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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 53
Volume 53, Number 1, October 2005
- Rabah Amir:
Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity: The case of Cournot oligopoly. 1-14 - Geir B. Asheim, Andrés Perea:
Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games. 15-42 - Parimal Kanti Bag, Hamid Sabourian:
Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem. 43-58 - Harold L. Cole, Narayana Kocherlakota:
Finite memory and imperfect monitoring. 59-72 - Geoffroy de Clippel:
Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example. 73-82 - Jeffrey C. Ely, William H. Sandholm:
Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory. 83-109 - Ed Hopkins, Martin Posch:
Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning. 110-125 - George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson:
Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria. 126-140 - Debapriya Sen:
Fee versus royalty reconsidered. 141-147
Volume 53, Number 2, November 2005
- Gary Charness, Matthew Rabin:
Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games. 151-169 - John H. Kagel, Dan Levin:
Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions. 170-207 - Jérôme Renault, Sergio Scarlatti, Marco Scarsini:
A folk theorem for minority games. 208-230 - Satoru Takahashi:
Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. 231-247 - Manabu Toda:
Axiomatization of the core of assignment games. 248-261
- Eduardo Zambrano:
Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory. 262-268
- Michael Maschler:
Book Review: B. Peleg, P. Sudhölter, , Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games (2003) Kluwer Academic, Boston 1-4020-7410-7 378 pages. 269-270
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