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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 153
Volume 153, September 2014
- Darrell Duffie, Semyon Malamud, Gustavo Manso:
Information percolation in segmented markets. 1-32
- Yuan Ju, Youngsub Chun, René van den Brink:
Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts. 33-45
- Francesco De Sinopoli, Claudia Meroni, Carlos Pimienta:
Strategic stability in Poisson games. 46-63
- Ju Hu:
Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning. 64-73
- Roger B. Myerson:
Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents. 74-102
- Debasis Mishra, Anup Pramanik, Souvik Roy:
Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces. 103-116 - Paolo G. Piacquadio:
Intergenerational egalitarianism. 117-127 - Yaron Azrieli, Eran Shmaya:
Rental harmony with roommates. 128-137 - Ziv Hellman:
A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria. 138-151
- Maria Goltsman, Gregory Pavlov:
Communication in Cournot oligopoly. 152-176
- Lei Qiao, Haomiao Yu:
On the space of players in idealized limit games. 177-190
- Richard P. McLean, Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite:
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring. 191-212
- Carlos Oyarzun:
A note on absolutely expedient learning rules. 213-223
- Laurence Ales, Pricila Maziero, Pierre Yared:
A theory of political and economic cycles. 224-251 - Belén Jerez:
Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: A general equilibrium approach. 252-286 - David Dillenberger, Juan Sebastián Lleras, Philipp Sadowski, Norio Takeoka:
A theory of subjective learning. 287-312 - Edoardo Gallo:
Social learning by chit-chat. 313-343 - Man-Wah Cheung:
Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space. 344-375
- Hiroki Nishimura, Efe A. Ok:
Non-existence of continuous choice functions. 376-391
- Bill Dupor, M. Saif Mehkari:
The analytics of technology news shocks. 392-427 - Itai Sher, Kyoo il Kim:
Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand. 428-458 - Gadi Barlevy:
A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles. 459-505 - Jacob K. Goeree, Yuanchuan Lien:
An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction. 506-533 - Braz Camargo, Benjamin Lester:
Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection. 534-568 - Jan Heufer:
Nonparametric comparative revealed risk aversion. 569-616 - Reto Foellmi, Tobias Wuergler, Josef Zweimüller:
The macroeconomics of Model T. 617-647 - Lars Ehlers, Isa Emin Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, Muhammed A. Yildirim:
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds. 648-683
- Ron Siegel:
Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations. 684-702 - Zhenyu Cui:
Comment on "Modeling non-monotone risk aversion using SAHARA utility functions" [J. Econ. Theory 146 (2011) 2075-2092]. 703-705
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