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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 50
Volume 50, Number 1, March 2021
- Bas J. Dietzenbacher, Elena Yanovskaya:
Consistency of the equal split-off set. 1-22 - Qianqian Kong, Hans Peters:
An issue based power index. 23-38 - Francesco Fallucchi, Andrea Mercatanti, Jan Niederreiter:
Identifying types in contest experiments. 39-61 - Werner Güth, Paul Pezanis-Christou:
An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games. 63-74 - Amir Ban, Ron Lavi:
Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations. 75-104 - Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi:
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets. 105-118 - Shuige Liu:
Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information. 119-148 - José Luis Contreras Biekert, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez:
The roommate problem with externalities. 149-165 - Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki:
The projective core of symmetric games with externalities. 167-183 - Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, María Gómez-Rúa, Elena Molis:
Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility. 185-214 - Hiromasa Ogawa:
Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk. 215-239 - Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano:
Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects. 241-278 - Sanjay Bhattacherjee, Palash Sarkar:
Weighted voting procedure having a unique blocker. 279-295 - Daniel Li Li, Erfang Shan:
Cooperative games with partial information. 297-309
Volume 50, Number 2, June 2021
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau:
Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information. 311-360 - Emre Dogan:
Population monotonicity in fair division of multiple indivisible goods. 361-376 - Marco Serena:
The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management. 377-397 - Zhiwei Cui, Yan-An Hwang, Ding-Cheng You:
Axiomatizations of the β and the score measures in networks. 399-418 - Shinji Ohseto:
Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains. 419-432 - Shiran Rachmilevitch:
Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism. 433-445 - Federico Fioravanti, Fernando Tohmé, Fernando Delbianco, Alejandro Neme:
Effort of rugby teams according to the bonus point system: a theoretical and empirical analysis. 447-474 - Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault:
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval. 475-502 - Yasushi Kawase, Keisuke Bando:
Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm. 503-546 - Benoit Duvocelle, János Flesch, Hui Min Shi, Dries Vermeulen:
Search for a moving target in a competitive environment. 547-557 - János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, William D. Sudderth:
Discrete stop-or-go games. 559-579 - Garth Isaak, Matthew Prudente:
Two-player pebbling on diameter 2 graphs. 581-596
Volume 50, Number 3, September 2021
- Anna Bogomolnaia, Misha Gavrilovich, Egor Ianovski, Galina Lyapunova, Hervé Moulin, Alexander S. Nesterov, Marina Sandomirskaia, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Elena Yanovskaya:
In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945-3 March 2021). 597-601 - Ignacio García-Marco, Kolja Knauer, Luis Pedro Montejano:
Chomp on generalized Kneser graphs and others. 603-621 - Richard J. Nowakowski, Carlos Pereira dos Santos, Alexandre M. Silva:
Three-player nim with podium rule. 623-633 - Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich, Nhan Bao Ho, Kazuhisa Makino:
On the Sprague-Grundy function of extensions of proper Nim. 635-654 - Alda Carvalho, Carlos Pereira dos Santos, Cátia Lente Dias, Francisco Coelho, João Pedro Neto, Richard J. Nowakowski, Sandra Vinagre:
On lattices from combinatorial game theory: infinite case. 655-670 - Daniel Allcock:
Best play in Dots and Boxes endgames. 671-693 - Ravi Kant Rai, Urban Larsson, Neel Patel:
Discrete Richman-bidding scoring games. 695-728 - Gafurjan I. Ibragimov, Massimiliano Ferrara, Marks Ruziboev, Bruno Antonio Pansera:
Linear evasion differential game of one evader and several pursuers with integral constraints. 729-750 - Roberto Ghiselli Ricci:
A note on a Tarski type fixed-point theorem. 751-758 - Michael Wegener, Evla Mutlu:
The good, the bad, the well-connected. 759-771 - Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Takuma Wakayama:
Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences. 773-785
Volume 50, Number 4, December 2021
- János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen, Anna Zseleva:
Legitimate equilibrium. 787-800 - Yusuke Kamishiro, Roberto Serrano, Myrna Wooders:
Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies. 801-827 - Mariya Teteryatnikova:
Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs. 829-865 - Karl H. Schlag, Péter Vida:
Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions. 867-889 - Eilon Solan, Omri N. Solan:
Sunspot equilibrium in positive recursive general quitting games. 891-909 - Christoph Diehl, Christoph Kuzmics:
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent. 911-925 - Peyman Khezr, Flavio M. Menezes:
Entry and social efficiency under Bertrand competition and asymmetric information. 927-944 - Dodge Cahan, Hongjia H. Chen, Louis Christie, Arkadii Slinko:
Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm. 945-970 - Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura:
Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities. 971-987 - Áron Tóbiás:
Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge. 989-1019 - Chihiro Morooka:
Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games. 1021-1032 - Chiara Donnini, Marialaura Pesce:
Fairness and fuzzy coalitions. 1033-1052 - Dimitry Shaiderman:
An upper bound for the ℓ 1-variation along the road to agreement. 1053-1067
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