

SUPPLEMENT I

THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN PRIMITIVE LANGUAGES

By BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, Ph.D., D.Sc.

Late Professor of Anthropology, University of London.

- I. The need of a Science of Symbolism and Meaning, such as is presented in this volume by Ogden and Richards. This need exemplified by the Ethnographer's difficulties in dealing with primitive languages.
- II Analysis of a savage utterance, showing the complex problems of Meaning which lead from mere linguistics into the study of culture and social psychology. Such a combined linguistic and ethnological study needs guidance from a theory of symbols developed on the lines of the present work.
- III The conception of 'Context of Situation'. Difference in the linguistic perspectives which open up before the Philologist who studies dead, inscribed languages, and before the Ethnographer who has to deal with a primitive living tongue, existing only in actual utterance. The study of an object alive more enlightening than that of its dead remains. The 'Sign-situation' of the Authors corresponds to the 'Context of Situation' here introduced.
- IV. Language, in its primitive function, to be regarded as a *mode of action*, rather than as a *countersign of thought*. Analysis of a complex speech-situation among savages. The essential primitive uses of speech: speech-in-action, ritual handling of words, the narrative, 'phatic communion' (speech in social intercourse).
- V. The problem of Meaning in primitive languages. Intellectual formation of Meaning by apperception not primitive. Biological view of meaning in early non-arti-

culate sound-reactions, which are expressive, significant and correlated to situation. Meaning in early phases of articulate speech. Meaning of words rooted in their pragmatic efficiency. The origins of the magical attitude towards words. Ethnographic and genetic substantiation of Ogden's and Richards' views of Meaning and Definition.

VI. The problem of grammatical structure. Where to look for the prototype of grammatical categories. "Logical" and "purely grammatical" explanations rejected. Existence of Real Categories in the primitive man's pragmatic outlook, which correspond to the structural categories of language. Exemplified on the nature of the noun and of other Parts of Speech.

I

Language, in its developed literary and scientific functions, is an instrument of thought and of the communication of thought. The art of properly using this instrument is the most obvious aim of the study of language. Rhetoric, Grammar and Logic have been in the past and still are taught under the name of Arts and studied predominantly from the practical normative point of view. The laying down of rules, the testing of their validity, and the attainment of perfection in style are undoubtedly important and comprehensive objects of study, especially as Language grows and develops with the advancement of thought and culture, and in a certain sense even leads this advancement.

All Art, however, which lives by knowledge and not by inspiration, must finally resolve itself into scientific study, and there is no doubt that from all points of approach we are driven towards a scientific theory of language. Indeed, for some time already, we have had, side by side with the Arts of Language, attempts at posing and solving various purely theoretical problems of linguistic form and meaning, approached mainly from the psychological point of view. It is enough to mention the names of W. von Humboldt, Lazarus and Steinthal, Whitney, Max Muller, Misteli, Sweet, Wundt, Paul, Finck, Rozwadowski, Wegener, Oertel, Marty, Jespersen and others, to show that the Science of Language is neither new nor unimportant. In all their works, besides problems of formal grammar, we find attempts at an analysis of the mental processes which are concerned in Meaning. But our knowledge of Psychology and of psychological methods advances, and within the last years has made very rapid progress

indeed. The other modern Humanistic Sciences, in the first place Sociology and Anthropology, by giving us a deeper understanding of human nature and culture, bring their share to the common problem. For the questions of language are indeed the most important and central subject of all humanistic studies. Thus, the Science of Language constantly receives contributions of new material and stimulation from new methods. A most important impetus which it has thus lately received has come from the philosophical study of symbols and mathematical data, so brilliantly carried on in Cambridge by Mr Bertrand Russell and Dr Whitehead.

In the present book Mr Ogden and Mr Richards carry over the study of signs into the field of linguistics, where it assumes a fundamental importance. Indeed, they work out a new Science of Symbolism which is sure to yield most valuable criteria for the criticism of certain errors of Metaphysics and of purely Formal Logic (cf. Chaps II, VII, VIII and IX). On the other hand, the theory has not merely a philosophical bearing, but possesses practical importance in dealing with the special, purely scientific problems of Meaning, Grammar, Psychology and Pathology of Speech. More especially, important researches on Aphasia by Dr Henry Head, which promise to throw entirely new light on our conceptions of Meaning, seem to work towards the same Semantic theories as those contained in the present book.¹ Dr A. H. Gardiner, one of the greatest experts in hieroglyphic script and Egyptian grammar—of which he is preparing a new analysis—has published some remarkable articles on Meaning, where he approaches the same problems as those discussed by Mr Ogden and Mr Richards, and solved by them in such an interesting manner, and their respective results do not seem to me to be incompatible.² Finally, I myself, at grips with the problem of primitive languages from Papuo-Melanesia, had been driven into the field of general Semantics.³ When, however, I had the privilege of looking through the proofs of the present book, I was astonished to find how exceedingly well the theories there presented answered all my problems and solved my difficulties; and I was gratified to find that the position to which I

¹ See the preliminary articles in *Brain*, to which the Authors also refer in Chapter X.

² See Dr Gardiner's articles in *Man*, January 1919, and in *The British Journal of Psychology*, April 1922.

³ Cf my article on "Classificatory Particles in the Language of Kiriwina," *Bulletin of School of Oriental Studies*, Vol II and *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, chapter on "Words in Magic—Some Linguistic Data."

had been led by the study of primitive languages, was not essentially a different one. I was therefore extremely glad when the Authors offered me an opportunity to state my problems, and to outline my tentative solutions, side by side with their remarkable theories. I accepted it the more gladly because I hope to show how important a light the theories of this book throw on the problems of primitive languages.

It is remarkable that a number of independent inquirers, Messrs Ogden and Richards, Dr Head, Dr Gardiner and myself, starting from definite and concrete, yet quite different problems, should arrive, if not exactly at the same results stated in the same terminology, at least at the construction of similar Semantic theories based on psychological considerations.

I have therefore to show how, in my own case, that of an Ethnographer studying primitive mentality, culture, and language, I was driven into a linguistic theory very much on lines parallel to those of the present work. In the course of my Ethnographic researches among some Melanesian tribes of Eastern New Guinea, which I conducted exclusively by means of the local language, I collected a considerable number of texts: magical formulæ, items of folk-lore, narratives, fragments of conversation, and statements of my informants. When, in working out this linguistic material, I tried to translate my texts into English, and incidentally to write out the vocabulary and grammar of the language, I was faced by fundamental difficulties. These difficulties were not removed, but rather increased, when I consulted the extant grammars and vocabularies of Oceanic languages. The authors of these, mainly missionaries who wrote for the practical purpose of facilitating the task of their successors, proceeded by rule of thumb. For instance, in writing a vocabulary they would give the next best approximation in English to a native word.

But the object of a scientific translation of a word is not to give its rough equivalent, sufficient for practical purposes, but to state exactly whether a native word corresponds to an idea at least partially existing for English speakers, or whether it covers an entirely foreign conception. That such foreign conceptions do exist for native languages and in great number, is clear. All words which describe the native social order, all expressions referring to native beliefs, to specific customs, ceremonies, magical rites—all such words are obviously absent from English as from any European language. Such words can only be translated into English, not by giving their imaginary equivalent—a real one

obviously cannot be found—but by explaining the meaning of each of them through an exact Ethnographic account of the sociology, culture and tradition of that native community.

But there is an even more deeply reaching though subtler difficulty: the whole manner in which a native language is used is different from our own. In a primitive tongue, the whole grammatical structure lacks the precision and definiteness of our own, though it is extremely telling in certain specific ways. Again some particles, quite untranslatable into English, give a special flavour to native phraseology. In the structure of sentences, an extreme simplicity hides a good deal of expressiveness, often achieved by means of position and context. Returning to the meaning of isolated words, the use of metaphor, the beginnings of abstraction, of generalization and a vagueness associated with extreme concreteness of expression—all these features baffle any attempt at a simple and direct translation. The ethnographer has to convey this deep yet subtle difference of language and of the mental attitude which lies behind it, and is expressed through it. But this leads more and more into the general psychological problem of Meaning.

II

This general statement of the linguistic difficulties which beset an Ethnographer in his field-work, must be illustrated by a concrete example. Imagine yourself suddenly transported on to a coral atoll in the Pacific, sitting in a circle of natives and listening to their conversation. Let us assume further that there is an ideal interpreter at hand, who, as far as possible, can convey the meaning of each utterance, word for word, so that the listener is in possession of all the linguistic data available. Would that make you understand the conversation or even a single utterance? Certainly not.

Let us have a look at such a text, an actual utterance taken down from a conversation of natives in the Trobriand Islands, N E New Guinea. In analysing it, we shall see quite plainly how helpless one is in attempting to open up the meaning of a statement by mere linguistic means, and we shall also be able to realize what sort of additional knowledge, besides verbal equivalence, is necessary in order to make the utterance significant.

I adduce a statement in native, giving under each word its nearest English equivalent.

<i>Tasakaulo</i>	<i>kaymatana</i>	<i>yakida</i> ;
We run	front-wood	ourselves ;

<i>tawoulo</i>	<i>ovanu</i> ;	<i>tasivla</i>	<i>tagine</i>
we paddle	in place ;	we turn	we see
<i>soda</i> ;	<i>isakaulo</i>	<i>ka'u'uya</i>	
companion ours ;	he runs	rear-wood	
<i>oluvneki</i>	<i>simlaveta</i>	<i>Pilolu</i>	
behind	their sea-arm	<i>Pilolu</i>	

The verbatim English translation of this utterance sounds at first like a riddle or a meaningless jumble of words ; certainly not like a significant, unambiguous statement. Now if the listener, whom we suppose acquainted with the language, but unacquainted with the culture of the natives, were to understand even the general trend of this statement, he would have first to be informed about the situation in which these words were spoken. He would need to have them placed in their proper setting of native culture. In this case, the utterance refers to an episode in an overseas trading expedition of these natives, in which several canoes take part in a competitive spirit. This last-mentioned feature explains also the emotional nature of the utterance : it is not a mere statement of fact, but a boast, a piece of self-glorification, extremely characteristic of the Trobrianders' culture in general and of their ceremonial barter in particular.

Only after a preliminary instruction is it possible to gain some idea of such *technical terms of boasting and emulation* as *kaymatana* (front-wood) and *ka'u'uya* (rear-wood). The metaphorical use of *wood* for *canoe* would lead us into another field of language psychology, but for the present it is enough to emphasize that 'front' or 'leading canoe' and 'rear canoe' are important terms for a people whose attention is so highly occupied with competitive activities for their own sake. To the meaning of such words is added a specific emotional tinge, comprehensible only against the background of their tribal psychology in ceremonial life, commerce and enterprise.

Again, the sentence where the leading sailors are described as looking back and perceiving their companions lagging behind on the sea-arm of *Pilolu*, would require a special discussion of the geographical feeling of the natives, of their use of imagery as a linguistic instrument and of a special use of the possessive pronoun (*their* sea-arm *Pilolu*)

All this shows the wide and complex considerations into which we are led by an attempt to give an adequate analysis of meaning. Instead of translating, of inserting simply an English word for a native one, we are faced by a long and not altogether simple pro-

cess of describing wide fields of custom, of social psychology and of tribal organization which correspond to one term or another. We see that linguistic analysis inevitably leads us into the study of all the subjects covered by Ethnographic field-work

Of course the above given comments on the specific terms (front-wood, rear-wood, their sea-arm Pīlolu) are necessarily short and sketchy. But I have on purpose chosen an utterance which corresponds to a set of customs, already described quite fully.¹ The reader of that description will be able to understand thoroughly the adduced text, as well as appreciate the present argument

Besides the difficulties encountered in the translation of single words, difficulties which lead directly into descriptive Ethnography, there are others, associated with more exclusively linguistic problems, which however can be solved only on the basis of psychological analysis. Thus it has been suggested that the characteristically Oceanic distinction of inclusive and exclusive pronouns requires a deeper explanation than any which would confine itself to merely grammatical relations.² Again, the puzzling manner in which some of the obviously correlated sentences are joined in our text by mere juxtaposition would require much more than a simple reference, if all its importance and significance had to be brought out. Those two features are well known and have been often discussed, though according to my ideas not quite exhaustively.

There are, however, certain peculiarities of primitive languages, almost entirely neglected by grammarians, yet opening up very interesting questions of savage psychology. I shall illustrate this by a point, lying on the borderland between grammar and lexicography and well exemplified in the utterance quoted.

In the highly developed Indo-European languages, a sharp distinction can be drawn between the grammatical and lexical function of words. The meaning of a root of a word can be isolated from the modification of meaning due to accident or some other grammatical means of determination. Thus in the word *run* we distinguish between the meaning of the root—rapid

¹ See *op cit*, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*—An account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea, 1922

² See the important Presidential Address by the late Dr W H R Rivers in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol LII, January-June, 1922, p 21, and his *History of Melanesian Society*, Vol II, p 486

personal displacement—and the modification as to time, tense, definiteness, etc., expressed by the grammatical form, in which the word is found in the given context. But in native languages the distinction is by no means so clear and the functions of grammar and radical meaning respectively are often confused in a remarkable manner.

In the Melanesian languages there exist certain grammatical instruments, used in the flexion of verbs, which express somewhat vaguely relations of time, definiteness and sequence. The most obvious and easy thing to do for a European who wishes to use roughly such a language for practical purposes, is to find out what is the nearest approach to those Melanesian forms in our languages and then to use the savage form in the European manner. In the Trobriand language, for instance, from which we have taken our above example, there is an adverbial particle *boge*, which, put before a modified verb, gives it, in a somewhat vague manner, the meaning either of a past or of a definite happening. The verb is moreover modified by a change in the prefixed personal pronoun. Thus the root *ma* (come, move hither) if used with the prefixed pronoun of the third singular *ɪ*—has the form *ima* and means (roughly), *he comes*. With the modified pronoun *ay*—or, more emphatical, *lay*—it means (roughly) *he came* or *he has come*. The expression *boge ayna* or *boge layma* can be approximately translated by *he has already come*, the participle *boge* making it more definite.

But this equivalence is only approximate, suitable for some practical purposes, such as trading with the natives, missionary preaching and translation of Christian literature into native languages. This last cannot, in my opinion, be carried out with any degree of accuracy. In the grammars and interpretations of Melanesian languages, almost all of which have been written by missionaries for practical purposes, the grammatical modifications of verbs have been simply set down as equivalent to Indo-European tenses. When I first began to use the Trobriand language in my field-work, I was quite unaware that there might be some snares in taking savage grammar at its face value and followed the missionary way of using native inflection.

I had soon to learn, however, that this was not correct and I learnt it by means of a practical mistake, which interfered slightly with my field-work and forced me to grasp native flexion at the cost of my personal comfort. At one time I was engaged in making observations on a very interesting transaction which took place in a lagoon village of the Trobriands between the coastal

fishermen and the inland gardeners.¹ I had to follow some important preparations in the village and yet I did not want to miss the arrival of the canoes on the beach. I was busy registering and photographing the proceedings among the huts, when word went round, 'they have come already'—*boge laymayse*. I left my work in the village unfinished to rush some quarter of a mile to the shore, in order to find, to my disappointment and mortification, the canoes far away, punting slowly along towards the beach! Thus I came some ten minutes too soon, just enough to make me lose my opportunities in the village!

It required some time and a much better general grasp of the language before I came to understand the nature of my mistake and the proper use of words and forms to express the subtleties of temporal sequence. Thus the root *ma* which means *come, move hither*, does not contain the meaning, covered by our word *arrive*. Nor does any grammatical determination give it the special and temporal definition, which we express by, 'they have come, they have arrived.' The form *boge laymayse*, which I heard on that memorable morning in the lagoon village, means to a native 'they have already been moving hither' and not 'they have already come here.'

In order to achieve the spatial and temporal definition which we obtain by using the past definite tense, the natives have recourse to certain concrete and specific expressions. Thus in the case quoted, the villagers, in order to convey the fact that the canoes had arrived, would have used the word *to anchor, to moor*. 'They have already moored their canoes,' *boge aykotasi*, would have meant, what I assumed they had expressed by *boge laymayse*. That is, in this case the natives use a different root instead of a mere grammatical modification.

Returning to our text, we have another telling example of the characteristic under discussion. The quant expression 'we paddle in place' can only be properly understood by realizing that the word *paddle* has here the function, not of describing what the crew are doing, but of indicating their immediate proximity to the village of their destination. Exactly as in the previous example the past tense of the word to come ('they have come') which we would have used in our language to convey the fact of arrival, has another meaning in native and has to be replaced by another root which expresses the idea; so here the native root *wa, to move thither*, could not have been used in

¹ It was a ceremony of the *Wast*, a form of exchange of vegetable food for fish. See *op cit, Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp 187-189 and plate xxxvi

(approximately) past definite tense to convey the meaning of 'arrive there,' but a special root expressing the concrete act of paddling is used to mark the spatial and temporal relations of the leading canoe to the others. The origin of this imagery is obvious. Whenever the natives arrive near the shore of one of the overseas villages, they have to fold the sail and to use the paddles, since there the water is deep, even quite close to the shore, and punting impossible. So 'to paddle' means 'to arrive at the overseas village.' It may be added that in this expression 'we paddle in place,' the two remaining words *in* and *place* would have to be retranslated in a free English interpretation by *near the village*.

With the help of such an analysis as the one just given, this or any other savage utterance can be made comprehensible. In this case we may sum up our results and embody them in a free commentary or paraphrase of the statement :

A number of natives sit together. One of them, who has just come back from an overseas expedition, gives an account of the sailing and boasts about the superiority of his canoe. He tells his audience how, in crossing the sea-arm of Pilolu (between the Trobriands and the Amphletts), his canoe sailed ahead of all others. When nearing their destination, the leading sailors looked back and saw their comrades far behind, still on the sea-arm of Pilolu.

Put in these terms, the utterance can at least be understood broadly, though for an exact appreciation of the shades and details of meaning a full knowledge of the native customs and psychology, as well as of the general structure of their language, is indispensable.

It is hardly necessary perhaps to point out that all I have said in this section is only an illustration on a concrete example of the general principles so brilliantly set forth by Ogden and Richards in Chapters I, III and IV of their work. What I have tried to make clear by analysis of a primitive linguistic text is that language is essentially rooted in the reality of the culture, the tribal life and customs of a people, and that it cannot be explained without constant reference to these broader contexts of verbal utterance. The theories embodied in Ogden's and Richards' diagram of Chapter I, in their treatment of the 'sign-situation' (Chapter III) and in their analysis of perception (Chapter IV) cover and generalize all the details of my example.

III

Returning once more to our native utterance, it needs no special stressing that in a primitive language the meaning of any single word is to a very high degree dependent on its context. The words 'wood', 'paddle', 'place' had to be retranslated in the free interpretation in order to show what is their real meaning, conveyed to a native by the context in which they appear. Again, it is equally clear that the meaning of the expression 'we arrive near the village (of our destination)' literally, 'we paddle in place', is determined only by taking it in the context of the whole utterance. This latter again, becomes only intelligible when it is placed within its *context of situation*, if I may be allowed to coin an expression which indicates on the one hand that the conception of *context* has to be broadened and on the other that the *situation* in which words are uttered can never be passed over as irrelevant to the linguistic expression. We see how the conception of context must be substantially widened, if it is to furnish us with its full utility. In fact it must burst the bonds of mere linguistics and be carried over into the analysis of the general conditions under which a language is spoken. Thus, starting from the wider idea of context, we arrive once more at the results of the foregoing section, namely that the study of any language, spoken by a people who live under conditions different from our own and possess a different culture, must be carried out in conjunction with the study of their culture and of their environment.

But the widened conception of *context of situation* yields more than that. It makes clear the difference in scope and method between the linguistics of dead and of living languages. The material on which almost all our linguistic study has been done so far belongs to dead languages. It is present in the form of written documents, naturally isolated, torn out of any *context of situation*. In fact, written statements are set down with the purpose of being self-contained and self-explanatory. A mortuary inscription, a fragment of primeval laws or precepts, a chapter or statement in a sacred book, or to take a more modern example, a passage from a Greek or Latin philosopher, historian or poet—one and all of these were composed with the purpose of bringing their message to posterity unaided, and they had to contain this message within their own bounds.

To take the clearest case, that of a modern scientific book, the writer of it sets out to address every individual reader who will peruse the book and has the necessary scientific training. He

tries to influence his reader's mind in certain directions. With the printed text of the book before him, the reader, at the writer's bidding, undergoes a series of processes—he reasons, reflects, remembers, imagines. The book by itself is sufficient to direct the reader's mind to its meaning, and we might be tempted to say metaphorically that the meaning is wholly contained in or carried by the book.

But when we pass from a modern civilized language, of which we think mostly in terms of written records, or from a dead one which survives only in inscription, to a primitive tongue, never used in writing, where *all the material lives only in winged words*, passing from man to man—there it should be clear at once that the conception of meaning as *contained* in an utterance is false and futile. A statement, spoken in real life, is never detached from the situation in which it has been uttered. For each verbal statement by a human being has the aim and function of expressing some thought or feeling actual at that moment and in that situation, and necessary for some reason or other to be made known to another person or persons—in order either to serve purposes of common action, or to establish ties of purely social communion, or else to deliver the speaker of violent feelings or passions. Without some imperative stimulus of the moment, there can be no spoken statement. In each case, therefore, utterance and situation are bound up inextricably with each other and the context of situation is indispensable for the understanding of the words. Exactly as in the reality of spoken or written languages, a word without *linguistic context* is a mere figment and stands for nothing by itself, so in the reality of a spoken living tongue, the utterance has no meaning except in the *context of situation*.

It will be quite clear now that the point of view of the Philologist, who deals only with remnants of dead languages, must differ from that of the Ethnographer, who, deprived of the ossified, fixed data of inscriptions, has to rely on the living reality of spoken language *in fluxu*. The former has to reconstruct the general situation—*i e.*, the culture of a past people—from the extant statements, the latter can study directly the conditions and situations characteristic of a culture and interpret the statements through them. Now I claim that the Ethnographer's perspective is the one relevant and real for the formation of fundamental linguistic conceptions and for the study of the life of languages, whereas the Philologist's point of view is fictitious and irrelevant. For language in its origins has been merely the

free, spoken *sum total* of utterances such as we find now in a savage tongue. All the foundations and fundamental characteristics of human speech have received their shape and character in the stage of development proper to Ethnographic study and not in the Philologist's domain. To define Meaning, to explain the essential grammatical and lexical characters of language on the material furnished by the study of dead languages, is nothing short of preposterous in the light of our argument. Yet it would be hardly an exaggeration to say that 99 per cent. of all linguistic work has been inspired by the study of dead languages or at best of written records torn completely out of any context of situation. That the Ethnographer's perspective can yield not only generalities but positive, concrete conclusions I shall indicate at least in the following sections.

Here I wish again to compare the standpoint just reached with the results of Messrs Ogden and Richards. I have written the above in my own terminology, in order to retrace the steps of my argument, such as it was before I became acquainted with the present book. But it is obvious that the *context of situation*, on which such a stress is laid here, is nothing else but the *sign-situation* of the Authors. Their contention, which is fundamental to all the arguments of their book, that no theory of meaning can be given without the study of the mechanism of reference, is also the main gist of my reasoning in the foregoing paragraphs. The opening chapters of their work show how erroneous it is to consider Meaning as a real entity, contained in a word or utterance. The ethnographically and historically interesting data and comments of Chapter II show up the manifold illusions and errors due to a false attitude towards words. This attitude in which the word is regarded as a real entity, containing its meaning as a Soul-box contains the spiritual part of a person or thing, is shown to be derived from the primitive, magical uses of language and to reach right into the most important and influential systems of metaphysics. Meaning, the real 'essence' of a word, achieves thus Real Existence in Plato's realm of Ideas; and it becomes the Universal, actually existing, of mediæval Realists. The misuse of words, based always on a false analysis of their Semantic function, leads to all the ontological morass in philosophy, where truth is found by spinning out meaning from the word, its assumed receptacle.

The analysis of meaning in primitive languages affords a striking confirmation of Messrs Ogden and Richards' theories. For the clear realization of the intimate connection between lin-

guistic interpretation and the analysis of the culture to which the language belongs, shows convincingly that neither a Word nor its Meaning has an independent and self-sufficient existence. The Ethnographic view of language proves the principle of Symbolic Relativity as it might be called, that is that words must be treated only as symbols and that a psychology of symbolic reference must serve as the basis for all science of language. Since the whole world of 'things-to-be-expressed' changes with the level of culture, with geographical, social and economic conditions, the consequence is that the meaning of a word must be always gathered, not from a passive contemplation of this word, but from an analysis of its functions, with reference to the given culture. Each primitive or barbarous tribe, as well as each type of civilization, has its world of meanings and the whole linguistic apparatus of this people—their store of words and their type of grammar—can only be explained in connection with their mental requirements.

In Chapter III of this book the Authors give an analysis of the psychology of symbolic reference, which together with the material collected in Chapter II is the most satisfactory treatment of the subject which I have ever seen. I wish to remark that the use of the word 'context' by the Authors is compatible, but not identical, with my use of this word in the expression 'context of situation' I cannot enter here into an attempt to bring our respective nomenclature into line and must allow the reader to test the Relativity of Symbolism on this little example.

IV

So far, I have dealt mainly with the simplest problems of meaning, those associated with the definition of single words and with the lexicographical task of bringing home to a European reader the vocabulary of a strange tongue. And the main result of our analysis was that it is impossible to translate words of a primitive language or of one widely different from our own, without giving a detailed account of the culture of its users and thus providing the common measure necessary for a translation. But though an Ethnographic background is indispensable for a scientific treatment of a language, it is by no means sufficient, and the problem of Meaning needs a special theory of its own. I shall try to show that, looking at language from the Ethnographic perspective and using our conception of *context of situation*, we shall be able to give an outline of a Semantic theory,

useful in the work on Primitive Linguistics, and throwing some light on human language in general

First of all, let us try, from our standpoint, to form a view of the Nature of language. The lack of a clear and precise view of Linguistic function and of the nature of Meaning, has been, I believe, the cause of the relative sterility of much otherwise excellent linguistic theorizing. The direct manner in which the Authors face this fundamental problem and the excellent argument by which they solve it, constitute the permanent value of their work.

The study of the above-quoted native text has demonstrated that an utterance becomes comprehensive only when we interpret it by its context of situation. The analysis of this context should give us a glimpse of a group of savages bound by reciprocal ties of interests and ambitions, of emotional appeal and response. There was boastful reference to competitive trading activities, to ceremonial overseas expeditions, to a complex of sentiments, ambitions and ideas known to the group of speakers and hearers through their being steeped in tribal tradition and having been themselves actors in such events as those described in the narrative. Instead of giving a narrative I could have adduced linguistic samples still more deeply and directly embedded in the context of situation.

Take for instance language spoken by a group of natives engaged in one of their fundamental pursuits in search of subsistence—hunting, fishing, tilling the soil; or else in one of those activities, in which a savage tribe express some essentially human forms of energy—war, play or sport, ceremonial performance or artistic display such as dancing or singing. The actors in any such scene are all following a purposeful activity, are all set on a definite aim; they all have to act in a concerted manner according to certain rules established by custom and tradition. In this, Speech is the necessary means of communion; it is the one indispensable instrument for creating the ties of the moment without which unified social action is impossible.

Let us now consider what would be the type of talk passing between people thus acting, what would be the manner of its use. To make it quite concrete at first, let us follow up a party of fishermen on a coral lagoon, spying for a shoal of fish, trying to imprison them in an enclosure of large nets, and to drive them into small net-bags—an example which I am choosing also because of my personal familiarity with the procedure¹

¹ Cf. the writer's article on "Fishing and Fishing Magic in the Trobriand Islands," *Man*, 1918.

The canoes glide slowly and noiselessly, punted by men especially good at this task and always used for it. Other experts who know the bottom of the lagoon, with its plant and animal life, are on the look-out for fish. One of them sights the quarry. Customary signs, or sounds or words are uttered. Sometimes a sentence full of technical references to the channels or patches on the lagoon has to be spoken; sometimes when the shoal is near and the task of trapping is simple, a conventional cry is uttered not too loudly. Then, the whole fleet stops and ranges itself—every canoe and every man in it performing his appointed task—according to a customary routine. But, of course, the men, as they act, utter now and then a sound expressing keenness in the pursuit or impatience at some technical difficulty, joy of achievement or disappointment at failure. Again, a word of command is passed here and there, a technical expression or explanation which serves to harmonise their behaviour towards other men. The whole group act in a concerted manner, determined by old tribal tradition and perfectly familiar to the actors through life-long experience. Some men in the canoes cast the wide encircling nets into the water, others plunge, and wading through the shallow lagoon, drive the fish into the nets. Others again stand by with the small nets, ready to catch the fish. An animated scene, full of movement follows, and now that the fish are in their power the fishermen speak loudly, and give vent to their feelings. Short, telling exclamations fly about, which might be rendered by such words as: 'Pull in,' 'Let go,' 'Shift further,' 'Lift the net'; or again technical expressions completely untranslatable except by minute description of the instruments used, and of the mode of action.

All the language used during such a pursuit is full of technical terms, short references to surroundings, rapid indications of change—all based on customary types of behaviour, well-known to the participants from personal experience. Each utterance is essentially bound up with the context of situation and with the aim of the pursuit, whether it be the short indications about the movements of the quarry, or references to statements about the surroundings, or the expression of feeling and passion inexorably bound up with behaviour, or words of command, or correlation of action. The structure of all this linguistic material is inextricably mixed up with, and dependent upon, the course of the activity in which the utterances are embedded. The vocabulary, the meaning of the particular words used in their characteristic technicality is not less subordinate to action. For technical language, in matters of practical pursuit, acquires its meaning

only through personal participation in this type of pursuit. It has to be learned, not through reflection but through action.

Had we taken any other example than fishing, we would have reached similar results. The study of any form of speech used in connection with vital work would reveal the same grammatical and lexical peculiarities : the dependence of the meaning of each word upon practical experience, and of the structure of each utterance upon the momentary situation in which it is spoken. Thus the consideration of linguistic uses associated with any practical pursuit, leads us to the conclusion that language in its primitive forms ought to be regarded and studied against the background of human activities and as a mode of human behaviour in practical matters. We have to realize that language originally, among primitive, non-civilized peoples was never used as a mere mirror of reflected thought. The manner in which I am using it now, in writing these words, the manner in which the author of a book, or a papyrus or a hewn inscription has to use it, is a very far-fetched and derivative function of language. In this, language becomes a condensed piece of reflection, a record of fact or thought. In its primitive uses, language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece of human behaviour. It is a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection.

These conclusions have been reached on an example in which language is used by people engaged in practical work, in which utterances are embedded in action. This conclusion might be questioned by an objection that there are also other linguistic uses even among primitive peoples who are debarred from writing or any means of external fixation of linguistic texts. Yet even they, it might be urged, have fixed texts in their songs, sayings, myths and legends, and most important, in their ritual and magical formulæ. Are our conclusions about the nature of language correct, when faced with this use of speech ; can our views remain unaltered when, from speech in action, we turn our attention to free narrative or to the use of language in pure social intercourse ; when the object of talk is not to achieve some aim but the exchange of words almost as an end in itself ?

Anyone who has followed our analysis of speech in action and compares it with the discussion of the narrative texts in Section II, will be convinced that the present conclusions apply to narrative speech as well. When incidents are told or discussed among a group of listeners, there is, first, the situation of that moment made up of the respective social, intellectual and emotional attitudes of those present. Within this situation, the narrative

creates new bonds and sentiments by the emotional appeal of the words. In the narrative quoted, the boasting of a man to a mixed audience of several visitors and strangers produces feelings of pride or mortification, of triumph or envy. In every case, narrative speech as found in primitive communities is primarily a mode of social action rather than a mere reflection of thought.

A narrative is associated also indirectly with one situation to which it refers—in our text with a performance of competitive sailing. In this relation, the words of a tale are significant because of previous experiences of the listeners; and their meaning depends on the context of the situation referred to, not to the same degree but in the same manner as in the speech of action. The difference in degree is important; narrative speech is derived in its function, and it refers to action only indirectly, but the way in which it acquires its meaning can only be understood from the direct function of speech in action. To use the terminology of this work: the referential function of a narrative is subordinate to its social and emotive function, as classified by the Authors in Chapter X.

The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration. When a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip quite unconnected with what they are doing—it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function. Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation. The meaning of any utterance cannot be connected with the speaker's or hearer's behaviour, with the purpose of what they are doing.

A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing-room, fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant. Inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things—all such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought. It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing a common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse; and where it purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly spurious on one side. What is the *raison d'être*, therefore, of such phrases as 'How do you do?' 'Ah, here you are,' 'Where do you come

from ?' ' Nice day to-day '—all of which serve in one society or another as formulæ of greeting or approach ?

I think that, in discussing the function of Speech in mere sociabilities, we come to one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society. There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company. Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity, all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man ¹

Now speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous. The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy. To the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes, taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but directly a bad character. This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule. The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship, which is consummated only by the breaking of bread and the communion of food. The modern English expression, ' Nice day to-day ' or the Melanesian phrase, ' Whence comest thou ? ' are needed to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence.

After the first formula, there comes a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious. Such gossip, as found in Primitive Societies, differs only a little from our own. Always the same emphasis of affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy. Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak. For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement. But though the hearing given to such

¹ I avoid on purpose the use of the expression Herd-instinct, for I believe that the tendency in question cannot strictly be called an instinct. Moreover the term Herd-instinct has been misused in a recent sociological work which has, however, become sufficiently popular to establish its views on this subject with the general reader.

utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of rôles

There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use—*phatic communion* I am tempted to call it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention—a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words. Let us look at it from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language. Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought.

But can we regard it as a mode of action? And in what relation does it stand to our crucial conception of context of situation? It is obvious that the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking. But what can be considered as *situation* when a number of people aimlessly gossip together? It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people. But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip. The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically. Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other. Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action.

I should like to add at once that though the examples discussed were taken from savage life, we could find among ourselves exact parallels to every type of linguistic use so far discussed. The binding tissue of words which unites the crew of a ship in bad weather, the verbal concomitants of a company of soldiers in action, the technical language running parallel to some practical work or sporting pursuit—all these resemble essentially the primitive uses of speech by man in action and our discussion could have been equally well conducted on a modern example. I have chosen the above from a Savage Community, because I wanted to emphasize that such and no other is the nature of *primitive* speech.

Again in pure sociabilities and gossip we use language exactly

as savages do and our talk becomes the 'phatic communion' analysed above, which serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas. "Throughout the Western world it is agreed that people must meet frequently, and that it is not only agreeable to talk, but that it is a matter of common courtesy to say something even when there is hardly anything to say"¹—as the Authors remark. Indeed there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate. As long as there are words to exchange, phatic communion brings savage and civilized alike into the pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse.

It is only in certain very special uses among a civilized community and only in its highest uses that language is employed to frame and express thoughts. In poetic and literary production, language is made to embody human feelings and passions, to render in a subtle and convincing manner certain inner states and processes of mind. In works of science and philosophy, highly developed types of speech are used to control ideas and to make them common property of civilized mankind.

Even in this function, however, it is not correct to regard language as a mere residuum of reflective thought. And the conception of speech as serving to translate the inner processes of the speaker to the hearer is one-sided and gives us, even with regard to the most highly developed and specialized uses of speech, only a partial and certainly not the most relevant view.

To restate the main position arrived at in this section we can say that language in its primitive function and original form has an essentially pragmatic character; that it is a mode of behaviour, an indispensable element of concerted human action. And negatively: that to regard it as a means for the embodiment or expression of thought is to take a one-sided view of one of its most derivative and specialized functions.

V

This view of the nature of language I have tried to establish by a detailed analysis of examples, by reference to concrete and actual facts. I trust therefore that the distinction which I have explained, between 'mode of action' and 'means of thinking,' will not remain an empty phrase, but that it has received its content from the adduced facts. Nothing, however, establishes the

¹ Cited from Chapter I of the present work

positive value and empirical nature of a general principle so completely as when it is shown to work in the solution of definite problems of a somewhat difficult and puzzling description.

In linguistics we have an intractable subject of this kind in the Problem of Meaning. It would perhaps be presumptuous for me to tackle this subject in an abstract and general manner and with any philosophical ambition, after it has been shown by Ogden and Richards (Chapters VIII and IX) to be of so highly dangerous a nature. But I simply want to approach it through the narrow avenue of Ethnographic empiricism and show how it looks viewed from the perspective of the pragmatic uses of primitive speech.

This perspective has allowed us to class human speech with the active modes of human behaviour, rather than with the reflective and cognitive ones. But this outside view and wholesale conception must be still supplemented by some more detailed, analytic considerations, if we want to arrive at a clearer idea of Meaning.

In Chapter III of the present work the Authors discuss the psychology of Sign-situations and the acquisition of significance by symbols. I need not repeat or summarize their penetrating analysis, which to me is extremely convincing and satisfactory and forms the corner-stone of their linguistic theory. I wish however to follow up one point in their argument, a point closely related to our pragmatic conception of language.

The Authors reject, and rightly so, the explanations of meaning by suggestion, association or apperception, urging that such explanations are not sufficiently dynamic. Of course new ideas are formed by apperception and since a new idea constitutes a new meaning and receives in due course a new name, apperception is a process by which significance is created. But that happens only in the most highly developed and refined uses of language for scientific purposes. From our previous discussion it should be well established that such a type of formulation of meaning is highly derivative and cannot be taken as the pattern on which to study and explain significance. And this not only with reference to savages, but also in our own linguistic life. For a man who uses his language scientifically has his attitude towards language already developed by and rooted in the more elementary forms of word-function. Before he has ever begun to acquire his scientific vocabulary in a highly artificial manner by apperception—which, moreover, takes place only to a very limited degree—he has learnt to use, used and grown up using

words and constructions, the meaning of which has been formed in his mind in quite a different manner. And this manner is primary as regards time, for it is derived from earlier uses ; it is more general, because the vast majority of words thus receive their meaning , and it is more fundamental, since it refers to the most important and prevalent uses of speech—those which we have indicated above as common to primitive and civilized humanity.

This manner of formation of meaning we must now proceed to analyse more in detail, with reference to our pragmatic view of language. And it will be best done by genetic considerations, by an analysis of infantile uses of words, of primitive forms, of significance and of pre-scientific language among ourselves. Some glimpses of formation of meaning in infancy and childhood will appear the more important, as modern psychology seems to be more and more inclined to assign a permanent influence to early mental habits in the outlook of the adult.

The emission of inarticulate emotional sound and of articulate speech is a biological arrangement of enormous importance to the young and adult of the human species, and is rooted deeply in the instinctive and physiological arrangement of the human organism. Children, savages and civilized adults alike react with vocal expression to certain situations—whether these arouse bodily pain or mental anguish, fear or passion, intense curiosity or powerful joy. These sound reactions are part of the human expression of emotions and as such possess, as has been established by Darwin and others, a survival value or are at least themselves relics of such values. Anyone in contact with infants and small children knows that they express without the slightest ambiguity their mood, their emotion, their need and desire. Concentrating our attention for the moment on infantile utterances of this type, it can be said that each sound is the expression of some emotional state ; that for surrounding people it has a certain significance ; and that it is correlated with the outer situation surrounding and comprising the child's organism—a situation which makes the child hungry or afraid or pleased or interested.

All this is true of the non-articulate sounds emitted by an infant, such as gurgling, wailing, squealing, crowing and weeping. Later on, certain slightly articulated utterances follow, first syllables—*gu*, *ma*, *ba*, etc.—repeated indefinitely, mixed up and blurred by other sounds. These sounds serve in a parallel manner to express certain psycho-physiological states and to

expend some of the child's energy. They are a sign of health and they are a form of indispensable exercise. Emission of sounds is at the earliest and at the later stage of verbal development, one of the child's main activities, persistent and passionate, as every parent knows from pleasant and unpleasant experiences alike!

How shall we conceive the formation of meaning at these earliest stages? Here, in this somewhat different approach, the pragmatic view of language obtrudes itself again. The child *acts* by sound at this stage, and acts in a manner which is both adapted to the outer situation, to the child's mental state and which is also intelligible to the surrounding adults. Thus the significance of sound, the meaning of an utterance is here identical with the active response to surroundings and with the natural expression of emotions. The meaning of such a sound is derived from one of the earliest and most important forms of human activity.

When sound begins to articulate, the child's mind develops in a parallel manner and becomes interested in isolating objects from its surroundings, though the most relevant elements, associated with the food and comfort of the infant, have been already singled out previously. At the same time, the child becomes aware of the sounds produced by the adults and the other children of its surroundings, and it develops a tendency to imitate them. The existence of a social milieu surrounding the child is a factor of fundamental biological importance in the upbringing of the human young and it is also an indispensable element in speech formation. Thus the child who begins to articulate certain syllables soon finds these syllables repeated by the adults and this paves the way to a clearer, more articulate enunciation.

It would be extremely interesting to find out, whether and how far some of the earliest articulated sounds have a 'natural' meaning, that is a meaning based on some natural connection between sound and object. The only fact here relevant I can quote from personal observation. I have noticed in two children that at the stage where distinct syllables begin to be formed the repeated sound, *ma, ma, ma . . .* appears when the child is dissatisfied generally, when some essential want is not fulfilled or some general discomfort is oppressing it. The sound attracts the most important object in its surroundings, the mother, and with her appearance the painful state of mind is remedied. Can it be that the entry of the sound *mama . . .* just at the stage when articulate speech begins—with its emotional significance and its

power of bringing the mother to the rescue—has produced in a great number of human languages the root *ma* for *mother*?¹

However this might be, and whether the child acquires some of its early vocabulary by a spontaneous process or whether all its words come to it from the outside, the manner in which the first items of articulate speech are used is the point which is really interesting and relevant for us in this connection.

The earliest words—*mama*, *dada*, or *papa*, expressions for food, water, certain toys or animals—are not simply imitated and used to describe, name, or identify. Like the previous non-articulate expressions of emotion, these early words also come to be used under the stress of painful situations or strong emotions, when the child cries for its parent or rejoices in her sight, when it clamours for food or repeats with pleasure or excitement the name of some favourite plaything of its surroundings. Here the word becomes the significant reaction, adjusted to situation, expressive of inner state and intelligible to the human milieu.

This latter fact has another very important set of consequences. The human infant, helpless in itself and unable to cope with the difficulties and dangers of its early life, is endowed with very complete arrangements for care and assistance, resulting from the instinctive attachment of the mother and, to a smaller extent, of the father. The child's action on the surrounding world is done through the parents, on whom the child acts again by its appeal, mainly its verbal appeal. When the child clamours for a person, it calls and he appears before it. When it wants food or an object or when it wishes some uncomfortable thing or arrangement to be removed, its only means of action is to clamour, and a very efficient means of action this proves to the child.

To the child, words are therefore not only means of expression but efficient modes of action. The name of a person uttered aloud in a piteous voice possesses the power of materializing this person. Food has to be called for and it appears—in the majority of cases. Thus infantile experience must leave on the child's mind the deep impression that a name has the power over the person or thing which it signifies.

¹ The correspondence between early natural sounds and the nearest kinship terms is well known (cf Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, Vol I, pp 242-245). Here I suggest something more, namely that the natural emotional tone of one of these sounds, *ma*, and its significance for the mother, cause her appearance and thus by a natural process form the meaning of the *mama* type of words. The usual opinion is that meaning is given to them, artificially, by adults. "The terms which have been derived from the babble of infants have, of course, been selected, and the use of them has been fixed, by grown-up persons." (Westermarck, *loc cit*, p. 245)

We find thus that an arrangement biologically essential to the human race makes the early articulated words sent forth by children produce the very effect which these words *mean*. Words are to a child active forces, they give him an essential hold on reality, they provide him with the only effective means of moving, attracting and repulsing outer things and of producing changes in all that is relevant. This of course is not the statement of a child's conscious views about language, but it is the attitude implied in the child's behaviour.

Following the manner in which speech is used into the later stage of childhood, we find again that everything reinforces this pragmatic relation to meaning. In all the child's experience, words *mean*, in so far as they act and not in so far as they make the child understand or apperceive. His joy in using words and in expressing itself in frequent repetition, or in playing about with a word, is relevant in so far as it reveals the active nature of early linguistic use. And it would be incorrect to say that such a playful use of words is 'meaningless'. It is certainly deprived of any intellectual purpose, but possesses always an emotional value, and it is one of the child's favourite actions, in which he approaches this or that person or object of his surroundings. When a child greets the approaching person or animal, item of food or toy, with a volley of the repeated name, he establishes a link of liking or disliking between himself and that object. And all the time, up to a fairly advanced age, the name of an object is the first means recurred to, in order to attract, to materialize this thing.

If we transfer now this analysis to conditions of primitive mankind, it will be better not to indulge in essentially imaginary and therefore futile speculations about the beginnings of speech, but simply to cast a glance at the normal uses of language as we see them in empirical observations of savages. Returning to the above examples of a group of natives engaged in a practical pursuit, we see them using technical words, names of implements, specific activities. A word, signifying an important utensil, is used in action, not to comment on its nature or reflect on its properties, but to make it appear, be handed over to the speaker, or to direct another man to its proper use. The meaning of the thing is made up of experiences of its active uses and not of intellectual contemplation. Thus, when a savage learns to understand the meaning of a word, this process is not accomplished by explanations, by a series of acts of apperception, but by learning to handle it. A word *means* to a native the proper use of the thing for which it stands, exactly as an implement *means* something

when it can be handled and means nothing when no active experience of it is at hand. Similarly a verb, a word for an action, receives its meaning through an active participation in this action. A word is used when it can produce an action and not to describe one, still less to translate thoughts. The word therefore has a power of its own, it is a means of bringing things about, it is a handle to acts and objects and not a definition of them.

Again, the same view of meaning results from the active uses of speech among ourselves, even among those of us, who, on comparatively rare occasions, can use language in a scientific or literary manner. The innumerable superstitions—the agnostic's fear of blasphemy or at least reluctance to use it, the active dislike of obscene language, the power of swearing—all this shows that in the normal use of words the bond between symbol and referent is more than a mere convention.

The illiterate members of civilized communities treat and regard words very much as savages do, that is as being strongly bound up with the reality of action. And the way in which they value verbal knowledge—proverbs, sayings, and, nowadays, news—as the only form of wisdom, gives a definite character to this implied attitude. But here I encroach on a field amply illustrated and analysed in this book.

Indeed, on anyone who has read the brilliant chapters of Ogden and Richards and grasped the main trend of their argument, it will have dawned before now that all the argument of this Section is a sort of foot-note to their fundamental contention that the primitive, magical attitude towards words is responsible for a good deal in the general use and abuse of language, more especially in philosophical speculation. By the rich material cited in Chapter II, and in *Word Magic*, by the examples of Chapters VII, VIII, and IX, and by much of what is incidentally said, we are made to realize how deeply rooted is the belief that a word has some power over a thing, that it participates of the nature of the thing, that it is akin or even identical in its contained 'meaning' with the thing or with its prototype.

But whence is this magical attitude derived? Here the study of the early stages of speech steps in helpfully and the Ethnographer can make himself useful to the Philosopher of Language. In studying the infantile formation of meaning and the savage or illiterate meaning, we found this very magical attitude towards words. The word gives power, allows one to exercise an influence over an object or an action. The meaning of a word arises out of familiarity, out of ability to use, out of the faculty of direct

clamouring as with the infant, or practically directing as with primitive man. A word is used always in direct active conjunction with the reality it means. The word acts on the thing and the thing releases the word in the human mind. This indeed is nothing more or less than the essence of the theory which underlies the use of verbal magic. And this theory we find based on real psychological experiences in primitive forms of speech

Before the earliest philosophical speculation sets in, there emerges the practice and theory of magic, and in this, man's natural attitude towards words becomes fixed and formulated by a special lore and tradition. It is through the study of actual spells and verbal magic as well as by the analysis of savage ideas on magic that we can best understand this developed traditional view of the secret power of appropriate words on certain things. Briefly it may be said that such study simply confirms our theoretical analysis of this section. In magical formulæ we find a preponderance of words with high emotional tension, of technical terms, of strong imperatives, of verbs expressing hope, success, achievement. So much must suffice here and the reader is referred for more data to Chapter II of this book, and to the chapters on 'Magic' and 'The Power of Words in Magic' in the above quoted work of mine¹

It may be of interest to interpret the results of our analysis of the earliest stages of meaning on the diagram in which the relations between Symbol, Act of Thought, and Referent are represented by a triangle at the beginning of Chapter I of this book. This diagram represents very adequately the said relations in the developed uses of speech. It is characteristic in this triangle that the base, indicated by a dotted line, represents the imputed relation which obtains between a Symbol and the thing it refers to, its Referent as the Authors name it. In developed functions of speech, such as are, or at least should be, used in philosophical speculation or scientific language (and it is chiefly with these functions that the Authors are concerned in this book) the gulf of Meaning, as it could be called, is bridged over only by the Act of Thought—the bent line of the two shoulders of the triangle

Let us try to represent by analogous diagrams the earlier stages of Meaning. At the first stage, when the utterance is a mere sound-reaction, expressive, significant and correlated with the situation, but not involving any act of thought, the triangle is reduced to its base, which stands for a real connection—that

¹ *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*

between SOUND-REACTION and SITUATION. The first cannot yet be termed a Symbol nor the latter a Referent.

FIRST STAGE

SOUND- REACTION	<i>(connected directly with)</i>	SITU- ATION
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SECOND STAGE

ACTIVE SOUND (Semi-articulated or articulated)	<i>(correlated with)</i>	REFER- ENT
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The beginnings of articulate speech, when, parallel with its appearance Referents begin to emerge out of the Situation, are still to be represented by a single solid line of actual correlation (second stage). The sound is not a real symbol yet, for it is not used detached from its Referent.

THIRD STAGE

(A)
Speech in Action.



(B)
Narrative Speech
ACT OF IMAGERY

ACTIVE SYMBOL	<i>(Used to handle)</i>	REFER- ENT
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SYMBOL *(Indirect
relation)* REFERENT

(C)
Language of Ritual Magic
RITUAL ACT
(based on traditional belief).

SYMBOL *(Mystically
assumed relation)* REFERENT



In the third stage we have to distinguish between the three fundamental uses of language, active, narrative and ritual. Each of them is made sufficiently clear by the diagram here given, which must be taken in conjunction with our previous analysis. The final stage of developed language is represented by the triangle of Ogden and Richards, and its genetic relation to its humble predecessors may explain some of its anatomy. First of all : the possibility of extending the Authors' diagram or pushing it backwards into primitive speech-uses affords an additional proof of its validity and adequacy. Further the solid nature of almost all the bases of our triangles explains why the dotted line in the final figure shows such tenacity and why it is capable of so much mischief. The extreme vitality of the magical attitude to words is explained in our foot-note to this, the theory of the book, not only by a reference to the primitive uses of language by savage and no doubt by prehistoric man, but also by its perpetual confirmation in infantile uses of language and in the very mechanism by which meaning is acquired in every individual life.

Some other corollaries might be drawn from our theory of primitive meaning. Thus we might find in it an additional confirmation of the Authors' analysis of definition. It is clear that they are right when they maintain that 'verbal' and 'real' definition must in the end come to the same thing, and that the making of this artificial distinction into a fundamental one has created a false problem. Meaning, as we have seen, does not come to Primitive Man from contemplation of things, or analysis of occurrences, but in practical and active acquaintance with relevant situations. The real knowledge of a word comes through the practice of appropriately using it within a certain situation. The word, like any man-made implement, becomes significant only after it has been used and properly used under all sorts of conditions. Thus, there can be no definition of a word without the reality which it *means* being present. And again, since a significant symbol is necessary for man to isolate and grasp an item of reality, there is no defining of a thing without defining a word at the same time. Definition in its most primitive and fundamental form is nothing but a sound-reaction, or an articulate word joined to some relevant aspect of a situation by means of an appropriate human action. This definition of definition does not, of course, refer to the same type of linguistic use as the one discussed by the Authors of this book. It is interesting to see, however, that their conclusions, which are arrived at by the study

of higher types of speech, hold good in the domain of primitive uses of words.

VI

In the course of this essay I have tried to narrow down the scope of each linguistic problem discussed. At first it was the principle that the study of language needs an ethnographic background of general culture, that linguistics must be a section, indeed the most important one, of a general science of culture. Then an attempt was made to show that this general conclusion leads us to certain more definite views about the nature of language, in which we conceived human speech as a mode of action, rather than as a countersign of thought. We proceeded then to a discussion of the origins and early forms of Meaning, as it must have been experienced by Primitive Man. This gave us the explanation and showed us the roots of the magical attitude of man to words. Thus we moved by a series of conclusions, each more concrete and definite than the previous one.

I wish now to touch upon one more problem, still more definite and concrete than the others, that namely of the structure of Language.

Every human tongue has a definite structure of its own. We have types of isolating, agglutinative, polysynthetic, incorporating and inflectional languages. In every one of them, the means of linguistic action and expression can be brought under certain rules, classified according to certain categories. This body of structural rules with their exceptions and irregularities, the various classes into which the elements of the language can be ranged, is what we call 'the grammatical structure' of a language.

Language is usually, though, as we have seen, incorrectly, regarded as 'the expression of thought by means of Speech Sounds.' The obvious idea, therefore, is that linguistic structure is the result of the rules of human thought, that 'every grammatical category is—or ought to be—the expression of some logical category.' But it does not require much mental effort to realize that to hope for such perfect conjugal harmony between Language and Logic, is far too optimistic: that in actuality 'they often diverge from one another,' in fact that they are constantly at loggerheads and that Language often ill-treats Logic, till it is deserted by her.¹

¹ I quote from H. Sweet (*Introduction to the History of Language*), because this author is one of the cleverest thinkers on language. Yet even he sees no alternative but Rule of Logic or Anarchy in language.

Thus we are faced by a dilemma—either the grammatical categories are derived from the laws of thought, and we are at a loss to explain why the two are so ill adapted to each other. Why, if Language has grown up in the services of Thought, has it been so little influenced or impressed by its pattern? Or we can, to escape these difficulties, run on to the other horn of the dilemma as most grammarians do. They haughtily turn away from the sour grapes of any deeper probing or philosophy of Language, and simply affirm that Grammar rules in its own right, by a sort of divine grace, no doubt; that the empire of Grammar must continue in its splendid isolation, as a power hostile to Thought, order, system and common sense.

Both views—the one appealing to Logic for help and the other indicating an autonomous rule for Grammar—are equally in disagreement with facts and to be rejected. It is nothing short of absurd to assume, with the rigid grammarian, that grammar has grown up as a sort of wild weed of human faculties for no purpose whatever except its own existence. The spontaneous generation of meaningless monstrosities in the brain of Man will not be easily admitted by psychology—unless of course the brain is that of a rigid scientific specialist. And, general principles or predilections apart, all human languages show, in spite of great divergences, a certain fundamental agreement in structure and means of grammatical expression. It would be both preposterous and intellectually pusillanimous to give up at the outset any search for deeper forces which must have produced these common, universally human features of Language. In our Theory of Meaning, we have seen that Language serves for definite purposes, that it functions as an instrument used for and adapted to a definite aim. This adaptation, this correlation between language and the uses to which it is put, has left its traces in linguistic structure. But of course it is clear that we must not look in the domain of logical thinking and philosophical speculation for light on the aim and purposes of early human speech, and so this purely logical view of language is as useless as the purely grammatical one.

Real categories there are, on which the grammatical divisions are based and moulded. But these real categories are not derived from any primitive philosophic system, built up by contemplation of the surrounding world and by crude speculations, such as have been imputed to primitive man by certain anthropologists. Language in its structure mirrors the real categories derived from practical attitudes of the child and of primitive or natural man

to the surrounding world. The grammatical categories with all their peculiarities, exceptions, and refractory insubordination to rule, are the reflection of the makeshift, unsystematic, practical outlook imposed by man's struggle for existence in the widest sense of this word. It would be futile to hope that we might be able to reconstruct exactly this pragmatic world vision of the primitive, the savage or the child, or to trace in detail its correlation to grammar. But a broad outline and a general correspondence can be found; and the realization of this frees us anyhow from logical shackles and grammatical barrenness.

Of course the more highly developed a language is and the longer its evolutionary history, the more structural strata it will embody. The several stages of culture—savage, barbarous, semi-civilized, and civilized; the various types of use—pragmatic, narrative, ritual, scholastic, theological—will each have left its mark. And even the final, powerful, but by no means omnipotent purification by scientific use, will in no way be able to obliterate the previous imprints. The various structural peculiarities of a modern, civilized language carry, as shown by Ogden and Richards, an enormous dead weight of archaic use, of magical superstition and of mystical vagueness.

If our theory is right, the fundamental outlines of grammar are due mainly to the most primitive uses of language. For these preside over the birth and over the most plastic stages of linguistic development, and leave the strongest mark. The categories derived from the primitive use will also be identical for all human languages, in spite of the many superficial diversities. For man's essential nature is identical and the primitive uses of language are the same. Not only that, but we have seen that the pragmatic function of language is carried on into its highest stages, especially through infantile use and through a backsliding of adults into unsophisticated modes of thinking and speaking. Language is little influenced by thought, but Thought, on the contrary, having to borrow from action its tool—that is, language—is largely influenced thereby. To sum up, we can say that the fundamental grammatical categories, universal to all human languages, can be understood only with reference to the pragmatic *Weltanschauung* of primitive man, and that, through the use of Language, the barbarous primitive categories must have deeply influenced the later philosophies of mankind.

This must be exemplified by a detailed analysis of one at least of the concrete problems of grammar; and I shall choose for a brief discussion the problem of the Parts of Speech. We

must turn, therefore, to a stage in the development of the individual or of mankind when the human being is not interested in reflection or speculation, when he does not classify phenomena for purposes of knowledge but only in so far as they enter into his direct dealings with his conditions of existence. The child, the primitive man, or the unsophisticated individual has to use Language as an indispensable means of influencing his social surroundings. In all this, a very definite attitude develops, a manner of taking notice of certain items of reality, of singling them out and connecting them—an attitude not framed in any system of thought, but expressed in behaviour and, in the case of primitive communities, embodied in the ensemble of cultural achievements among which Language looms first and foremost.

Let us begin with the relation of a child to its surroundings. At the earliest stage, its actions and behaviour are governed by the wants of the organism. It is moved by hunger and thirst, desire for warmth and a certain cleanliness, proper conditions for rest and sleep, a due amount of freedom for movement, and last, not least, the need of human companionship, and of handling by adults. At a very early stage the child reacts to general situations only, and hardly even singles out the nearest persons who minister to its comfort and supply it with food. But this does not last long. Even within the first couple of weeks, some phenomena, some units begin to stand out from the general surroundings. Human faces are of special interest—the child smiles back and utters sounds of pleasure. The mother or the nurse is gradually recognized, as even before that, are objects or vehicles of food.

Undoubtedly the strongest emotional appeal is exercised over the child by the personality of its mother, and these articles or vehicles of food. Anyone imbued with Freudian principles might feel inclined to look here for a direct connection. In the young of man, as in those of any Mammalian species, the infant associates with its mother all its emotions about food. Primarily she is for him a vessel of nourishment. If therefore nutrition is given by any other means—and it must be remembered that savage infants are fed with chewed vegetable food almost from birth, as well as by the breast—the tender feelings by which an infant responds to maternal cares are probably extended to other ministrations of food. When one sees the loving attitude of a modern bottle-fed baby to its bottle, the tender caresses and fond smiles which it bestows on it, the identity of response to artificial and natural food-conveyers seems to imply an identical mental attitude of the infant. If this be so, we gain an insight into a

very early process of personification of objects, by which relevant and important things of the surroundings release the same emotional response as do the relevant persons. However true may be this suggestion of a direct identification, there is no doubt that a great similarity exists between the early attitude towards the nearest persons and objects which satisfy the needs of nutrition.

When the child begins to handle things, play with objects of its surroundings, an interesting feature can be observed in its behaviour, also associated with the fundamental nutritive tendency of an infant. It tries to put everything into its mouth. Hence the child pulls, tries to bend and ply soft or plastic objects, or it tries to detach parts of rigid ones. Very soon isolated, detachable things become of much greater interest and value than such as cannot be handled in their entirety. As the child grows up and can move things more freely, this tendency to isolate, to single out physically, develops further. It lies at the bottom of the well-known destructive tendency of children. This is interesting, in this connection, for it shows how one mental faculty of singling out relevant factors of the surroundings—persons, nutritive objects, things—has its parallel in the bodily behaviour of the child. Here again, in studying this detail of behaviour, we find a confirmation of our pragmatic view of early mental development.

There can also be found a tendency to personify objects of special interest. By the term 'personification' I do not mean here any theory or view of the child's own. I mean, as in the case of food items, that we can observe in him a type of behaviour which does not discriminate essentially between persons and objects. The child likes and dislikes some of his playthings, gets angry with them should they become unwieldy; he hugs, kisses and shows signs of attachment towards them. Persons, no doubt, stand out first in time and foremost in importance. But even from this it results that the relation to them is a sort of pattern for the child's attitude towards things.

Another important point is the great interest in animals. From my own observation, I can affirm that children a few months old, who did not take any prolonged interest in inanimate things, would follow a bird in its movements for some time. It was also one of the first words which a child would understand; that is, it would look for the bird when it was named. The interest shown in animals at later stages of childhood is well known. In this connection, it is of importance to us, because an animal and especially a bird with its spontaneous movements, with its ease of detachment from surroundings, with its unquestionable

reminiscence of persons, is just such an object as would arouse the child's interest, according to our theory.

Analysing the present-day savage in his relation to the surroundings, we find a clear parallel to the attitude just described. The outer world interests him in so far as it yields things useful. Utility here of course must be understood in its broadest sense, including not only what man can consume as food, use for shelter and implement, but all that stimulates his activities in play, ritual, war, or artistic production.

All such significant things stand out for the savage as isolated, detached units against an undifferentiated background. When moving with savages through any natural milieu—sailing on the sea, walking on a beach or through the jungle, or glancing across the starlit sky—I was often impressed by their tendency to isolate the few objects important to them, and to treat the rest as mere background. In a forest, a plant or tree would strike me, but on inquiry I would be informed—'Oh, that is just "bush."' An insect or bird which plays no part in the tradition or the larder would be dismissed '*Mauna wala*'—'merely a flying animal.' But if, on the contrary, the object happened to be useful in one way or another, it would be named, detailed reference to its uses and properties would be given, and the thing thus would be distinctly individualized. The same would happen with regard to stars, landscape features, minerals, fishes and shells. Everywhere there is the tendency to isolate that which stands in some connection, traditional, ritual, useful to man, and to bundle all the rest into one indiscriminate heap. But even within this tendency there is visibly a preference for isolated small, easily handled objects. Their interest in animals is relatively greater than in plants; greater in shells than in minerals, in flying insects than in crawling ones. That which is easily detached is preferred. In the landscape, the small details are often named and treated in tradition, and they arouse interest, while big stretches of land remain without name and individuality.

The great interest taken by primitive man in animals forms a curious parallel to the child's attitude; and the psychological reasons of both are, I think, similar. In all manifestations of Totemism, Zoolatry, and of the various animal influences in primitive folk-lore, belief and ritual, the interest of the savage in animals finds its expression.

Now let us restate the nature of this general category in which primitive mind places persons, animals and things. This rough,

uncouth category is not defined, but strongly felt and well expressed in human behaviour. It is constructed on selective criteria of biological utility as well as further psychological and social uses and values. The prominent position taken up in it by persons colours it in such a way that things and animals enter into it with a personified character. All items of this category are also individualized, isolated, and treated as units. Out of an undifferentiated background, the practical *Weltanschauung* of primitive man isolates a category of persons and personified things. It is clear at once that this category roughly corresponds to that of substance—especially to the Aristotelian *ousia*. But, of course, it owes nothing whatever to any philosophical speculation, early or late. It is the rough, uncouth matrix out of which the various conceptions of substance could be evolved. It might be called *crude substance*, or *protousia* for those who prefer learned sounds to simple ones.

As we have seen, parallel with the child's early mental attitudes, and presumably also with those of man in the first stages of his development, there comes the evolution of significant, articulate sound. The category of *crude substance* so prominent in the early mental outlook requires and receives articulate sounds to signify its various items. The class of words used for naming persons and personified things forms a primitive grammatical category of noun-substantives. Thus, this part of speech is seen to be rooted in active modes of behaviour and in active uses of speech, observable in child and in savage, and assumable in primitive man.

Let us next treat briefly the second important class of words—the action-words or verbs. The underlying real category appears later in the child's mental outlook, and it is less preponderant in that of the savage. To this corresponds the fact that the grammatical structure of verbs is less developed in savage tongues. Indeed, human action centres round objects. The child is and has to be aware of the food or of the ministering person before it can or need disentangle the act from the agent or become aware of its own acts. The bodily states of a child also stand out much less from the situation than the things which enter into the latter. Thus only at a subsequent stage of the child's development can we see that it disentangles the changes in its surroundings from the objects which change. This happens at a stage when articulate sounds have begun to be used by the infant. Actions such as eating, drinking, resting, walking; states of the body, such as sleep, hunger, rest; moods, such as like and dislike begin to be

expressed Of this real category of action, state and mood, we can say that it lends itself to command as well as to indication or description, that it is associated with the element of change, that is, time, and that it stands in a specially close connection with the persons of the speaker and hearer. In the outlook of savages, the same characters could be noticed in this category ; great interest in all changes referring to the human being, in phases and types of human action, in states of human body and moods. This brief indication allows us to state that at the primitive stages of human speech there must have existed a real category into which entered all items of change capable of temporal modification, bearing the character of human mood and of human will, and bound up with the personal action of man.

When we look at the class of words used to denote items of this real category, we find a close correspondence between category and part of speech. The action-word, or verb, is capable in all languages of grammatical modifications expressing temporal relation, moods or modes of utterance, and the verb is also closely associated with pronouns, a class of words which corresponds to another real category.

A few words must be said about the pronouns. What is the real category of primitive human behaviour and primitive speech habits corresponding to that small but extremely vital class of words ? Speech, as we saw, is one of the principal modes of human action, hence the actor in speech, the speaker, stands to the foreground of the pragmatic vision of the world. Again, as Speech is associated with concerted behaviour, the speaker has constantly to refer to hearer or hearers. Thus, the speaker and hearer occupy, so to speak, the two principal corner-sites in the perspective of linguistic approach. There comes then a very limited, special class of word corresponding to a real category, constantly in use, easily associable with action-words, but similar in its grammatical nature to nouns—the part of speech called pronoun, including a few words only, but constantly in use ; as a rule short, easily manageable words, appearing in intimate association with the verb, but functioning almost as nouns. This part of speech, it is obvious, corresponds closely to its real category. The correspondence could be followed into many more interesting details—the special asymmetric position of the third pronominal person, the problem of genders and classificatory particles, shown especially in the third person.¹

¹ Cf the writer's article on 'Classificatory Particles' in the *Bulletin of Oriental Studies*, Vol II

One point, however, referring to a common characteristic of nouns and pronouns and dealing with the declension of the various cases of the noun, must still be touched upon. The real category of this latter is derived from personified units of the surroundings. In the child, the first attitude towards items of this category is discrimination, based on biological utility and on pleasure in perceiving them. The infant hails them in significant sounds, or names them with articulate words on their appearance, and calls for them in need. Thus these words, the nouns, are submitted to a definite use, that of naming and appeal. To this there corresponds a subclass of noun-substantives which could be called the appellative case, and which is similar to some uses of the vocative and nominative in the Indo-European declension.

In the more developed uses of Language, this becomes a more efficient adjunct of action. The thing-word comes into a nearer association with the action-word. Persons are named, by their names or by pronominal designations in association with what they do: 'I go,' 'thou comest,' 'so-and-so drinks,' 'animal runs,' etc. The name of a person or personified thing is thus used in a different manner, with a different mode of meaning as an actor, or technically as the subject of action. This is the use corresponding to the subjective case in which a noun is always put as the subject of a predication. It may be said that to this case in nouns corresponds a class of pronouns, the personal pronouns, I, thou, he.

Action is carried out with relation to certain objects. Things and persons are handled. Their names, when associated with an action-word in that manner, stand in the objective case, and pronouns are used in a special form, viz., that called objective or reflexive.

Since language is rooted in man's practical interest in things and persons there is another relationship of fundamental importance, that namely in which a person can lay a definite claim to relation with or possession of, another person or thing. With regard to the surroundings nearest people, there are the ties of kinship and friendship. With regard to things, there comes the economic sentiment of possession. The relation of two nouns, standing to each other as a thing or person related to or possessed by another thing or person, can be called the genitive or possessive relation; and it is found as a distinct mode of connecting two nouns in all human languages. To this corresponds also the genitive case of European languages in its most characteristic uses. In pronouns again, there is a special class of possessive pronouns which expresses relationship.

Finally, one mode of action towards outer things or people stands out from the others, namely that determined by spatial conditions. Without going more into detail on this subject, I suggest that a definite subclass of substantival uses can be assumed in all languages—that corresponding to a prepositional case.

There are still obviously further categories resulting from man's utilitarian attitude, those of the attributes or qualities of a thing, characteristics of an action, relations between things, relations between situations, and it would be possible to show that adjective, adverb, preposition, conjunction are based on these real categories. One could proceed also, still dealing on the one hand with the Semantic Matter-to-be-expressed and on the other with structural features of Language, to explain these latter by a reference to real facts of primitive human nature.

This short sketch, however, is sufficient to indicate the method and the argument, by which such a genetic, primitive Semantics could be established—a science which, referring to the primitive attitude of Man towards Reality, would show what is the real nature of grammatical categories. The results of such primitive Semantics even in so far as we have indicated them, stand, I think, in close connection with the results of Ogden and Richards. Their contention is that a false attitude towards Language and its functions is one of the main obstacles in the advance of philosophical thought and scientific investigation, and in the ever-growing practical uses of language in the press, pamphlet and novel. Now in this and the previous section, I have tried to show that such a crude and unsound attitude towards Language and Meaning must exist. I have tried to demonstrate how it has arisen and why it had to persist; and I try to trace it even into details of grammatical structure.

There is one more thing to add. Through later processes of linguistic use and of thinking, there took place an indiscriminate and wholesale shifting of roots and meanings from one grammatical category to another. For according to our view of primitive Semantics, each significant root originally must have had its place, and one place only, in its proper verbal category. Thus, the roots meaning 'man,' 'animal,' 'tree,' 'stone,' 'water,' are essentially nominal roots. The meanings 'sleep,' 'eat,' 'go,' 'come,' 'fall,' are verbal. But as language and thought develop, the constant action of metaphor, of generalization, analogy and abstraction, and of similar linguistic uses build up links between the categories and obliterate the boundary lines, thus allowing words and

roots to move freely over the whole field of Language. In analytic languages, like Chinese and English, this ubiquitous nature of roots is most conspicuous, but it can be found even in very primitive languages.

Now Mr Ogden and Mr Richards have brought out in a most convincing manner the extreme persistence of the old realist fallacy that a word vouches for, or contains, the reality of its own meaning. A peep behind the scenes of primitive root-formation, of the reality of primitive categories and of their subsequent, insidious collapse, adds an important document to the Authors' views. The migration of roots into improper places has given to the imaginary reality of hypostatized meaning a special solidity of its own. For, since early experience warrants the substantial existence of anything found within the category of Crude Substance or Protousia, and subsequent linguistic shifts introduce there such roots as 'going,' 'rest,' 'motion,' etc., the obvious inference is that such abstract entities or ideas live in a real world of their own. Such harmless adjectives as 'good' or 'bad,' expressing the savage's half-animal satisfaction or dissatisfaction in a situation, subsequently intrude into the enclosure reserved for the clumsy, rough-hewn blocks of primitive substance, are sublimated into 'Goodness' and 'Badness' and create whole theological worlds, and systems of Thought and Religion. It must, of course, be remembered that the theory of Ogden and Richards, and the view here expressed, maintain most emphatically that Language, and all Linguistic processes derive their power only from real processes taking place in man's relation to his surroundings. I have merely touched upon the question of linguistic shiftings, and it would be necessary to account for them by the psychological and sociological processes of barbarous and semi-civilized communities; exactly as we accounted for Primitive Linguistics by analysing the mind of Primitive Man—and as the Authors of this book account for the virtues and imperfections of the present-day language by their masterly analysis of the human mind in general.