"On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives."

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis (2017)

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2021-07-25

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Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis:
On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives. WINE 2017: 1-15

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