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Synthese, Volume 150
Volume 150, Number 1, May 2006
- Ruth E. Kastner:
Cramer's Transactional Interpretation and Causal Loop Problems. 1-14 - Reese M. Heitner:
From a Phono-Logical Point of View: Neutralizing Quine's Argument Against Analyticity. 15-39 - Stephen Hetherington:
Knowledge's Boundary Problem. 41-56 - Ryan Wasserman:
The Future Similarity Objection Revisited. 57-67 - Craig Stephen Delancey:
Ontology and Teleofunctions: A Defense and Revision of the Systematic Account of Teleological Explanation. 69-98 - Eric Marcus:
Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. 99-129 - Luc Bovens, Wlodek Rabinowicz:
Democratic Answers to Complex Questions - An Epistemic Perspective. 131-153
Volume 150, Number 2, May 2006
- Jussi Haukioja:
Proto-Rigidity. 155-169 - Joshua Gert:
Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments. 171-183 - John D. Norton:
How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction. 185-207 - Karen Green:
A Pinch of Salt for Frege. 209-228 - Jacques Dubucs, Sandra Lapointe:
On Bolzano's Alleged Explicativism. 229-246 - Ram Neta:
Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology. 247-280 - Nicholas Georgalis:
Representation and the First-Person Perspective. 281-325
Volume 150, Number 3, June 2006
- Torben Braüner, Per F. V. Hasle, Peter Øhrstrøm:
Preface. 327-328 - Patrick Blackburn:
Arthur Prior and Hybrid Logic. 329-372 - B. Jack Copeland:
Meredith, Prior, and the History of Possible Worlds Semantics. 373-397 - Kit Fine:
The RealIty of Tense. 399-414 - Antony Galton:
Operators vs. Arguments: The Ins and Outs of Reification. 415-441 - Peter M. Simons:
The Logic of Location. 443-458 - Heinrich Wansing:
Logical Connectives for Constructive Modal Logic. 459-482 - Alberto Zanardo:
Moment/History Duality in Prior's Logics of Branching-Time. 483-507
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