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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 139
Volume 139, Number 1, March 2008
- Soo Hong Chew, Jacob S. Sagi:
Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of uncertainty. 1-24 - Jakub Steiner:
Coordination of mobile labor. 25-46 - Ming Li, Kristóf Madarász:
When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests. 47-74 - Leonard J. Mirman, Olivier F. Morand, Kevin L. Reffett:
A qualitative approach to Markovian equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with capital. 75-98 - Antonio Cabrales, Antoni Calvó-Armengol:
Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria. 99-113 - Pablo F. Beker:
Retained earnings dynamic, internal promotions and Walrasian equilibrium. 114-156 - Hector Chade, Pavlo Prokopovych, Lones Smith:
Repeated games with present-biased preferences. 157-175 - Geoffroy de Clippel, Hervé Moulin, T. Nicolaus Tideman:
Impartial division of a dollar. 176-191 - Eiichi Miyagawa, Yasuyuki Miyahara, Tadashi Sekiguchi:
The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs. 192-221 - Sylvain Chassang:
Uniform selection in global games. 222-241 - Takashi Hayashi:
Regret aversion and opportunity dependence. 242-268 - Julio Dávila, Jan Eeckhout:
Competitive bargaining equilibrium. 269-294 - Daniel A. Hojman, Adam Szeidl:
Core and periphery in networks. 295-309 - Tomoo Kikuchi:
International asset market, nonconvergence, and endogenous fluctuations. 310-334 - Subir Chattopadhyay:
The Cass criterion, the net dividend criterion, and optimality. 335-352
- Hitoshi Matsushima:
Role of honesty in full implementation. 353-359 - Takashi Hayashi:
A note on small income effects. 360-379 - Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, Nicholas Ziros:
A three way equivalence. 380-391 - Nikolai S. Kukushkin, Cristian Marius Litan, Francisco Marhuenda:
On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in bimatrix game forms. 392-395
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