

MICHEL FOUCAULT



SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION

LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE
1977-1978

EDITED BY MICHEL SENELLART

GENERAL EDITORS: FRANÇOIS EWALD & ALESSANDRO FONTANA

ENGLISH SERIES EDITOR: ARNOLD I. DAVIDSON

TRANSLATED BY GRAHAM BURCHELL

Security, Territory, Population


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CONTENTS

Foreword: François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana	xiii	
Introduction: Arnold I. Davidson	xviii	
one	11 JANUARY 1978	1
<i>General perspective of the lectures: the study of bio-power. ~ Five proposals on the analysis of mechanisms of power. ~ Legal system, disciplinary mechanisms, and security apparatuses (dispositifs). Two examples: (a) the punishment of theft; (b) the treatment of leprosy, plague, and smallpox. ~ General features of security apparatuses (1): the spaces of security. ~ The example of the town. ~ Three examples of planning urban space in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: (a) Alexandre Le Maître's La Métropolitée (1682); (b) Richelieu; (c) Nantes.</i>		
two	18 JANUARY 1978	29
<i>General features of the apparatuses of security (II): relationship to the event: the art of governing and treatment of the uncertain (l'aléatoire). ~ The problem of scarcity (la disette) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. ~ From the mercantilists to the physiocrats. ~ Differences between apparatuses of security and disciplinary mechanisms in ways of dealing with the event. ~ The new governmental rationality and the emergence of "population." ~ Conclusion on liberalism: liberty as ideology and technique of government.</i>		

- three** 25 JANUARY 1978 55
General features of apparatuses of security (III). ~ Normation (normation) and normalization. ~ The example of the epidemic (smallpox) and inoculation campaigns in the eighteenth century. ~ The emergence of new notions: case, risk, danger, and crisis. ~ The forms of normalization in discipline and in mechanisms of security. ~ Deployment of a new political technology: the government of populations. ~ The problem of population in the mercantilists and the physiocrats. ~ The population as operator (opérateur) of transformations in domains of knowledge: from the analysis of wealth to political economy, from natural history to biology, from general grammar to historical philology.
- four** 1 FEBRUARY 1978 87
The problem of “government” in the sixteenth century. ~ Multiplicity of practices of government (government of self, government of souls, government of children, etcetera). ~ The specific problem of the government of the state. ~ The point of repulsion of the literature on government: Machiavelli’s The Prince. ~ Brief history of the reception of The Prince until the nineteenth century. ~ The art of government distinct from the Prince’s simple artfulness. ~ Example of this new art of government: Guillaume de la Perrière Le Miroir politique (1555). ~ A government that finds its end in the “things” to be directed. ~ Decline of law to the advantage of a variety of tactics. ~ The historical and institutional obstacles to the implementation of this art of government until the eighteenth century. ~ The problem of population an essential factor in unblocking the art of government. ~ The triangle formed by government, population, and political economy. ~ Questions of method: the project of a history of “governmentality.” Overvaluation of the problem of the state.
- five** 8 FEBRUARY 1978 115
Why study governmentality? ~ The problem of the state and population. ~ Reminder of the general project: triple displacement

of the analysis in relation to (a) the institution, (b) the function, and (c) the object. ~ The stake of this year's lectures. ~ Elements for a history of "government." Its semantic field from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. ~ The idea of the government of men. Its sources: (A) The organization of a pastoral power in the pre-Christian and Christian East. (B) Spiritual direction (direction de conscience). ~ First outline of the pastorate. Its specific features: (a) it is exercised over a multiplicity on the move; (b) it is a fundamentally beneficent power with salvation of the flock as its objective; (c) it is a power which individualizes. Omnes et singulatim. The paradox of the shepherd (berger). ~ The institutionalization of the pastorate by the Christian Church.

- six 15 FEBRUARY 1978 135
Analysis of the pastorate (continuation). ~ The problem of the shepherd-flock relationship in Greek literature and thought: Homer, the Pythagorean tradition. Rareness of the shepherd metaphor in classical political literature (Isocrates, Demosthenes). ~ A major exception: Plato's *The Statesman*. The use of the metaphor in other Plato texts (*Critias*, *Laws*, *The Republic*). The critique of the idea of a magistrate-shepherd in *The Statesman*. The pastoral metaphor applied to the doctor, farmer, gymnast, and teacher. ~ The history of the pastorate in the West, as a model of the government of men, is inseparable from Christianity. Its transformations and crises up to the eighteenth century. Need for a history of the pastorate. ~ Characteristics of the "government of souls": encompassing power coextensive with the organization of the Church and distinct from political power. ~ The problem of the relationships between political power and pastoral power in the West. Comparison with the Russian tradition.
- seven 22 FEBRUARY 1978 163
Analysis of the pastorate (end). ~ Specificity of the Christian pastorate in comparison with Eastern and Hebraic traditions. ~ An art of governing men. Its role in the history of

governmentality. ~ Main features of the Christian pastorate from the third to the sixth century (Saint John Chrysostom, Saint Cyprian, Saint Ambrose, Gregory the Great, Cassian, Saint Benedict): (1) the relationship to salvation. An economy of merits and faults: (a) the principle of analytical responsibility; (b) the principle of exhaustive and instantaneous transfer; (c) the principle of sacrificial reversal; (d) the principle of alternate correspondence. (2) The relationship to the law: institution of a relationship of complete subordination of the sheep to the person who directs them. An individual and non-finalized relationship. Difference between Greek and Christian apatheia. (3) The relationship to the truth: the production of hidden truths. Pastoral teaching and spiritual direction. ~ Conclusion: an absolutely new form of power that marks the appearance of specific modes of individualization. Its decisive importance for the history of the subject.

- eight** 1 MARCH 1978 191
The notion of “conduct.” ~ The crisis of the pastorate. ~ Revolts of conduct in the field of the pastorate. ~ The shift of forms of resistance to the borders of political institutions in the modern age: examples of the army, secret societies, and medicine. ~ Problem of vocabulary: “Revolts of conduct,” “insubordination (insoumission),” “dissidence,” and “counter-conduct.” Pastoral counter-conducts. Historical reminder: (a) asceticism; (b) communities; (c) mysticism; (d) Scripture; (e) eschatological beliefs. ~ Conclusion: what is at stake in the reference to the notion of “pastoral power” for an analysis of the modes of exercise of power in general.
- nine** 8 MARCH 1978 227
From the pastoral of souls to the political government of men. ~ General context of this transformation: the crisis of the pastorate and the insurrections of conduct in the sixteenth century. The Protestant Reformation and the Counter Reformation. Other factors. ~ Two notable phenomena: the intensification of the religious pastorate and the increasing question of conduct, on both private and public levels. ~ Governmental reason specific

to the exercise of sovereignty. ~ Comparison with Saint Thomas. ~ Break-up of the cosmological-theological continuum. ~ The question of the art of governing. ~ Comment on the problem of intelligibility in history. ~ Raison d'État (1): newness and object of scandal. ~ Three focal points of the polemical debate around raison d'État: Machiavelli, "politics" (la "politique"), and the "state."

ten

15 MARCH 1978

255

Raison d'État (II): its definition and principal characteristics in the seventeenth century. ~ The new model of historical temporality entailed by raison d'État. ~ Specific features of raison d'État with regard to pastoral government: (1) The problem of salvation: the theory of coup d'État (Naudé). Necessity, violence, theatricality. ~ (2) The problem of obedience. Bacon: the question of sedition. Differences between Bacon and Machiavelli. ~ (3) The problem of truth: from the wisdom of the prince to knowledge of the state. Birth of statistics. The problem of the secret. ~ The reflexive prism in which the problem of the state appeared. ~ Presence-absence of "population" in this new problematic.

eleven

22 MARCH 1978

285

Raison d'État (III). ~ The state as principle of intelligibility and as objective. ~ The functioning of this governmental reason: (A) In theoretical texts. The theory of the preservation of the state. (B) In political practice. Competition between states. ~ The Treaty of Westphalia and the end of the Roman Empire. ~ Force, a new element of political reason. ~ Politics and the dynamic of forces. ~ The first technological ensemble typical of this new art of government: the diplomatic-military system. ~ Its objective: the search for a European balance. What is Europe? The idea of "balance." ~ Its instruments: (1) war; (2) diplomacy; (3) the installation of a permanent military apparatus (dispositif).

- twelve** 29 MARCH 1978 311
- The second technological assemblage characteristic of the new art of government according to raison d'État: police. Traditional meanings of the word up to the sixteenth century. Its new sense in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: calculation and technique making possible the good use of the state's forces. ~ The triple relationship between the system of European balance and police. ~ Diversity of Italian, German, and French situations. ~ Turquet de Mayerne, La Monarchie aristodémocratique. ~ The control of human activity as constitutive element of the force of the state. ~ Objects of police: (1) the number of citizens; (2) the necessities of life; (3) health; (4) occupations; (5) the coexistence and circulation of men. ~ Police as the art of managing life and the well-being of populations.*
- thirteen** 5 APRIL 1978 333
- Police (continuation). ~ Delamare. ~ The town as site for the development of police. Police and urban regulation. Urbanization of the territory. Relationship between police and the mercantilist problematic. ~ Emergence of the market town. ~ Methods of police. Difference between police and justice. An essentially regulatory type of power. Regulation and discipline. ~ Return to the problem of grain. ~ Criticism of the police state on the basis of the problem of scarcity. The theses of the économistes concerning the price of grain, population, and the role of the state. ~ Birth of a new governmentality. Governmentality of the politiques and governmentality of the économistes. ~ The transformations of raison d'État: (1) the naturalness of society; (2) new relationships between power and knowledge; (3) taking charge of the population (public hygiene, demography, etc.); (4) new forms of state intervention; (5) the status of liberty. ~ Elements of the new art of government: economic practice, management of the population, law and respect*

for liberties, police with a repressive function. ~ Different forms of counter-conduct relative to this governmentality. ~ General conclusion.

Course Summary	363
Course Context	369
Name Index	403
Subject Index	409



FOREWORD

MICHEL FOUCAULT TAUGHT AT the Collège de France from January 1971 until his death in June 1984 (with the exception of 1977 when he took a sabbatical year). The title of his chair was “The History of Systems of Thought.”

On the proposal of Jules Vuillemin, the chair was created on 30 November 1969 by the general assembly of the professors of the Collège de France and replaced that of “The History of Philosophical Thought” held by Jean Hyppolite until his death. The same assembly elected Michel Foucault to the new chair on 12 April 1970.¹ He was 43 years old.

Michel Foucault’s inaugural lecture was delivered on 2 December 1970.² Teaching at the Collège de France is governed by particular rules. Professors must provide 26 hours of teaching a year (with the possibility of a maximum of half this total being given in the form of seminars³). Each year they must present their original research and this obliges them to change the content of their teaching for each course. Courses and seminars are completely open; no enrolment or qualification is required and the professors do not award any qualifications.⁴ In the terminology of the Collège de France, the professors do not have students but only auditors.

Michel Foucault’s courses were held every Wednesday from January to March. The huge audience made up of students, teachers, researchers and the curious, including many who came from outside France, required two amphitheatres of the Collège de France. Foucault often complained about the distance between himself and his “public” and of how few exchanges the course made possible.⁵ He would have liked a seminar in which real collective work could take place and made a number of attempts to bring

this about. In the final years he devoted a long period to answering his auditors' questions at the end of each course.

This is how Gérard Petitjean, a journalist from *Le Nouvel Observateur*, described the atmosphere at Foucault's lectures in 1975:

When Foucault enters the amphitheater, brisk and dynamic like someone who plunges into the water, he steps over bodies to reach his chair, pushes away the cassette recorders so he can put down his papers, removes his jacket, lights a lamp and sets off at full speed. His voice is strong and effective, amplified by loudspeakers that are the only concession to modernism in a hall that is barely lit by light spread from stucco bowls. The hall has three hundred places and there are five hundred people packed together, filling the smallest free space . . . There is no oratorical effect. It is clear and terribly effective. There is absolutely no concession to improvisation. Foucault has twelve hours each year to explain in a public course the direction taken by his research in the year just ended. So everything is concentrated and he fills the margins like correspondents who have too much to say for the space available to them. At 19.15 Foucault stops. The students rush towards his desk; not to speak to him, but to stop their cassette recorders. There are no questions. In the pushing and shoving Foucault is alone. Foucault remarks: "It should be possible to discuss what I have put forward. Sometimes, when it has not been a good lecture, it would need very little, just one question, to put everything straight. However, this question never comes. The group effect in France makes any genuine discussion impossible. And as there is no feedback, the course is theatricalized. My relationship with the people there is like that of an actor or an acrobat. And when I have finished speaking, a sensation of total solitude . . ." ⁶

Foucault approached his teaching as a researcher: explorations for a future book as well as the opening up of fields of problematization were formulated as an invitation to possible future researchers. This is why the courses at the Collège de France do not duplicate the published books. They are not sketches for the books even though both books and

courses share certain themes. They have their own status. They arise from a specific discursive regime within the set of Foucault's "philosophical activities." In particular they set out the program for a genealogy of knowledge/power relations, which are the terms in which he thinks of his work from the beginning of the 1970s, as opposed to the program of an archeology of discursive formations that previously orientated his work.⁷

The courses also performed a role in contemporary reality. Those who followed his courses were not only held in thrall by the narrative that unfolded week by week and seduced by the rigorous exposition, they also found a perspective on contemporary reality. Michel Foucault's art consisted in using history to cut diagonally through contemporary reality. He could speak of Nietzsche or Aristotle, of expert psychiatric opinion or the Christian pastoral, but those who attended his lectures always took from what he said a perspective on the present and contemporary events. Foucault's specific strength in his courses was the subtle interplay between learned erudition, personal commitment, and work on the event.



With their development and refinement in the 1970s, Foucault's desk was quickly invaded by cassette recorders. The courses—and some seminars—have thus been preserved.

This edition is based on the words delivered in public by Foucault. It gives a transcription of these words that is as literal as possible.⁸ We would have liked to present it as such. However, the transition from an oral to a written presentation calls for editorial intervention: at the very least it requires the introduction of punctuation and division into paragraphs. Our principle has been always to remain as close as possible to the course actually delivered.

Summaries and repetitions have been removed whenever it seemed to be absolutely necessary. Interrupted sentences have been restored and faulty constructions corrected. Suspension points indicate that the recording is inaudible. When a sentence is obscure there is a conjectural integration or an addition between square brackets. An asterisk directing the reader to the bottom of the page indicates a significant

divergence between the notes used by Foucault and the words actually uttered. Quotations have been checked and references to the texts used are indicated. The critical apparatus is limited to the elucidation of obscure points, the explanation of some allusions, and the clarification of critical points. To make the lectures easier to read, each lecture is preceded by a brief summary that indicates its principal articulations.

The text of the course is followed by the summary published by the *Annuaire du Collège de France*. Foucault usually wrote these in June, some time after the end of the course. It was an opportunity for him to pick out retrospectively the intention and objectives of the course. It constitutes the best introduction to the course.

Each volume ends with a “context” for which the course editors are responsible. It seeks to provide the reader with elements of the biographical, ideological, and political context, situating the course within the published work and providing indications concerning its place within the corpus used in order to facilitate understanding and to avoid misinterpretations that might arise from a neglect of the circumstances in which each course was developed and delivered.

Security, Territory, Population, the course delivered in 1978, is edited by Michel Senellart.



A new aspect of Michel Foucault’s “œuvre” is published with this edition of the Collège de France courses.

Strictly speaking it is not a matter of unpublished work, since this edition reproduces words uttered publicly by Foucault, excluding the often highly developed written material he used to support his lectures. Daniel Defert possesses Michel Foucault’s notes and he is to be warmly thanked for allowing the editors to consult them.

This edition of the Collège de France courses was authorized by Michel Foucault’s heirs who wanted to be able to satisfy the strong demand for their publication, in France as elsewhere, and to do this under indisputably responsible conditions. The editors have tried to be equal to the degree of confidence placed in them.

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1. Michel Foucault concluded a short document drawn up in support of his candidacy with these words: "We should undertake the history of systems of thought." "Titres et travaux" in *Dits et Écrits, 1954-1988*, four volumes, eds. Daniel Defert and François Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) vol. 1, p. 846; English translation by Robert Hurley, "Candidacy Presentation: Collège de France" in *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, vol. 1: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997) p. 9.
 2. It was published by Gallimard in May 1971 with the title *L'Ordre du discours* (Paris). English translation by Rupert Swyer, "The Order of Discourse," appendix to M. Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972).
 3. This was Foucault's practice until the start of the 1980s.
 4. Within the framework of the Collège de France.
 5. In 1976, in the vain hope of reducing the size of the audience, Michel Foucault changed the time of his course from 17.45 to 9.00. See the beginning of the first lecture (7 January 1976) of "*Il faut défendre la société*." *Cours au Collège de France, 1976* (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1997); English translation by David Macey, "*Society Must be Defended*." *Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976* (New York: Picador, 2003).
 6. Gérard Petitjean, "Les Grands Prêtres de l'université française," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 7 April 1975.
 7. See especially, "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire" in *Dits et Écrits*, vol. 2, p. 137. English translation by Donald F. Brouchard and Sherry Simon, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1998) pp. 369-392.
 8. We have made use of the recordings made by Gilbert Burlet and Jacques Lagrange in particular. These are deposited in the Collège de France and the Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine.



INTRODUCTION*

IN THE YEARS BETWEEN December, 1976 and May, 1984 Michel Foucault published no new books. Yet far from being a period of silence, Foucault concentrated an extraordinary amount of intellectual activity in essays, lectures, interviews, and especially in his courses at the Collège de France. Without access to these courses, it was extremely difficult to understand Foucault's reorientation from an analysis of the strategies and tactics of power immanent in the modern discourse on sexuality (1976) to an analysis of the ancient forms and modalities of relation to oneself by which one constituted oneself as a moral subject of sexual conduct (1984). In short, Foucault's passage from the political to the ethical dimension of sexuality seemed sudden and inexplicable. Moreover, it was clear from his published essays and interviews that this displacement of focus had consequences far beyond the specific domain of the history of sexuality.

Security, Territory, Population contains a conceptual hinge, a key concept, that allows us to link together the political and ethical axes of Foucault's thought. But this essential moment has been rather undervalued due to the fact that the main legacy of this course has been to give rise to so-called "governmentality studies." There is absolutely no doubt that the practices of governmentality and the historically precedent practices of pastoral power studied by Foucault in this course open up a new and significant field of inquiry, both within Foucault's own work and more generally. Yet one should not overlook the fact that pastoral

* This introduction is dedicated to my students at the University of Pisa who read *Security, Territory, Population* with me in Spring, 2007.

power and governmentality are historically and philosophically contiguous in that they take as the object of their techniques and practices the *conduct* of human beings. If the “government of men” is understood as an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals, “pastoral power” concentrates this activity in the regime of religious institutions, while governmentality locates it in the direction of political institutions. As Foucault remarks,

. . . from the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, generally speaking I think that inasmuch as many pastoral functions were taken up in the exercise of governmentality, and inasmuch as government also begins to want to take responsibility for people’s conduct, to conduct people, then from then on we see revolts of conduct arising less from the religious institution and much more from political institutions.¹

Indeed, it is Foucault’s analysis of the notions of conduct and counter-conduct in his lecture of 1 March 1978 that seems to me to constitute one of the richest and most brilliant moments in the entire course. Beginning from the Greek expression *oikonomia psuchōn* and the Latin expression *regimen animarum*, Foucault proposes the concept of *conduct* as the most adequate translation of these expressions, taking philosophical advantage of the way in which “conduct” can refer to two things:

Conduct is the activity of conducting (*conduire*), of conduction (*la conduction*) if you like, but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself (*se conduit*), lets oneself be conducted (*se laisse conduire*), and finally, in which one behaves (*se comporter*) under the influence of a conduct as the action of conducting or of conduction (*conduction*).²

One already sees here the double dimension of conduct, namely the activity of conducting an individual, conduction as a relation between individuals, and the way in which an individual conducts himself or is conducted, his conduct or behavior in the narrower sense of the term. Yet Foucault moves quickly from the quite specific form of power that

takes as its object the conduct of individuals to the correlative counter-movements that he initially designates as specific revolts of conduct.

Just as there have been forms of resistance to power as the exercise of political sovereignty and just as there have been other equally intentional [*voulues*, that is “willed”] forms of resistance or refusal that were directed at power in the form of economic exploitation, have there not been forms of resistance to power as conducting?³

These forms of resistance also have a double dimension. They are movements characterized by wanting to be conducted differently, whose objective is a different type of conduction, and that also attempt to indicate an area in which each individual can conduct himself, the domain of one's own conduct or behavior.⁴

In the first volume of his history of sexuality *La Volonté de savoir* (*The Will to Know*), writing from a directly political point of view, Foucault had already insisted that resistance is not in a position of exteriority with respect to power, and that points of resistance do not answer to a set of principles heterogenous to relations of power.⁵ Resistance is “coextensive and absolutely contemporaneous” to power; resistances exist within the strategic field of relations of power and relations of power themselves only exist relative to a multiplicity of points of resistance.⁶ In *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault also emphasizes the non-exteriority, the immanent relation, of conduct and counter-conduct. The fundamental elements of the counter-conduct analyzed by Foucault are not absolutely external to the conduct imposed by Christian pastoral power. Conduct and counter-conduct share a series of elements that can be utilized and re-utilized, re-implanted, re-inserted, taken up in the direction of reinforcing a certain mode of conduct or of creating and re-creating a type of counter-conduct:

... the struggle was not conducted in the form of absolute exteriority, but rather in the form of the permanent use of tactical elements that are pertinent in the anti-pastoral struggle to the very extent that they are part, even in a marginal way, of the general horizon of Christianity.⁷

Moreover, it is noteworthy that in the case of power/resistance and in that of conduct/counter-conduct, Foucault stresses that the tactical immanence of both resistance and counter-conduct to their respective fields of action should not lead one to conclude that they are simply a passive underside, a merely negative or reactive phenomenon, a kind of disappointing after-effect.⁸ In each case Foucault employs the same kind of almost technical expression: resistance is not "*la marque en creux*" of power, counter-conducts are not "*les phénomènes en creux*" of the pastorate.⁹ As he says in the interview "Non au sexe roi", if resistance were nothing more than the reverse image of power, it would not resist; in order to resist one must activate something "as inventive, as mobile, as productive" as power itself.¹⁰ Foucault similarly underlines the productivity of counter-conduct which goes beyond the purely negative act of disobedience.¹¹ Finally, as a counterpart to the celebrated motto "where there is power, there is resistance," one could invoke Foucault's remark about the "immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counter-conduct," a correlation that is not only historical but also conceptual.¹²

In light of all of these parallels between resistance and counter-conduct, what does the creation of the couple conduct/counter-conduct in 1978 add to Foucault's previous conceptualization? On the one hand, the notion of counter-conduct adds an explicitly ethical component to the notion of resistance; on the other hand, this notion allows one to move easily between the ethical and the political, letting us see their many points of contact and intersection. Foucault's three initial examples—the appearance of desertion-insubordination, the development of secret societies, and the rise of medical dissent—bring to light both of these aspects of the notion of conduct/counter-conduct. Furthermore, Foucault's problem of vocabulary, his attempt to find a specific word to designate the resistances, refusals, revolts against being conducted in a certain way, show how careful he was in wanting to find a concept that neglected neither the ethical nor the political dimensions and that made it possible to recognize their nexus. After rejecting the notions of "revolt," "disobedience," "insubordination," "dissidence," and "misconduct," for reasons ranging from their being notions that are either too strong, too weak, too localized, too passive, or too substance-like,

Foucault proposes the expression “counter-conduct”—“counter-conduct in the sense of struggle against the procedures implemented for conducting others”—and notes that anti-pastoral counter-conduct can be found at a doctrinal level, in the form of individual behavior, and in strongly organized groups.¹³

When Foucault returns to the notion of conduct in his essay “Le sujet et le pouvoir,” he emphasizes that this notion is perhaps “one of those that best allows us to grasp what is specific to relations of power,” immediately placing “conduct” in a political field.¹⁴ As in 1978, he observes that “conduct is both the act of ‘directing’ [*mener*] others (according to more or less strict mechanisms of coercion) and the way of behaving [*se comporter*] in a more or less open field of possibilities”, and then adds that the exercise of power consists in “‘conducting conduct’ [*conduire des conduites*]’.”¹⁵ Next, Foucault draws a direct connection between power and government, again distinguishing government from political and economic subjection, and highlighting the fact that to govern an individual or a group is “to act on the possibilities of action of other individuals,” is a “mode of action on the actions of others.”¹⁶ Thus, according to Foucault, “to govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of actions of others.”¹⁷ Although much less conceptually detailed in *La Volonté de savoir*, Foucault’s fundamental idea of studying power as a multiplicity of force relations has many of the same consequences as his later articulation of the notion of conduct. These force relations, unequal but also local and unstable, give rise to states of power, and modifications of these same relations transform those situations of power.¹⁸ A force is not a metaphysical substance or abstraction, but is always given in a particular relation; a force can be identified as any factor in a relation that affects the elements of the relation; *anything* that influences the actions of individuals in a relation, that has an effect on their actions, is in this sense a force. And thus force relations structure the possible field of actions of individuals. Resistance and counter-conduct modify these force relations, counter the locally stabilized organizations of power, and thereby affect, in a new way, the possibilities of action of others. A force relation can be immanent in a physical environment, in a social configuration, in a pattern of behavior, in a bodily gesture, in a certain attitude, in a way of life. All of these features

can structure the field of action of individuals, and thus power and resistance “come from everywhere.”¹⁹

Foucault’s analysis of the different forms of counter-conduct found in a number of anti-pastoral communities in the Middle Ages brings clearly to the forefront the political dimension of counter-conduct. As he says in concluding his discussion, “in some of these communities there was a counter-society aspect, a carnival aspect, overturning social relations and hierarchy.”²⁰ But even apparently personal or individual forms of counter-conduct such as the return to Scripture or the adherence to a certain set of eschatological beliefs have a political dimension, that is, modify force relations between individuals, acting on the possibilities of action. Reading Scripture as “a spiritual act that puts the faithful in the presence of God’s word and which consequently finds its law and guarantee in this inner illumination” is a counter-conduct that is “used against and to short-circuit, as it were, the pastorate.”²¹ And eschatological beliefs that imply that the faithful “will no longer need a shepherd” are also a way of “disqualifying the pastor’s role,” a counter-conduct with profound political effects.²²

The ethical dimension of counter-conduct is clearly present when Foucault mentions the *devotio moderna*, an anti-pastoral struggle expressed and manifested in “a whole new attitude, religious comportment, way of doing things and being, and a whole new way of relating to God, obligations, morality, as well as to civil life.”²³ Foucault’s detailed discussion of asceticism as a form of counter-conduct—beginning from the idea that “asceticism is an exercise of self on self; it is a sort of close combat of the individual with himself in which the authority, presence, and gaze of someone else is, if not impossible, at least unnecessary”—cannot help but bring to mind his late idea of ethics as a relation to oneself, the constitution of oneself as a moral subject, and the related notions of “modes of subjectivation” and “practices of the self.”²⁴ When Foucault introduces the idea of ethics as the self’s relation to itself, as distinct from a moral code and the actual behavior of individuals with respect to this code, he does so by claiming that there are “different ways of ‘conducting oneself’ [*se conduire*] morally,” emphasizing this other aspect of morality, namely “the way in which one should ‘conduct oneself’ [*se conduire*].”²⁵ What then follows is a much more precise and unambiguous description,

from the ethical point of view, of the second sense of “conduct” mentioned in *Security, Territory, Population*. And Foucault’s conclusion links together the aspects of conduct as moral action and as moral self-constitution:

There is no specific moral action that does not refer to the unity of a moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call for the constitution of oneself as a moral subject; and no constitution of the moral subject without “modes of subjectivation” and without an “ascetics” or “practices of the self” that support them [the modes of subjectivation].²⁶

In the first lecture of *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, when Foucault takes up the notion of the “care of the self” (*epimeleia heauton*), he identifies three components of this care: a general attitude with respect to oneself, to others, and to the world; a form of attention turned towards oneself; a series of practices or techniques of the self.²⁷ Attitude, attention, and practices of the self are all features of the ethical sense of conduct.

In “Le sujet et le pouvoir” Foucault stresses that power, understood as the government of men, includes the element of freedom:

Power is only exercised on “free subjects” and only insofar as they are “free”—understanding by this claim individual or collective subjects faced with a field of possibility in which several conducts, several reactions, and various modes of behavior can take place.²⁸

This quotation underscores Foucault’s assertion that power never exhaustively determines a subject’s possibilities, and it specifies the relevant field of possibility as that of conduct or behavior, taking the latter in the widest sense of the term. If we recall Foucault’s remark that “ethics is the deliberative form that freedom takes,” the “deliberative practice of freedom,” we can also see that for Foucault ethics is in effect a kind of freedom of conduct.²⁹ In a series of remarkable formulas concerning freedom, Foucault speaks of the “insubordination of freedom,” the “rebelliousness of the will and the intransitivity of freedom,” the

“art of voluntary inservitude” and of “deliberative indocility.”³⁰ All of these phrases belong to the semantic field of counter-conduct and make evident the double ethical and political scope of this counter-conduct.

The discussion of asceticism in *Security, Territory, Population* is a perfect example of the art of voluntary intractability, the exercise of freedom as a form of counter-conduct. According to Foucault’s analysis, Christianity is not an ascetic religion, since the organization of pastoral power with its requirement of permanent obedience and renunciation of one’s individual will is incompatible with the structure and practice of asceticism:

... whenever and wherever pastoral counter-conducts develop in the Middle Ages, asceticism was one of their points of support and instruments against the pastorate . . . Insofar as the pastorate characterizes its structures of power, Christianity is fundamentally anti-ascetic, and asceticism is rather a sort of tactical element, an element of reversal by which certain themes of Christian theology or religious experience are utilized against these structures of power.³¹

The challenge represented by the ascetic exercise of the self on the self, which becomes a kind of egoistic self-mastery, provokes a counter-conduct to pastoral obedience, and gives rise to a type of *apatheia* that is much closer to the Greek *apatheia* which guarantees the mastery of oneself than to the Christian *apatheia*, part of pastoral power, which requires the continual renunciation of a will that is turned towards oneself.³² Finally, mysticism is a form of counter-conduct that has the distinction of being an experience that “by definition escapes pastoral power.”³³ Eluding pastoral examination, confession, and teaching, mystical experience short-circuits the pastoral hierarchy:

In the pastorate, the pastor’s direction of the individual’s soul was necessary, and no communication between the soul and God could take place that was not either ruled out or controlled by the pastor.³⁴

The direct, immediate communication between the soul and God in mysticism thus marks the distance separating mysticism from the pastorate.

When in the discussion following his lecture “Qu’est-ce que la critique? [Critique et Aukflärung],” given less than two months after the conclusion of *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault designates mysticism as one of the first major revolts of conduct in the West, he underlines the conjunction of the ethical and the political in the history of mysticism: “mysticism as individual experience and institutional and political struggle are absolutely united, and in any case constantly referred to one another.”³⁵ Spiritual movements intertwined with popular struggle are one historically prominent source of counter-conduct.

It is astonishing, and of profound significance, that the autonomous sphere of conduct has been more or less invisible in the history of modern (as opposed to ancient) moral and political philosophy. The “juridification” of moral and political experience has meant that the role of conduct has typically been subordinated to that of the law, thus losing its specificity and its particular force.³⁶ Perhaps the major exception to this absence of attention to the sphere of conduct can be found in the third chapter of John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, where the political and moral importance of conduct is central.³⁷ As Mill says,

No one’s idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own judgment, or of their own individual character.³⁸

But as Mill goes on to observe, we are governed by custom, “the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct,” and we do not choose our plan of life or determine our own conduct.³⁹

I do not mean that they [individuals] chose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes . . .⁴⁰

“Eccentricity of conduct” is Mill’s name for counter-conduct, and he strikingly opposes “originality in thought and action” to the “despotism of custom.”⁴¹ Indeed, *On Liberty* contains moments of lyrical encomium to counter-conduct:

In this age the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric . . . That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.⁴²

And Mill recognizes that uniformity of conduct weakens the possibility of resistance:

The demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced *nearly* to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.⁴³

The counter-conduct required by putting into practice one’s “own mode of laying out his existence” is the only domain of force consonant with the political principle of liberty and the politics of individual differences.⁴⁴ However much Mill’s conclusions may differ from Foucault’s, *On Liberty* has the merit of both isolating the conceptual specificity of conduct and of identifying its singular ethical-political value.

Foucault’s appreciation of the feminist and gay movements can best be understood from the point of view of the notion of conduct/counter-conduct. Already in *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault connects one historically important form of counter-conduct to the status of women: “these revolts of conduct are often linked up with the problem of women and their status in society, in civil society or in religious society.”⁴⁵ And he gives as examples the movement of Rhenish *Nonnenmystik*, the groups formed around women prophets in the Middle Ages, and

various Spanish and French groups of spiritual direction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Foucault's interest in the modern history of relations among women revolves around the question of female friendship, how it develops, what kind of conduct it involves, how women were bound to one another through a certain type of affect, of affection. He was especially attentive to the "response [of women], often innovative and creative, to a status that was imposed upon them."⁴⁶ And he was well aware that the creative counter-conduct of women was often the target of the harshest criticism against them, as if the civil debate around juridical issues could not but degenerate when the topic turned to the behavior of women. He would certainly have shared the acute perception of Mill: "... the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused either of doing 'what nobody does', or of not doing 'what everybody does', is the subject of as much depreciatory remark as if he or she had committed some grave moral delinquency."⁴⁷

Foucault's famous remark that what makes homosexuality "disturbing" is the "homosexual mode of life much more than the sexual act itself" is directly related to the way in which this mode of life is a center of counter-conduct.⁴⁸ Foucault attaches great significance to that aspect of the gay movement which puts into play "relations in the absence of codes or established lines of conduct," "affective intensities," "forms that change."⁴⁹ Foucault describes these relations with the same expression, *court-circuit*, that he had used to describe religious counter-conduct: "these relations create a short-circuit, and introduce love where there should be law, rule, habit."⁵⁰ Gay counter-conduct, a new mode of life, gay culture in the widest sense of the term, is what fascinated Foucault:

... a culture that invents modalities of relations, modes of existence, types of values, forms of exchange between individuals that are really new, that are not homogenous to nor superimposable on general cultural forms. If this is possible, then gay culture will not be simply a choice of homosexuals for homosexuals. It will create relations that are, up to a certain point, transposable to heterosexuals. One has to overturn things a bit, and rather than say what one said at a certain moment—"Let us try to reintroduce

homosexuality into the general normality of social relations”—let us say the opposite: “No. Let it [homosexuality] escape as far as possible from the type of relations that are proposed to us in our society, and let us try to create in the empty space in which we find ourselves new relational possibilities.”⁵¹

This new space of, so to speak, gay counter-conduct will create the possibility for others to “enrich their life by modifying their own scheme of relations,” with the effect that “unforeseen lines of force will be formed.”⁵²

This space of counter-conduct cannot be reduced to the juridical sphere, and that is why Foucault maintained that one should consider “the battle for gay rights as an episode that cannot represent the final stage” of the struggle.⁵³ The real effects (*effets réels*) of the battle for rights should be looked for much more in “attitudes, [in] schemes of behavior, than [in] legal formulations,” and thus the attempt to create a new mode of life is much more pertinent than the question of individual rights.⁵⁴ The rights that derive from marital and family relations are a way of stabilizing, rendering stationary, certain forms of conduct; as Foucault says, extending these rights to other persons is but a first step, since “if one asks people to reproduce marriage bonds in order for their personal relation to be recognized, the progress realized is slight.”⁵⁵ Our legal, social, institutional world is one in which the only relations possible are “extremely few, extremely schematized, extremely poor.”⁵⁶ Given that “a rich relational world would be extremely complicated to manage,” the institutional framework of our society has attempted to narrow the possibility of relations, and, following Foucault’s diagnosis, we have “to fight against the impoverishment of the relational fabric” of our social world.⁵⁷ We have all heard the “progressive” sentiments of those liberals who announce that they are not opposed to gay marriage as long “as they behave like married couples.” It is precisely the threat of counter-conduct, and not the legal status, that is most disruptive and unsettling.

This is certainly one reason why Foucault announced that after studying the history of sexuality, he wanted to understand the history of friendships—friendships that for centuries allowed one to live “very

intense affective relations” and that also had “economic and social implications.”⁵⁸ The kinds of counter-conduct made possible by these friendships both changed the force relations between individuals and modified one’s relation to oneself. One conducts oneself in another way with friends, fabricating new ethical and political possibilities. Beginning in the sixteenth century, as we find texts that criticize (especially male) friendships as “something dangerous,” this type of friendship begins to disappear.⁵⁹ And Foucault’s suggestion was that this space of dangerous friendship came to be occupied by the problem of homosexuality, of sexual relationships between men: “the disappearance of friendship as a social relation and the fact that homosexuality was declared a social, political, and medical problem are part of the same process.”⁶⁰ The constitution of homosexuality as a separate medical and psychiatric problem was much more effective as a technique of control than the attempt to regulate friendship. Even today, behind every intense friendship lurks the shadow of sex, so that we no longer see the striking perturbations of friendship. The counter-conduct of friendship has become pathologized—the unruliness of friendship is but a form of abnormality.

What Foucault once named the “struggles against subjection” and “for a new subjectivity” could also be described as a struggle against a certain type of conduction and for another form of conduct.⁶¹ The Kantian question of “who we are at this precise moment of history” is inseparable from this question of our conduct.⁶² To become other than what we are requires an ethics and politics of counter-conduct. Foucault arrived at the conclusion that,

Probably the principal objective today is not to discover but to refuse what we are . . . We have to promote new forms of subjectivity while refusing the type of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries.⁶³

This double refusal and promotion is the domain of counter-conduct, a sphere of revolt that incites a process of productivity.⁶⁴ Moreover, Foucault explicitly links this domain to his definition of the “critical attitude,” a political and moral attitude, a manner of thinking, that is a

critique of the way in which our conduct is governed, a “partner and adversary” of the arts of governing.⁶⁵ This critical attitude is part of a philosophical *ēthos*, and no such *ēthos* is effective without a permanent exercise of counter-conduct.⁶⁶

One of Foucault’s most disquieting acclamations of counter-conduct is his discussion in favor of suicide, against “the humiliations, the hypocrisies, the dubious procedures” to which one constrains the conduct of suicide.⁶⁷ Should not we instead “prepare ourselves with all the care, the intensity, and the ardor that we desire,” a “patient preparation, without respite, without inevitability either” that will shed light on all one’s life?⁶⁸

I’m in favor of a true cultural combat in order to teach people again that there is no conduct that is more beautiful, that, consequently, deserves to be considered with as much attention as suicide. One should work on one’s suicide all one’s life.⁶⁹

The government of conduct with respect to death, which extends to the “appalling banality” of the behavior of funeral homes, compellingly diminishes the force of any critical attitude, “as if death must extinguish every effort of imagination.”⁷⁰ And here Foucault’s imagination is itself a form of counter-conduct, a vision of

the possibility of places without geography or schedule where one would enter in order to try to find, in the midst of the most ridiculous scenery, with nameless partners, opportunities to die free of all identity: one would have an indeterminate time there, seconds, weeks, perhaps months, until, with an imperious self-evidence, the opportunity presented itself that one would immediately recognize one could not miss: it would have the form without form of pleasure, absolutely simple.⁷¹

The ethical and political impact of counter-conduct is also at the heart of Foucault’s last courses, concerned with the practice of *parrhesia*, and is especially prominent in his discussion of the apex of philosophical counter-conduct, namely Cynic *parrhesia* and the Cynic way of life. The

Cynic discourse that challenged all of the dependencies on social institutions, the Cynic recourse to scandalous behavior that called into question collective habits and standards of decency, Cynic courage in the face of danger—all of this parrhesiastic conduct could not but result in the association of this behavior with “dog-like” conduct: “the noble philosophers of Greece, who usually comprised an elite group, almost always disregarded the Cynics.”⁷² Cynic provocation stands as an emblem of the risks and the intensities of counter-conduct. Politically and ethically, *counter-conduct* is the invention of a new philosophical concept.

If counter-conduct at the end of life can be decisively shocking, we should not underestimate its more everyday occasions throughout the course of one’s early life. Notwithstanding the cultural diversity of conduct, one of the most universal and dispiriting memories of every child’s life is the constant exclamation of adults: behave yourself. Let’s hope that it is an admonition that we can still learn to combat.

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1. This volume, pp. 197–198.
 2. This volume, p. 193. I have very slightly modified Graham Burchell’s more elegant translation of the end of this phrase in order to make it as literal as possible.
 3. This volume, p. 195.
 4. This volume, pp. 194–195.
 5. Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 1: La Volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), pp. 125–127.
 6. Michel Foucault, “Non au sexe roi” in *Dits et écrits II*, 1976–88 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), p. 267 and *La Volonté de savoir*, p. 126.
 7. This volume, p. 125. Translation slightly modified.
 8. *La Volonté de savoir*, pp. 126–127 and this volume, p. 195.
 9. *La Volonté de savoir*, p. 126; the second quoted phrase appears on p. 198 of the French edition of *Security, Territory, Population*.
 10. “Non au sexe roi”, p. 267.
 11. This volume, p. 200. See also p. 201.
 12. *La Volonté de savoir*, p. 125 and this volume, p. 196.
 13. This volume, pp. 201, 204.
 14. Michel Foucault, “Le sujet et le pouvoir” in *Dits et écrits II*, p. 1056. Although this essay was published in 1982, there is compelling internal evidence that parts of it were written several years earlier.
 15. *Ibid.* p. 1056.
 16. *Ibid.*
 17. *Ibid.*

18. *La Volonté de savoir*, pp. 121-123.
19. *Ibid.* p. 122.
20. This volume, pp. 211-212.
21. This volume, p. 213.
22. This volume, p. 214.
23. This volume, p. 204.
24. This volume, p. 205; *Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 2: L'Usage des plaisirs* (Paris, Gallimard, 1984), pp. 36-45; "A propos de la généalogie de l'éthique: un aperçu du travail en cours" in *Dit et écrits II*, pp. 1437-1441.
25. *L'Usage des plaisirs*, p. 37.
26. *Ibid.* p. 40.
27. Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 10-11.
28. "Le sujet et le pouvoir", p. 1056.
29. "L'éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté" in *Dits et écrits II*, pp. 1530-1531.
30. "Le sujet et le pouvoir", p. 1056 and "Qu'est-ce que la critique? [Critique et Aufklärung]" in *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, avril-juin 1990, p. 39.
31. This volume, p. 207.
32. This volume, pp. 178-179, 206-208.
33. This volume, p. 212.
34. This volume, p. 213.
35. "Qu'est-ce que la critique? [Critique et Aufklärung]", p. 59.
36. *L'Usage des plaisirs*, pp. 41-42.
37. See the chapter on Mill in Stanley Cavell, *Cities of Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004) as well as Piergiorgio Donatelli, *Introduzione a Mill* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2007).
38. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* in *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, vol. XVIII, ed. by J. M. Robson (Toronto-London: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 262.
39. *Ibid.* pp. 261, 262-263.
40. *Ibid.* pp. 264-265.
41. *Ibid.* pp. 268, 272.
42. *Ibid.* p. 269.
43. *Ibid.* p. 275.
44. *Ibid.* 270, 272-275.
45. This volume, pp. 196-197.
46. "Entretien avec M. Foucault" in *Dits et écrits II*, p. 1108.
47. Mill, *On Liberty*, p. 270.
48. "De l'amitié comme mode de vie" in *Dits et écrits II*, p. 983.
49. "Choix sexuel, acte sexuel" in *ibid.* p. 1152 and "De l'amitié comme mode de vie", pp. 982-983.
50. "De l'amitié comme mode de vie", p. 983.
51. "Le triomphe social du plaisir sexuel: une conversation avec Michel Foucault" in *Dits et écrits II*, p. 1130.
52. *Ibid.* and "De l'amitié comme mode de vie", p. 983.
53. "Le triomphe social du plaisir sexuel: une conversation avec Michel Foucault", p. 1127.
54. *Ibid.* pp. 1127-1128.
55. *Ibid.* 1128.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.* pp. 1128-1129.
58. "Michel Foucault, une interview: sexe, pouvoir et la politique de l'identité" in *Dits et écrits II*, p. 1563.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.* 1564.
61. "Le sujet et le pouvoir", pp. 1046-1047.
62. *Ibid.* pp. 1050-1051.
63. *Ibid.* p. 1051.

64. This volume, p. 200.
65. "Qu'est-ce que la critique? [Critique et Aufklärung], p. 38.
66. "Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?" in *Dits et écrits II*, pp. 1387, 1390, 1396.
67. "Un plaisir si simple" in *ibid.* p. 777.
68. *Ibid.* pp. 778-789.
69. "Conversation avec Werner Schroeter" in *ibid.* p. 1076.
70. "Un plaisir si simple", p. 779.
71. *Ibid.*
72. Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), p. 122. For Foucault's detailed discussion of the Cynics, see *ibid.* pp. 115-133 and his still unpublished final course at the Collège de France, *Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres: le courage de la vérité*.

8 FEBRUARY 1978

*Why study governmentality? ~ The problem of the state and population. ~ Reminder of the general project: triple displacement of the analysis in relation to (a) the institution, (b) the function, and (c) the object. ~ The stake of this year's lectures. ~ Elements for a history of "government." Its semantic field from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. ~ The idea of the government of men. Its sources: (A) The organization of a pastoral power in the pre-Christian and Christian East. (B) Spiritual direction (direction de conscience). ~ First outline of the pastorate. Its specific features: (a) it is exercised over a multiplicity on the move; (b) it is a fundamentally beneficent power with salvation of the flock as its objective; (c) it is a power which individualizes. *Ommes et singulatim*. The paradox of the shepherd (berger). ~ The institutionalization of the pastorate by the Christian Church.*

I MUST APOLOGIZE, BECAUSE I will be more muddled than usual today. I've got the flu and don't feel very well. I was bothered all the same, since I had some misgivings about letting you come here and then telling you at the last minute that you could leave again. So, I will talk for as long as I can, but you must forgive me for the quantity as well as the quality.

I would like to begin to go over the dimension that I have called by the ugly word "governmentality."* Assuming that "governing" is different

* In inverted commas in the manuscript.

from “reigning or ruling,” and not the same as “commanding” or “laying down the law,” or being a sovereign, suzerain, lord, judge, general, landowner, master, or a teacher, assuming therefore that governing is a specific activity, we now need to know something about the type of power the notion covers. In short, we need to analyze the relations of power on which the sixteenth century arts of government set their sights, which are also the target of seventeenth century mercantilist theory and practice, and which, finally, are the aim—and maybe reach a certain threshold of, I think last week I said science,¹ but this is a thoroughly bad and disastrous word; let’s say a certain level of political competence—in, broadly speaking, the physiocratic doctrine of “economic government.”²

First question: Why should one want to study this insubstantial and vague domain covered by a notion as problematic and artificial as that of “governmentality”? My immediate answer will be, of course, in order to tackle the problem of the state and population. Straightaway there is a second question: This is all very well, but we know what the state and population are, or, at any rate, we think we do. The notions of the state and of the population have their definitions and histories. Broadly speaking, we are more or less familiar with the domain to which these notions refer, or anyway, if there is a submerged or obscure part, there is another visible part. So, since it involves studying this, at best, or worst, semi-obscure domain of the state and population, why should one want to approach it through such a thoroughly obscure notion as that of “governmentality”? Why attack the strong and the dense with the feeble, diffuse, and lacunary?

Well, I will give you the reason in a few words and by recalling a somewhat more general project. When in previous years we talked about the disciplines, about the army, hospitals, schools, and prisons, basically we wanted to carry out a triple displacement, shifting, if you like, to the outside, and in three ways. First, moving outside the institution, moving off-center in relation to the problematic of the institution or what could be called the “institutional-centric” approach. Consider the example of the psychiatric hospital. For sure, we can start from the psychiatric hospital as it is given in its structure and institutional density and try to discover its internal structures, to identify the logical necessity of each of

its constituent components, and to show what type of medical power is organized within it and how it develops a certain psychiatric knowledge. But—and here I refer specifically to Robert Castel's clearly fundamental and essential work, *L'Ordre psychiatrique*,³ which really should be read—we can proceed from the outside, that is to say, show how the hospital can only be understood as an institution on the basis of something external and general, that is, the psychiatric order, precisely insofar as the latter is connected up with an absolutely global project, which we can broadly call public hygiene, which is directed towards society as a whole.⁴ As Castel does, we can show how the psychiatric institution gives concrete expression to, intensifies, and gives density to a psychiatric order rooted in the definition of a non-contractual regime for individuals reduced to the status of minors.⁵ Finally, we can show how a whole battery of multifarious techniques concerning the education of children, assistance to the poor, and the institution of workers' tutelage are coordinated through this psychiatric order.⁶ This kind of method entails going behind the institution and trying to discover in a wider and more overall perspective what we can broadly call a technology of power. In the same way, this analysis allows us to replace a genetic analysis through filiation with a genealogical analysis—genealogy should not be confused with genesis and filiation—which reconstructs a whole network of alliances, communications, and points of support. So, the first methodological principle is to move outside the institution and replace it with the overall point of view of the technology of power.⁷

The second shift, the second transfer to the outside, concerns the function. Take the case of the prison, for example. We could of course analyze the prison on the basis of the functions we expect it to perform, those defined as its ideal functions, and of the optimal way of exercising them (which is, broadly speaking, what Bentham did in his *Panopticon*⁸). Starting from there, we could see what real functions were assured by the prison and establish an historical balance sheet of functional pluses and minuses, or anyway of what was intended and what was actually achieved. But, here again, studying the prison from the angle of the disciplines involved short-circuiting, or rather moving outside in relation to the functional point of view, and putting the prison back in a general economy of power. As a result, we noticed that the real

history of the prison is undoubtedly not governed by the successes and failures of its functionality, but is in fact inserted within strategies and tactics that find support even in these functional defects themselves. So, the second principle is to substitute the external point of view of strategies and tactics for the internal point of view of the function.

Finally, the third de-centering, the third shift to the outside, concerns the object. Taking the point of view of the disciplines involved refusing to give oneself a ready-made object, be it mental illness, delinquency, or sexuality. It involved not seeking to measure institutions, practices, and knowledges in terms of the criteria and norms of an already given object. Instead, it involved grasping the movement by which a field of truth with objects of knowledge was constituted through these mobile technologies. We can certainly say that madness “does not exist,”^{9*} but this does not mean it is nothing. All in all, it was a matter of doing the opposite of what phenomenology had taught us to say and think, the phenomenology that said, roughly: Madness exists, which does not mean that it is a thing.¹⁰

In short, the point of view adopted in all these studies involved the attempt to free relations of power from the institution, in order to analyze them from the point of view of technologies; to distinguish them also from the function, so as to take them up within a strategic analysis; and to detach them from the privilege of the object, so as to resituate them within the perspective of the constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge. If this triple movement of a shift to the outside was tried out with regard to the disciplines, I would now like to explore this possibility with regard to the state. Can we cross over to the outside of the state as we could, without great difficulty, with regard to these different institutions? Is there an encompassing point of view with regard to the state as there was with regard to local and definite institutions? I think this type of question cannot fail to arise, be it only as the result, the necessity implied by precisely what I have just been saying. After all, do not these general technologies of power, which we have attempted to reconstruct by moving outside the institution, ultimately fall under a global, totalizing institution that is, precisely, the state?

* In inverted commas in the manuscript.

By stepping outside these local, regional, and precise institutions of the hospital, the prison, or families, are we not referred back, quite simply, to another institution, so that we will have abandoned institutional analysis only to be enjoined to enter into another type of institutional analysis in which, precisely, the state is the stake? It is all very well to emphasize confinement, for example, as a general procedure that enveloped the history of psychiatry; but in the end is not confinement a typical operation of the state, or one that broadly falls under the action of the state? We may well single out the disciplinary mechanisms of sites such as the prison, workshops, and the army, where there were attempts to put these mechanisms to work. But, in the last instance, is not the state ultimately responsible for their general and local application? It may be that the extra-institutional, non-functional, and non-objective generality of the analysis I have been talking about confronts us with the totalizing institution of the state.*

* No doubt due to the fatigue that he refers to at the start of the lecture, Foucault leaves out the exposition of pages 8 to 12 of the manuscript:

“Hence the second reason for raising the question of the state: Is not the method of analyzing localized powers in terms of procedures, technologies, tactics, and strategies just a way of passing from one level to another, from the micro to the macro? And consequently, would it not have only provisional value: for the stage of this transition? It is true that no method should be a stake in itself. A method should be made in order to get rid of it. But it is less a question of method than of point of view, of an adaptation of the gaze, a way of turning round the [*support?*] of things by moving the person observing them. Now it seems to me that such a shift produces effects that are at least worth maintaining for as long as one can, if not holding on to them at any price.

What are these effects?

a. By de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power we can grasp their genealogy, i.e., the way they are formed, connect up with each other, develop, multiply, and are transformed on the basis of something other than themselves, on the basis of processes that are something other than relations of power. Example of the army: We may say that the disciplinarization of the army is due to its control by the state (*étatisation*). However, when disciplinarization is connected, [not] with a concentration of state control, but with the problem of floating populations, the importance of commercial networks, technical inventions, models [*several illegible words*] community management, a whole network of alliance, support, and communication constitutes the “genealogy” of military discipline. Not the genesis: filiation. If we want to avoid the circularity that refers the analysis of relations of power from one institution to another, it is by grasping them at the point where they constitute techniques with operative value in multiple processes.

b. By de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power we can [see] the respect in which and why they are unstable.

—Permeability to a whole series of different processes. Technologies of power are not immobile: they are not rigid structures aiming to immobilize living processes by their very immobility. Technologies of power are endlessly modified by the action of numerous factors. And when an institution breaks down it is not necessarily because the power that underpins

So, in short, the challenge of the lectures I would like to give this year will be this. Just as in the examination of the relationships between reason and madness in the modern West we tried to question the general procedures of confinement and segregation, thus going behind the asylum, the hospital, therapies, and classifications,* and just as for the prison we tried to go behind penitentiary institutions in the strict sense so as to seek out the general economy of power, can we carry out the same reversal for the state? Is it possible to move outside? Is it possible to place the modern state in a general technology of power that assured its mutations, development, and functioning? Can we talk of something like a “governmentality” that would be to the state what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were to the penal system, and what biopolitics was to medical institutions? These are the kind of questions that are at stake [in these lectures].[†]

So, this notion of government. A bit of orientation in the history of the word, in a period in which it had not yet acquired the political, rigorous statist meaning, it begins to take on in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What do we get from looking at some historical dictionaries of the French language?¹¹ We see that in the thirteenth,

it has been put out of play. It may be because it has become incompatible with some fundamental mutations of these technologies. Example of penal reform (neither popular revolt, nor even extra-popular pressure).

—But also accessibility to struggles or attacks that inevitably find their theater in the institution.

This means that it is entirely possible to arrive at overall effects, not by concerted confrontations, but also by local or lateral or diagonal attacks that bring into play the general economy of the whole. Thus: marginal spiritual movements, multiplicities of religious dissidence, which did not in any way attack the Catholic Church, ultimately toppled not only a whole section of the ecclesiastical institution, but the way in which religious power was exercised in the West.

These theoretical and practical effects suggest that it may be worth the effort to continue with experiment.”

* The manuscript adds here (p. 13): “just as to examine the status of illness and the privileges of medical knowledge in the modern world it was also necessary to go behind the hospital and medical institutions in order to attempt to connect up with the general procedures for taking charge of life and illness in the West, with ‘biopolitics.’”

[†] Inaudible words. Foucault adds: I would now like to, in order to excuse the character [*an inaudible word*] of what I am trying to say to you between two fits of coughing . . .

The manuscript contains this complementary note: “NB. I am not saying that the state was born from the art of government, or that the techniques for governing men were born in the seventeenth century. The state as the set of institutions of sovereignty has existed for millennia. The techniques of the government of men also existed for millennia. But it is on the basis of a new general technology [of] the government of men that the state took the form that we know.”

fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries the word “to govern (*gouverner*)” actually covers a considerable number of different meanings. First, we find the purely material, physical, and spatial meaning, of to direct, move forward, or even to move forward oneself on a track, a road. “To govern” is to follow a path, or put on a path. In Froissart, for example, you find a text like this: “A [...] path so narrow that [...] two men *ne s’y pourraient gouverner*,”¹² that is to say, could not go forward walking abreast. It also has the material but much wider meaning of supporting by providing means of subsistence. For example, in a text from 1421: “enough wheat to govern (*gouverner*) Paris for two years,”¹³ or again, from the same period: “a man did not have the wherewithal to live or govern (*gouverner*) his wife who was ill.”¹⁴ So, “to govern” in the sense of support, provide for, and give means of subsistence. “A wife of excessive government (*gouvernement*)”¹⁵ is a wife who consumes too much and is difficult to support. “To govern” also has a meaning close to this, but a little different, of the source of one’s means of subsistence. Froissart talks of a town “which is governed (*se gouverner*) by its drapery,”¹⁶ that is to say, getting its means of subsistence from this activity. These are a set of reference points, or some specifically material references anyway, of this word “to govern (*gouverner*).”

There are meanings of a moral kind. “To govern” may mean “to conduct someone,” either in the specifically spiritual sense of the government of souls—a completely classical sense that will endure and subsist for a very long time—or, in a way that deviates a bit from this, “to govern” may mean “to impose a regimen,” on a patient for example: the doctor governs the patient, or the patient, who imposes treatment on himself, governs himself. Thus, a text says: “A patient who, after having left the Hôtel-Dieu, passed away as a result of his bad government.”¹⁷ He had followed a bad regimen. “To govern,” or “government,” may refer to conduct in the specifically moral sense of the term: a daughter who was of “bad government,”¹⁸ that is to say, whose conduct was bad. “To govern” may refer also to a relationship between individuals that can take many forms, be it the relationship of command and control—directing, dealing with someone—or having a verbal relationship with someone: “governing someone” may mean “speaking with him,” “conversing with him” in the sense of holding someone in a conversation. Thus, a text from the fifteenth century says: “He ate well with all those who conversed

with him (*le gouvernement*) during his supper.”¹⁹ To govern (*gouverner*) someone during his supper is to speak with him. But it may also refer to a sexual relationship: “A fellow who had a sexual relationship with (*gouvernait*) the wife of his neighbor, and saw her regularly.”²⁰

This is both a very empirical and unscientific set of reference points established through dictionaries and various references. All the same, I think it allows us to situate one of the dimensions of the problem. Before it acquires its specifically political meaning in the sixteenth century, we can see that “to govern,” covers a very wide semantic domain in which it refers to movement in space, material subsistence, diet, the care given to an individual and the health one can assure him, and also to the exercise of command, of a constant, zealous, active, and always benevolent prescriptive activity. It refers to the control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone’s body, soul, and behavior. And finally it refers to an intercourse, to a circular process or process of exchange between one individual and another. Anyway, one thing clearly emerges through all these meanings, which is that one never governs a state, a territory, or a political structure. Those whom one governs are people, individuals, or groups. When one speaks of a town that governs itself (*se gouverne*), and which is governed on the basis of its drapery, it means that people get their means of subsistence, their food, their resources, and their wealth from drapery. It is not therefore the town as a political structure, but the people, individuals, or group. Those whom one governs are people.*

I think this may put us on the track of something that is undoubtedly of some importance. To start with, and fundamentally, at least through this first set of references, those whom one governs are people. Now the idea of governing people is certainly not a Greek idea, and nor do I think it is a Roman idea. In Greek literature at least, there is the fairly frequent metaphor of the rudder, the helmsman, the pilot, and the person who steers the ship, to designate the activity of the person who is the head of the city-state and who has a number of duties and responsibilities with regard to the city. Take, for example, *Oedipus the King*.²¹ In *Oedipus the*

* The manuscript adds: “History of governmentality. Three major vectors of the governmentalization of the state: the Christian pastoral = old model; the new regime of diplomatic-military relations = supporting structure; the problem of the internal police of the state = internal support.” See above, the last lines of the previous lecture, 1 February.

King, frequently, or at several points, there is the metaphor of the king who is responsible for the city-state and must conduct it as a good pilot properly governs his ship, avoiding reefs and guiding it to port.²² But in these metaphors, which identify the king as a helmsman and the city as a ship, we should note that what is governed, what the metaphor designates as the object of government, is the city-state itself, which is like a ship threatened by reefs, a ship caught in the storm, a ship that has to steer a course avoiding pirates and enemies, and a ship that must be led to safe harbor. Individuals are not the object of government; the action of government is not brought to bear on individuals. The captain or pilot of the ship does not govern the sailors; he governs the ship. In the same way, the king governs the city-state, but not the men of the city. The object or target of government is the city-state in its substantial reality, its unity, and its possible survival or disappearance. Men are only governed indirectly, insofar as they have boarded the ship. And men are governed through the intermediary or relay of boarding the ship. But it is not men themselves who are directly governed by the person who is the head of the city-state.*

So I do not think that the idea that one could govern men, or that one did govern men, was a Greek idea. If I have the time and courage I will come back to this problem, either at the end of these lectures or in the next series of lectures, basically around Plato and *The Statesman*. But, generally speaking, I think we can say that the origin of the idea of a government of men should be sought in the East, in a pre-Christian East first of all, and then in the Christian East, and in two forms: first, in the idea and organization of a pastoral type of power, and second, in the practice of spiritual direction, the direction of souls.

First, the idea and organization of a pastoral power. The theme of the king, god, or chief as a shepherd (*berger*) of men, who are like his flock, is frequently found throughout the Mediterranean East. It is found in Egypt,²³ Assyria,²⁴ Mesopotamia,²⁵ and above all, of course, in the Hebrews. In Egypt, for example, but also in the Assyrian and Babylonian

* The manuscript adds, p. 16: "This does not exclude there being those among the rich and powerful who had a status that allowed them to manage the affairs of the city-state, and allowed others (citizens, not slaves or metics) multiple and closely woven modes of action: clientelism, euergetism."

monarchies, the king is actually designated, in a completely ritual way, as the shepherd (*berger*) of men. On his coronation, for example, the Pharaoh receives the insignia of the shepherd. The shepherd's crook is placed in his hands and he is declared the shepherd of men. The title of shepherd (*pâtre*) or pastor (*pasteur*) of men, is one of the royal titles for the Babylonian monarchs. It was also a term designating the relationship of the gods, or god, with men. God is the pastor of men. In an Egyptian hymn, we can read something like this: "Oh Ra who keeps watch when all men sleep, who seeks what is good for your flock . . ." ²⁶ God is the shepherd (*berger*) of men. In a word, this metaphor of the shepherd, this reference to pastorship allows a type of relationship between God and the sovereign to be designated, in that if God is the shepherd of men, and if the king is also the shepherd of men, then the king is, as it were, the subaltern shepherd to whom God has entrusted the flock of men and who, at the end of the day and the end of his reign, must restore the flock he has been entrusted with to God. Pastorship is a fundamental type of relationship between God and men and the king participates, as it were, in this pastoral structure of the relationship between God and men. An Assyrian hymn addressed to the king says: "Radiant companion who shares in God's pastorship (*pastorat*), who cares for the land and provides for it, O shepherd of plenty." ²⁷

Obviously, the theme of pastorship is especially developed and intensified in the Hebrews, ²⁸ with the particular characteristic that in the Hebrews the shepherd-flock relationship is essentially, fundamentally, and almost exclusively a religious relationship. Only the relations between God and his people are defined as relations between a shepherd (*pasteur*) and a flock. No Hebrew king, with the exception of David, the founder of the monarchy, is explicitly referred to by name as a shepherd (*berger*). ²⁹ The term is reserved for God. ³⁰ But some prophets are thought to have received the flock of men from God, to whom they must return it, ³¹ and, on the other hand, the bad kings, ³² those who are denounced for having betrayed their task, are designated as bad shepherds, not in relation to individuals, but always in reference to the whole, as those who have squandered and dispersed the flock, who have been unable to feed it and take it back to its land. ³² The pastoral relationship in its full and positive form is therefore essentially the

relationship of God to men. It is a religious type of power that God exercises over his people.

I think there is something in this that is fundamental, and probably specific, to the Mediterranean East, and which is very different from what is found in the Greeks. You never find the Greeks having the idea that the gods lead men like a pastor, a shepherd, leads his flock. Whatever the intimacy between the Greek gods and their city, and it is not necessarily very great, it is never that kind of relationship. The Greek god founds the city, he or she indicates its site, helps in the construction of walls, guarantees its soundness, gives his or her name to the town, and issues oracles through which he or she gives advice. The god is consulted; he or she protects and intervenes; he or she is sometimes angry, and then makes peace; but the Greek god never leads the men of the city like a shepherd leads his sheep.

What is it, then, that characterizes this power of the shepherd, which we can see is foreign to Greek thought, but present and intense in the Mediterranean East, especially in the Hebrews? What are its specific features? I think we can summarize them in the following way. The shepherd's power is not exercised over a territory but, by definition, over a flock, and more exactly, over the flock in its movement from one place to another. The shepherd's power is essentially exercised over a multiplicity in movement. The Greek god is a territorial god, a god *intra muros*, with his privileged place, his town or temple. The Hebrew God, on the other hand, is the God moving from place to place, the God who wanders. The presence of the Hebrew God is never more intense and visible than when his people are on the move, and when, in his people's wanderings, in the movement that takes them from the town, the prairies, and pastures, he goes ahead and shows his people the direction they must follow. The Greek god, rather, appears on the walls to defend his town. The Hebrew God appears precisely when one is leaving the town, when one is leaving the city walls behind and taking the path across the prairies. "O God, when you set out at the head of your people," say the Psalms.³³ In the same way, or in a somewhat similar way, Amon, the Egyptian shepherd-god, is defined as the one who leads people on every path. If there is a reference to the territory in the direction God gives to a multiplicity on the move, it is to where the shepherd-god

knows fertile grasslands can be found, the best routes to take, and the places suitable for resting. In Exodus, it is said to Yahweh: "In your faithful love you led out the people you had redeemed; in your strength you have guided them to your holy pastures."^{34*} So, in contrast with the power exercised on the unity of a territory, pastoral power is exercised on a multiplicity on the move.

Second, pastoral power is fundamentally a beneficent power. You will say that this is part of all religious, moral, and political descriptions of power. What kind of power would be fundamentally wicked? What kind of power would not have the function, purpose, and justification of doing good? It is a universal feature, except that, nonetheless, in Greek thought anyway, and I think also in Roman thought, the duty to do good was ultimately only one of the many components characterizing power. Power is characterized as much by its omnipotence, and by the wealth and splendor of the symbols with which it clothes itself, as by its beneficence. Power is defined by its ability to triumph over enemies, defeat them, and reduce them to slavery. Power is also defined by the possibility of conquest and by the territories, wealth, and so on it has accumulated. Beneficence is only one of a whole bundle of features by which power is defined.

However, pastoral power is, I think, entirely defined by its beneficence; its only *raison d'être* is doing good, and in order to do good. In fact the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation (*salut*)[†] of the flock. In this sense we can say that we are assuredly not very far from the objective traditionally fixed for the sovereign, that is to say, the salvation of one's country, which must be the *lex suprema* of the exercise of power.³⁵ But the salvation that must be assured to the flock has a very precise meaning in this theme of pastoral power. Salvation is first of all essentially subsistence. The means of subsistence provided, the food assured,

* [Foucault's French version of this verse is slightly different from the King James version: "thou has guided them in thy strength unto thy holy habitation," and from that of the New Jerusalem Bible: "in your strength you have guided them to your holy dwelling"; G.B.]

† The French *salut* can, of course, mean both "safety" and "salvation" in its religious sense. I have chosen to translate it as salvation, bearing in mind that the English word, in addition to the specifically religious sense, also includes the sense of preserving from harm, whereas "safety" does not include the religious sense: G.B.

is good pasture. The shepherd is someone who feeds and who feeds directly, or at any rate, he is someone who feeds the flock first by leading it to good pastures, and then by making sure that the animals eat and are properly fed. Pastoral power is a power of care. It looks after the flock, it looks after the individuals of the flock, it sees to it that the sheep do not suffer, it goes in search of those that have strayed off course, and it treats those that are injured. A rabbinic commentary, which is a bit late but which absolutely reflects this, explains how and why Moses was chosen by God to lead the flock of Israel. It was because when Moses was a shepherd in Egypt he knew how to graze his sheep and knew, for example, that when he came to pasture he had to send the youngest sheep first to eat the most tender grass, then those a little older, and then the eldest and most robust who could eat the toughest grass. In this way each category of sheep had the grass it needed and enough to eat. Moses presided over this just, calculated, and reflected distribution of food, and Yahweh, seeing this, said to him: "Since you know how to pity the sheep, you will have pity for my people, and I will entrust them to you."³⁶

The shepherd's (*pasteur*) power manifests itself, therefore, in a duty, a task to be undertaken, so that—and I think this is also an important characteristic of pastoral power—the form it takes is not first of all the striking display of strength and superiority. Pastoral power initially manifests itself in its zeal, devotion, and endless application. What is the shepherd (*berger*)? Is he someone whose strength strikes men's eyes, like the sovereigns or gods, like the Greek gods, who essentially appear in their splendor? Not at all. The shepherd is someone who keeps watch. He "keeps watch" in the sense, of course, of keeping an eye out for possible evils, but above all in the sense of vigilance with regard to any possible misfortune. He will keep watch over the flock and avoid the misfortune that may threaten the least of its members. He will see to it that things are best for each of the animals of his flock. This is true for the Hebrew God and equally for the Egyptian god, of whom it is said: "Oh Ra who keeps watch when all men sleep, who seeks what is beneficial for your flock . . ." ³⁷ But why? He keeps watch because he has an office, which is not primarily defined as an honor, but rather as a burden and effort. The shepherd (*pasteur*) directs all his care towards

others and never towards himself. This is precisely the difference between the good and the bad shepherd. The bad shepherd only thinks of good pasture for his own profit, for fattening the flock that he will be able to sell and scatter, whereas the good shepherd thinks only of his flock and of nothing else. He does not even consider his own advantage in the well-being of his flock. I think we see here the appearance, the outline, of a power with an essentially selfless and, as it were, transitional character. The shepherd (*pasteur*) serves the flock and must be an intermediary between the flock and pasture, food, and salvation, which implies that pastoral power is always a good in itself. All the dimensions of terror and of force or fearful violence, all these disturbing powers that make men tremble before the power of kings and gods, disappear in the case of the shepherd (*pasteur*), whether it is the king-shepherd or the god-shepherd.

Finally, the last feature, which confirms some of things I have been saying, is the idea that pastoral power is an individualizing power. That is to say, it is true that the shepherd directs the whole flock, but he can only really direct it insofar as not a single sheep escapes him. The shepherd counts the sheep; he counts them in the morning when he leads them to pasture, and he counts them in the evening to see that they are all there, and he looks after each of them individually. He does everything for the totality of his flock, but he does everything also for each sheep of the flock. And it is here that we come to the famous paradox of the shepherd, which takes two forms. On the one hand, the shepherd must keep his eye on all and on each, *omnes et singulatim*,³⁸ which will be the great problem both of the techniques of power in Christian pastorate, and of the, let's say, modern techniques of power deployed in the technologies of population I have spoken about. *Omnes et singulatim*. And then, in an even more intense manner, the second form taken by the paradox of the shepherd is the problem of the sacrifice of the shepherd for his flock, the sacrifice of himself for the whole of his flock, and the sacrifice of the whole of his flock for each of the sheep. What I mean is that, in this Hebrew theme of the flock, the shepherd owes everything to his flock to the extent of agreeing to sacrifice himself for its salvation.³⁹ But, on the other hand, since he must save each of the sheep, will he not find himself in a situation in which he has to neglect the whole of the flock

in order to save a single sheep? This theme, with Moses at its center, is endlessly repeated in all the different sedimentations of the Biblical text from Genesis up to the rabbinical commentaries. Moses really was prepared to abandon the whole of the flock in order to save a single sheep that had gone astray. Finally he found the sheep and brought it back on his shoulders, and at that moment, it turns out that the flock he was prepared to sacrifice was nonetheless saved, symbolically, precisely by the fact that he was prepared to sacrifice it.⁴⁰ This is central to the challenge, to the moral and religious paradox of the shepherd, or what could be called the paradox of the shepherd: the sacrifice of one for all, and the sacrifice of all for one, which will be at the absolute heart of the Christian problematic of the pastorate.

To sum up, we can say that the idea of a pastoral power is the idea of a power exercised on a multiplicity rather than on a territory. It is a power that guides towards an end and functions as an intermediary towards this end. It is therefore a power with a purpose for those on whom it is exercised, and not a purpose for some kind of superior unit like the city, territory, state, or sovereign [...*]. Finally, it is a power directed at all and each in their paradoxical equivalence, and not at the higher unity formed by the whole. I think the structures of the Greek city-state and the Roman Empire were entirely foreign to this type of power. You will say that there are a number of texts in Greek literature in which there is a very explicit comparison between political power and the power of the shepherd. There is *The Statesman*, which, as you know, is engaged in precisely this type of research. What is the one who rules? What is it to rule? Is it not exercising power over a flock?

Good, listen, I feel really lousy. I cannot go into all this, and ask you if we can stop now. I really am too tired. I will talk about this again, the problem of *The Statesman* in Plato next week. I would just like to indicate roughly—well, if I have given you this very clumsy schema, it is because it seems to me that we have a very important phenomenon, which is that the idea of a pastoral power, which is entirely foreign, or at any rate considerably foreign to Greek and Roman thought, was introduced into the Western world by way of the Christian Church. The Christian Church

* An inaudible word.

coagulated all these themes of pastoral power into precise mechanisms and definite institutions, it organized a pastoral power that was both specific and autonomous, it implanted its apparatuses within the Roman Empire, and at the heart of the Empire it organized a type of power that I think was unknown to any other civilization. This really is the paradox and the subject on which I would like to focus in the next lectures. Of all civilizations, the Christian West has undoubtedly been, at the same time, the most creative, the most conquering, the most arrogant, and doubtless the most bloody. At any rate, it has certainly been one of the civilizations that has deployed the greatest violence. But, at the same time, and this is the paradox I would like to stress, over millennia Western man has learned to see himself as a sheep in a flock, something that assuredly no Greek would have been prepared to accept. Over millennia he has learned to ask for his salvation from a shepherd (*pasteur*) who sacrifices himself for him. The strangest form of power, the form of power that is most typical of the West, and that will also have the greatest and most durable fortune, was not born in the steppe or in the towns. This form of power so typical of the West, and unique, I think, in the entire history of civilizations, was born, or at least took its model from the fold, from politics seen as a matter of the sheep-fold.

1. See the previous lecture, 1 February, p. 104 and p. 106 concerning economy as “science of government,” and p. 107: “an art of government that has now crossed the threshold of political science.”
2. On this notion, see above, lecture of 18 January, p. 33.
3. R. Castel, *L'Ordre psychiatrique. L'âge d'or de l'aliénisme* (Paris: Minuit, “Le sens commun,” 1976; English translation by W.D. Halls, *The Regulation of Madness, the origins of incarceration in France* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988).
4. See, *ibid.* ch. 3, pp. 138–152 (“L’aliéniste, l’hygiéniste et la philanthrope”); trans., *ibid.* pp. 112–124 (“The Mental Health Specialist, the Hygienist and the Philanthropist”). See on pp. 142–143 (trans. pp. 116–117), the quotations from the prospectus presenting the *Annales d’hygiène publique et de médecine légale*, founded in 1829 by Marc and Esquirol (“public hygiene, which is the art of preserving the health of people gathered together in society and which is destined to be very greatly developed and to provide numerous applications for the improvement of our institutions”).
5. *Ibid.* ch. 1, pp. 39–50 (“Le criminel, l’enfant, le mendiant, le prolétaire et le fou”); trans., *ibid.* pp. 28–38 (“Criminal, Child, Beggar, Poor Wage-earner and Mad person”).
6. *Ibid.* ch. 5, pp. 208–215 (“Les opérateurs politiques”); trans., *ibid.* pp. 171–180 (“The Political Operators”).
7. In the 1973–1974 lectures, *Le Pouvoir psychiatrique; Psychiatric Power*, going back over various points in *Histoire de la folie; Madness and Civilization*, that according to him could be challenged, Foucault questions for the first time the criticism of psychiatric power in terms of the institution and sets against it a criticism founded on the analysis of relations of power, or the micro-physics of power. See the lecture of 7 November 1973, p. 16; p. 15: “I no longer think that the institution is a very satisfactory notion. It seems to me that it harbors a number of dangers, because as soon as we talk about institutions we are basically talking about both individuals and the group, we take the individual, the group, and the rules which govern them as given, and as a result we can throw in all the psychological or sociological discourses. [...] What is important [...] is not institutional regularities, but much more the practical dispositions of power, the characteristic networks, currents, relays, points of support, and differences of a form of power, which are, I think, constitutive of, precisely, both the individual and the group.” See the lecture of 14 November 1973, p. 34; p. 33: “Let’s be really anti-institutionalist.” See too, *Surveiller et Punir*, p. 217; *Discipline and Punish*, p. 215: “‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus (*appareil*).”
8. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), *Panopticon, or the Inspection House...*, in *Works*, ed., J. Bowring (Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–1843) vol. IV, pp. 37–66; French translation, *Panoptique, Mémoire sur un nouveau principe pour construire des maisons d’inspection, et nommément des maisons de force*, trans. E. Dumont (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1791), republished in *Œuvres de Jérémy Bentham*, ed., E. Dumont (Brussels: Louis Hauman and Co., 1829) vol. 1, pp. 245–262. The French translation is reproduced in J. Bentham, *Le Panoptique*, preceded by M. Foucault, “L’œil du pouvoir”; “The eye of power” and followed by a translation by M. Sissung of the first part of the original version of *Panopticon*, as published by Bentham in England in 1791. The most recent English edition is, Jeremy Bentham, *The Panopticon Writings*, ed. M. Božovič (New York and London: Verso, 1995). See *Surveiller et Punir*, pp. 201–206; *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 200–209.
9. See, “L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté” (January 1984) *Dits et Écrits*, 4, p. 726; English translation by P. Aranov and D. McGrawth, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Vol. 1: Ethics: subjectivity and truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997) p. 297: “I have been seen as saying that madness does not exist, whereas the problem is absolutely the converse: it was a question of knowing how madness, under the various definitions that have been given, was at a particular time integrated into an institutional field that constituted it as a mental illness occupying a specific place alongside other illnesses.” According to Paul Veyne, this was how Raymond Aron, for example, understood *Histoire de la folie; Madness and Civilization*.
10. See Paul Veyne, “Foucault révolutionne l’histoire” (1978) in Paul Veyne, *Comment on écrit l’histoire* (Paris: Le Seuil, “Points Histoire,” 1979) p. 229. Veyne’s essay on Foucault is not

included in the English translation of the first, 1971 edition of his book, *Writing History: Essay on Epistemology*, trans. Mina Moore-Rinvulcri (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1984). The essay is translated by Catherine Porter, "Foucault Revolutionizes History" in Arnold I. Davidson, ed., *Foucault and his Interlocutors* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997) p. 170: "When I showed the present text to Foucault, he responded roughly as follows: 'I personally have never written that *madness does not exist*, but it can be written; because, for phenomenology, madness exists, but is not a thing, whereas one has to say on the contrary that madness does not exist, but that it is not therefore nothing.'"

11. The manuscript (unnumbered page inserted between pages 14 and 15) refers to the *Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française et de tous ses dialectes du IX^e au XV^e* of Frédéric Godefroy (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1885) vol. IV.
12. "Un petit chemin si estroit, qu'un home a cheval seroit assez empesché d passer outre, ne deux hommes ne s'y pourroyent gouverner" Froissart, *Chroniques*, 1559, Book I, p. 72, cited by F. Godefroy, *Dictionnaire*, p. 326.
13. "Si y avoit a Paris plus de blé que homme qui fust ne en ce temp y eust oncques voeu, car on tesmoignoit qu'il y en avoit pour bein gouverner Paris pour plus de 2 ans entiers," *Journal de Paris sous Charles VI*, p. 77, cited by F. Godefroy, *Dictionnaire*, p. 325.
14. "Il n'avoit de quoy vivre ni gouverner sa femme qui estoit malade" 1425, Arch. JJ 173, pièce 186, cited by Godefroy, *ibid.*
15. "Pour ces jours avait ung chevalier et une dame de trop grand gouvernement, et se nommoit li sires d'Aubrecourt" Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. II, p. 4, cited by Godefroy, *ibid.*
16. "Une grosse ville non fermee qui s'appelle Senarpont et se gouverner toute de la draperie" Froissart, *Chroniques*, Book V, cited by Godefroy, *ibid.* p. 326.
17. "De laquelle bateure icellui Philipot a esté malade par l'espace de trois semaines ou environ, tant a l'Ostel Dieu ou il fu porté comme en son hostel, et depuis, par son mauvais gouvernement, est alé de vie a trespassement" 1423, Arch. JJ 172; pièce 186, cited by Godefroy, *ibid.* p. 325.
18. "Une fille qui avoit esté de mauvais gouvernement" H. Estienne, *Apol. P. Hérod.*, c. 15, cited by Godefroy, *ibid.*
19. "Il fit bonne chere a tous, voire aux principaux des Seize, qui le gouvernerent pendant son souper" Pasq., *Lett.*, XVII, 2, cited by Godefroy, *ibid.*
20. "Un quidam qui gouvernait la femme de son voisin et l'alloit voir si souvent qu'a la fin le mary s'en aperçut" G. Bouchet, *Serées*, 1.III, p. 202, cited by Godefroy, *ibid.* This is also cited by Littré, *Dictionnaire de la langue française* (Paris: J.-J. Pauvert, 1957) vol. 4, p. 185.
21. Foucault frequently took an interest in this drama in the years between 1970 and 1980. See the lectures of 1970-1971, "La Volonté de savoir," 12th lecture (summarized in a lecture at Cornell in October 1972); "La vérité et les formes juridiques," (1974) *Dits et Écrits*, 2, pp. 553-568; English translation by Robert Hurley, "Truth and Juridical Forms," *Essential Works of Foucault*, 3, pp. 1-89; the first lectures of the 1979-1980 series, "Du gouvernement des vivants" (16 and 23 January, and 1 February: the Louvain seminar of May 1981, "Mal faire, dire vrai. Fonction de l'aveu" (unpublished).
22. In fact the image only appears once in *Oedipus the King*. See the French translation by R. Pignarre (Paris: Garnier, 1964) p. 122: "My king, I have said to you before, and I say it again, / I would prove mad and foolish / if I were to abandon you, you / who, when my country was beset by storm, / was the good wind that guided it. Ah! Once again, / if you can, lead us to safe harbor today." [Cf. the English translation by David Grene, which refers to "you who steered the country," but not explicitly to harbor or port; "Oedipus the King" in David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, eds, *Sophocles I* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991) pp. 40-41; G.B.] It is, however, a recurrent theme in Sophocles: *Ajax*, 1082, *Antigone*, 162, 190. See P. Louis, *Les Métaphores de Platon*, p. 156, n. 18.
23. The Pharaohs were designated as the shepherds (*bergers*) of their people from the 12th dynasty, under the Middle Empire at the beginning of the 2nd millennium. See D. Müller, "Der gatte Hirt. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte ägyptischer Bildrede," *Zeitschrift für Ägypt. Sprache*, 86, 1961, pp. 126-144.
24. The description of the king as pastor (*re'ū*) goes back to Hammurabi (around 1728-1686). Most of the Assyrian kings, up to Assurbanipal (669-626) and the neo-Babylonian

- monarchs, will adopt this custom. See L. Dürr, *Ursprung und Ausbau der israelitisch-jüdischen Heilandservartung. Ein Beitrag zur Theologies des Alten Testaments* (Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1925) pp. 116-120.
25. See I. Seibert, *Hirt-Herde-König. Zur Herausbildung des Königiums in Mesopotamien* (Berlin: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaft zu Berlin. Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft, 53, 1969).
 26. "Hymne à Amon-Ré" (Le Caire, c.1430 B.C.E) in A. Barucq and F. Dumas, *Hymnes et Prières de l'Égypte ancienne*, no. 69 (Paris: Le Cerf, 1980) p. 198.
 27. Source unidentified. On the divine origin of royal power, which expresses the image of the shepherd (*pasteur*), see I. Seibert, *Hirt-Herde-König*, pp. 7-9.
 28. There is a considerable literature on this subject. See, W. Jost, *Poimen. Das Bild vom Hirten in der biblischen Überlieferung und seine christologische Bedeutung* (Giessen: Otto Kindt, 1939); G.E. Post, "Sheep," in *Dictionary of the Bible* (Edinburgh: 1902) vol. 4, pp. 486-487; V. Hamp, (i) "Das Hirtmotiv im Alten Testament," in *Festschrift Kard. Faulhaber* (Munich: J. Pfeiffer, 1949) pp. 7-20, and (ii) "Hirt," in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* (Freiburg im Breisgau: 1960) col. 384-386. On the New Testament: Th. H. Kempf, *Christus der Hirt. Ursprung und Deutung einer altchristlichen Symbolgestalt* (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1942); J. Jeremias, "Ποιμήν," in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, Bd. 6, 1959, pp. 484-501. Among more recent studies we note the article by P. Grelot, "Berger," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique* (Paris: Bauchesne) 1984) vol. 12, col. 361-372, and the good synthesis accompanied by a very rich bibliography, by D. Peil, *Untersuchungen zur Staats- und Herrschaftsmetaphorik in literarischen Zeugnissen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: W. Fink, 1983) pp. 29-164 ("Hirt und Herde").
 29. This title is not applied directly to him in the historical and sapiential books. See the second book of Samuel, 5, 2; 24, 17; Psalms, 78, 70-72: God entrusts the "grazing (*paître*)" of the people of Israel to him and David designates the latter as a "flock." On the other hand, the designation is more frequent in the prophetic books: see, for example, Ezekiel, 34, 23; 37, 24 ("My servant David will reign over them, one shepherd for all" (New Jerusalem Bible). As Foucault suggests, the image of the shepherd is sometimes used to designate pagan kings: see Isaiah, 44, 28 (with reference to Cyrus); Jeremiah, 25, 34.
 30. See Genesis, 48, 15; Psalms, 23, 1-4; 80, 2; Isaiah, 40, 11; Jeremiah, 31, 10; Ezekiel, 34, 11-16; Zechariah, 11, 4-14. See W. Jost, *Poimen*, p. 19 sq. Obviously there are many more occurrences of the application of pastoral vocabulary to Yahweh ("to guide," "to lead," "to herd," "to lead to pasture," etcetera). See, J. Jeremias, "Ποιμήν," p. 486.
 31. See, Jeremiah, 17, 16 (but the translation of this passage has been questioned); Amos, 1, 1; 7, 14-15; See W. Jost, *Poimen*, p. 16.
 32. See, Isaiah, 56, 11; Jeremiah, 2, 8; 10, 21; 12, 10; 23, 1-3; Ezekiel, 34, 2-10 ("Disaster is in store for the shepherds of Israel who feed themselves! Are not shepherds meant to feed a flock? Yet you have fed on milk, you have dressed yourselves in wool, you have sacrificed the fattest sheep, but failed to feed the flock. You have failed to make weak sheep strong, or to care for the sick ones, or bandage the injured ones. You have failed to bring back strays or look for the lost. On the contrary you have ruled them cruelly and harshly" *New Jerusalem Bible*); Zechariah, 10, 3; 11, 4-17; 13, 7.
 33. Psalms, 68, 7.
 34. Exodus, 15, 13.
 35. Foucault is alluding here to the maxim "Salus populi suprema lex esto," the first occurrence of which is found—with a quite different meaning—in Cicero, *De legibus*, 3, 3, 8, with regard to the duty of magistrates to apply the law zealously, and which was taken up from the sixteenth century by most of the theorists of absolutism. See above, lecture of 1 February, note 27, the quotation from Pufendorf's *De officio hominis et civis; On the Duty of Man and Citizen*.
 36. See, J. Engemann, "Hirt" in *Realexikon für Antike und Christentum* (Stuttgart: 1991) vol. 15, col. 589: "Andererseits bleibt ihnen (= den Rabbinen) dennoch bewußt, daß Mose, gerade weil er ein guter Hirt war, von Gott erwählt wurde, das Volk Israel zu führen (Midr. Ex. 2, 2); L. Ginzberg, *The legends of the Jews*, 7, trans. from the German manuscript by Henrietta Szold (Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Soc. of America, 1938) Reg. s.v. shepherd." See also Philo of Alexandria, *Di vita Mosis*, l. 60 (according to D. Peil, *Untersuchungen*, p. 43, n. 59); Justin Martyr, *Apologies*, 62, 3 (according to W. Jost, *Poimen*, p. 14, n. 1).

37. Phrase already quoted above, p. 124.
38. See the lectures, "'*Omnes et singulatim*': Toward a critique of political reason," given by Foucault at the University of Stanford in October 1979, in *Essential Works of Foucault*, 3, pp. 298-325; French translation by P.-E. Dauzat, "'*Omnes et singulatim*': vers une critique de la raison politique," *Dits et Ecrits*, 4, pp. 134-161.
39. See, John, 11, 50; 18, 14: "... it was better for one man to die for the people."
40. See the next lecture, 15 February, p. 152.