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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 121
Volume 121, Number 1, March 2005
- Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Efe A. Ok:
Rational choice with status quo bias. 1-29 - Heidrun C. Hoppe, Ulrich Lehmann-Grube:
Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications. 30-50 - Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Monique Florenzano, Rabee Tourky:
Linear and non-linear price decentralization. 51-74 - Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn:
Stable matchings and preferences of couples. 75-106 - Ángel Hernando-Veciana:
Competition among auctioneers in large markets. 107-127 - Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti:
Alliances and negotiations. 128-141
Volume 121, Number 2, April 2005
- Roman Inderst:
Matching markets with adverse selection. 145-166 - Enrique Kawamura:
Competitive equilibrium with unawareness in economies with production. 167-191 - Emilio Espino:
On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information. 192-213 - Ran Spiegler:
Testing threats in repeated games. 214-235 - Christopher P. Chambers:
Allocation rules for land division. 236-258 - Martin W. Cripps, Eddie Dekel, Wolfgang Pesendorfer:
Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests. 259-272
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