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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 217
Volume 217, 2024
- Jan Starmans:
Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents. 105761 - Deniz Okat, John G. F. Nash:
Delegating trial and error. 105802 - Jörgen Kratz:
Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange. 105803 - Gadi Barlevy, Daniel Bird, Daniel Fershtman, David Weiss:
Money under the mattress: Inflation and lending of last resort. 105804 - Christopher P. Chambers, Siming Ye:
Haves and have-nots: A theory of economic sufficientarianism. 105805 - Raphael Boleslavsky, Curtis R. Taylor:
Make it 'til you fake it. 105812 - Robert M. Anderson, Haosui Duanmu, Aniruddha Ghosh, M. Ali Khan:
On existence of Berk-Nash equilibria in misspecified Markov decision processes with infinite spaces. 105813 - Riccardo Bianchi-Vimercati, Martin Eichenbaum, Joao Guerreiro:
Fiscal stimulus with imperfect expectations: Spending vs. tax policy. 105814 - Ian Ball, Xin Gao:
Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition. 105816 - Yu Awaya, Vijay Krishna:
Panics and prices. 105818 - Victor Amelkin, Santosh Venkatesh, Rakesh Vohra:
Contagion and equilibria in diversified financial networks. 105819 - Sergei Severinov, Gábor Virág:
Who wants to be an auctioneer? 105820 - Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti, Levent Ülkü:
A model of approval with an application to list design. 105821 - Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou, Xavier Venel:
Communication on networks and strong reliability. 105822 - Simon P. Anderson, André de Palma:
Economic distributions, primitive distributions, and demand recovery in monopolistic competition. 105823 - Pedram Heydari:
Regret, responsibility, and randomization: A theory of stochastic choice. 105824 - Vincent Fardeau:
Arbitrage with financial constraints and market power. 105825 - Wenqian Huang, Haoxiang Zhu:
CCP auction design. 105826
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