It is obvious that a great many of the things that we know we know because we learn them in conve... more It is obvious that a great many of the things that we know we know because we learn them in conversation with others, conversations in which it is the intention of our interlocutor to inform us of something. It might be thought that only assertoric acts are informative. I shall argue that there is a range of conversational interventions that have this characteristic, including speech acts, presuppositions and conversational implicatures. The main focus of the paper is a discussion of the different norms, both moral and epistemological, that entitle us to believe what we learn from conversations. I compare our entitlement to believe what we learn from conversation with our entitlements to believe what we learn from perception. In providing an account of our epistemic warrant for our knowledge gained in conversation with ours, I draw on the work of Tyler Burge (1993 and 1997). Relying on others is perhaps not metaphysically necessary for any possible rational being. But it is cognitively fundamental to beings at all like us. (Burge, 1993, p. 466) Successful communication entails understanding. We might even take understanding to be one of the necessary goals of individual participants in a conversation (Davis, pp. 136-137). With understanding comes knowledge, knowledge at least of what has been communicated. Much has been made of testimony as a primary source of knowledge. I shall try to show that other conversational interventions are similar sources of knowledge, presuppositions, implicatures, and other types of speech acts besides testimony, for example. I shall draw on the work of Tyler Burge in attempting to provide the grounds for our knowledge in such cases (1993 and 1997). Burge is primarily concerned with what he calls 'something that is presented as true' (1993, p. 467). It is not clear that this applies to the full range of conversational interventions that I shall consider. 1 Part of my goal is to extend his theory to other conversational interventions. I shall, however, part company with Burge on several points. I shall not follow him in his defense of his views about beliefs acquired from others being a source of a priori knowledge or in his claim that the rationality I would like to thank
It is obvious that a great many of the things that we know we know because we learn them in conve... more It is obvious that a great many of the things that we know we know because we learn them in conversation with others, conversations in which it is the intention of our interlocutor to inform us of something. It might be thought that only assertoric acts are informative. I shall argue that there is a range of conversational interventions that have this characteristic, including speech acts, presuppositions and conversational implicatures. The main focus of the paper is a discussion of the different norms, both moral and epistemological, that entitle us to believe what we learn from conversations. I compare our entitlement to believe what we learn from conversation with our entitlements to believe what we learn from perception. In providing an account of our epistemic warrant for our knowledge gained in conversation with ours, I draw on the work of Tyler Burge (1993 and 1997). Relying on others is perhaps not metaphysically necessary for any possible rational being. But it is cognitively fundamental to beings at all like us. (Burge, 1993, p. 466) Successful communication entails understanding. We might even take understanding to be one of the necessary goals of individual participants in a conversation (Davis, pp. 136-137). With understanding comes knowledge, knowledge at least of what has been communicated. Much has been made of testimony as a primary source of knowledge. I shall try to show that other conversational interventions are similar sources of knowledge, presuppositions, implicatures, and other types of speech acts besides testimony, for example. I shall draw on the work of Tyler Burge in attempting to provide the grounds for our knowledge in such cases (1993 and 1997). Burge is primarily concerned with what he calls 'something that is presented as true' (1993, p. 467). It is not clear that this applies to the full range of conversational interventions that I shall consider. 1 Part of my goal is to extend his theory to other conversational interventions. I shall, however, part company with Burge on several points. I shall not follow him in his defense of his views about beliefs acquired from others being a source of a priori knowledge or in his claim that the rationality I would like to thank
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Papers by Steven Davis