.[92][93] The residents were welcomed by the militants in a festival and were allowed to visit the main city, which was held by AAS, and other nearby areas before returning to Aden.[94] According to the residents, control of the city was divided between the army and the militants, the two in some areas being separated by only a few meters.[92]
February–March 2012: Re-escalation
On 4 February, officials reported that the government had been negotiations with AAS through a tribal delegation for a potential militant withdrawal from Zinjibar. According to tribal negotiator Tariq al-Fadhli, the militants demanded that sharia law be implemented and that Yemeni soldiers "retreat to their barracks" before they withdrew from the city.[95][96] The government claimed that a ceasefire had been agreed upon for the election on 21 February, but this was denied by AAS in a statement shortly after a series clashes took place in the city.[97]
Both AAS and the Yemeni government were expecting the conflict to intensify after the inauguration of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi on 25 February, replacing the ousted Ali Abdullah Saleh. During his inauguration speech, Hadi pointed out AQAP as a top priority for his administration, vowing to continue the battle against it.[98][99] One of Hadi's first moves in as President was to name Gen. Salem Ali Qatan as the new commander of army forces in the south.[82] The Yemeni Army gave a seven-day ultimatum for the militants to surrender or flee on 28 February,[100] while AAS emir Jalal Baleedi gave the army a 10-day counter-ultimatum the following day.[101]
In retaliation to the rise in US and Yemeni airstrikes after the inauguration of Hadi, AAS forces launched an attack on military units stationed in Dofas on 4 March.[21] The 39th Armoured Brigade's artillery base was overran and looted, while the 115th and 119th Infantry Brigade's defended their encampments for hours until the militants withdrew.[102][103] The battle killed 185 soldiers, the most in a single engagement since the military's conflict with AAS began, dealing a heavy blow to army morale.[104] Yemeni forces responded to the attack with several air raids and artillery barrages on the city and nearby areas in the following weeks.[105][106]
April 2012: Army advances
On 19 April, the Yemeni Army reportedly advanced on the outskirts of Zinjibar after clashes killed 18 militants and wounded dozens of militants, forcing the rest to flee.[107][108] Later in the day, the military launched an overnight surprise offensive, making a "major advance" while killing 25 militants and seizing a district on the outskirts of the city.[109][110] According to statements made by the military, on 23 April the Yemeni Air Force carried out strikes on Zinjibar before army forces backed by tribesmen moved in on the city. The 119th Infantry Brigade, approaching from the southwest, secured al-Kawd, the 25th Mechanized Brigade cleared the southeastern approaches to the city, the 201st Mechanized Brigade approached from the north and cleared the surrounding areas, and the 39th Armoured Brigade entered the city center from the east, securing several key government buildings, including the local post office,[111] by the morning of 24 April after a six-hour battle.[112][113][114] At the same time, clashes raged on the eastern and southern outskirts of Zinjibar.[111] While AAS admitted that their forces had "encountered a massive offensive by Saana regime forces", it denied the government's report and claimed that it had blocked the army's advances.[115]
May–June 2012: Final offensive
On 12 May, the Yemeni government began an all-out offensive to recapture Zinjibar and other areas occupied by AAS in Abyan Governorate. 20,000 members of the military participated in the operation, including the air force and navy.[8] The offensive received direct and extensive support from the United States, which positioned nearly 60 soldiers at the al-Anad Air Base to coordinate the offensive and oversee drone strikes.[116] Saudi Arabia also aided the offensive by funneling money to the Yemeni government which was used to buy the allegiance of numerous tribes in the area, who began fighting AAS alongside the army.[1]
The offensive involved government forces executing a crescent-shaped advance on Zinjibar.[116] On 13 May, government forces reached the Shaddad Fort, around three kilometers east of Zinjibar, and Zinjibar Bridge, just one kilometer south of it.[117] By mid-May the army had managed to push into the center of Zinjibar, with air force helicopters flying over the city for the first time since its seizure, indicating that the militants had lost their anti-air capability.[116] Army forces were moving slowly along the outskirts of Zinjibar in order to avoid being outflanked, though the offensive in general had slowed down in part due to poor intelligence, leading to uncertainty as to whether most militants in the city had been either killed, deserted or strategically withdrew in preparation for a counteroffensive.[118][119]
On 23 May, government forces advanced into and secured several parts of the central and northern neighborhoods of Zinjibar, including the local stadium and government buildings.[120] Further advances were made on 26 May, with the 25th Mechanized Brigade capturing the Maraqid and Mashqasa areas.[121] By end of the month, the 25th Mechanized Brigade, 39th Armoured Brigade and local Popular Committee's had managed to recapture all militant-held positions in the east of Zinjibar.[122]
Militant defenses in the area began to collapse on 11 June after the seizure of the 7 October factory, which was used as a base by the militants and was located on a hilltop overlooking Jaʽār, five kilometers from the center of the town.[123][124] On 12 June, the Yemeni Army and Popular Committee fighters moved into Zinjibar as AAS completely withdrew from the city. The push into Zinjibar came hours after the military seized Jaʽār after the militants left the city during dawn. Gen. Qatan confirmed the capture of Zinjibar via a phone call from the local government headquarters.[125] Abyan governor Jamal al-Aqel said that about 300 militants fled from Zinjibar towards Shuqrah, which was still under AAS control. Retreating militants distributed flyers to local residents stating that they were withdrawing in order to avoid more bloodshed and destruction in the area.[126] Government forces had consolidated control over the city by the next day as Defense Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed visited the areas.[127]
Casualties
Summarize
Perspective
According to Time magazine, although the Yemeni military was reluctant to disclose its casualties publicly, unofficial internal estimates report that at as many as 1,000 soldiers had died in the battle to reclaim the city altogether. Gen. Nasser al-Taheri, commander of the Southern Military Region after the assassination of Gen. Qatan, estimated that at least 600 militants were killed in the battle, including many in the core leadership of AAS and AQAP.[12]
As reported by the state-ran Saba News Agency on 11 September 2011, a day after the conclusion of the July–September offensive, Defence Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed said that 230 soldiers from the Southern Military Region had been killed in the battle since May, while 50 pro-government tribal fighters were also killed. Then-vice president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi repordetly told European diplomats that 90 soldiers from the besieged 25th Mechanized Brigade and 30 AQAP leaders had been killed in Zinjibar since the battle began.[128]
According to an Agence France-Presse tally composed of multiple sources, 485 people were killed in the 2012 Abyan offensive since its instigation on 12 May until the liberation of Zinjibar on 12 June. The total included 368 militant fighters, 72 army soldiers, 26 Popular Committee fighters and 19 civilians. The total includes fighting not only in Zinjibar, but all of Abyan.[129]
Destruction
War photographer Yuri Kozyrev compared the destruction in Zinjibar to that of Grozny during the First Chechen War.[12] Visiting journalist Adam Baron described the state of the city as "apocalyptic" with nearly every building destroyed.[130] Local authorities estimated that at around 80 percent of homes in the city were in some way damaged during the battle.[131] Most government headquarters, offices, and institutions also sustained damage.[132] The main government complex in the city, which was completed in 2010, was completely in ruins.[133] The main souk of the city was akin to an "ancient cemetery" in the immediate aftermath of the battle.[134] Almasdar Online wrote in January 2012 that the souk, the Aden bus station, and areas of the al-Asla and Sawahil neighborhoods were the most damaged.[135] The al-Sarh neighborhood also witnessed some of the fiercest fighting during the battle and near-total destruction in its aftermath.[136] The power supply network of Zinjibar, although partially restored later, sustained severe damage, leaving lasting effects even by 2020.[137]
Analysis
Summarize
Perspective
Context within the Yemeni revolution
Within the context of the then-ongoing revolution, the seizure of Zinjibar provoked suspicion that the government had willfully or intentionally let the city fall. The army's quick abandonment of the city to the militants led to accusations that Saleh had ordered security forces to withdraw and let the militants capture it.[16] A number of commentators claimed that the militants were working for the Saleh regime;[138][27] some Saleh supporters had even joined the militants believing them to be backed by the government.[13] Analyst Ali Dahmis claimed that Saleh had allowed Zinjibar to fall in order to shift attention from his loss of control over Sanaa.[33] Political analyst Abdul Ghani al-Iryani questioned the absence of counterterrorism units normally stationed in the area who could have easily defended the city, believing that "if AQAP was strong enough to take control of an entire governorate, they would have done so much sooner."[139] Gen. Sawmali, who led the only army brigade which remained to defend the city, stated in an interview:
God bless our colleagues in the Public Security, Police, and Central Security who pulled out of the governorate and left behind all their military equipment and munitions as a gift for al-Qaeda elements… I do not want to go too far and accuse my colleagues of complicity with al-Qaeda against us and I do not cast doubt about them… but we can say that it is cowardice and fear that filled them after the governor, his deputies, and directors of departments left Zinjibar.[9]
Opposition figures and analysts suspected that Saleh had let the city fall in an attempt to convince the US and neighbouring countries that he was needed in power in order to deal with the threat and prevent a complete AQAP takeover, thus saving his faltering regime.[125][84][10] Saleh's government was known to have previously utilized and exaggerate the threat of al-Qaeda, and in some cases collude the group, in order to receive increased aid and attention from the US government.[16] Iryani said in February 2012 that Saleh "ordered his police force to evacuate the city and turn it over to the militants because he wanted to send a signal to the world that, without me, Yemen will fall into the hands of the terrorists."[5] Former defense minister Abdullah Ali Alewa claimed that the move was in order to "frighten people that if he goes, Yemen will become Somalia."[16] A group of pro-opposition army generals, led by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, released a statement in which they stated that Saleh "delivered Zinjibar to groups that he has formed and armed, to continue to utilize the spectre of al-Qaeda to frighten regional and international parties."[140] Southern Movement figure Ali Nasir Muhammad viewed the AAS seizure as facilitated by the government in order to tarnish the reputation of the secular separatists.[9]
Opposing allegiances between different army brigades participating in the battle led to internal conflicts.[141] The besieged 25th Mechanized Brigade was considered to be a close ally of the pro-opposition Gen. Ahmar,[9] along with the 119th Infantry Brigade.[82] Meanwhile, two other units participating in the battle, the 31st Armoured Brigade and the 201st Mechanized Brigade, were still loyal to Saleh.[82] Gen. Mahdi Maqula, a close ally of Saleh who was the commander of the 31st Armoured Brigade and the entire Southern Military Region, was accused by military officers of hindering the delivery of supplies to army forces fighting in the south. After taking helm of the government, one of Hadi's first decisions as president was to replace Maqula with Gen. Salem Ali Qatan in both of his roles.[142]
Strategic significance
Zinjibar lies east of the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait, through which about three million barrels of oil pass daily.[61] The city also lies upon the only road connecting the city of Aden to the rest of Abyan Governorate.[21] Aden itself is located approximately 50 kilometers west of Zinjibar.[143] If AAS were to win the battle for Zinjibar, Aden would have likely been its next target, with the former acting as a staging ground.[10] Multiple AQAP leaders claimed that Aden would be the groups next target after Zinjibar.[13][21] Analyst Katherine Zimmerman of Critical Threats wrote on matter:
Should Ansar al Sharia defeat the Yemeni military in Zinjibar, Abyan would become a staging ground for an offensive to take the strategic city of Aden. The fall of Aden raises the possibility of the fall of the south, which will have resounding effects on the future of the Yemeni state. Al Qaeda would gain relative freedom of movement from the Arabian Sea to the Saudi border, significantly increasing the risk of an attack on an international or Saudi oil target, and could erect a form of an Islamist government in its territories. The Yemeni state would not only lose its southern port city of Aden, but would also lose revenues from southern oil. Should the Yemeni military or some other actor fail to halt al Qaeda’s advance, there is the very real prospect that al Qaeda could establish an Islamic emirate in south Yemen.[53]
By June 2011, "noticeable movements" of AAS militants were recorded in several areas of Aden Governorate, including Khor Maksar and al-Mansoura districts. Two officers from the 31st Armoured Brigade were assassinated by car bombings during the month, while Gen. Madhi Maqula survived an assassination attempt at his house.[144] The attacks grew increasingly bolder over time;[145] a suicide car bombing killed four soldiers and civilian in al-Mansoura district on 24 June,[146] while a similar attack on 24 July killed 9 soldiers in a convoy heading to reinforce the army at Zinjibar.[147]
The intensification of attacks in Aden drew the attention of the government.[148] On 3 July 2011, the Ministry of Defense admitted that a number of militants had infiltrated Aden, and announced that it would deploy a security belt around the city.[57] The deployment of the 31st Armoured Brigade to participate in the battle in August was seen as a reaction to the threat to Aden, though the operation was more so done to prevent further AAS advances towards Aden rather than recapturing its territory in Abyan. The July–September offensive succeeded in establishing a front line that prevented the spread southward of the insurgency.[148]
Aftermath
2015–2016 fall and recapture
Al-Qaeda's fighters stormed Jaar and Zinjibar in early December 2015 and recaptured the towns,[149] later declaring them "Emirates", providing civilian services, and establishing a Sharia court. In summer 2016 Yemeni government forces backed by Arab coalition aircraft and gunboats moved to retake the towns, and despite encountering "repeated suicide attacks" drove AQAP out of Zinjibar on 14 August 2016.[150]
References
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