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Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 40
Volume 40, Number 1, January 2013
- Francis Bloch, David Cantala:
Markovian assignment rules. 1-25 - Tomohiko Kawamori:
Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences. 27-40 - Bettina Klaus, Olivier Bochet:
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness. 41-63 - M. Socorro Puy:
Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties. 65-87 - Ipek Özkal-Sanver:
Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution. 89-99 - Richard F. Potthoff:
Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections. 101-122 - Marcus Pivato:
Risky social choice with incomplete or noisy interpersonal comparisons of well-being. 123-139 - Bernhard Kittel, Wolfgang J. Luhan:
Decision making in networks: an experiment on structure effects in a group dictator game. 141-154 - Jun Iritani, Tomoyuki Kamo, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa:
Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules. 155-171 - Ram Sewak Dubey, Tapan Mitra:
On the nature of Suppes-Sen maximal paths in an aggregative growth model. 173-205 - Josep Freixas, Dorota Marciniak:
Egalitarian property for power indices. 207-227 - Eivind Stensholt:
What shall we do with the cyclic profile? 229-262 - Arnaud Dellis:
The two-party system under alternative voting procedures. 263-284 - Mathieu Lefebvre, Pierre Pestieau, Gregory Ponthiere:
Measuring poverty without the Mortality Paradox. 285-316
Volume 40, Number 2, February 2013
- Josep M. Colomer:
Ramon Llull: from 'Ars electionis' to social choice theory. 317-328 - Lucia Buenrostro, Amrita Dhillon, Péter Vida:
Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability. 329-352 - Peter Emerson:
The original Borda count and partial voting. 353-358 - Biung-Ghi Ju:
On the characterization of liberalism by Samet and Schmeidler. 359-366 - Udo Ebert:
The relationship between individual and household measures of WTP and WTA. 367-390 - Stefano Benati, Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti:
Probabilistic spatial power indexes. 391-410 - Elyès Jouini, Clotilde Napp, Diego Nocetti:
Collective risk aversion. 411-437 - Katherine A. Baldiga, Jerry R. Green:
Assent-maximizing social choice. 439-460 - Takumi Kongo:
An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems. 461-478 - Shin Sato:
Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders. 479-494 - Jianpei Li, Yi Xue, Weixing Wu:
Partnership dissolution and proprietary information. 495-527 - Nicolas Gravel, Patrick Moyes:
Utilitarianism or welfarism: does it make a difference? 529-551 - Federico Quartieri:
Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance. 553-579 - Marcus Pivato:
Voting rules as statistical estimators. 581-630 - Agnieszka Rusinowska:
Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions. 631-634
Volume 40, Number 3, March 2013
- Emrah Arbak, Marie-Claire Villeval:
Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence. 635-662 - Diego Dominguez:
Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. 663-678 - Antonio Quesada:
The majority rule with a chairman. 679-691 - René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki, Yuan Ju:
Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values. 693-714 - Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris, Giovanna Iannantuoni:
Electing a parliament. 715-737 - Felix Brandt, Maria Chudnovsky, Ilhee Kim, Gaku Liu, Sergey Norin, Alex Scott, Paul D. Seymour, Stéphan Thomassé:
A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. 739-743 - Tim Groseclose, Jeffrey Milyo:
Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially. 745-751 - Alfred Endres, Tim Friehe:
The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: incentives for abatement and R&D. 753-770 - Fuad Aleskerov, Alexander Karpov:
A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification. 771-786 - Takeshi Momi:
Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences. 787-792 - Yukihiro Nishimura, Ryusuke Shinohara:
A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good. 793-814 - Hirofumi Yamamura, Ryo Kawasaki:
Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules. 815-832 - Andranik Tangian:
German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy. 833-869 - Shuhei Morimoto, Shigehiro Serizawa, Stephen Ching:
A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents. 871-911 - Marcello Basili, Stefano Vannucci:
Diversity as width. 913-936
Volume 40, Number 4, April 2013
- David Rietzke, Brian Roberson:
The robustness of 'enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances. 937-956 - Marlies Ahlert, Katja Funke, Lars Schwettmann:
Thresholds, productivity, and context: an experimental study on determinants of distributive behaviour. 957-984 - Rafael Salas, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez:
Popular support for social evaluation functions. 985-1014 - Yves Sprumont:
On relative egalitarianism. 1015-1032 - Norihito Sakamoto:
No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality. 1033-1045 - Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Lars Peter Østerdal:
Rationing in the presence of baselines. 1047-1066 - Franz Dietrich, Christian List:
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case. 1067-1095 - Achill Schürmann:
Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice. 1097-1110 - Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, Laia Saumell:
A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case. 1111-1142 - Abhijit Chandra, Sunanda Roy:
On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies. 1143-1158 - Matthew McGinty, Garrett Milam:
Public goods provision by asymmetric agents: experimental evidence. 1159-1177 - Sébastien Rouillon:
Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results. 1179-1203 - Emiliya Lazarova, Dinko Dimitrov:
Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players. 1205-1229 - Dominique Lepelley:
Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting. 1231-1235
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