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
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# UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM



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**Individual Manpower Mobilization:  
The Army Reserve Personnel Center**

*Adding Value to the Total Force and to the Nation*

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FOREWORD

This is one in a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in winning the war in the Persian Gulf. Countless reports have been written and numerous books published about the coalition victory. None have appeared, however, that focus on the valuable contributions of Army Reserve soldiers and civilians to the favorable outcome of the conflict. This monograph and others in the series fill that void.

This report on the mobilization of individuals to augment the Total Force details the contributions made by Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), Individual Ready Reservists (IRRs) and retirees. It tells the story of mobilizing this vast pool of personnel, its management by the Army Reserve Personnel Center and the problems associated with such a mammoth challenge. It is a story of Total Army success in meeting the needs for trained and ready soldiers. Recommendations for employment of these mobilization assets in any future contingency action are offered.

Other monographs will be issued to describe the roles of a variety of Army Reserve units and individual soldiers. They will include military police, civil affairs specialists, engineers, trainers, communicators, medical personnel, transporters and strategic intelligence units. These monographs, and the results of additional research on contributions of the Army Reserve to operations in the Persian Gulf, will be bound eventually in a single volume.

Your comments on this and future issuances are most welcome.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

RONALD E. SMITH  
Colonel, General Staff  
Chief, Program Analysis and  
Evaluation Division

**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE  
in  
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

**Individual Manpower Mobilization:**

**The Army Reserve Personnel Center**

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John R. Brinkerhoff, Consultant to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, has been the principal author of this report. Ted Silva and John Seitz were editors and contributing authors.

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**Questions concerning this report may be addressed to:**

**Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
ATTN: DAAR-PAE  
Room 1D424  
Washington, DC 20310-2400**

**Phone: (703) 695-0877  
DsN: 225-0877**

**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE  
in  
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

**Individual Manpower Mobilization:  
The Army Reserve Personnel Center**

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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE  
in  
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

**Individual Manpower Mobilization:  
The Army Reserve Personnel Center**

**Pretrained Individual Manpower**

Over and above the personnel already assigned to the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units that were readied and deployed to the Persian Gulf or employed in CONUS, the Army needed additional soldiers to fill units to full wartime strength and replace losses due to illness, injury, or enemy action. The job of mobilizing the additional manpower to sustain the Army in DESERT STORM fell to the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN).

Pretrained individual manpower are military personnel not assigned to a unit who have completed their initial entry (basic) training and have enough skill training to have been awarded a military occupational specialty (MOS). These trained individuals may be assigned to a unit as a filler (bringing the unit to full wartime strength) or replacement and contribute immediately to unit mission accomplishment. The other possible source of fillers and replacements is post-trained individuals who volunteer or are drafted into military service and then must receive 12 weeks of basic training or equivalent before they are eligible to deploy outside the United States. Post-trained individuals are not available for several months after a mobilization and even then are trained only at the entry level for their particular skills. It is highly advantageous, therefore, to have pretrained individuals available to meet the needs of the Army in the first three or four months of a mobilization--particularly to fill positions calling for more than entry-level skills.

There are four basic sources of pretrained individual manpower: Active Component individuals accounts, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), and Military Retired Personnel. Active Army individuals include trainees undergoing their initial entry training, students in military or civilian schools, patients in hospitals, prisoners in confinement facilities, and transients who are between assignments from units. While Active Army individuals are a significant source of fillers, most of the fillers and replacements for a large military operation will come from the other three sources--all of which are managed in peacetime by the Army Reserve Personnel Center.

As soon as the Army started preparing Active units for deployment to the Gulf, calling up Guard and Reserve units to be deployed, and increasing the operational tempo of units in the CONUS, the need for pretrained individual manpower to bring Active and Reserve units to full, deployable strength, replace losses and to man new provisional units formed for the war, was evident. Initially, some of these needs were met from taking up the slack from the Active

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Component individuals accounts, and in some cases by reassigning Active and Reserve personnel from non-deploying units to deploying units. These practices, particularly transferring people from one unit to another, soon led to complications as the ability of the Army to support the mobilization process was damaged, and later mobilizing Reserve units found themselves short of people, having already provided filler personnel for units called earlier. This made it necessary for the Army to use the manpower mobilization programs designed to meet just such a situation.

The first of the pretrained individuals to report were the IMAs. Next, IRR personnel began entering the system as individual fillers and replacements-- initially as volunteers, and then involuntarily after authority was granted to call up the Ready Reserve. For specific skills in demand, retired military personnel were recalled to active duty as an additional source of fillers and replacements. The total contribution, as shown in Figure 1, was substantial.

Figure 1.

Pretrained Individual Manpower Used in DESERT STORM

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Personnel	Total
Individual Mob Augmentees	1,487	155	722	2,364
Individual Ready Reservists	101	28	19,055	19,184
Retired Military Personnel	414	212	753	1,379
Total	2,002	395	20,530	22,927

The Army Reserve Personnel Center

The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), St. Louis, Missouri, is a field operating agency of the Chief, Army Reserve. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, it was under the command of Brigadier General Thomas J. Kilmartin, USAR. ARPERCEN is the central personnel office for all members of the U.S. Army Reserve, and it also serves other parts of the Total Army, including former soldiers, military dependents, and retired military personnel of all components--Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve. Over 2,000 military personnel and civilian employees are employed at ARPERCEN.

The motto of ARPERCEN is "Management for Mobilization," and the emphasis is on assuring that pretrained individual manpower will be available to meet Army needs. ARPERCEN provides life cycle personnel management services for U.S. Army Reserve soldiers to support defined readiness requirements, and it goes beyond what is normally considered personnel management to manage training, sustainment, and retention as well. The major organizational elements of ARPERCEN and a list of key ARPERCEN personnel during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM is at Appendix A.

During Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and long afterwards, ARPERCEN was involved in mobilizing, calling up, managing, and demobilizing Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Individual Ready Reservists, Active Guard Reserve personnel, and military retired personnel--all in addition to its normal functions for members of the Ready Reserve, Active Army, and Military Retirees. Each of these mobilization missions tasked the ingenuity and energy of the ARPERCEN work force.

### Individual Mobilization Augmentees

Operation DESERT STORM was the first opportunity for the Army's Individual Mobilization Augmentees to contribute to a major mobilization and deployment.<sup>1</sup> An Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) is a member of the Selected Reserve who is preassigned to augment an Active Component unit upon mobilization. The idea is that additional personnel to cope with expanded workload during an emergency--to man a command post seven days per week, 24 hours per day, for example--could be obtained from the Army Reserve when needed. The value of an IMA is enhanced by preassignment to a specific unit, training with the unit, and in effect becoming a part-time member of the unit before an emergency.

### The IMA Program

The IMA program was established in 1981 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide a means to augment Active Component units rapidly with pretrained individuals upon mobilization. Prior to the IMA Program, the Army had Ready Reservists known as Mobilization Designees who were preassigned to mobilization positions, but the Mobilization Designees were not members of the part of the Ready Reserve known as the Selected Reserve. The two major differences between a Ready Reservist who is a member of the Selected Reserve and an Individual Ready Reservist who is not, have to do with training and availability.

Selected Reservists--most of whom are in Reserve units--may be paid to attend training assemblies (drills) and in fact are required to attend a specified number of training assemblies each year plus two weeks of annual training. Individual Ready Reservists may be placed on Active Duty for Training (ADT) or Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) for short periods of time, but are not assigned to units and thus do not perform training assemblies for pay.

The other difference is that Selected Reservists may be available sooner than Individual Ready Reservists. Up to 200,000 Selected Reservists may be called to active duty involuntarily by the President without prior Congressional approval for a period of up to 90 days, renewable for another 90 days, under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, Section 673b. Up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve (which includes the Selected Reserve) may be called to active duty involuntarily in time of National Emergency declared by the President for a period of 24 months under the authority of Title 10 United States Code, Section 673. In effect, it is faster and easier to obtain the services of Selected Reservists in time of need than members of the Individual Ready Reserve.<sup>2</sup>

For Operation DESERT SHIELD, the Presidential 673b authority was exercised on 22 August 1990 to permit the call up of a limited number of Selected Reservists, but authority to call up members of the Ready Reserve--the IRR--was not given until 18 January 1991.

The OSD IMA Program made it possible for all of the Armed Forces to have IMAs who could be called early under the Presidential 673b authority and who could be paid for attending annual training or training assemblies with the Active Component units to which they were preassigned. Essentially, the Air Force system, which had worked well for years, was made available to the other Armed Forces.

The Army, however, chose not to use all of its newly gained authority for IMAs. It converted its Mobilization Designees into IMAs, but until 1988 all Army IMAs were limited to a single two week annual training period with their units, and even after 1988 the number of IMAs authorized to train with their units in addition to annual training was small.<sup>3</sup> Since the intent of the OSD Program was to promote familiarity with not only a specific unit but with a specific wartime job in that unit, the Army program fell short of OSD aspirations.

Nevertheless, the Army expanded its IMA program significantly from its older Mobilization Designee program, and IMAs were preassigned to all Army Major commands. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the strength of the IMA program.<sup>4</sup> The figure for 1980 is for Mobilization Designees. The number of enlisted IMAs increased substantially as the program developed, and by 1990, about 23% of all IMAs were enlisted personnel--primarily NCOs.

A month before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the Army had a total of 14,189 IMAs on the rolls including 31 general officers. This represented a fill of 70% of the total of 20,329 IMA positions required in mobilization manning documents. Figure 3 shows the composition of the IMA Program on 30 June 1990.<sup>5</sup>

Figure 2.

Army IMA Program Strength

	Officers	Enlisted	Total
1980	6,236	180	6,416
1981	6,536	445	6,981
1982	7,288	399	7,687
1983	7,472	634	8,106
1984	8,128	1,655	9,783
1985	8,541	2,583	11,124
1986	8,275	4,322	12,597
1987	8,074	4,864	12,938
1988	8,802	3,324	12,126
1989	9,632	2,976	12,608
1990	10,945	3,244	14,189

Figure 3.

Army IMA Strength Prior to DESERT STORM

General	31
Colonel	824
Lt Colonel	2,875
Major	3,360
Captain	2,382
Lieutenant	<u>913</u>
Total:	10,385
Warrant Officer	560
Sergeant Major	143
Master Sergeant	515
Sgt First Class	871
Staff Sergeant	820
Sergeant	845
Specialist & PFC	<u>50</u>
Total:	3,244
Total IMAs:	14,189

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Thus, on the eve of the war, the Army IMA program had significant personnel resources available to rapidly increase the strength of Active Component units and headquarters.

### The IMA Call Up for DESERT STORM

Utilization of IMAs by the Army in response to Operation DESERT SHIELD initially, and then to Operation DESERT STORM, was substantial but not as originally envisaged by the program managers. Only 17% of the IMAs were used in one way or another--some by being called to active duty involuntarily and others by participating voluntarily. Many of these did not serve to augment their Active units quickly because of call-up restrictions placed on the Services by OSD and the need to balance priorities within the authorizations then extant.

A total of 2,364 IMAs were brought to active duty with reporting dates starting 31 August 1990 and continuing through 18 August 1991. Of the total, 1,559 were ordered to active duty involuntarily under the Presidential 673b Authority, and 805 volunteers served on Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD).<sup>6</sup> General officers are not included in these totals. IMAs ordered to active duty tended to serve with the Active Component units to which they were preassigned, while those volunteers on TTAD often were assigned to other units or duties. Figure 4 shows the breakout of IMAs utilized during DESERT STORM by status and grade.<sup>7</sup> Since some IMAs went on and off active duty or TTAD during the operation, a few more than once, the maximum number on active duty at any one time (March 1991) was only 1,550.<sup>8</sup> For the same reason, the numbers in Figure 4 and 5 are not arithmetically congruent.

Figure 4.

#### IMAs Utilized by Status and Grade

Grade	Involuntary (673b)	Voluntary (TTAD)	Total
Officers	1,026	461	1,487
Warrant Officers	97	58	155
Enlisted Personnel	436	286	722
Total	1,559	805	2,364

The timing of IMA utilization is shown in Figure 5.<sup>9</sup> IMA volunteers were used on TTAD as early as 14 August 1990, and the first IMAs were ordered to active duty on 31 August

1990, shortly after the President authorized calling up a portion of the Selected Reserve under Title 10, USC, Section 673b.

The schedule for calling up the IMAs demonstrates a major departure from pre-war planning for their call up and use. The IMA program was established to allow the Army to augment their headquarters and activities such as emergency operations centers or planning cells quickly in the opening stages of a crisis. This did not happen during DESERT SHIELD, for from August 1990 through December 1990 only 113 IMAs had been called up to serve with the Active units to which they had been preassigned. About 300 of the volunteer IMAs did report on TTAD in August and September, but it was not until the Combat Phase--DESERT STORM--started in January 1991 that large numbers of IMAs were utilized. 1,283 IMAs--74% of all that were called--were not called up until after the war was over.

Figure 5.

**IMA Reporting Dates for Operation DESERT STORM**

	673b	TTAD	Total
<b>CY 1990</b>			
August	11	41	52
September	81	257	338
October	16	78	94
November	2	37	39
December	3	0	3
<b>CY 1991</b>			
January	22	270	292
February	313	11	324
March	668	14	682
April	123	0	123
May	37	0	37
June	9	0	9
July	350	0	350
August	56	0	56
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,691</b>	<b>708</b>	<b>2,399</b>

The use of volunteer IMAs in TTAD status began much earlier than the involuntary call-up because from 2 August until 22 August 1990 there was no authority to call up members of the Selected Reserve . Urgent requirements in the first weeks or months had to be met by volunteers if they were to be met at all.

The timing of IMA utilization suggests that many of the IMAs called up for DESERT STORM were not used to provide the immediate augmentation for which they were trained but were used instead to meet personnel requirements that under pre-war plans were supposed to have been met from other sources of pretrained individuals. While this is understandable given the situation in the Fall of 1990, some of these initial common filler requirements might also have been met by earlier and greater utilization of volunteers from the IRR or retired military personnel. In fact, the timing of the utilization of the IMAs, IRR, and retired personnel indicates that each of these programs became most productive from January through March 1991.

The overall utilization rate of 17% of IMAs is disappointing considering the nature of the crisis. This low utilization is explained partially by the fact that not all of the activities to which IMAs were assigned were heavily involved in DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM and thus did not need augmentation. The distribution of IMAs by the organization, headquarters, or activity to which they were assigned is shown in Figure 6.<sup>10</sup>



Figure 6.  
IMAs by Status and Command or Agency

Command or Agency	Involuntary (673b)	Voluntary (TTAD)	Total
<b>OSD and Defense Agencies</b>			
Office of the Secretary of Defense	2	0	2
National Command System	2	0	2
Defense Intelligence Agency	56	5	61
Defense Logistics Agency	3	0	3
<b>Unified &amp; Specified Command HQ</b>			
CENTCOM HQ	29	20	49
SOCCENT	15	0	15
USSOCOM HQ	5	0	5
Transportation Command	3	1	4
US Space Command	0	1	1
<b>Army Staff &amp; Operating Agencies</b>			
HQDA	52	124	176
Inspector General Agency	0	13	13
Military Postal Service Agency	12	0	12
ARPERCEN	0	13	13
US Military Academy	2	2	4
<b>Army Major Commands</b>			
Criminal Investigation Command	92	15	107
Forces Command	412	103	515
Health Services Command	432	250	682
Information Systems Command	6	0	6
Intelligence & Security Command	39	6	45
Army Materiel Command	251	28	279
Military District of Washington	1	0	1
Military Traffic Management Cmd	81	12	93
Personnel Command	41	68	109
Special Operations Command	31	29	60
Training & Doctrine Command	101	12	113
US Army Europe	23	6	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,691</b>	<b>708</b>	<b>2,399</b>

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IMA utilization during DESERT STORM varied significantly by the kinds of Active units to which the IMAs were assigned.

--None of the 457 IMAs assigned to non-DOD units were called, but this appears appropriate considering the nature of the emergency.

--Despite increased activity levels in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Agencies, only 68 of the 1,015 IMAs assigned to these organizations were used--a mere 7%--and 61 of these went to the Defense Intelligence Agency, which still used only 15% of its IMAs.

--The Unified and Specified Command Headquarters, to which 556 IMAs were assigned, used only 74, and this is understandable because headquarters for SOUTHCOM and PACOM, to which 304 of the IMAs were assigned, did not require augmentation.

--CENTCOM--the heart of the operation--used only 49 of its assigned 134 IMAs, a surprisingly low participation of only 37% considering the after-action reports that the headquarters was understaffed at the outset and required considerable augmentation.

--Department of the Army Headquarters also made little use of its 803 IMAs, with only 176, or 22% being called up or placed on TTAD. Although IMAs did some good work, as stated below, there were entire major staff sections on the Army Staff that simply did not use their IMAs for the purpose for which they had been planned.

The IMA utilization rates of Army major commands is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7.

Utilization of IMAs by Army Major Commands

Army Major Command	IMAs Assigned	IMAs Utilized	Utilization Rate (%)
Personnel Command	90	109	121%
Forces Command	623	515	83%
Criminal Investigation Command	167	107	64%
Military Traffic Management Command	206	93	45%
Health Services Command	2,076	682	33%
US Army Europe	99	29	29%
Army Materiel Command	1,387	279	20%
Special Operations Command	300	60	20%
Intelligence & Security Command	569	45	8%
Training and Doctrine Command	1,968	113	6%
Information Systems Command	133	6	5%
Military District of Washington	40	1	3%

The variation of IMA utilization by command reflected the preferences of each organization to the extent that the approval system for IMA authorizations was initiated by requests from the major commands to Headquarters, Department of the Army. While not all requests for IMAs were approved, in order to get IMAs the commands had to ask for them. Forces Command used a high proportion of its IMAs. Health Services Command used only a third, even while it was seeking medical officers and technicians from the IRR and the pool of military retirees. Training and Doctrine Command used very few of its assets, even while faced with the necessity to provide unprogrammed refresher training and special skill courses. The Military Traffic Management Command used only half of its IMAs even though it had to accomplish a workload greatly in excess of its peacetime program and had few other ways to expand. The Army Materiel Command used only one-fifth of its augmentation. Only the Personnel Command, faced with a major increase in workload, made really good use of IMAs by using more than they had assigned.

Figure 7, moreover, lists only those commands that did use some IMAs. The Corps of Engineers, IX Corps, US Forces Korea, and Japan, and many operating agencies--all with significant numbers of IMAs assigned--utilized none at all during Operation DESERT STORM.

These data indicate that prior to August 1990 there were widespread differences of opinion among the various Army commands and agencies about the IMA program. Some commands had taken the program seriously, incorporated IMAs into their emergency plans and procedures, trained them, and used them when the occasion arose. Other commands, although they had IMAs assigned to them, took them less seriously and did not even seek to use them extensively when the occasion arose. Admittedly, there were other considerations that affected the utilization of IMAs. Lack of authority prior to 22 August 1990 to call up IMAs involuntarily meant that Active Component units could not simply telephone their IMAs and tell them to report for duty--as was the original intent of the program. Incremental strength ceilings for successive stages of the Selected Reserve Call up Authority meant that IMAs had to compete in priority with Guard and Reserve troop program units to be placed on active duty. Since the thrust of Operation DESERT SHIELD was to place combat forces in the theater as soon as possible, having extra staff officers at a headquarters in CONUS was of lower priority--no matter how important the job to be done. Lack of funding to pay volunteers on TTAD may also have been a constraint initially before the funding caught up with the operations, and because this aspect of the situation had not been considered in advance.

### The Approval Process for IMAs

The major reason for the low utilization of IMAs for DESERT STORM was that few authorizations for IMAs were made available out of the Army's share of Selected Reserve authorizations from each successive call up by the President. Acting upon advice from the Secretary of Defense, the President initially did not authorize calling up the entire 200,000 Selected Reservists available to him under the PSRC. The authorizations were dribbled out in stages, and each increment of authorizations had to be parcelled out to each of the Military Services, then among the Guard Units and Reserve Units, and finally to the IMAs. Recognizing the value of having the augmentees on hand while the headquarters were dealing with the workload of planning and simultaneously implementing a major deployment, OCAR worked to obtain a major share of authorizations out of the initial call up. At this stage, however, emphasis was on units to be deployed to the theater and there was little interest in augmenting headquarters in CONUS.<sup>11</sup>

The result, as shown in Figure 8, was that the initial ceiling for IMAs from 22 August to mid-October was only 500 spaces, and the IMA ceiling did not reach 2,000 until 19 January 1991, when use by the President of his authority to call up to a million Ready Reservists eased earlier restrictions on strength. As noted earlier, by January 1991, the Army had ordered to active duty only 113 IMAs, while using another 413 as volunteers on TTAD.<sup>12</sup>

Figure 8.

IMA Share of Army Authorizations for Call up of Reservists

Date	DOD Total	Army Total	IMA Total
23 August 1990	80,000	25,000	500
14 November 1990	125,000	80,000	500
1 December 1990	188,000	115,000	500
19 January 1991	360,000	220,000	2,000

The initial allocation of only 500 IMA authorizations was quickly oversubscribed by requests for IMAs. Forces Command and Army Materiel Command agitated for substantial numbers of IMAs. Some headquarters, such as USAREUR and the Intelligence and Security Command turned immediately to volunteer IMAs on TTAD, and others simply did without their IMAs. Health Services Command (HSC) had priority on IMAs at first, and the IMAs for HSC were first granted, then taken away because they did not use them, and then granted again.<sup>13</sup>

The original intent of the IMA program was that these personnel would report automatically to their Active Component units upon declaration of a national emergency or war in which it was assumed there would be no ceilings on the numbers of military personnel on active duty or the numbers of Selected Reservists that could be ordered to active duty. For DESERT STORM, however, there was no such declaration initially and strict strength controls dictated an incremental buildup of military personnel not only in the theater but also in the supporting forces in the United States. This meant that there had to be some way to set priorities and decide on what IMAs went, and what IMAs did not. It also meant that what was intended to be an instantaneous mass response turned into a lengthy administrative process that addressed each IMA individually by name.

The mission of determining IMA activations by name was given to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army Staff--DA DCSOPS. Having the DCSOPS perform a military personnel function rather than the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel was not in accordance with normal staff procedures, but made some sense because DCSOPS was the manager of the overall force and strength ceilings--and strength ceilings controlled the pace and nature of the DESERT SHIELD buildup.

The IMA approval system started with an Active Component unit that wanted to have the services of one of the IMAs that had been preassigned to the unit--or in some cases an IMA that had not been preassigned. The organization made a request by message to DA DCSOPS, where an action team coordinated the requirement with other Army Staff sections and the Office, Chief Army Reserve. DA DCSOPS made a determination as to whether the request was approved or

disapproved and notified the command and, in the case of approvals, ARPERCEN. Upon receipt of an approved request, ARPERCEN would issue the orders and process the IMA onto active duty. A system of reports was established to assure that the numbers of IMAs on active duty at any one time was below the strength ceiling established by the Army for its IMA authorization.

Army IMA utilization was comparable to that of the Air Force but not as great as for the Marine Corps. Figure 9 shows the absolute strength of the IMA programs for all of the Armed Forces, the percentage of active duty strength represented by the IMAs, and the number of IMAs used during Operation DESERT STORM.<sup>14</sup>

Figure 9.

DOD IMA Programs for Operation DESERT STORM

Armed Force	Pre-War Strength	Percent of AC	Number Used	Participation Rate
Army	14,165	1.8%	2,364	17%
Navy	2,516	0.4%	262	10%
Air Force	13,315	2.3%	2,334	18%
Marine Corps	1,330	6.7%	856	64%

Both the Air Force and the Army relied on IMAs to provide about a 2% strength increase immediately, but both used fewer than 20% of their IMAs for DESERT STORM. The Navy had both a small IMA program and relatively little IMA participation in DESERT STORM. The Marine Corps had both high reliance on IMA augmentation and made by far the greatest use of their IMAs to augment the active Marine Corps for DESERT STORM. All of the Service IMA programs, showed little use during the Fall of 1990, and all reached their peak strengths on active duty during March 1991, after the war had ended.

Utilization of IMAs

What did the IMAs do during the war? The answer to this question basically is whatever their Active units wanted, and that is not merely a flippant remark. Caught in a mobilization for which planning was not yet completed, there was a great deal of improvisation, and having

IMAs (and other pretrained individuals) available provided the necessary slack to allow the Army to respond. Generally, the IMAs did the following:

--Filled in behind Active Component officers ordered suddenly to the theater or other jobs. In one instance cited in a post-war survey, when an Active Component officer was transferred, an IMA lieutenant colonel took over a division chief job and "performed outstandingly."

--Provided the additional personnel to man headquarters operations centers for 24-hour, seven-day operations. The Army Operations Center, for example, used IMAs as operations officers, assistant team chiefs, and a shift chief to operate continuously during the operation. The Crisis Response Cell at the Army's Special Operations Command was operated entirely by IMAs.

--Provided most or all of the personnel to man emergency organizations not active in peacetime. This was the case, for example, with the National Prisoner of War Information Center operated almost entirely by IMAs for the Army Staff in the Pentagon.

--Provided key skills not immediately available in the Active units. For example, several IMAs were involved directly with efforts to identify and interdict shipments of war materials to Iraq during the war.

--Provided the extra people needed to facilitate the rapid deployment of units to the theater, serving as departure controllers.<sup>15</sup>

--Augmented Active unit capability. IMAs, for example, constituted the entire forward command and control element for SOCCENT in the theater.<sup>16</sup>

Some IMAs were utilized in unexpected ways, as in the case of Major Timothy C. Johnson, a nuclear engineer assigned before the war as an IMA to the Defense Intelligence Agency as a member of a Target Vulnerabilities assessment team with which he had trained for three successive periods of annual training. After volunteering for active duty in October 1990, he was ordered to active duty involuntarily on 4 March 1991 and served until 22 March 1991. During his period of active duty, he worked in the Africa Branch performing duties quite different from those for which he had trained, while backfilling against Active Component personnel who were deployed to Saudi Arabia. Major Johnson considers his experience a good one, for he was treated well and enjoyed learning new things. He received recognition for his military service in the form of a letter to his civilian employer, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.<sup>17</sup>

A different and probably unique situation was experienced by Colonel Thomas E. Johnson, whose pre-war assignment was commander of the Staging Command, Fort Dix, New Jersey. The Staging Command was a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) unit composed entirely of about 160 IMAs which had the mission of processing Guard and Reserve

units for which Fort Dix was the designated mobilization station.<sup>18</sup> In the Fall of 1990 as Fort Dix scrambled to put together an organization to accomplish the mobilization station mission, Colonel Johnson contacted the Commanding General several times offering the services of his unit. Colonel Johnson was called up for active duty on 17 December 1990, but he was the only member of his unit to be called. He assumed command of the provisional mobilization organization, composed of AC personnel stationed at Fort Dix, and non-deployable Reserve personnel. One of his first actions was to sweep the barracks to find people left behind by deploying units and put them to work. He also made use of Reservists on Annual Training and other types of duty, including some members of his own IMA unit. In addition to processing and training the mobilized units, Colonel Johnson's organization provided training for some Kuwaiti soldiers. Colonel Johnson worked directly for the Commanding General and was one of three brigade level commands on the Post.<sup>19</sup>

In addition, IMAs helped process Guard and Reserve units to active duty, ministered to troops in hospitals and leaving for the war, provided legal assistance to soldiers, issued prescription drugs, briefed high level officials including the Chief of Staff of the Army, worked with ships' crews from many nations, helped Reservists with financial problems resulting from being called up to active duty, managed the airlift of a division, wrote histories of the operation, redeployed equipment from Saudi Arabia on cargo ships, established petroleum terminals in the desert, loaded aircraft for movement of cargo and personnel, solved crimes, managed a major logistical system in Saudi Arabia, investigated allegations of fraud and misconduct, commanded companies and battalions, wrote operations plans, helped plan and execute the restoration of Kuwait, worked in hospital emergency rooms, flew aircraft, and helped demobilize Guard and Reserve Units. IMAs were used in every theater supporting the war, including 378 sent to Southwest Asia.<sup>20</sup> They supported the mobilization process itself and were essential to successful planning and implementation of the operation by Army and Joint headquarters. How well did they do on these jobs?

### Supervisor Evaluation of IMA Performance

There are two important aspects of the performance of the IMAs: How well did they satisfy the Active units to which they reported? How well were they received and utilized in these units? The first question is from the viewpoint of the supervisors; the second question is from the viewpoint of the IMAs themselves. Fortunately, there are some data to provide general answers to these questions, for ARPERCEN surveyed both the 93 agencies and headquarters to which IMAs were assigned and 1,559 of the IMAs activated for Operation DESERT STORM.<sup>21</sup>

As shown in Figure 10, the response of IMA Supervisors was highly favorable.<sup>22</sup> Almost all (98%) of the IMA supervisors were AC officers, and a significant number of them (13%) had IMAs under them that were senior in grade. Supervisors responding to the survey were mostly field grade officers (66%) but included also non-commissioned officers (10%) and civilian employees (24%).



Figure 10.

**Results of IMA Supervisors' Survey**  
(Percentage of Respondents)

	Yes	No
Were IMA's Adequately Trained?	84%	16%
Was IMA performance good or very good?	92%	8%
Did IMA's contribute to the mission?	95%	5%

Based on survey results, the IMAs were used as intended to augment Active Army units rapidly. A few supervisors indicated that they encountered IMAs that were incompetent or had bad attitudes, but these were the exceptions, and most supervisors thought their IMAs did an outstanding job. From the standpoint of job performance the supervisors made the following general points:

--Best results were achieved when IMAs had served many years in a close relationship with the Active unit and had learned ahead of time to perform the mobilization job.

--IMAs who had not had the opportunity to train often with their units suffered from lack of experience initially, but most made this up after a few days on the job.

--Administrative and personal problems, such as pay and arranging for dependent or child care, tended to detract from IMA job performance, and Army systems to provide assistance in these matters did not respond quickly enough to IMA.

--Army IMAs tended to be available later than Air Force or Navy IMAs because the Army's procedures to get them on board--even in voluntary TTAD status--was slow and cumbersome.

--Navy and Air Force IMAs had the edge on Army IMAs in joint headquarters because they were able to train on weekends during the year in addition to annual training, while Army IMAs were limited to 14 days annual training only.

The supervisors also found that they had problems when they had not paid attention to their IMA programs and had either allowed positions to remain unfilled or had not arranged for effective job training. In these cases, the Active units suffered because they either could not get IMAs or because the IMAs had to be trained after reporting. On the other hand, some units had prepared well for their IMAs, as one survey comment noted: "Our system insured that each individual was prepared for mobilization; the administrative processing was superb; and each IMA assumed their duties immediately." This kind of capability is the goal of the IMA Program.

### IMA Evaluation of Their Own Experiences

In most respects the results of the IMA Soldier Survey reinforced the views of the IMA Supervisors.<sup>23</sup> Almost half (43%) of the IMAs volunteered for duty (whether or not they were on TTAD or 673b status) and many of the other half had positive attitudes about doing the jobs for which they had trained. Timely notification was a problem for the IMAs, for almost half (47%) of the respondents had less than 7 days notification, and another third (30%), less than two weeks. Figure 11. shows the general results of the IMA Soldiers' Survey.

Figure 11.

#### Results of IMA Soldier's Survey

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Mobilized to Wartime Position?	77%	23%
Utilized in Primary MOS?	80%	20%
Received Orders in Advance?	80%	20%
Performed Well without More Training?	73%	27%
Adequately Utilized?	91%	9%

Generally, but not always, the IMAs reported that they were used intelligently and appropriately. Some of the negative reports mention being kept on after the war ended so that Active Component officers could take leave, performing work that called for lower grades, and the Active unit distrusting them or simply not knowing what to do with the IMAs after they reported. Another complaint was that numerous IMAs (about 135) were mobilized after the war was over. Most IMAs, however, reported good experiences. One IMA commented that assignment as battalion commander was the highlight of his career.

The survey showed that peacetime training for Army IMAs can be improved. Just over half of the respondents (56%) said that their training prepared them fully for their wartime jobs. Another 35% said they were reasonably well trained, but 10% said their peacetime training was ineffective. Some of those who were dissatisfied with their peacetime training attributed their lack of preparedness to the limit of two weeks of annual training, while others implied that the training they received in peacetime was not very good.

Processing was another problem for some of the IMAs. Problems with administration and support services caused 25% of the respondents to classify their active duty tour experience as only fair or poor. Eighty percent of the respondents waited at least two weeks for their first pay check, and 25% said they had to wait more than a month. Many processing centers did not know how to handle the IMAs, and neither did some Active Component units. One big problem was the status of IMAs who volunteered to work on TTAD status, for these personnel did not have the job protection or eligibility for some active duty privileges available to the IMAs who

were called up involuntarily. In many cases, dependents of IMAs had great difficulty in obtaining the support normally available to Active Army personnel, such as coverage with CHAMPUS medical insurance, and the DELTA dental insurance plan, which is not available to Reservists on short tours of active duty. Finally, many IMAs report that they did not receive recognition for their work nor did they in many cases receive a performance rating, and in some cases did not even know the identity of their rating chain.

Fifteen percent of the IMAs responding to the survey reported only fair or poor reception from their Active Component units. These IMAs said that they were not considered as equals and that returning AC personnel appeared to resent the IMAs, particularly resentment of IMAs who performed well. One IMA reported that processing for deployment to SWA through Fort Dix was "the worst experience in 26 years..." of service. Many other IMAs reported being treated as a second-class citizen by Active Component personnel. Even IMAs who were well received complained of difficulties with family situations and employers, including losing jobs or being demoted while on active duty. The seriousness of the problems were bad enough, but the IMAs report that the worst part was an inability to obtain help from the Army in resolution of these problems. There were numerous complaints that Active Component personnel received all of the decorations and the IMAs were left out.

Offsetting these views, 85% of the respondents reported that they had a good reception from their Active Component comrades. Many IMAs reported that they were treated well, particularly if they had already trained and worked in the unit, and the Active Component personnel appreciated them and went out of their way to ease the transition to active duty. In fact, 85% of the respondents reported that they received personal thanks from their commander or a higher commander for their service, and many IMAs were awarded decorations for their performance of duty. Overall, the IMAs by a large margin felt that they contributed to the Army and were appreciated by the Army.

### Evaluation of the IMA Program in DESERT STORM

The IMA Program was both a success and a failure in DESERT STORM.

It was a success in that those IMAs that were called did good jobs, and the program contributed almost 2,400 personnel to augment Active Component units when extra help was needed. The supervisor evaluations reveal that, with few exceptions, the IMAs contributed to mission accomplishment. The few exceptions were of the same magnitude that can be expected of any personnel program, including the Active Army and Guard and Reserve Units. Perhaps the greatest success of the IMA program was to persuade many Active Component officers that it was a success, and to whet their appetite for more.

However, measured against its basic objective and enormous potential, the IMA program in DESERT STORM has to be termed a failure.

The IMA program was intended to provide immediate augmentation for Active units--primarily headquarters required suddenly to expand their operations and work around the clock. The concept was that these Reservists would be preassigned to Active units, train with their units, work with their units, and become part of the Active units so much that they would be able to report for duty and hit the ground running without additional training or breaking in. Where this degree of integration of the IMA and his or her Active unit was achieved, the survey results indicate that both the IMA and the Active unit being augmented were very pleased. It is likely that those Active organizations or even entire major commands that never did integrate their IMAs into their units were reluctant to rely on untested, untried, and unfamiliar Reservists in a really important situation. That this was so is evident in the reports of commands that did utilize their IMAs, and those that did not.

The original concept also called for IMAs to be so much a part of their Active units that they would simply report for duty when needed without having to go through a lot of administrative hassle. As the record indicates, this was not the case, and the IMAs had to be ordered by ARPERCEN and go through an administrative maze just as if they had not been preassigned to Active units.

One of the inescapable conclusions is that most of the jobs that were filled by IMAs could have been filled by members of the IRR or by recalled retirees. The special status of IMA as a real part-time member of an Active unit was not reflected in the way in which most IMAs were called up or utilized. Since IMAs cost more money than IRRs or retirees, there is in a real sense a question as to why the Army should pay for an IMA to fill a need that could be met by a less expensive form of pretrained individual manpower.

On the other hand, during DESERT STORM many Active Component commanders were able to see that IMAs were very valuable as a means of rapid personnel augmentation, with their value increasing as they spent more time working with their Active units in peacetime. One outcome of the DESERT STORM experience is likely to be increased emphasis on integrating IMAs more closely into their Active Component units by increasing the time they spend in those units learning or performing actual work.

Finally, the Army has to decide if the IMAs are going to be Reservists managed centrally by ARPERCEN or part-time Active Army personnel to be administered by the Active units to which they are preassigned. Over the years there has grown a body of law and regulation that separates the Army into three parts: Active; Guard; Reserve. Each part of the Army has its own separate rules and regulations, forms and reports, data bases, and even its own personnel center. This artificial separation--based more on attitudes than good management--was a distinct problem in implementing the IMA program for DESERT STORM. Intended to be "instant active duty" members of an Active unit, the IMAs functioned instead as simply "super IRRs."

### Individual Ready Reservists

On the eve of DESERT STORM, the Army's IRR had a mobilizable strength of 240,258, which was indeed a significant personnel asset. Almost the entire IRR was pretrained and qualified for deployment by virtue of having received initial entry training and having served with Active or Selected Reserve units. There were a few untrained people in the IRR who had entered under special recruiting programs, but the Army was aware of the existence of this group and was moving either to train them or purge them from the system because they were not immediate mobilization assets. Figure 12 shows the size and composition of the Army's IRR in August 1990.<sup>24</sup>

For management purposes, ARPERCEN organized the IRR into 4 groups. The most desirable group was the RT-12 Group of 771 officers and 16,445 enlisted personnel who had left active duty within 12 months. The second group consisted of 33,560 officers and 177,135 enlisted personnel available immediately to fill identified positions. The third group included the remaining trained IRR personnel considered to be mobilization assets.

Figure 12.

Army IRR Strength in August 1990

	Mobilization Assets	Untrained	Excluded	Total
Officer	40,644	0	4,984	45,628
Enlisted	199,614	11,123	18,280	238,261
Total	240,258	11,123	23,264	283,889

The fourth group consisted of personnel who were untrained or otherwise ineligible for mobilization. In August 1990, all of the IRR officers were trained, but 11,123 of the enlisted personnel lacked enough training to hold an MOS and would have required additional training before being assigned to a unit. Officers and other enlisted personnel excluded from consideration as mobilization assets included those due to be discharged, missing addresses, HIV positive, pregnant, discharged from the AC or TPUs due to disciplinary reasons, or persons with incomplete records. This group also included 451 officers and 1,447 enlisted personnel who reside overseas and were preassigned to an overseas Army command.

The composition of the IRR available for DESERT STORM was similar to the composition of the rest of the Army. The average age of the officers was 35-39; 82% had college degrees; they had an average service of 3 or 4 years; and 70% were lieutenants or

captains. The average enlisted person was between 24 and 29; 90% were high school graduates; they had an average military service of 2 to 3 years; and 84% were in the lowest four enlisted grades (E1 - E4). Contrary to the popular view of the IRR, this was a young, experienced, well educated group of soldiers available for immediate duty.<sup>25</sup>

### IRR Volunteers

After authority was granted for call up of a portion of the Selected Reserve under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call up Authority, ARPERCEN was assigning IRR enlisted personnel who volunteered for active duty to meet Army requirements for filler personnel. US Forces Command provided the numbers of particular skills needed to fill the mobilizing units, and ARPERCEN recorded the requests and tried to fill them from among the volunteers, even soliciting volunteers in some cases from among the IRR personnel having the skills in demand. Once the IRR volunteers were identified, they were placed on orders for 179 day Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD), sometimes within 72 hours of the time that the skill shortfall was identified.<sup>26</sup>

The first IRR member to volunteer did so on 13 August 1990, even before the Army put out a call for volunteers. ARPERCEN established a data base of the 6,357 Individual Ready Reservists--4,683 officers and 1,674 enlisted personnel--who volunteered for active duty prior to the cut-off date of 22 March 1991. None of the IRR officer volunteers were used because there were sufficient officers already on active duty to meet the needs of the deploying units. However, 1,874 enlisted IRR volunteers were called up to active duty to meet specific skill shortfalls. The first list of skill shortages was received on 19 August 1990, and the first five IRR volunteers were ordered to active duty on 21 August 1990. Some of the skills required were as follows:

In September 1990, a request was received for soldiers with combat arms skills, and telephone inquiries located 582 IRR members who volunteered to meet this need.

On 29 October 1990, a shortage of water treatment specialists was identified, and 56 IRR personnel volunteered to attend a special refresher course at Fort Lee, Virginia. Forty-six of the Reservists completed the course, 6 soldiers were placed on active duty immediately, and the others were later included in the call up.

On 15 November 1990, a shortage of graves registration specialists was identified, and 63 IRR soldiers attended a special course at Fort Lee, Virginia, with 28 of them completing the course and serving in that skill.

On 7 December 1990, a requirement was placed on ARPERCEN for 1,500 motor transport operators. Enough IRR personnel volunteered to meet this need, which included a special 5-day refresher course at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and an assured assignment to a unit in the theater.

Similar requirements were placed and met for such other skills as telecommunications center operators, combat signaleers, chaplain assistants, Arabic linguists, and more combat arms specialists.

This volunteer program continued from August 1990 until the involuntary IRR call up began in January 1991. By July 1991, the IRR volunteers started the process of separation from active duty, and most of the volunteers were separated by the end of August 1991. Utilization of IRR volunteers was very effective in filling specific skill shortages in Active, Guard, and Reserve units.

### Planning the IRR Call Up

Once planning for the combat phase started, the Army realized that it could not rely on IRR volunteers to fill its units, and authority was sought and granted to call up a portion of the IRR involuntarily.

Department of the Army wanted IRR personnel for two different, mutually exclusive uses. Personnel with technical skills were needed to fill combat support and combat service support units to wartime strength, but personnel with combat skills were needed to replace the casualties that might occur in the offensive phase. Since the Army was permitted to call only 20,000 IRR personnel in the first increment, a choice had to be made. The Chief of Staff of the Army decided to go heavy on combat skills in the first increment.<sup>27</sup>

This decision to call up mostly personnel with combat skills required significant adjustment by ARPERCEN, whose IRR mobilization plan was designed to support Operations Plan 4102 that called for massive U.S. reinforcement of Europe in a major war with the Warsaw Pact. ARPERCEN had tested and perfected a system to accomplish a continuous call up of the entire IRR, with mostly technical skills being called in the initial stages as fillers for support units. IRR personnel would be sent automatically to 22 pre-designated mobilization stations for brief processing and then assignment to units. The ARPERCEN computers were programmed to accomplish this form of mobilization automatically at the touch of a button, but they were not prepared for the mobilization of 20,000 personnel with primarily combat skills.

Having decided to emphasize calling IRR personnel with combat skills, the Chief of Staff directed that each combat soldier would receive adequate refresher training and be certified by TRADOC as combat ready before being allowed to deploy to the Southwest Asia Theater. The Army did not want to send poorly trained troops into combat.<sup>28</sup> This decision forced ARPERCEN to make two major modifications to its plan:

First, the number of mobilization stations was changed from 22 to nine, and IRR personnel were ordered to mobilization stations by skill. Utilization of all of the pre-designated mobilization stations for only 20,000 personnel would have processed about 900 personnel per station, with some stations having many fewer than that. Utilizing fewer stations appeared to

be a more efficient approach. In order to facilitate delivery of combat skill refresher training, the IRR personnel were ordered to mobilization stations at posts with appropriate Army Schools. Personnel with infantry skills were sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, home of the Infantry School; personnel with armor skills, to Fort Knox, Kentucky location of the Armor School; personnel with combat engineer skills to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, location of the Engineer School; and each other skill group was sent to an appropriate mobilization station.<sup>29</sup> This system facilitated delivery of refresher training but meant that ARPERCEN had to reprogram its list of personnel to be called up, throw out its pre-assignment of personnel to mobilization stations, and proceed with new assignment instructions and coordination.

Second, Department of the Army decided to obtain the first increment of IRR personnel from the RT-12 Group as much as possible because recalling personnel who had left active duty less than a year previously would reduce requirements for refresher training. However, it took 3-6 months for many members of this group to be accessed into the IRR data base after they had left the Active Component, and it proved difficult to locate some of these personnel.<sup>30</sup> ARPERCEN again had to improvise to make maximum use of this group of IRR personnel.

A second call-up increment of 10,000 IRR personnel with primarily technical skills to be used as fillers for support units was planned by Department of the Army, but was not implemented. At the beginning, ARPERCEN systems were reflective of planning for the European reinforcement scenario but were able to accommodate to the needs of DESERT STORM by herculean efforts. Had the war continued, the changes made already by ARPERCEN to accommodate the call-up of the first IRR increment would have made it a lot easier to accomplish the second and any subsequent call-ups.<sup>31</sup>

### The IRR Call Up

A total of 20,920 members of the IRR were called up involuntarily for DESERT STORM in addition to those who had volunteered for active duty. IRR personnel were selected primarily from the RT-12 Group according to their skill and time on active duty. About half of the IRR personnel called up had combat arms skills, another quarter had combat support skills, and the remaining quarter, combat service support skills. Based on a show rate planning factor of 70%, the goal was to provide 14,500 personnel for Army units.<sup>32</sup>

Authority to call up the Ready Reserve was granted by the President on 18 January 1991, and the official order to call up a portion of the IRR was received by ARPERCEN on 20 January 1991. The IRR was called up in two packages: Package A-1 included 20,102 reservists--all enlisted personnel. Package A-2 included 818 reservists--101 officers, 28 warrant officers, and 689 enlisted personnel. The call up was designed to provide junior enlisted personnel and company grade officers. Over 18,000 of the enlisted personnel (87%) were in pay grades E-4 or below, and all of the officers were captains or lieutenants.<sup>33</sup>



Mailgrams for Package A-1 were released on 21 January 1991, and orders were mailed the next day, with a reporting date of 31 January 1991.<sup>34</sup> Mailgrams for Package A-2 were released on 29 January 1991, with a reporting date of 8 February 1991. The IRR call up was terminated on 1 March 1991, and the demobilization phase started. Follow-up actions during April and May of 1991 located and accounted for IRR members who had not responded to the initial call up order. The response to the IRR Call up is shown in Figure 13.<sup>35</sup>

**Figure 13.**  
**Summary of Army IRR Call Up for DESERT STORM**

Reported to Mobilization Station	17,310
Orders Revoked	2,185
Exemptions	706
Unaccounted for	719
Total Called Up	20,920

A total of 2,891 IRR personnel who were called were relieved of the obligation to report; 2185 were already in another form of military service while 706 applied for and received an exemption from military service.

ARPERCEN established an Exemption Review Board to adjudicate requests for delay or exemption from the IRR call up. Final results of the Exemption Review Board are in Figure 14.<sup>36</sup>

**Figure 14.**  
**Results of ARPERCEN Exemption Review Board**

Approvals	706
Disapprovals with Delay	55
Disapprovals without Delay	95
Other Disposition	92
Total Cases Received	948

Requests for exemption were approved for the following reasons: hardship (398); medical condition (134); dependents (94); key employee (13); not MOS qualified (15); dropped from the IRR (25); ; member of the National Guard (5), and a host of other reasons including being out of the country, being a missionary, or being in the Retired Reserve.

Requests for delays for medical reasons (27); personal hardship (19); education situation (3); and dependents (6) were approved.

Requests for exemption because of problems such as financial condition (5); employment (2); sole survivor (1); medical (40); hardship (11); education situation (8); dependents (2); and conscientious objection (8) were all disapproved.

Other situations that were resolved consisted of 71 personnel who did report to the mobilization site; six in ROTC under the Simultaneous Membership Program; ten who did not receive mobilization orders; three who were already on active duty in another status; and two who had been discharged from the IRR.

The 719 IRR personnel who remained unaccounted for in the original call up were the subject of follow up actions, with the result that 535 of them had orders revoked for good reason; another 104 eventually did report for duty; and only 80 were classified as absent without official leave (AWOL). The cases of the 80 AWOLs were sent to the Army Deserter Information Point, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, for resolution, and upon further investigation 57 were exonerated and 12 were apprehended and boarded out of the Army. As of mid-1992, 11 deserters still had not been apprehended.<sup>37</sup>

Considering the size of the call up, there were relatively few complaints to Congress or other higher authority. Only 237 written Congressional Inquiries were handled by ARPERCEN, although there were numerous phone calls. ARPERCEN fielded a total of over 50,000 phone calls over 800 number hot lines established for the IRR call-up.<sup>38</sup>

### Processing of IRR Personnel

After reporting to their mobilization stations, IRR personnel received 1.5 weeks of Post-M-Day Training designed to prepare them for active duty. This "regreening" process included issuing clothing and personal equipment, firing their individual weapons, CBR refresher training, and administrative processing.<sup>39</sup> Half of the complaints from IRR personnel called to active duty were about being treated like basic trainees when they arrived at mobilization stations. Since all IRR personnel have prior service and many are specialists and sergeants, this reduced individual motivation and lowered morale.<sup>40</sup>

Numerous problems occurred in the administrative processing of IRR personnel upon arrival at mobilization stations.<sup>41</sup>

--Orders did not provide enough information for IRR personnel to prepare properly for in-processing and should have included a specific building to which the IRR personnel were to report.

--Soldiers reporting early were processed but were not paid for the extra days.

--Arrangements for meals were inadequate; the mess halls were overcrowded; and some Reservists were not issued meal cards and had to pay for their meals while on active duty.

This forced some to eat elsewhere to save money. The Retraining staff were often unprepared for the influx of IRR personnel.

--Some soldiers received only a partial issue of military clothing before moving to their units of assignment on the basis that they would receive a complete set at the unit, but often this was not the case. Few IRR soldiers received a Class A or Class B uniform--something that was needed when travelling on orders.

--College students had unique problems, both in notifying their colleges that their absences were legitimate and in stopping payment of military based educational benefits to preclude getting in subsequent trouble with the Department of Veterans Affairs.

--There were numerous instances of lost records--personnel, medical, dental, and educational. As a result, a lot of testing and examining was done repeatedly.

--Personnel records were not screened thoroughly to prevent unqualified people from continuing the in-processing routine. This meant that some IRR personnel were shipped to their units and had to be transferred again or separated from the Service by the unit--an added burden to a deploying unit.

--Many restrictions were placed on IRR personnel as to leaving the post, bed check, signing in, and off-limits areas. This was insulting to IRR soldiers who had proved their worth by completing their prior service honorably and well enough to be retained as a mobilizable asset in the IRR.

--Church services were not advertised well, and in some cases soldiers were told they could not go to church.

--Check cashing was a major problem for IRR soldiers because they had out of state banks and were not assigned to a permanent unit on the post. Post Exchanges were not instructed to honor the checks of IRRs.

--Soldiers Manuals covering common tasks were not made available generally, but these would have helped get the IRR soldiers back into the system faster.

--Some units were ill prepared to accept the IRR personnel because of a general lack of information and guidance on the IRR filler system, and uncertainty about the length of time the IRR personnel would remain in the unit. The big question was whether the IRR soldier was on active duty status or on Inactive Ready Reserve status, and the lack of a clear answer to this was the cause of many disputes between Active and Reserve soldiers.

--There was a question as to whether IRR personnel were to wear the shoulder patch of the unit to which assigned or the IRR shoulder patch, about which few IRR personnel knew.

--There was no method established to promote IRR personnel while they were on active duty, and this caused many problems.

--Outprocessing was generally as smooth as could be expected, with some problems experienced by IRR personnel in obtaining the new dental and educational records that had been created for their period of active duty.

--Most Active Army people knew little or nothing about the IRRs and did not know what to do with them.

Many of these problems appear to have occurred because IRR personnel were treated as a separate, differently administered group instead of simply as active duty military personnel. Differences between the IRR and the rest of the Army, fostered deliberately in peacetime, proved to be disadvantageous when it became necessary to mobilize these individual Reservists and integrate them into units.

### The IRR Show Rate

In every emergency, there are things that go right and things that go wrong. Often these errors are caused by pre-emergency assumptions that turn out to be inaccurate. Sometimes there are shortfalls and problems beyond that which were anticipated in the plans. Sometimes, however, the anticipated problems fail to materialize and the errors are few. This was the case with the call up of the Army's Individual Ready Reserve for Operation DESERT STORM.

The most significant measure of the effectiveness of the IRR call up is the show rate, or the percentage of people who responded out of the number who were called up. The overall show rate for this call up was 83%--the ratio of the 17,310 personnel who reported to mobilization stations to the 20,920 who were ordered to report. This show rate was much better than the traditional IRR show rate planning factor of 70% and demonstrated not only that the Army's pre-war management of these pretrained individuals was good, but that the Reservists themselves displayed a positive attitude toward their obligations to serve the Nation in an emergency--admittedly for a war with significant, broad popular support.

This 70% planning factor was included in the DOD Total Force Study of 1975, and was derived based on experience in prior call ups of Reservists for Korea, the Berlin Crisis of 1962, and several smaller crises. Although the analysis was superficial and the results highly aggregated, the 70% figure gained credibility through its sheer existence over time and because of lack of better data. In reality, no one really knew what would happen if the Reserves were to be called up.<sup>42</sup> The best that could be done was to plan for a 70% show rate from the IRR and do what could be done to improve responsiveness.

Accordingly, the Army placed great emphasis on management actions that would increase the propensity of Individual Ready Reservists to report.

--IRR members were informed of their military service obligation and the fact that they might someday be called up.

--Greater attention was paid to maintaining a valid list of current addresses--no easy feat in a highly mobile society.

--The system for notification and ordering to active duty of the IRR was improved, tested, and rehearsed.

--The number of people involved in personnel management for the IRR was increased, and greater attention paid to individual Reservists.

--IRR training and continued involvement with the Army was emphasized, including an annual muster.

These management actions paid off in DESERT STORM with an IRR show rate much greater than the pre-war, traditional planning factor of 70%. The show rate would have been even better if ARPERCEN had been permitted to perform some simple edit checks on the soldiers in the recall packages to avoid some of the revocations or exemptions, but the Judge Advocate General at Headquarters, Department of the Army, ruled that it was necessary to call everyone without making any edit-based deletions--presumably in the spirit of fairness.<sup>43</sup>

It is clear from the results that unwillingness to report for active duty--an element always present in the minds of manpower mobilization planners as likely to be quite important--was not a factor in this call up. There appears to have been remarkably little outright malingering. Most of the IRR personnel who were called but did not report were found either to be already serving in another capacity or to have legitimate reasons for exemption.

A notable exception to the general willingness of IRR personnel to answer the call to active duty was shown by medical doctors--all commissioned officers. Money was the primary factor influencing these generally senior officers to avoid service, and there were 2,000 resignations and retirements of doctors shortly after DESERT STORM. Many doctors who did report lacked officer basic training and had to receive waivers to perform their duty.<sup>44</sup>

Contrary to expectations, there was no great problem with Key Federal Employees asking to be exempted because of the importance of their civilian jobs to national defense. Only 13 soldiers were exempted for this reason. The peacetime program for screening the Ready Reserve proved to be effective.<sup>45</sup>

Despite a few relatively minor problems in implementing the IRR call up, the outcome was a great success and a testimony to the years of hard work and clever planning that paid off in the outstanding response of the IRR to the call for service in Operation DESERT STORM.

### Retired Personnel

ARPERCEN also processed 1,379 retired Army personnel to active duty for service during Operation DESERT STORM. Although retired military personnel had been used on an informal basis in previous wars, this was the first formal recall of retired military personnel since the program was established by OSD in the 1970s.

As soon as the war started, ARPERCEN began to receive telephonic and written applications from retirees volunteering for recall to active duty. From August 1990 until a cut-off date of 22 March 1991, a total of 9639 retired Army personnel volunteered to serve on active duty.<sup>46</sup> These volunteers were given preference when ARPERCEN began filling requisitions for particular skills. A data base of all volunteers was established and information and assistance was provided to all retirees who contacted ARPERCEN. The great value of the retiree program is the ability to obtain the services of recently retired (and still capable) non-commissioned officers, who comprise most of the retiree pool. About 5,800 of the retirees who volunteered for recall for Operation DESERT STORM were non-commissioned officers, 1,000 were warrant officers, and almost 2,800 were commissioned officers.<sup>47</sup>

Recall orders were issued starting in November 1990. The number of orders increased substantially in December 1990 and peaked in February 1991. The last retiree was ordered to active duty for this operation in July 1991. A total of 1,466 orders were issued, but 87 were revoked for medical problems, disqualification in specialty, and volunteers changing their minds about going. Of the total 1,379 retirees who actually went on active duty, 1,250 were volunteers and 129 were recalled involuntarily. All of the retired personnel recalled were receiving retired (retainer) pay after 20 or more years of active duty service in the Army.

Retirees ordered to active duty were selected for specific skills and in some cases for specific positions. The distribution of these recalled retirees by grade and category is shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15.

**Retired Army Personnel Recalled for DESERT STORM**

	Voluntary	Involuntary	Total
<b>Officers</b>			
Colonel	138	35	173
Lieutenant Colonel	164	4	168
Major	60	0	60
Captain	13	0	13
Total Officers	375	39	414
Warrant Officers	122	90	212
<b>Enlisted Personnel</b>			
Sergeant Major	125		125
Master Sergeant	254		254
Sergeant First Class	288		288
Staff Sergeant	78		78
Sergeant	8		8
Total Enlisted	753		753
Total Retirees	1,250	129	1,379

Those selected for recall from the volunteers had specialties needed by the Army for Operation DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM. There were insufficient volunteers in two specific skill areas to fill the requirements, and retirees were recalled involuntarily for these specialties. All of the officers recalled involuntarily were medical officers, and all of the warrant officers recalled involuntarily were aviators. Figure 16 shows the aggregated distribution of skills among the retirees recalled, including those recalled involuntarily. Because of the differences in the way in which military occupational specialties are established for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel, these comparisons are not precise, and they do not purport to indicate the kind of unit in which these personnel served. The table does indicate the range of skills available and used from the retiree pool, and highlights some categories of substantial use, such as health care.

Figure 16.

**Skill Distribution of Recalled Army Retirees**

	Officer	WO	NCO	Total
Combat	85	0	108	193
Aviation	28	60	4	92
Combat Support	37	0	79	116
Combat Service Support	71	51	291	413
Health Care	152	50	36	238
Maintenance	7	51	41	99
General Support	34	0	194	228
Total	414	212	753	1,379

The distribution of skills was widespread across the entire Army, but there were certain definite needs met by retirees:

--For the officers, a large number of medical officers were recalled as well as aviators, reflecting peacetime Army shortages in these skills. Many officers with combat and combat support skills were called and utilized on headquarters staffs or training assignments. Twelve retired chaplains were also recalled.

--Warrant officers were recalled primarily to serve as aviators, maintenance technicians, and administrative technicians, in keeping with the technical nature of the warrant officer grades.

--Non-Commissioned officers met a variety of needs, including 45 command sergeants major to bolster unit leadership. Among the skills recalled, there were 35 recruiters, 35 ammunition supply specialists, 122 personnel specialists, and 87 administrative specialists.

Retired military personnel were assigned to many Army commands, and--although an exact accounting is difficult--it is estimated that 55 retirees actually were deployed and served in the Southwest Asia Theater during the war.<sup>48</sup> Figure 17 shows the distribution of recalled retirees by major command.



Figure 17.

**Assignment of Army Retirees to Major Commands/Agencies**

Forces Command	682
Casualty Assistance Operations Center	209
Health Services Command	189
Army Reserve Personnel Center	128
Training and Doctrine Command	72
Personnel Command	53
Army Headquarters and Staff	41
Defense Intelligence Agency	3
Transportation Command	2
Total	1,379

Starting in April 1991 and continuing into 1992, ARPERCEN also managed the transition of these recalled retirees back into retired status. This included processing for relief from active duty and restarting their retired pay, as well as assuring that necessary medical treatment was received. Although the retiree recall program was hampered by the same problems as the IMA and IRR programs, it was nevertheless accomplished in a timely and effective manner.

From the Army's viewpoint the retiree recall program was a success. With little cost, nearly fourteen-hundred highly qualified and experienced leaders and technicians were made available as fillers and replacement during Operation DESERT STORM. It is significant that half of the recalled retirees were senior enlisted leaders, showing that this is an important--perhaps the most important--aspect of the program. Senior officers were a small part of those recalled, and no general officers were recalled for this war.

This relatively small recall demonstrated that (with some system improvements) it would be entirely feasible to make available for service many more of the over 100,000 retired Army personnel now drawing retired pay.

**Additional Manpower Support for DESERT STORM**

In addition to the IMA, IRR, and Retiree mobilizations for DESERT STORM, there are three other subjects that may be discussed under the general heading of military manpower

mobilization: General Officers; Active Guard Reserve personnel; and Sustainment Operations. The latter two of these tasks were also accomplished by ARPERCEN.

### Reserve General Officer Participation

The utilization of IMA general officers is a separate topic, for these officers are managed by the Senior Officer and Enlisted Management Office (SOEMO) of OCAR directly rather than by ARPERCEN, and their utilization in DESERT STORM was given special attention by the Chief of Staff of the Army.<sup>50</sup>

On the eve of the war, there were 120 general officers in the United States Army Reserve--47 major generals and 73 brigadier generals.<sup>50</sup> Five of these general officers were on extended active duty, 84 were assigned to Selected Reserve Units, and 31 were IMAs.<sup>51</sup> There were no general officers on active duty in Active Guard Reserve (AGR) status, and none in the IRR.<sup>52</sup> Official utilization of these 120 general officers for DESERT STORM was low, but this was offset by the voluntary service many general officers performed for the Army.

Ten of the 94 general officers in units were called to active duty for service and deployed to SWA with their units, as shown in Figure 18.<sup>53</sup>

Figure 18.

### Reserve General Officer Commanders Activated With Units

Name	Unit	Date Called	Location
BG Michael D. Strong	332d Medical Brigade	19 November 1990	SWA Theater
MG Terrence Mulchay	416th Engineer Cmd	29 November 1990	SWA Theater
BG Max L. Shardin	416th Engineer Cmd	29 November 1990	SWA Theater
BG Thomas P. Jones	21st SUPCOM	1 December 1990	SWA Theater
BG Joseph F. Conlon	800th MP Brigade	7 December 1990	SWA Theater
BG Richard E. Storat	411th Engineer Bde	18 December 1990	SWA Theater
BG Howard T. Mooney	352d Civil Affairs Cmd	21 January 1991	SWA Theater
BG Alan J. Kunschner	2291st Hospital	1 February 1991	Fort Lee
BG Ralph C. Slusher	2290th Hospital	1 February 1991	Walter Reed AMC
BG David C. Stabenow	5501st Hospital	1 February 1991	Fort San Houston

As for IMAs, of the 31 general officer IMAs assigned to fill positions in August 1990, only one was called to active duty--Major General Max Baratz, who was activated on 21 November 1990 to serve as Deputy Commanding General of Forces Command. Although each general staff section of the Army Staff had a Reserve general IMA, and each Army major command had one or more Reserve generals as IMAs, none of them were called to active duty to help out in what was obviously a major operational emergency.<sup>54</sup> The case of General Baratz is all the more exceptional because General Baratz simply reported for duty without waiting to be ordered, went to work, and after some delay was finally legalized in his status. In the case of one headquarters an Active Army colonel had the option of calling in the Reserve brigadier general IMA to augment his staff section and--quite understandably--chose not to.<sup>55</sup>

In 1990, the Army had 30 general officer positions in Active and Reserve units to be filled by specially selected Army Reserve colonels in peacetime. For example, the IMA positions as Deputy Commanders for Mobilization of the Eastern and Western Regions of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) were designated to be brigadier general positions upon mobilization. The colonels filling these positions believed that upon mobilization they would be promoted immediately to brigadier general.

However, the Army determined that the call up for DESERT SHIELD did not mean automatic promotion because only the President had that authority. The five colonels listed in Figure 19 filled positions that called for general officers upon mobilization, but none were promoted as they had been led to expect. Colonel Robert H. McInvale and Colonel Hans A. Bosch, filling the Deputy Commander positions respectively for the Eastern and Western Regions of MTMC, were neither called to active duty nor promoted to brigadier general, although both officers contributed significantly as volunteers to MTMC operations.<sup>56</sup> All of these "general upon mobilization" positions were eliminated after DESERT STORM.

Figure 19.

**Colonels in General Officer Mobilization Positions Called to Active Duty**

<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>
Peter A. Sanchez	3297th Hospital	Fort Gordon, GA
Jack H. Kotter	416th Engineer Command	SWA Theater
Robert H. Beahm	354th Civil Affairs Brigade	Fort Bragg, NC then to SWA
John S. Gillick	6253d Hospital	Fort Carson, CO
Miller L. Love	360th Civil Affairs Command	Fort Bragg, NC

Although not called to active duty formally, many Reserve generals contributed generously of their time and energy in helping the Army to do what had to be done to defeat Iraq and liberate Kuwait. They served in their unit or IMA positions using a combination of Annual Training, Active Duty for Training, and Active Duty for Special Work. A review of

the voluntary service of 100 Reserve general officers for the period of August 1990-May 1991 inclusive shows that the mean number of extra days for the group was 20 and that thirty officers contributed 30 or more days of active duty during the period.<sup>57</sup> Figure 20 shows the voluntary participation of the eleven Army Reserve generals with the greatest numbers of active duty days. These data do not, of course, reflect the many more days worked by these officers and other Reservists as well without orders for any form of active duty.

Figure 20.

Voluntary DESERT STORM Participation by Reserve Generals

Name	Extra Days	Extra Days
BG Gary A. Stemley	Assistant Chief of Engineers (IMA)	112
BG Ross G. Pickus	Deputy Chief, Army Reserve (IMA)	94
MG Joseph H. Brooks	Deputy Commander, MTMC (IMA)	85
BG Roger C. Poole, Jr.	Tp Spt Director, ODCSLOG DA (IMA)	84
MG Felix A. Santoni	DCG, Southern Command (IMA)	73
BG Dorothy B. Pockington	Deputy Chief, Army Nurses (IMA)	69
BG Donald F. Campbell	Commander, 352d Civil Affairs Command	58
MG George E. Barker	Assistant DCSPER, HQDA (IMA)	56
MG George J. Vukasin	DCG, Sixth Army (IMA)	50
BG Herbert B. Quinn, Jr.	DCG, 310th TAACOM	49
MG Raymond C. Bonnabeau	Deputy Surgeon General (IMA)	45

Army utilization of Reserve general officers in the formal sense of ordering them to active duty was 11% for unit commanders and 3% for IMAs. General officer commanders were called up with their organizations, but most IMAs were utilized in an informal manner, relying on voluntary service rather than a formal order to active duty.

Brigadier General Ross G. Pickus was one of the IMA generals who did his job voluntarily without being called to active duty officially. In August 1990, as soon as it became apparent that the Army Reserve would be mobilized in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, General Pickus reported for duty as Deputy Chief, Army Reserve and was put to work by Major General William F. Ward, Chief, Army Reserve, as the principal trouble-shooter and expediter for the mobilization of Reserve units and individuals. General Pickus spent a lot of his time on the road visiting mobilization stations, Army Reserve Command Headquarters, and units being

activated--listening to problems, taking action to resolve some on the spot, or dealing with CONUS Army Headquarters, Forces Command, and Department of the Army to achieve a workable solution. Since he was getting paid for the days he worked for the Army, it did not matter to General Pickus what his exact duty status was, nor did it impair his effectiveness. As he puts it, no one at the headquarters he visited as the representative of the Chief, Army Reserve, ever asked him his duty status. As far as they were concerned, he was an Army general.<sup>58</sup>

General Pickus believes, however, that it would have been better if he and his IMA colleagues had been ordered to active duty officially instead of being allowed to contribute informally. Although he and some of the other IMAs were able to contribute a lot of time to the Army voluntarily because their civilian employers were cooperative, many other IMAs needed to be ordered to active duty to protect their civilian jobs. Unless their civilian employers were very lenient, many IMAs were in no position to contribute a lot of time voluntarily. General Pickus believes that the inability of the Army to order its IMAs to active duty early in the mobilization is another disadvantage that the imposition of rigid ceilings on the Selected Reserve Call-up Authority had on the overall operation.<sup>59</sup>

### Utilization of AGR Personnel

In September 1990 the Army had 13,703 military personnel in Active Guard Reserve (AGR) status, including 3,236 officers, 622 warrant officers, and 9,845 enlisted personnel. AGR personnel are members of the Selected Reserve, but they are on active duty to provide Full Time Unit Support to the Army Reserve. In addition to the 7,746 AGR personnel serving in Selected Reserve units, AGR personnel were also serving on staffs of major headquarters--particularly in areas relevant to Reserve units or where the Active Army has few personnel with certain skills, such as Civil Affairs.<sup>60</sup>

During DESERT STORM, 1,283 AGR soldiers were activated to serve with Active or Reserve units, and 617 of these deployed to the theater. Figure 21 shows the break out of AGRs utilized for DESERT STORM.<sup>61</sup> FORSCOM reported that 83 other AGR soldiers were not deployed because of medical problems, pregnancy, hardship, or pending disciplinary actions.<sup>62</sup>

Figure 21.

### Active Guard Reserve Personnel Utilized in DESERT STORM

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Personnel	AGR Total
Activated	196	55	1,032	1,283
Deployed to SWA	123	37	457	617

Although they were already on full time active duty and assigned to Selected Reserve units, the AGR personnel were accessed to the Active Army as if they were Reservists, and even those AGR personnel assigned to Selected Reserve troop program units were categorized and treated more like Individual Ready Reservists than unit members. Some activated AGR personnel served with their units, while others were reassigned to different units, and on several occasions AGR volunteers were solicited for immediate deployment to the theater.<sup>63</sup> The impression is that during the manpower mobilization the Army regarded these soldiers as individual replacements instead of unit members.<sup>64</sup>

### Southwest Asia Sustainment Phase Operations

After the end of DESERT STORM it was necessary to provide both replacement units and individual replacements for units remaining in the theater to support withdrawal functions. An individual replacement requirement of 2,264 was identified for Army Reserve Units and 2,446 for Army National Guard units from April to December 1991. The Chief, National Guard Bureau was tasked to provide replacements for the Army Guard units and identified 2,592 soldiers for that purpose, of whom 2,221 actually deployed. ARPERCEN was tasked to provide replacements for Reserve units and to coordinate the sustainment operation with the Chief, National Guard Bureau and FORSCOM. ARPERCEN identified 2,720 volunteers--1,774 unit reservists and 946 IRR personnel--of whom 2,165 deployed. Later, 256 personnel in the theater extended their service to provide additional unit strength.<sup>65</sup> This operation carried ARPERCEN past the stage of providing fillers to bring units to wartime strength and into the stage of providing replacements for losses.

### Problems Experienced by ARPERCEN

ARPERCEN managed to do the job of ordering to active duty and/or processing approximately 24,000 pretrained individuals to support Operation DESERT STORM. This was done primarily by improvised, manual or partially automated procedures that required heroic efforts from ARPERCEN personnel. All of the automated systems established by ARPERCEN for doing this work were designed for a major mobilization for a war in Europe, in which it was assumed that all of the resources would be called up in a continuous flow once it was started. There were neither plans nor procedures for a smaller, phased call up as did occur. Thus, when the mobilization started, it was necessary in many cases to throw out the current plans and simply do what had to be done. ARPERCEN complains that the problem was exacerbated by intervention from higher headquarters giving orders and establishing policies that were contrary to existing ARPERCEN plans and systems.<sup>66</sup> While most of these changes directed by higher headquarters made it more difficult for ARPERCEN to do its job, often they were prompted by events and circumstances of which ARPERCEN was not aware.<sup>67</sup>

### IMA Mobilization Processing

One of the most cherished features of pre-war planning for IMA reporting was the issuance to each IMA of "hip-pocket orders," in the form of a card that was itself authority for the individual to report to his or her unit in the event of mobilization. This system did not work well for DESERT STORM, primarily because the Army sent these skilled people where they were needed instead of simply augmenting their pre-assigned Active Component units automatically.<sup>68</sup> Health Services Command compiled their own list of IRR volunteers and reassigned the ones they selected to critical positions as they worked down their list. Criminal Investigation Command also changed the pre-war assignments of their IMAs.<sup>69</sup> Because of this, Headquarters, Department of the Army, directed ARPERCEN to cut orders for each IMA.<sup>70</sup> This change forced ARPERCEN to abandon the pre-war system for processing IMAs onto active duty and develop impromptu methods sometimes requiring manual work but more often using laptop computers.

### Personnel Records Control

One of the most difficult changes to overcome had to do with the use of the personnel record jacket with hard copies of personnel documents maintained by ARPERCEN for each of the military personnel under its management.<sup>71</sup>

Pre-war plans stated specifically that personnel records of mobilized IRR personnel would not be shipped to mobilization stations, but on 18 January 1991, just as the first IRR mailgrams were to be released, DA DCSPER ordered that personnel records would be sent to mobilization stations.<sup>72</sup> This forced ARPERCEN to improvise a system to ship the records, and diverted resources from other missions. Some records were already enroute to the original 22 mobilization stations before instructions to reassign IRR personnel to only nine stations were received. This required locating the records at the erroneous mobilization station and reshipping them to the correct mobilization station.<sup>73</sup> In some cases the records arrived after the person, and temporary records had to be made. Many mobilization stations receiving the records considered them to be "only old historical documents," and did not even open the boxes of records. They chose instead to start from scratch and obtain the necessary information directly from the soldier and other data bases.<sup>74</sup> Some soldiers were allowed to hand carry their records from the mobilization station to pre-deployment training sites. Another unplanned requirement was shipping personnel records of all medical and dental personnel to the DA Surgeon General's Office before the officers could be called to active duty.<sup>75</sup> All of this caused a problem with record keeping, and as late as September 1991 many records that had been shipped to mobilization stations were still missing despite ARPERCEN efforts to recover these essential documents.<sup>76</sup>

Pre-war plans also provided that personnel records of all Army Reserve unit personnel be shipped to ARPERCEN for safekeeping during the mobilization, but this procedure was never implemented by DA, and no records were received.<sup>77</sup>

### IRR Mailgram Arrangements

At the direction of OSD and DA, ARPERCEN had established a system for notifying IRR personnel to report to mobilization stations using Western Union Mailgrams. The system had been in place for 10 years and had been tested repeatedly in mobilization exercises during that time. However, on the eve of the first real use of the mailgram system, DA made two significant changes.

Just as the mailgram was going to press, the Judge Advocate General, Surgeon General, and Defense Finance Center gave new instructions on the wording of the mailgram.<sup>78</sup> These changes were designed to bring the wording of the order into line with current law and regulations. The word changes were relatively minor and incorporated into the text with little difficulty.<sup>79</sup> However, some IRR personnel reported that the language was too bureaucratic and complicated, and several mailgram recipients had to seek assistance in figuring out what they were being ordered to do.<sup>80</sup>

Far more serious was the invalidation of the military travel warrant of the mailgram. Pre-war plans provided that all IRR personnel ordered to active duty would receive along with his or her mailgram a travel warrant to be used by the soldier to arrange and pay for transportation to a designated mobilization station. However, the airlines were refusing to honor the travel warrants and were charging a processing fee and standard fares instead of military fares. Despite years of preparation and testing, the Army had failed to check recently with the airlines to see if they still agreed to the travel warrants.<sup>81</sup> Although word changes were made to try to make the warrants more acceptable to the airlines, based on recommendations from the Military Traffic Management Command and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, it was decided at Department of the Army Headquarters simply to eliminate the whole system of travel warrants.<sup>82</sup>

ARPERCEN suddenly was required to find another way to get some 20,000 IRR personnel to their designated mobilization stations. Alert personnel at ARPERCEN turned to their local travel agent, Carlson Travel Network, and asked that private organization to do the job. Carlson was able to make individual reservations and provide airline tickets at military rates for almost all of the IMA, IRR, and retired personnel processed by ARPERCEN who needed them. Carlson also arranged for airlines to put on additional flights or make unscheduled stops to handle the IRR workload and also arranged with bus companies near mobilization stations to transport military personnel at reduced fares.<sup>83</sup> The key to the success of Carlson Travel Network in this unprogrammed work, was having a national network that linked each Carlson office, so that if the 800-number was busy in one office, it would ring in another that was capable of making the travel arrangement regardless of location.

Post-war assessment indicated that the method actually used by Carlson Travel Network was more responsive and overall better than the original travel warrant scheme, so as it turned out this was a beneficial change.<sup>84</sup> Those responsible for mobilizing the IRR, however, did not consider it such a good thing when they found out about it in the middle of the IRR call-up!



### Family Support

Assuring adequate support of families--dependent spouses, and children--was a problem for the entire Army during the mobilization, but it was a particular problem for individual Reservists who did not have the support of an organized unit to help take care of the dependents they left behind. Prior to DESERT SHIELD, ARPERCEN had no requirement to develop family support plans, and these plans were found to be inadequate or non-existent for individual Reservists. During the mobilization, ARPERCEN experienced numerous problems with single parents and dual military families. Many mobilized sole parents requested exemptions from service because of their responsibilities toward their children, and there were similar problems when both parents were in military service. The real problem was exacerbated by negative treatment in the media. The problem of family support for individual reservists needs more attention as part of a larger program for family support for the entire Army during mobilization.<sup>85</sup>

### Mobilization of Chaplains

Problems were experienced in the mobilization of professional officers--physicians, other health care professionals, attorneys, and chaplains.<sup>86</sup> The experience with mobilization of chaplains is, perhaps, illustrative of these problems. Chaplains provide a valuable service to units in combat, but very often these positions are not filled in peacetime, so an ability to provide pretrained individual chaplains is very important. Chaplains must receive an ecclesiastical endorsement from their church denomination before they can serve in the Army, and clergy should receive at least the Chaplain Officers Basic Course (CHOBC) before serving with Army units. However, the program to assure that these qualifications were met for Reserve and retired chaplains was very poor.<sup>87</sup>

At the start of the mobilization, many of the IMA positions calling for chaplains were vacant, and efforts were made to transfer chaplains from non-activating units to fill these IMA positions. Some units gave up their chaplains to fill IMA positions and later found themselves without chaplains when the units later were activated and deployed.<sup>88</sup> A better solution would have been to fill the IMA positions with IRR chaplains, but the IRR was not a very good source of chaplains to meet the needs of DESERT STORM. In August 1991, there were 267 chaplains in the IRR, but 40% of these turned out to be non-mobilization assets because they were awaiting discharge, retirement, or medical evaluation, or were being transferred to a unit. Many of the remaining chaplains lacked the training necessary to perform the role of an Army Chaplain. Others were in the IRR because they had performed poorly in units.<sup>89</sup> As a result, usable chaplain assets in the IRR were depleted rapidly, and an additional call would have exhausted the supply.<sup>90</sup>

Recalled retired chaplains were a good source of mobilization resources, and 76% of those contacted by ARPERCEN indicated their willingness to serve. However, some chaplains

were recalled to perform other than chaplain's duties, and there were difficulties in assuring the eligibility of some retirees to serve. The basic lesson is that insufficient attention was paid pre-war to keeping an adequate supply of trained and endorsed chaplains in the Reserve Components to augment the Active Army upon mobilization. It also suggests that centralized management of this scarce but important personnel resource would be advantageous.<sup>91</sup>

### Automated Systems

ARPERCEN had spent a lot of money creating large data bases and automated systems for mobilization of pretrained individual manpower. These systems used large, main-frame computers and were designed to permit a more-or-less continuous flow of orders once the system was started to provide people for a full mobilization to support a major conventional war with the Soviet Union. These systems, for the most part, were found to be inappropriate for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and they were discarded at the outset to be replaced by smaller, microcomputer based systems or, in some cases, manual procedures.

The Retired Activities Division was unable to use its sophisticated main-frame computer program to manage recall of military retirees for Operation DESERT STORM and had to create an entirely new system on a personal computer. The first task was to establish a data base of retirees who volunteered for recall to active duty. While this was being done, it was also necessary to track recall orders being issued to retirees. The number of retirees recalled to active duty was low during the Fall of 1990 but increased dramatically in December 1990 and the first two months of 1991. Orders were produced, copied, and distributed, and many had to be amended due to data base errors or last minute changes in procedure from DA.<sup>92</sup>

There was wide disparity among the multitude of different data bases used by ARPERCEN and other personnel agencies of the Army, leading to a plaintive plea that at least the "SSN, Name, Grade, and MOS fields...should be the first four fields of any data base."<sup>93</sup> Numerous problems of interoperability and exchange of data as well as compartmentalization appeared. There were problems in obtaining data from Active Army data bases once the Reservists were placed on active duty.<sup>94</sup> The internal problem was diagnosed as resulting from the use by each division within ARPERCEN of a different data base suboptimized for the business of that particular division but unable easily to work with other data bases.<sup>95</sup> Numerous other data base problems surfaced that have been duly noted and are being corrected. The impression gained from the experience related by the users of all of these automated systems is that simplicity is hard to achieve because of the multitude of laws, regulations, and rules--often conflicting--that are pushed down on ARPERCEN and the other personnel operating agencies of the Army from a multitude of higher headquarters.

The Mobilization Directorates of both the Army Personnel Command and ARPERCEN were well aware of the shortcomings of the Army's Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS) and had been moving toward a more flexible system when Operation DESERT SHIELD started. Despite the difficulties noted above, MOBPERS did function and, among other

things, produced the mailgrams that were essential for the call-up of the IRR. Many of the problems with MOBPERs were not a fault of the system itself, but resulted from functional changes that ran contrary to existing mobilization procedures, including changes in mobilization stations, use of derivative UICs, and cross-levelling of RC personnel prior to mobilization. These unanticipated conditions and the major difficulties encountered in transferring Reserve personnel to the Active Army personnel data base were major problems affecting the ability of the Army's automated systems to support the mobilization of individual manpower for Operation DESERT STORM.<sup>96</sup>

### Lessons for Individual Manpower Mobilization

Individual Manpower Mobilization has been the subject of intense activity for many years. Analyses were performed, plans drawn, systems integrated, and procedures tested and exercised. Yet, when it came to reality, however, the individual manpower mobilization system did not work very well. There are a variety of reasons for this, and some of these have emerged from the story of ARPERCEN's operations. There are also four major lessons that can be relearned from this experience.

ARPERCEN provided approximately 24,000 trained individual soldiers to bring Army units to full strength and replace losses if that had been necessary. But it had to do this heroically, laboriously, and at great cost. Many of the men and women of ARPERCEN worked 24 hours a day for seven days a week for several months to do their jobs.<sup>97</sup> Their work was made difficult by four major factors: Incompatibility of automated personnel systems; unexpected last-minute guidance by Department of the Army Headquarters; incremental allocation of strength authorizations; and the sheer complexity of the laws, rules, and regulations governing personnel management.

A great many lessons were learned during the operations about simplicity, commonality, and the advantages and disadvantages of automated systems. The major lesson for ARPERCEN itself from this experience is that personnel management is a seamless web of actions that must be interconnected rather than compartmented and treated in isolation. ARPERCEN should try at least to establish one common data base that includes everyone under ARPERCEN management and from which multiple users can extract information about any particular personnel category as the basis for taking action, and it would be even better if the Army would strive for one personnel system for all of its military members.<sup>98</sup>

Department of the Army Headquarters must learn something from the ARPERCEN experience also. While flexibility is a virtue, discarding plans and procedures that had been tested, approved, and exercised for many months and instituting new and uncoordinated plans and procedures is not a good way to run a manpower mobilization. Fortunately for the Army, ARPERCEN was able to do the job this time, but even though new systems were being created for the new conditions, there might have been confusion had the mobilization expanded and

continued over a longer period of time. Changes of policy and process directed by Department of the Army were for the most part necessitated by the broad situation, but they were perceived at the working level of ARPERCEN as arbitrary and capricious. Some of these last minute changes could have been made earlier and incorporated into the ARPERCEN plan before August 1990, suggesting that insufficient attention was paid before the war to individual manpower mobilization.

The Secretary of Defense and his staff should recognize the adverse impact on manpower mobilization of incremental increases in authorizations for manpower, such as Reserve call up strengths or strengths in the theater. Acting in good faith to limit the supposed unconstrained appetites of the CINC or the Military Services for more and more, OSD managers imposed tight ceilings on strengths. These ceilings were sources of great frustration and inefficiency. This is nowhere more evident than in the case of Army IMAs--designed to provide instant augmentation to plan and manage the initial stages of a mobilization and deployment, but instead either unavailable or made available only by various subterfuges devised to circumvent the strength constraints. A better solution would be to prepare a plan and carry it out with appropriate flexibility.

Finally, individual manpower mobilization is subject to an increasingly incomprehensible set of personnel management laws, rules, and regulations. These rules are often conflicting and make it very difficult to do things simply, easily, and cheaply. When they are put into effect by men and women at the working level who are scrupulous at following the rules, the net result is lengthy delay and gross inefficiency. These rules are promulgated by Congress, the White House, OSD, the Army, and numerous other agencies, each of which writes in good faith yet another apparently useful rule, but whose cumulative effect is sheer confusion at the bottom end of the guidance chain. Since there is no single agency that can be identified as responsible for this particular condition, nor its solution, this suggestion to keep guidance simple and flexible is addressed to all.

**Note on Sources**

The draft manuscript was reviewed by ARPERCEN, OCAR, and ODCSPER, DA. Mr Doyle Echols, ARPERCEN Historian, was most helpful in verifying and providing data, and many others at ARPERCEN also contributed significantly. LTC Joseph Kwiatkowski, IMA Program Officer for OCAR, made several useful comments. LTC Marlin Guild and Major Allen Cranford of the OCAR Senior Officer and Enlisted Management Office of OCAR helped assure the accuracy of the general officer data. Colonel Alan Sepe, ODCSPER, provided several useful insights about the overall process at Headquarters, Department of the Army, and LTG William H. Reno, DCSPER during DESERT STORM, explained the decision process at Department of the Army.

**The Principal Author**

Mr. John Brinkerhoff is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, California Institute of Technology, Columbia University, and George Washington University. He is a retired Army engineer corps colonel. He has served two tours on the Army staff in force development and manpower related positions. Subsequent to his military service, he was Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, after which he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Additionally, he served as an Associate Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), where he was responsible for mobilization policy. Mr. Brinkerhoff is serving as a consultant to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation.

**The Editors and Contributing Authors**

Mr. Ted Silva is a graduate of Northeastern University, the University of Hawaii, the Executive Development Program of Cornell University, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is a retired Army signal corps colonel. His Reserve Component experience includes service as Chief, Reserve Forces and Mobilization Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. For the past three years, Mr. Silva has served as a program manager and research analyst for the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, evaluating Federal emergency preparedness and the Army Reserve participation in Operation DESERT STORM.

Mr. John Seitz is a graduate of the University of Missouri, Shippensburg University, and the Army War College. He is a retired Army field artillery colonel. His Reserve Component experience includes service as Chief, Readiness Group Fort Riley and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Fourth Army. For the past three years, Mr. Seitz has worked as a research analyst and program manager for the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, evaluating Federal emergency preparedness and the Army Reserve participation in Operation DESERT STORM.

### Appendix A: ARPERCEN Organization for Desert Storm

This appendix summarizes the organization of ARPERCEN during the manpower mobilization for DESERT SHIELD and then DESERT STORM that occurred from August 1990 to June 1991. In addition to its routine peacetime duties (which did not slacken during this period), ARPERCEN had to surge its own capabilities and perform the work needed to support the Army with pretrained individual manpower as described in the body of the paper. The way that ARPERCEN organized to do this internally during the operation is shown below. To do the necessary work, ARPERCEN augmented its permanent staff with 289 Reservists and military retirees brought on active duty in various statuses. While all of these persons worked hard, those who held key positions of responsibility during the manpower mobilization are listed below.<sup>1</sup>

Headquarters, ARPERCEN, Brigadier General Thomas J. Kilmartin, Commander, managed and coordinated all aspects of the manpower mobilization.

Mobilization, Operations and Training Directorate, Colonel Rodney S. Nishimura, Director, had the principal responsibility for planning and implementing the manpower mobilization.

Mobilization Plans and Requirements Division, Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Underwood, Chief, had overall responsibility for the IRR call up.

Mobilization Requirements Branch, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Brown, Chief, managed the IRR call up by developing rosters, monitoring orders, and reviewing requests for delay and exemption.

Mobilization Plans and Operations Branch, Mr. Charles V. Nahtik, Chief, established the Mobilization Operations Center, issued IRR mailgrams, and monitored all DESERT STORM traffic.

Mobilization Preassignment Branch, Mr. Terry Colwell, Chief, managed the recall of military retirees.

Individual Mobilization Augmentation Division, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald E. Rosenbaum, Chief, managed both voluntary and involuntary call up of IMAs by receiving approvals from DA, obtaining orders, monitoring fill of positions at commands and agencies, and responding to inquiries by IMAs.

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<sup>1</sup> This appendix is based on the ARPERCEN History and additional information received from Major Antonelli on 28 August 1992.

Mobilization Training Division, Lieutenant Colonel Calberth B. Riley, Chief, managed the screening and assignment of IRR volunteers by receiving requests from FORSCOM, canvassing lists of volunteers, matching requirements to supply, and monitoring IRR processing.

Mobilization Readiness Division, Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Dyer, Chief, tracked status of the over 20,000 personnel mobilized for DESERT STORM.

Information Management Directorate, Colonel G. Sutherland, Director, assisted other directorates in tracking IRR, IMA, AGR, and retired personnel involved in DESERT STORM.

Mobilization Support Division, Mr. George Lampman, Chief, Mobilization Division, provided information management support for the mobilization of IMA, IRR, and retired personnel.

Officer Personnel Management Directorate, Colonel J. C. Hileman, Director, identified, contacted, and processed IRK officers being called involuntarily to active duty.

Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, Colonel F. Meyers, Director, identified, contacted, and processed IRR enlisted personnel being called involuntarily to active duty.

Personnel Records Management Directorate, Mr. Dave Smith, Director, sent records of personnel called up or volunteering as directed by DA and attempted to locate records and reconstitute them after the end of the mobilization. Continued to maintain 1.3 million military personnel records.

Personnel Actions Directorate, Colonel Winslow Griffin, Director, had overall responsibility for the Exemption Board and was in charge of the Demobilization Task Force that reviewed all personnel records for accuracy and completeness, to include awards, decorations, retirement points, and discharge or release from active duty status.

Resource Management Directorate, Colonel R. Y. Buff, Director, provided budget and manpower support to the augmented ARPERCEN staff, including managing funds for DESERT STORM support.

Logistics Directorate, Colonel W. Banks, Jr., Director, provided airline tickets and chartered buses and aircraft for movement of personnel being mobilized.

Full-Time Support Management Center, Colonel Richard C. Jelen, Director, managed AGR soldiers activated or deployed for DESERT STORM. This organization reported directly to OCAR but also functioned as a part of ARPERCEN.

End Notes

1. A few IMAs were utilized as volunteers for Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.
2. In addition to the Selected Reserve and the IRR, the Ready Reserve also includes members of the Inactive National Guard. The authority to call up a million members of the Ready Reserve under Title 10, USC 673 is termed "Partial Mobilization" by DOD, and the Title 10, USC 673b authority to call up 200,000 Selected Reservists is now termed the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up Authority (PSRC).
3. The Army's first "drilling IMAs" were authorized in April 1988 and received their first pay in June 1988. Doyle Echols, ARPERCEN, 2 November 1992. IMAs could drill with their units voluntarily for retirement points.
4. ARPERCEN, "Comments and Changes to Draft Document," 16 October 1992, hereafter cited as "ARPERCEN Comments".
5. ARPERCEN Comments, 16 October 1992.
6. The official ARPERCEN figure for IMAs utilized is 2,399, but ARPERCEN records also reveal that a total of 2,596 IMA orders were prepared for the 2,399 persons, indicating that some personnel who volunteered originally were later called up involuntarily, and that some IMA personnel had more than one set of orders.
7. These data are a result of the official reconciliation of IMA files conducted in December 1992 by Major William Hamlin, PA&E Division, ARPERCEN, and provided on 4 December 1992. The total of 2,399 IMAs does not agree with the earlier official number of 2,364, and this makes the IMA totals for Figures 5 and 6 off by 35 personnel. The reconciliation data is not available now, and may never be, but it does not affect the thrust, conclusions, or lessons learned which were derived from the research in publishing this monograph.
8. ARPERCEN, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM: A History, Undated, p. 2.
9. These data were derived indirectly from two different sources. The totals of IMAs on active duty were taken from an OASD(RA) listing of "Numbers of IMAs by Service During Operation DESERT STORM," Undated, and the number of IMAs called up involuntarily under 673b were obtained from the Army Reserve IMA Program Assessment, DAAR-FMF, 7 Jun 91. The timing of utilization of IMA volunteers was obtained by taking the difference between the two sets of data. However, the Army Reserve IMA Program Assessment indicates that 1,731 IMAs were called up involuntarily instead of the 1,691 reported officially by ARPERCEN. In order to make the total of that column add to 1,691, a reduction of 40 personnel was made arbitrarily in the number for March 1991, the greatest single monthly total. Until these data can be reconciled, that correction offers a reasonable view of the timing of the IMA call-up.



10. ARPERCEN, "IMA Utilization During DESERT SHIELD/STORM by Agency," IMA Functional Area Assessment, 31 Oct 91.
11. Colonel Alan M. Sepe, Chief Mobilization Directorate, ODCSPER, 7 July 1991. Colonel Sepe was assigned to OCAR Personnel Division during Operation DESERT STORM and worked on manpower mobilization actions during the operation. Prior to that assignment he was Chief, IMA Division at ARPERCEN.
12. Andrulis Research Corporation, Mobilization of the U.S. Army Reserve in Support of Operation DESERT STORM, August 1991, Appendix D.
13. Colonel Sepe, 7 July 1991.
14. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, FY 1990 Summary, December 29, 1990, for program strengths, and OASD(RA)(M&P) for maximum IMA participation strengths, 20 August 1992.
15. Interview with LTC John M. York, ARPERCEN Assistant Chief of Staff, 22 June 1992. LTC York was Chief of the IMA Division during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
16. LTC York, 22 June 1992.
17. Telephone Interview, Major Timothy C. Johnson, 15 September 1992.
18. The 42nd Replacement Battalion was responsible for processing new Active and Reserve accessions and IRR and other individuals being deployed overseas through Fort Dix.
19. Telephone Interview, Colonel Thomas E. Johnson, 15 September 1992.
20. ARPERCEN Comments, 16 October 1992.
21. ARPERCEN, "IMA Supervisors' Survey Results," and "IMA Soldiers' Survey Results," Undated. The survey instrument was sent out in January 1992. For the Supervisors' Survey, 113 responses were received from 93 agencies, because extra copies were made and distributed within these agencies to division and branch chiefs who supervised IMAs. The Supervisors' Survey covered 567 of the IMAs who were activated.
22. These results are very comparable to the results of a similar Air Force IMA survey that showed 90% of Air Force supervisors thought their own IMAs were adequately trained, 96% were good or very good, and 98% that IMAs contributed to mission accomplishment. The Air Force survey also disclosed many of the same problems encountered by the Army IMA Program.

23. The "IMA Soldiers' Survey" was issued in January 1992, and 783 responses were received out of 1,559 instruments sent out, for a very impressive response rate of 50%. Of the responses 539 were from officers; 60 from warrant officers; and 184 from non-commissioned officers.
24. ARPERCEN, MOBPERS Monthly Data Comparison Report, 31 August 1990. This Report lists AGR personnel in the IRR, but these were deleted from the tables shown in the text.
25. DCSPER 46 Report, February 1991.
26. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. 2.
27. Interview with LTG William H. Reno, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, 5 November 1992.
28. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992.
29. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992.
30. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992.
31. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992.
32. Interview with LTC Thomas R. Brown, Chief of the Mobilization Requirements Branch, and Mr Charles V. Nahlik, Chief of the Mobilization Plans and Operations Branch, 22 June 1992. Data on distribution of call up by skills obtained from Diana Schwendener, ARPERCEN Operations Center, 19 November 1992.
33. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p E6. Grade distribution of IRR personnel called up was provided by Diana Schwendener, ARPERCEN Operations Center, 19 November 1992.
34. According to Brown and Nahlik, 22 June 1992, great credit belongs to the US Postal Service employees who volunteered to come in on Monday, 21 January 1991, a National Holiday (Martin Luther King Day) to get the mailgrams out.
35. ARPERCEN, Information Paper DARP-MOP-P, "ARPERCEN's Role in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Operation," 31 December 1991. These figures vary slightly from those in the ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. E6, but the difference may be due to the timing.
36. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. E7.
37. ARPERCEN Comments, 16 October 1992, and additional information from Doyle Echols, 2 November 1992.
38. ARPERCEN, "Facts of Interest, Appendix D," undated.
39. Brown and Nahlik, 22 June 1992.

40. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Treatment of IRR Soldiers," 30 July 1991.
41. This section is based on a report by Specialist Matthew J. Giacomini, who reported on his experiences as an Individual Ready Reservist to Colonel James F. Kulas, 21st TAACOM, 19 June 1991.
42. Establishing a show rate for a Reserve call up is difficult, for it requires measuring the propensity of human beings to do something that they might not want to do, depending on the exact situation. Some of the factors that influence propensity to report are the kind of war, the degree of popular support, relationship of the Reservist to his or her military service, and the expectations of the individual. Simply asking the Reservists what they would do in a specified situation would not provide answers that could be relied on in a different situation.
43. Brown and Nahlik, 22 June 1992.
44. Brown and Nahlik, 22 June 1992.
45. Brown and Nahlik, 22 June 1992. Contrary to DOD policy, Mr Vann Hipp, then serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Reserve Affairs, served a 4 month tour of active duty in the theater, although his civilian position clearly marked him as a key employee to be screened into the Standby Reserve.
46. ARPERCEN Comments, 16 October 1992.
47. The section on retired military personnel is based primarily on Memorandum for Commander, ARPERCEN, "Final After Action Report -Mobilization Preassignment Branch, Mobilization Plans and Requirements Division in Support of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM47.," 3 August 1992. Additional data were provided by Mr Edison T. (Terry) Colwell, Chief of the Mobilization Preassignment Branch by telephone interview, 19 August 1992.
48. Telephone Interview, Mr Colwell, 19 August 1992.
49. The information in this section was provided primarily by LTC Marlin T. Guild, Chief, and Major Allen D. Cranford of the Senior Officer and Enlisted Management Office, OCAR.
50. ARPERCEN Comments, 16 October 1992, as of 30 June 1990. An additional 11 major generals and 17 brigadier generals were in the Standby Reserve.
51. The five Reserve generals on extended active duty were as follows: MG William F. Ward, Chief, Army Reserve; MG William R. Berkman, Executive of the Reserve Forces Policy Board; BG Roger C. Bultman, Deputy Chief, Army Reserve; BG J. Ronald Carey, RCAS Project Manager; and BG Thomas J. Kilmartin, Commander, ARPERCEN.
52. Reserve general officers are permitted to spend a maximum of 30 days in the Individual Ready Reserve after leaving a unit or IMA position while transitioning into the Standby Reserve.

53. DAMO-ODM, Information Paper, "Activated Reserve Component General Officers," 14 December 1990, and additional information supplied by SOEMO. In addition, three Army National Guard brigadier generals were called to active duty with their respective Roundout brigades.

54. IMA generals were authorized as follows (1 unless shown otherwise): ODCSOPS; ODCSLOG (2); ODCSPER; ODCSINT; SAR; ASA(M&RA); OTSG; Chief of Nurses; Chief of Chaplains; OJAG (2); OJCS; Chief of Engineers; AMC (6); MTMC; FORSCOM (5); TRADOC; OCAR; 7th Signal Brigade; USARPAC; USARSO. An IMA GO position authorized for Chief, Public Affairs, was not filled in August 1990.

55. Colonel Sepe, 7 July 1992.

56. See ANDRULIS Research Corporation monograph entitled, US Army Reserve Participation in Port Operations for Operation DESERT STORM, 3 May 1991, p. 26.

57. Data was furnished by SOEMO, OCAR. The extra days cited does not include the following: IDT for unit members; active duty for personnel boards; and TTAD tours, which would add more days to the totals if included.

58. Interview with Major General Ross G. Pickus, 10 November 1992.

59. General Pickus, 10 November 1992. General Pickus was employed as an executive by the Reserve Officers Association during the mobilization and was granted whatever time off was needed to perform his military duties.

60. Doyle Echols, 4 November 1992.

61. ARPERCEN Comments, 16 October 1992.

62. ARPERCEN Information Paper, "Nondeployable Active/Guard Reserve (AGR) Soldiers in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM" 31 December 1991.

63. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Request for AGR Volunteers to the Persian Gulf Area," 30 September 1991.

64. There is considerable ambiguity on the status of AGR personnel within the Ready Reserve. DOD Defense Manpower Data Center, "Total DOD and USCG Strength by Training/Retirement Category," 29 December 1990, shows all AGR personnel under the heading, "INDIV," instead of under the unit heading. The MOBPERS Monthly Data Comparison Report, RCS DARP-3, 31 August 1990, shows AGR personnel as part of "IRR Reinforcing and AT Assets," although excluded as mobilization assets. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Accounting Procedures for Active Guard Reservists (AGR) During a National Emergency," 30 September 1991, also implies that AGR personnel were part of the IRR. On the other hand, a February 1991 chart showing USAR Ready Reserve Composition cites the DCSPER 46 Report as a source and shows

AGRs as part of the Selected Reserve, but separate from the TPU and IMA categories.

65. ARPERCEN Information Paper, "DESERT STORM Southwest Asia Support Project," 31 December 1991.
66. According to ARPERCEN personnel involved in the process, officers from Headquarters, Department of the Army called directly and frequently to operating personnel at ARPERCEN with changes to previous plans and procedures, usually without having coordinated the changes within Department of the Army or with the ARPERCEN leadership.
67. Interviews with ARPERCEN personnel and the content of ARPERCEN after-action reports give no indication that the broader issues and policies affecting individual manpower mobilization were understood at ARPERCEN.
68. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992.
69. LTC York, 22 June 1992.
70. LTC York, 22 June 1992. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992, says that the decision to publish individual orders for each IMA was proposed by the Reserve side of the house.
71. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., pp. 2-3, is the source of the basic data on the records management problem.
72. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992. General Reno was not aware that ARPERCEN did not plan to ship IRR personnel records to the mobilization stations and agrees that ordering the records to be shipped was a mistake, for the records problem turned out to be a real "pain in the neck."
73. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
74. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. C27, also Brown and Nahlik, 22 June 1992.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. C26.
79. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992. General Reno points out that ARPERCEN had the text on its computer and could make the changes easily.
80. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Western Union Mailgram Order," 30 September 1991.

81. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992.
82. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Western Union Mailgram Order," 30 September 1991.
83. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Communications," 30 Sep 91.
84. Ibid.
85. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Single Parent/Dual Military Family," 30 July 1991, and ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Single Parent Family Support Plan," 30 Sep 91. ARPERCEN Comments, 16 October 1992, is the source of the statement that ARPERCEN had no requirement to develop family support plans prior to the war. ARPERCEN has since been given the mission.
86. The story of mobilization of all health care personnel will be covered in a subsequent historical case study covering all aspects of Army Reserve participation in the provision of medical support for DESERT STORM in CONUS and the theater.
87. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. C14.
88. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Filling IMA Positions with TPU Chaplains," 30 September 1991.
89. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "IRR Chaplain Mobilization Management," 30 September 1991.
90. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. C14.
91. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p. C14.
92. ARPERCEN History, op. cit., p C2.
93. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Critical Elements for a Database," 30 September 1991.
94. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Access to Active Duty Information," 30 September 1991.
95. ARPERCEN Lessons Learned, "Incompatibility of Databases for DESERT STORM," 30 September 1991.
96. Comments on draft paper by Major Peter Jones and Major David Tucker, DAAR-IN-IMO, 5 October 1992.
97. Brown and Nahlik, 22 June 1992.
98. LTG Reno, 5 November 1992. General Reno advocates a single Army personnel data base that incorporates all Components and categories and permits movement by an individual from

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*Twice the Citizen*

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one part of the Army to another simply by changing the Component and category designator.

The lack of resources available to handle Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) presented another problem. The battalion did not get its first utility detachment in country until 16 January 1991. This detachment was immediately overwhelmed (being organized to support a 4,000 man installation) by having to support not only Khobar Village (at over 30,000 personnel) but also the entire Dhahran area. Prior to the arrival of the utility detachment, a portion of RPMA was accomplished by making use of transient engineer unit assets, but primarily by detailing some of the 31 personnel of the 1030th Engineer Battalion HHD and by submitting numerous Purchase Request and Commitments (DA Form 3953) for local contractors. The use of HHD personnel, contracting, and tasking transient engineer units gradually decreased in scope, but continued throughout Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Another problem was the lack of participation and support from the Area Support Group or Area Support Battalion. Rather than providing engineer support for DEH operations, engineers were forced to divert command/control/engineering personnel and assets to provide logistical support at Khobar Village for the largest troop population in the Dhahran area, taking over numerous functions usually handled by an area support battalion or group. For example, the S-4 of the 1030th Engineer Battalion HHD was tasked to set up and operate a self-service supply center, supervise nine mess operations for over 30,000 troops, accomplish the distribution of bottled water, noon supplements, and MRE's for these troops, and assist incoming units set up supply-related accounts. In addition, transportation for troops and equipment had to be coordinated, and AFEES, MWR, and other troop support operations were set up, supervised, and often manned with engineer personnel.

Security was also a major problem. Although an MP unit had originally been programmed into Khobar to provide security for the troop concentration, this unit failed to materialize. To make matters worse, the compound was readily accessible from nearby Al Khobar and without any fence or barrier system to prevent unauthorized entry. The local Saudi representatives steadfastly refused to allow any fortifications, barriers, or defensive positions which would make the village look "military." The Saudis indicated that a contract already existed to build a chain-link perimeter fence. This fence never materialized, and the Saudis eventually agreed to allow the limited use of concertina wire. To meet the need for a security fence, the 1030th Engineer Battalion submitted its own request and contracted for the installation of a chain-link perimeter fence. In the interim, a combination of concrete barriers and concertina wire was emplaced around the perimeter of Khobar Village to limit access and provide some security.

The concept of having EAC units provide their own security force at Khobar Village was never satisfactory. A cohesive chain of command which could encompass all troops at Khobar Village was very slow in developing. This shortcoming was exacerbated by the nature of most EAC type units, by the constantly changing organizational structures as units were task organized for missions, and by the constant turnover of troops/units at Khobar. Fortunately, the first

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Khobar Village.



transient unit coming into Khobar Village--VII Corps--helped establish and man the initial guard force, providing time for an adequate security plan to be developed and implemented. Although several MP units and two RAOC headquarters were located in Khobar Village or nearby, these units were fully committed to other missions and could not take on responsibility for the security of Khobar Village. The mission of organizing, equipping, and staffing the Base Cluster Operations Center (BCOC) that supervised and monitored all security operations--to include SCUD Alerts--was assigned by default to the 1030th Engineer Battalion, placing an additional demand on already short engineer assets. This experience suggests a need to re-evaluate planning for the security of EAC units.

Closely associated with security, communications at Khobar Village was also a major problem. Neither tactical nor commercial telephones were readily available. Although each building had been wired for commercial telephones, the local Al Khobar telephone network could not handle additional lines. Military communication assets were also critically short. The first "SCUD Alert" communication system at Khobar Village consisted of an FM link from VII Corps HQ at Dammam to VII Corps HQ at Khobar, through a land line to the 1030th Engineer Battalion, then out to tenant units through the 1030th "Camel" switchboard. Although major commands eventually obtained tactical and/or commercial telephone sets, access to open lines was severely limited and the initial land-line network remained the primary communications system for tenant units for most of the operation. The related problem of providing telephones for troop use was solved by contracting and coordinating with the local MCC representatives and assisting with construction of a bank of 144 telephones in one of the parking garages.

Facilities engineering support for Khobar Village and the Dhahran area was late in arriving and inadequate for the task. Even after the arrival of the 416th Engineer Command main body and the 1030th Engineer Battalion Headquarters, most of the downward trace units were not in the country, resulting in a lot of bosses but very few workers to execute missions or projects. When the downward trace units began to arrive, many of these assets were chopped to assist the corps, again leaving inadequate support for the EAC engineer projects. In addition to engineer personnel, engineer equipment for EAC missions was often not available. Equipment often lagged behind arrival of engineer units, and non-unit engineer items were often prioritized for corps use. One consequence of the shortage and late arrival of engineer troops and equipment was the subsequent failure to provide equipment wash racks in a timely manner. EAC engineer assets were over committed to deployment projects that extended until the cease fire and were unable to plan effectively or execute redeployment missions.

As a consequence of not having personnel and equipment to do engineer missions, the majority of EAC projects and especially the early Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA), were handled by local contractors. Tasking these projects, supervising, and insuring quality control became significant problems. Both the ARCENT Engineer and Contracting Sections were at times clearly overwhelmed. As a result, many jobs were requested, lost track of, and never initiated. Other jobs were completed and closed out without engineer supervision to insure the work was performed to specifications.

The experience of the 1030th Engineer Battalion at Khobar Village and as the Facilities Engineering Activity for ARCENT suggests that in a future contingency operation, adequate facilities engineering assets should be programmed into the theater of operations at the same time as or before the arrival of the troops they are to support.

### **The Principal Author**

**Mr. John Brinkerhoff is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, California Institute of Technology, Columbia University, and George Washington University. He is a retired Army engineer corps colonel. He has served two tours on the Army staff in force development and manpower related positions. Subsequent to his military service, he was Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, after which he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Additionally, he served as an Associate Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), where he was responsible for mobilization policy. Mr. Brinkerhoff is serving as a consultant to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation.**

### **The Editors and Contributing Authors**

**Mr. Ted Silva is a graduate of Northeastern University, the University of Hawaii, the Executive Development Program of Cornell University, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is a retired Army signal corps colonel. His Reserve Component experience includes service as Chief, Reserve Forces and Mobilization Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. For the past three years, Mr. Silva has served as a program manager and research analyst for the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, evaluating Federal emergency preparedness and the Army Reserve participation in Operation DESERT STORM.**

**Mr. John Seitz is a graduate of the University of Missouri, Shippensburg University, and the Army War College. He is a retired Army field artillery colonel. His Reserve Component experience includes service as Chief, Readiness Group Fort Riley and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Fourth Army. For the past three years, Mr. Seitz has worked as a research analyst and program manager for the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, evaluating Federal emergency preparedness and the Army Reserve participation in Operation DESERT STORM.**