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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 158
Volume 158, Part A, July 2015
- Justin Burkett:
Endogenous budget constraints in auctions. 1-20
- David Freeman:
Calibration without reduction for non-expected utility. 21-32
- Ehud Lehrer, Roee Teper:
Subjective independence and concave expected utility. 33-53 - Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima:
Efficient assignment with interdependent values. 54-86 - Chih-Chun Yang:
Weak assumption and iterative admissibility. 87-101 - Michael Peters:
Reciprocal contracting. 102-126 - Christoph Schottmüller:
Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions. 127-164 - Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama:
Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money. 165-185 - Michael Kuhn, Stefan Wrzaczek, Alexia Prskawetz, Gustav Feichtinger:
Optimal choice of health and retirement in a life-cycle model. 186-212
- Metin Uyanik:
On the nonemptiness of the α-core of discontinuous games: Transferable and nontransferable utilities. 213-231
- Murali Agastya, Arkadii Slinko:
Dynamic choice in a complex world. 232-258 - Jihong Lee, Hamid Sabourian:
Complexity and repeated implementation. 259-292 - Mark Armstrong, John Vickers:
Which demand systems can be generated by discrete choice? 293-307
- Anna Bogomolnaia:
Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule. 308-318
- Audrey Hu, Liang Zou:
Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences. 319-335 - Kota Saito:
Impure altruism and impure selfishness. 336-370 - William Fuchs, Andrzej Skrzypacz:
Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection. 371-406
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