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SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 10
Volume 10, Number 1, March 2011
- Federico Echenique, Daniel Golovin, Adam Wierman:
Complexity and economics: computational constraints may not matter empirically. 2-5 - Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Polynomial computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games. 6-8 - James R. Wright, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Linear solvers for nonlinear games: using pivoting algorithms to find Nash equilibria in n-player games. 9-12 - Adam Kalai, Ehud Kalai:
Cooperation in two person games, revisited. 13-16 - Yoram Bachrach, Morteza Zadimoghaddam, Peter B. Key:
A cooperative approach to collusion in auctions. 17-22 - Katrina Ligett, Georgios Piliouras:
Beating the best Nash without regret. 23-26 - Sham M. Kakade, Ilan Lobel, Hamid Nazerzadeh:
Optimal dynamic mechanism design via a virtual VCG mechanism. 27-30 - Bo An, James Pita, Eric Anyung Shieh, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Janusz Marecki:
GUARDS and PROTECT: next generation applications of security games. 31-34 - Martin Zinkevich, Michael H. Bowling, Michael Wunder:
The lemonade stand game competition: solving unsolvable games. 35-38 - Michael L. Littman, Daniel M. Reeves:
Puzzle: baffling raffling. 39 - Assaf Romm:
Solution to Exchanges 8.2 puzzle: a Dutch Dutch auction clock auction. 40-44
Volume 10, Number 2, June 2011
- Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts:
Cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments. 3-8 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass:
Algorithmic rationality: adding cost of computation to game theory. 9-15 - Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, Aviv Zohar:
When is it best to best-respond? 16-18 - Maria-Florina Balcan:
Leading dynamics to good behavior. 19-22 - Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer, Elliot Anshelevich:
A competitive strategy for routing flow over time. 23-28 - Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On optimal multidimensional mechanism design. 29-33 - Saeed Alaei, Kamal Jain, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions. 34-36 - David Pardoe, Peter Stone:
Designing adaptive trading agents. 37-39 - Nikhil R. Devanur:
Online algorithms with stochastic input. 40-49 - Daniel M. Reeves:
Borrowing in the limit as our nerdiness goes to infinity. 50 - Nikos Karanikolas, Maria Kyropoulou, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
Solution to Exchanges 9.1 puzzle: borrowing as cheaply as possible. 51-52
Volume 10, Number 3, December 2011
- Edith Law, Luis von Ahn:
Book announcement: Human Computation. 3-4 - Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar:
On Bitcoin and red balloons. 5-9 - Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan:
Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. 10-14 - Ozan Candogan, Kostas Bimpikis, Asuman E. Ozdaglar:
Optimal pricing in social networks. 15-17 - Yevgeniy Vorobeychik:
Security and network effects: centralized and decentralized perspectives. 18-20 - Reshef Meir, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Strategyproof classification. 21-25 - Cali Mortenson Ellis, Rahul Sami:
Prediction markets for education: an experimental study. 26-28 - John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers:
Stability and competitive equilibrium in matching markets with transfers. 29-34 - Daniel M. Reeves:
Contingency exigency. 35-36 - R. Preston McAfee:
Solution to exchanges 10.1 puzzle: Baffling Raffling debaffled. 37-39
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