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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 70
Volume 70, Number 1, September 2010
- Matthew O. Jackson
, Ehud Lehrer:
Introduction to the special issue in honor of Ehud Kalai. 1-3 - Andrew McLennan, Rabee Tourky:
Imitation games and computation. 4-11 - Frank H. Page Jr., Myrna Holtz Wooders:
Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability. 12-20 - Claude d'Aspremont, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira:
Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game. 21-33 - Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
The myth of the Folk Theorem. 34-43 - Salvador Barberà, Danilo Coelho:
On the rule of k names. 44-61 - Paul Milgrom:
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions. 62-70 - Roberto Cominetti, Emerson Melo, Sylvain Sorin:
A payoff-based learning procedure and its application to traffic games. 71-83 - Kamal Jain, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Eisenberg-Gale markets: Algorithms and game-theoretic properties. 84-106 - Hervé Moulin:
An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method. 107-131 - Yair Tauman, Andriy Zapechelnyuk:
Bargaining with a property rights owner. 132-145 - Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt:
Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction. 146-169 - Matthew O. Jackson, Alison Watts:
Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games. 170-191
Volume 70, Number 2, November 2010
- Daron Acemoglu, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Ali ParandehGheibi:
Spread of (mis)information in social networks. 194-227 - Regina M. Anctil, John Dickhaut, Cathleen Johnson, Chandra Kanodia:
Does information transparency decrease coordination failure? 228-241 - Masaki Aoyagi:
Information feedback in a dynamic tournament. 242-260 - Jean-Pierre Benoît, Lewis A. Kornhauser:
Only a dictatorship is efficient. 261-270 - Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer:
Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation. 271-288 - Geert Dhaene, Jan Bouckaert:
Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis. 289-303 - Kfir Eliaz, Andrew Schotter:
Paying for confidence: An experimental study of the demand for non-instrumental information. 304-324 - John Geanakoplos, Pradeep Dubey:
Credit cards and inflation. 325-353 - Thorsten Hens, Bodo Vogt:
Indirect reciprocity and money. 354-374 - Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Aniol Llorente-Saguer:
A simple mechanism for resolving conflict. 375-391 - Jens Leth Hougaard, Lars Peter Østerdal:
Monotonicity of social welfare optima. 392-402 - Jürgen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder:
Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence. 403-424 - Patrick Hummel:
On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence. 425-445 - William H. Sandholm:
Decompositions and potentials for normal form games. 446-456 - Curtis R. Taylor, Hüseyin Yildirim:
A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs. 457-471 - Philipp C. Wichardt:
Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight. 472-487
- Vincent Anesi:
Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games. 488-493 - Yuk-fai Fong, Daniel F. Garrett:
Bidding in a possibly common-value auction. 494-501 - Yan-An Hwang:
Marginal monotonicity solution of NTU games. 502-508
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