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ORCID2nd WINE 2006: Patras, Greece
- Paul G. Spirakis, Marios Mavronicolas, Spyros C. Kontogiannis:
Internet and Network Economics, Second International Workshop, WINE 2006, Patras, Greece, December 15-17, 2006, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4286, Springer 2006, ISBN 3-540-68138-8 - Abraham Neyman:
Recent Developments in Learning and Competition with Finite Automata (Extended Abstract). 1-2 - Davide Bilò
, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti:
Dynamic Mechanism Design. 3-15 - Tian-Ming Bu, Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun:
Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints. 16-26 - Pinyan Lu, Shang-Hua Teng, Changyuan Yu:
Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit. 27-36 - Carmine Ventre:
Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain. 37-49 - Heiner Ackermann, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking:
Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games. 50-61 - Juliane Dunkel, Andreas S. Schulz:
On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games. 62-73 - Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games. 74-86 - Igal Milchtaich:
The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games. 87-98 - Abraham Flaxman, David Gamarnik, Gregory B. Sorkin:
First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction. 99-111 - Shuchi Chawla, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems. 112-123 - Antoniy Ganchev, Lata Narayanan, Sunil M. Shende:
Mechanisms to Induce Random Choice. 124-135 - Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi:
Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design. 136-148 - Mihalis Yannakakis:
Succinct Approximation of Trade-Off Curves. 149 - Nicole Immorlica, Kamal Jain, Mohammad Mahdian:
Game-Theoretic Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures. 150-161 - Pradeep Dubey, Rahul Garg, Bernard De Meyer:
Competing for Customers in a Social Network: The Quasi-linear Case. 162-173 - Jean Cardinal, Martin Hoefer:
Selfish Service Installation in Networks. 174-185 - Pradeep Dubey, Rahul Garg:
Games of Connectivity. 186-197 - David Abraham, Ning Chen, Vijay Kumar, Vahab S. Mirrokni:
Assignment Problems in Rental Markets. 198-213 - Ping Li, Hou-Sheng Chen, Guangdong Huang, Xiao-Jun Shi:
On Portfolio's Default-Risk-Adjusted Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based on Copulas. 214-224 - Rahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor:
Price Roll-Backs and Path Auctions: An Approximation Scheme for Computing the Market Equilibrium. 225-238 - Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V. Vazirani:
New Results on Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Time Solvability in Eisenberg-Gale Markets. 239-250 - Xiaotie Deng:
Making Economic Theory Operational. 251-261 - Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Shang-Hua Teng:
Sparse Games Are Hard. 262-273 - Xi Chen, Li-Sha Huang, Shang-Hua Teng:
Market Equilibria with Hybrid Linear-Leontief Utilities. 274-285 - Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Paul G. Spirakis:
Polynomial Algorithms for Approximating Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games. 286-296 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
A Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria. 297-306 - Dorit S. Hochbaum:
Ranking Sports Teams and the Inverse Equal Paths Problem. 307-318 - Dominic Dumrauf, Martin Gairing:
Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games. 319-330 - Vladimir V. Mazalov, Burkhard Monien, Florian Schoppmann, Karsten Tiemann:
Wardrop Equilibria and Price of Stability for Bottleneck Games with Splittable Traffic. 331-342 - Thodoros Komninos, Yannis C. Stamatiou, G. Vavitsas:
A Worm Propagation Model Based on People's Email Acquaintance Profiles. 343-352 - Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. 353-364 - Mikolaj Morzy, Adam Wierzbicki:
The Sound of Silence: Mining Implicit Feedbacks to Compute Reputation. 365-376 - Paolo Penna, Guido Proietti, Peter Widmayer:
Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot. 377-388 - Nicole Immorlica, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian:
Secretary Problems with Competing Employers. 389-400
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