



Security Council

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Letter dated 30 September 2024 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 20 of resolution 2700 (2023).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti on 16 August 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 11 September 2024.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 2653 (2022)

* Reissued for technical reasons on 29 October 2024.



Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)

Summary

Both the political and security dynamics in Haiti shifted significantly during the reporting period of November 2023 to August 2024. Following weeks of anti-government protests across the country, and in anticipation of the long-awaited deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, gangs from the two opposing coalitions – G9 and G-Pèp – activated the *Viv Ansanm* alliance in February 2024 and launched a series of coordinated attacks in Port-au-Prince.

The reporting period saw a spike in gang violence. Since late February, gangs – including those led by the five individuals currently included in the United Nations sanctions consolidated list – staged repeated assaults against government facilities and critical infrastructure, including seaports, airports and police stations, as well as banks, businesses and private property. The two largest prisons in the country were attacked in March, and more than 4,600 inmates escaped, some of whom joined the ranks of the gangs. The attacks have not only had a substantial humanitarian impact, killing many, displacing thousands and leaving parts of the population without access to basic commodities, but have also further crippled the economy and the financial sector.

This extreme violence contributed to the announcement of the resignation of the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, on 11 March, during a meeting facilitated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which established a new road map for the political transition. Since then, despite challenges in building cohesion between Haitian stakeholders, several significant steps have been taken to implement transitional arrangements, including the formation of the Transitional Presidential Council, the appointment on 29 May of Garry Conille – a former Prime Minister and senior United Nations official – as the interim Prime Minister and the installation of the new Government on 12 June.

Despite those advancements, gang violence has continued to plague Haiti. Several parts of the capital remain under attack, and, at the time of writing, gangs control about 85 per cent of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Gangs actively continue to undermine the political transition, including by relentlessly targeting police and judicial facilities and personnel, in particular in the West and Artibonite departments, thereby impeding the restoration of State authority and the future organization of elections. Against that backdrop, self-defence groups have proliferated, leading to a notable rise in extrajudicial killings and mob lynchings.

The establishment of the Transitional Government and the coinciding initial deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission in June, signal a potential revival of State control and a more effective and coordinated response to the violence. In reaction, although gangs have called for dialogue in the hope of securing an amnesty, they have violently demonstrated their opposition to the mission and to any threat to their hegemony. Aside from some infighting, six months on, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance still holds, and gangs have expanded their territories to increase revenue from kidnappings, extortion and drug trafficking. They have engaged in an active recruitment drive, in particular of children, strengthened the protection of their strongholds and stockpiled arms and ammunition.

Despite the strengthening of the arms embargo measures, arms trafficking continues unabated, as evidenced by the high levels of armed violence in the country and the new materiel displayed by gangs. Gangs have been increasingly procuring larger calibre weapons, resulting in more damage and a posing greater challenge to the police and the mission. In response to the security vacuum, more civilians have been purchasing weapons, and some private security companies, as well as units of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, have continued to procure firearms illicitly, further fuelling trafficking dynamics. The Panel of Experts is looking into several regional trafficking trends, and the main routes previously reported remain the same. The effective enforcement of the arms embargo by Haiti and Member States from the wider region remains critical to achieving any decrease in armed violence in the country.

Serious violations of human rights persist on a large scale with total impunity. Gangs continue to launch indiscriminate attacks against the population, killing, raping, torturing and kidnapping civilians, notably in the West and Artibonite departments. The surge in the numbers of internally displaced persons and their dire living conditions exacerbate the risk of women and girls becoming victims of sexual assault and exploitation. The Panel is particularly concerned about children being victims of forced recruitment, sexual violence and malnutrition, as well as the deprivation of access to education and health services. At the time of writing, about 600,000 people were displaced within the country and hundreds of thousands had fled abroad, including through smuggling networks tied to regional criminal organizations. With many children and young people out of school and universities, and skilled people fleeing, the future of the country is at stake.

The recent crisis has exposed connections between the actions of the gangs and other armed actors and the actions of certain political, economic and security individuals, and the Panel is looking into the activities of several of them. In addition, weak security and governance continue to be exploited by cross-border trafficking networks, involving gang members, to smuggle large quantities of goods into the country on behalf of Haitian businesspeople who finance the gangs. This deprives the State of import taxes and facilitates the trafficking of arms and ammunition, as well as drugs, thereby fuelling armed violence.

For Haitian interlocutors, the sanctioning of these actors, who continue to back the gangs and threaten the peace and security of Haiti in total impunity, is a major priority. With the revival of the political process and the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, it is a crucial moment for the sanctions regime to effectively support the stabilization of Haiti.

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I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. On 19 October 2023, the Security Council adopted resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), in which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti consisting of an arms embargo, as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Currently, the sanctions list includes the names of five individuals.
2. The Security Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 21 of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), and further decided that this mandate should also apply with respect to the measures imposed under resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#).
3. The present final report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#) and covers investigations conducted up to 9 August 2024. The Panel provides details concerning some of its analyses in the annexes to the present report.

B. Methodology

4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel's methods were in full conformity with the best practices and methods, as recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources, given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.
5. Following the publication of its final report in September 2023 ([S/2023/674](#)), the Panel and the Chair of the Committee received information volunteered by and about a range of actors cited in the report. The Panel reviewed the material and shared it, along with its observations, with the Committee.
6. Since its appointment in October 2023, the Panel conducted investigations in Haiti, as well as fact-finding missions in Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Jamaica, Honduras, Mexico and the United States of America and is grateful for the support it received from the respective national authorities, as well as from non-governmental actors. The Panel's ability to conduct some field inquiries has been affected due to budgetary constraints, as well as the security situation in Haiti, which had deteriorated severely since March 2024.
7. The Panel welcomes the continuous collaboration it has received from the Haitian authorities. In Haiti, the Panel met with representatives of Haitian institutions, including the Haitian national police; customs, financial and anti-corruption units; representatives of the political and private sectors; civil society organizations; former gang members; individuals living in gang-controlled areas; and other victims of gang-related violence, including sexual and gender-based violence.
8. The Panel has sent a range of requests for information to Member States. The Panel would like to thank those Members States that have responded to its requests and further emphasizes the critical importance of that information in supporting its work (see table of correspondence in annex 2).

Cooperation with other entities

9. In line with resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), the Panel has continued to cooperate positively with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), from which it has received great support. The Panel has also engaged with representatives of CARICOM, including from the Eminent Persons Group and the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, as well as the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Panel also met with the leaders of the Multinational Security Support task force to give them a briefing on the Panel's work and the sanctions regime and to establish channels of cooperation.

10. In line with paragraph 25 of resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), the Panel supported the Secretary-General in his assessment of the progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in paragraph 24 of the same resolution.

C. Development of the United Nations sanctions regime on Haiti

11. Following the designation by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) of four individuals on 8 December 2023, the sanctions list is now composed of five gang leaders from the West department of Haiti.¹ While that decision sent a positive message, the effect of the sanctioning remains extremely limited as gang leaders and the activities of their criminal groups are not directly affected by the measures. All gang leaders are involved in arms trafficking and/or violations of the arms embargo. The Panel is also monitoring the implementation of the asset freeze and the travel ban on those individuals and is currently looking into reports of potential violations of the measures.

12. By significantly enlarging the scope of the arms embargo, from one that only targeted sanctioned individuals and entities to a territorial embargo, the Security Council has adopted a key measure to contribute to tackling arms and ammunition trafficking. However, enforcement of the embargo remains weak, with regular violations (see sect. II.B.1).

13. The renewal of the sanctions regime in October 2023 was perceived positively by most of the Haitian population, who strongly expect the sanctioning of additional actors, in particular those who back the gangs and those involved in arms trafficking.

D. Evolution of the security situation and the political track

14. Following the announcement at the end of February 2024 by the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, that elections would be held no later than 31 August 2025, gangs from the two opposite coalitions (G9 and G-Pèp), including those led by the five United Nations sanctioned individuals, announced their intention to topple the Prime Minister. They reactivated the *Viv Ansanm* (living together) alliance (see [S/2024/253](#), annex 1) to carry out coordinated attacks against critical infrastructure (see sect. II.A). These attacks resulted in the deaths and displacement of large numbers of individuals and cut off critical supply lines for the population (see sect. II.C).

15. On 3 March, the Government declared a state of emergency, and, the following day, international flights were cancelled while gangs attacked the airport, which prevented the return of Mr. Henry to Haiti after a visit to Kenya.

¹ See <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries>.

16. In reaction to this extreme outbreak of gang violence, on 11 March, CARICOM convened an urgent meeting in Kingston with Haitian stakeholders and international partners. The same day, Mr. Henry announced that he would resign upon the establishment of the Transitional Presidential Council and the naming of an interim Prime Minister. All parties present in Kingston agreed to establish a transitional political arrangement that would facilitate a peaceful transition of power through free and fair elections.²

17. The 3 April political agreement for a peaceful and orderly transition adopted in Haiti³ and the issuance of the executive order of 12 April by the Government⁴ set out the composition and the role of the Transitional Presidential Council, which includes a wider range of stakeholders than any previous transitional agreements, with seven voting members from the principal political parties and sectors (Groupe Montana, Fanmi Lavalas, Pitit Desalin, RED/EDE/Compromis historique, the private sector group, the signatories of the agreement of 21 December 2022 and the Collectif des partis politiques du 30 janvier 2023) and two observing members drawn from civil society and interfaith groups. Only one woman was included in the Council as one of the two non-voting members.

18. Mr. Henry resigned as Prime Minister on 24 April, in anticipation of the installation of the Transitional Presidential Council the following day. Despite the difficulties the Council has been experiencing in reaching an agreement around internal decision-making mechanisms, significant steps have been taken, including the appointment on 30 May of Garry Conille, a former prime minister and former senior United Nations official, as interim Prime Minister and the installation of the new Government, on 12 June.

19. While the initial deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission in June provides critical support to the Haitian authorities in moving forward the transition towards restoring security and paving the way to national elections, the nomination of the members of the Provisional Electoral Council, the next key step of the transition, remains a challenge.

Security challenges to the political transition

20. Gangs continue to deliberately undermine the political transition, including by relentlessly targeting facilities of the Haitian national police in the West and Artibonite departments,⁵ thereby preventing the restoration of any State authority and security, a critical prerequisite for free and democratic elections. They have openly and violently declared their opposition to the Transitional Presidential Council and the Multinational Security Support mission (see sect. II.A.4). In anticipation of the deployment of the mission, gangs have engaged in an active recruitment drive (see sect. II.A), procured weapons and ammunition (see sect. II.B.1 and annex 24) and expanded their territories to secure more revenue and establish “retreat zones” (see sect. II.A.4).

21. The initial deployment on 25 June of the Multinational Security Support mission, with the arrival of 200 Kenyan police officers, was received very positively, but its precise objectives and scope remain unclear for most of the population, with

² CARICOM, “Outcome declaration of CARICOM, international partners and Haitian stakeholders”, 11 March 2024.

³ Available at www.haitilibre.com/docs/accord-politique-pour-une-transition-pacifique-et-ordonnee.pdf.

⁴ Available at www.haitilibre.com/docs/Decret-portant-creation-du-Conseil-presidentiel-de-transition.pdf.

⁵ As at 30 June 2024, 74 Haitian national police stations were not operational. United Nations police data.

many hoping that the mission will deploy outside of Port-au-Prince and in the Artibonite department, to recover gang-controlled territory. At the time of writing, Haitian interlocutors expressed concern that the mission had yet to show results.

22. The arrival of the Multinational Security Support mission, coinciding with the establishment of the Transitional Government, signals a potential return to governance and a more strategic and coordinated response to violence. In reaction, gang leaders have oscillated between shows of force and calls for dialogue in the hope of securing an amnesty.

23. Interlocutors of the Panel shared their concerns and challenges on the way forward in addressing the gang phenomenon. They noted that negotiations with violent criminal groups mostly motivated by pecuniary objectives are extremely sensitive and risky and could be perceived both as a sign of political recognition and the promotion of impunity. Conversely, a purely hard security approach will hinder the recovery of Haiti. They also highlighted that the judiciary and the prison systems (see sect. II.C and annex 32) do not have the capacity to process potential mass arrests of gang members and that the conception of any disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration and/or community violence reduction programming are very much at the embryonic stage.


II. Information relevant to the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions [2653 \(2022\)](#) and [2700 \(2023\)](#) and the potential designation of individuals or entities who may have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti

A. Gang dynamics

24. Over the course of the reporting period, gang dynamics have shifted significantly, with the two rival coalitions – G9 and G-Pèp – activating the *Viv Ansanm* alliance on 29 February 2024 to establish a common front against the Government (see annexes 3 and 4). Since late February, the capital has witnessed unprecedented levels of violence, with coordinated gang attacks against key government buildings and critical infrastructure (see annex 5 and sect. II.D.2).

25. The West and Artibonite departments continue to be plagued by alarming levels of violence. In the West department, gangs have targeted communes such as Cité Soleil, Delmas, Tabarre, Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets. They also expanded their control on the outskirts of the capital, notably over southern (Carrefour, Gressier and Léogâne), eastern (Ganthier) and northern (Cabaret and Arcahaie) communes, ahead of the commencement of the Multinational Security Support mission's operations, to increase revenue. An estimated 85 per cent of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is currently under gang influence and control (see annex 6).⁶

⁶ Interviews with gang analysts, June and July 2024. For definition of areas of gang control and areas of influence, see [S/2023/674](#).



Source: BINUH quarterly report on the human rights situation, April–June 2024.

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

26. The lives of the inhabitants of the entire capital have been deeply affected by gang violence, hampering the functioning of vital sectors, including security, education, health, culture and transport. In the Artibonite department, the increased number of kidnappings, rapes, hijacking of trucks and killings⁷ (see sect. II.C) have prompted renewed calls for the urgent deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission to the area.⁸ Against that backdrop, self-defence groups have multiplied, as well as extrajudicial killings, including of minors, and mob lynchings.

27. The five sanctioned individuals continue to head the main gangs in Haiti, with 5 Segond, led by Johnson André (alias “Izo” – HTi.002) and Grand Ravine, led by Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli” – HTi.003), currently the strongest in terms of territorial control, headcount, firepower and revenue. While he might be the most notorious and vocal gang leader (see sect. II.A), Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque” – HTi.001) is not the most powerful. He has lost considerable influence over the G9 coalition (see annex 7), with his Delmas 6 gang weakened by ongoing police operations and loss of revenue. Of note, *Viv Ansanm* looted most of the businesses in Bas Delmas that used to pay Barbeque money in exchange for “security”.⁹

28. Meanwhile, the Kraze Barye gang has been less prominent, weakened by the multiple clashes with an offshoot of the gang, led by “Didi”, who was killed in May 2024, who had opposed the gang’s leader, Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005). The gang was also weakened by several police operations. Kraze Barye has received support from the 5 Segond and Canaan gangs. The latter, led by Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”), has grown in importance largely due to its closeness to 5 Segond and by the fact that the Canaan area was spared from *Viv Ansanm* attacks and police operations. In turn, the 400 Mawozo gang, headed by Joseph Wilson (alias “Lanmo San Jou” – HTi 004), has

⁷ Interviews with gang analysts and civil society representatives, June and July 2024.

⁸ United Nations police report, July 2024.

⁹ Interviews with gang analysts, May 2024 and United Nations confidential report, May 2024.

strengthened its fighting capacity and boosted its revenue, in particular by extorting trucks carrying goods to and from the Dominican Republic (see annex 8).¹⁰

1. Gang violence in downtown Port-au-Prince and nearby areas

29. As the capital's main administrative, financial and commercial district, the Port-au-Prince downtown area has always been at the centre of gangs' expansionary ambitions. Since late February 2024, the area had turned into a battlefield. Several strategic checkpoints were recently established from where gang members could keep watch and disrupt police operations, with snipers shooting from the tops of vandalized buildings.¹¹ For instance, gang members from 5 Segond and Grand Ravine opened fire, disrupting both visits of the interim Prime Minister to the country's largest hospital after it was liberated in early July 2024 from gang control.¹²

30. Over the course of the reporting period, the 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs – which in 2022 had started to move towards southern downtown – aggressively expanded into the areas surrounding the National Palace. Meanwhile, northern downtown has been under the control of the Krache Dife, Les Argentins and La Saline gangs since 2021. The area has been strategic for revenue collection through extortion, truck hijackings and the theft of goods, and kidnapping. Its proximity to the national port authority¹³ also places it in a favourable location for drug trafficking activities (see S/2024/253).¹⁴

31. The political aspirations of *Viv Ansanm* came to light through its support to Guy Philippe and anti-government stance (see S/2024/253). As the takeover of the National Palace would be a symbolic blow to Haiti, *Viv Ansanm* has launched at least 10 major attacks against the Palace since early March 2024. The offensives were backed by Dimitri Hérard, the former head of the National Palace General Security Unit from 2017 to 2021, who was imprisoned for his alleged involvement in the 2021 assassination of former president Jovenel Moïse (see annex 9) and escaped from prison together with 4,600 inmates in March 2024. Mr. Hérard tried to encourage others to shoot the security officers who were resisting the attacks and was in league with Guy Philippe, who reportedly tried to bribe police officers to allow the gangs into the Palace.¹⁵

32. In a move to disrupt the political transition, *Viv Ansanm* also repeatedly attacked, inter alia, the Ministries of Justice, Defence and the Interior, the former building of the Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administratif and the general hospital, as well as Haitian national police units, including the Unité départementale de maintien d'ordre and the Port-au-Prince police station.¹⁶ In a nearby neighbourhood, Les Argentins (also known as the Bel Air gang), led by Kempes Sanon, repeatedly attempted to seize control of the Brigade of Operation and Departmental Intervention, strategically located high up in the national fort, which would enable the gang to control large parts of downtown.¹⁷

33. In the neighbouring Solino, since February 2024, Barbeque has joined hands with his former rival, Kempes Sanon, to intensify raids to gain access to strategic

¹⁰ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, Haitian national police officers and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, 2024.

¹¹ Interviews with a gang analyst and a Haitian national police officer, June and July 2024.

¹² United Nations police report, July 2024 and interview with a gang analyst, a Haitian national police officer and a government representative working on anti-gang operations, July 2024.

¹³ The government authority that manages all of the country's seaports. See https://www.mef.gouv.ht/directions/og_autonomes.

¹⁴ Interviews with a gang analyst and a government representative working on gang-related issues, June and July 2024.

¹⁵ Interviews with confidential sources, June and July 2024.

¹⁶ Interviews with Haitian national police officers and a gang analyst, July 2024.

¹⁷ Interview with a government representative working on gang-related issues, June 2024.

routes connecting their territories to other areas and benefit from diversified streams of revenue (see [S/2023/674](#)). Gangs have clashed with the Solino self-defence group, leading to several casualties (see annex 10). In the past, Barbeque enjoyed some kind of informal arrangement with certain police officers in Solino. However, consistent attacks by *Viv Ansanm* against police premises and residences, as well as Haitian national police operations against Barbeque's stronghold, have contributed to undermining that relationship.¹⁸ As a reaction to the increased police pressure, on 9 June, Barbeque claimed responsibility for an attack in which three officers of the anti-gang tactical unit of the Haitian national police were killed as they were patrolling in lower Delmas (see annex 11). Barbeque blamed the officers for entering the area in a private capacity to support the Solino self-defence group.¹⁹

2. Expansion over southern West department

34. Gangs have sought to expand their territories to increase revenue from kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking and illegal tolls along route RN2, which connects the capital to the south. Ahead of the commencement of Multinational Security Support mission operations, control over southern communes of the West department provide gangs with rear bases and corridors to other departments (see annex 12).²⁰

35. Grand Ravine's cell in Mariani, set up in the Carrefour commune in late 2023 (see [S/2024/253](#)), received reinforcements from the 103 Zombie group, led by Charlemagne Dorin (alias "Ti Bebe Bougòy"), to extend Grand Ravine's control over the neighbouring Gressier commune.²¹ Additional illegal tolls were established, and brutal gang violence broke out in May 2024. At least 25 civilians were killed between 28 June and 1 July 2024,²² and the police lost control of the Gressier police station on 7 July 2024.

36. The southern communes of Léogâne, Grand Goave and Petit Goave are currently under threat from gang incursion. On 20 July, the 103 Zombie group published a video showing that they had entered Laferronay, a locality in the Léogâne commune, bordering the Gressier commune. Its mountainous terrain could serve as a strategic rear base for gang members, as the Police can only gain access to such areas using aerial capacity. In response, the population of the commune of Léogâne erected barricades to prevent further gang infiltration.

37. Since February 2024, the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (alias "Chrisla"), has taken control of the Carrefour commune. There has been no police presence in the area since mid-May 2024, when two police stations were attacked.

38. As a result of gang violence in the Carrefour and Gressier communes, at least 233 individuals, including gang members and civilians, were killed or injured from April to June 2024.²³

¹⁸ Interviews with a gang analyst and a government representative working on gang-related issues, June and July 2024.

¹⁹ Video on file with the Panel.

²⁰ United Nations confidential report; and interview with gang analysts and Haitian national police officers, May, June and July 2024.

²¹ United Nations confidential document; and interviews with gang analysts and Haitian national police officers, July 2024.

²² United Nations data, May and July 2024.

²³ United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, "Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti", April–June 2024.

3. Continued gang violence in the Artibonite department

39. Gran Grif, led by Luckson Elan, and Kokorat San Ras, led by Ferdens Tilus (alias “Meyer”),²⁴ continued to spread violence in the Artibonite department, including in the northern communes, which had been previously spared from violence (see annexes 13 to 15).²⁵ In a bid to expand territorial control, Kokorat San Ras attacked the commune of Terre Neuve for the first time in mid-June 2024, killing 11 civilians. The gang set up a new cell in Mapou Lagond, l’Estère commune, in January 2024.

40. The above-mentioned gangs are closely connected to the *Viv Ansanm* gangs that operate in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, notably G-Pèp. During the reporting period, they carried out indiscriminate killings, burned houses and attacked police stations. For example, on 11 January 2024, a man was murdered and dismembered after resisting Gran Grif assaults. Kidnappings are at alarming levels (see annex 33). On 18 February, Kokorat San Ras kidnapped 20 passengers travelling in the Gros Morne commune and demanded US \$3,500 to return the bus, besides the ransom for passengers. Hostages are often tortured and killed if a ransom is not paid. In addition, gangs repeatedly loot farmland and steal livestock. In response, self-defence groups have continued to execute individuals allegedly associated with the gangs or suspected of common crimes.²⁶

41. Despite a warrant issued for Youri Latortue in January 2024 in relation to charges related to murder, criminal conspiracy and forgery, he continues to use the Raboteau and Kokorat San Ras gangs to exert control over Gonaïves and the wider Artibonite region with total impunity. Latortue has been using “National Security”, his private security company, to acquire firearms and has been providing materiel to gang members.²⁷

42. Police and judiciary facilities and personnel in the Artibonite region continue to be under threat by gangs and their backers (see S/2023/674). In early February, during anti-government demonstrations in support of Guy Philippe, members of Raboteau and Kokorat San Ras ransacked the courthouse. Members of the two gangs met with Guy Philippe, accompanied by armed agents of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, ahead of the demonstrations in Gonaïves. On that occasion, a number of weapons were distributed under the guise of recruiting Brigade agents.²⁸ Of note, some agents – who are required to possess a firearm – actively participated in anti-government demonstrations in support of Guy Philippe (see annex 26).

4. Strategy against Multinational Security Support mission operations

43. Gangs have largely concentrated their efforts on strengthening the protection of their zones in order to prevent security forces from entering, including by digging trenches and erecting barricades along the points of access to their strongholds and employing scouts and drones to track police movements. Within their zones, they have placed gas cylinders and prepared Molotov cocktails to use against police during operations. To intimidate security forces, gangs have broadcast videos showing the weapons and ammunition that they have recently acquired (see annex 16).²⁹

²⁴ These individuals were recently sanctioned by Canada. See Canada, Global Affairs, “Canada imposes sanctions against Haitian gang leaders”, 21 June 2024.

²⁵ BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti”.

²⁶ United Nations confidential reports, 2024 and interviews with civil society representatives, June and July 2024.

²⁷ Information provided by a Member State and interviews with confidential sources, 2024.

²⁸ Interviews with confidential sources, January and February 2024.

²⁹ Interviews with international and national gang analysts, a Haitian national police officer, a government representative working in anti-gang operations, and an individual living in gang-controlled area, 2024.

44. Some gang members have either fled Port-au-Prince or relocated to hard-to-reach areas with a view both to creating new bases and increasing criminal revenue. While Grand Ravine has moved towards the southern communes of the West department (see sect. II.A.2), the 400 Mawozo gang has led brutal attacks over the eastern commune of Ganthier.³⁰ After the release of a video in which Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004) boasted about the new acquisition of weapons and ammunition (see annex 17), the gang took over the town of Ganthier, during a major attack on 21 July. Several properties were set on fire, including the town police station, which was further destroyed on 25 July. A new gang cell was set up, and Lanmo San Jou announced, on 28 July, that Fond-Parisien, a communal section of Ganthier, would be the gang's next target.³¹ Its aim is to take total control over route RN8 to extort drivers moving between Croix-des-Bouquets and Malpasse, on the border with the Dominican Republic, and to facilitate the smuggling of weapons, ammunition and other contraband across the porous Haitian border (see sect. II.D.3).³² Of note, with *Viv Ansanm*, illegal tolls have multiplied not only along the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to other areas, but also on secondary roads and streets in several neighbourhoods of the metropolitan area.³³ In the northern communes of the capital, the 5 Segond and Cannan gangs killed at least 10 people and burned several houses during attacks against the Arcahaïe and Cabaret communes on 6 August, in a bid to extend control along the Port-au-Prince bay area, presumably to facilitate the movement of drugs and access to other areas.

45. The fear of gangs extending their areas of control has triggered the spreading of messages on social networks encouraging the population to acquire machetes to undertake acts of mob justice against *Viv Ansanm* members (see annex 18). Acts of lynching are likely to increase, exacerbating community violence.³⁴

46. Gang leaders are using the population as human shields, including for potential upcoming anti-gang operations (see sect. II.C.3). They have organized cash handouts to ensure residents stay,³⁵ forbidden the population from leaving and even forced residents to remain in the houses they have invaded, in order to merge with the population.³⁶ Women and children have been installed at the entrances of gang zones to serve as a protective buffer during police operations.³⁷ On 24 July 2024, gangs in Cité Soleil commune, such as Belekou, Boston and Brooklyn, announced a peace pledge and dismantled the barriers separating their respective areas that had been restricting the movements of the population (see annex 18), reportedly to evade police operations by pretending to be civilians.

47. Gangs have also bolstered their ranks – to an estimated 5,500 members (see annex 4) – mainly with children, aiming at leveraging potential incidents against them to undermine the presence of the Multinational Security Support mission.³⁸ Children have

³⁰ 400 Mawozo started launching attacks over the neighbouring areas of Croix-des-Bouquets commune, which the gang controls, to expand territory and increase revenue. After taking over the control of these areas and some sections of Thomazeau commune, in early October 2023, the gang started progressing over Ganthier commune, launching a deadly attack late November 2023, and has intensified its offensives since January 2024.

³¹ Video on file with the Panel.

³² Interview with a gang analyst, July 2024. See also, Jacqueline Charles, “What a gang attack in a rural Haiti town says about the Kenya-led security mission”, *Miami Herald*, 26 July 2024.

³³ Interview with a representative of the transport sector, July 2024.

³⁴ United Nations confidential report, June 2024; and interviews with international and national gang analysts and an individual living in gang-controlled area, 2024.

³⁵ Interviews with gang analysts and an individual living in gang-controlled area, May 2024.

³⁶ Interview with a political analyst, July 2024.

³⁷ United Nations confidential report, May 2024; and interview with an individual living in gang-controlled area July 2024.

³⁸ Interviews with government representatives, Haitian national police officers, national and international gang analysts, and an individual living in gang-controlled area, 2024.

taken part in attacks, including as scouts, by carrying weapons and ammunition and even participating in combat.³⁹ Of note, the current Grand Ravine leaders in Mariani (Bout Ba) and Gressier (Ti Bebe Bougoy) were recruited as children about 10 years ago, indicating that today's recruits are likely to become the gang leaders of tomorrow.⁴⁰

48. In addition, escapees from the recent mass jailbreaks have added new skills to the gangs they have joined. For instance, Dimitri Hérard sought refuge in 5 Segond's zone and helped organize, train and advise gang members on strategies for the coordinated attacks. He facilitated the acquisition of the firearms that were on display in the propaganda video of the so-called "Unité village de dieu" (see annex 24).⁴¹ Alongside his involvement in drug trafficking, he also provides Izo with connections to large criminal organizations in the region.⁴²

49. Despite the increased levels of criminality and human rights abuses, *Viv Ansanm* gangs have stepped up their demands for dialogue and media presence, likely with the aim of improving their public image and articulating opportunistic social and political narratives to justify their violence. In the light of the announcement by the Government that firm action would be taken to regain gang-controlled areas, as well as changes in leadership in the Haitian national police and the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, gangs are motivated by the opportunity to secure an amnesty rather than pursuing genuine political aspirations.⁴³

50. The failure by *Viv Ansanm* to install Guy Philippe as head of the transition dashed any previous hopes of amnesty, despite the recurrent attacks against the National Palace (see sect. II.A.1).⁴⁴ In that context, on 25 June, the same day that Kenyan troops arrived in Port-au-Prince, Barbeque (HTi.001) – as the *Viv Ansanm* spokesperson – called for talks with the Prime Minister "as a first step to restoring peace in the country". On 28 June, the interim Prime Minister urged gangs first to halt criminal activities, lay down arms and recognize the authority of the State before any other arrangement is made.⁴⁵

51. Despite their plea for talks, gangs continue their criminal activities, with violence at a record high. On 28 June, Barbeque showed up surrounded by armed men, stating his readiness to fight the international mission.⁴⁶ Izo (HTi.002) has also posted on social media drone images of the Multinational Security Support mission's patrols that started in July, in an apparent attempt to intimidate them (see annex 16).

52. The activation of the *Viv Ansanm* coalition demonstrates an evolution in gangs' abilities to define, coordinate and operationalize strategies according to their agendas. The key role they played in the ousting of Mr. Henry is illustrative of this. Regaining gang-held areas will be a significant challenge for the new Government supported by the

³⁹ Interview with an individual living in gang-controlled area, June 2024. See also, Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, "Ma vie comme enfant membre de 5 Segonn au Village de Dieu", 16 June 2024.

⁴⁰ Interviews with a gang analyst and an individual living in gang-controlled area, June and July 2024.

⁴¹ Interviews with confidential sources, 2024.

⁴² Interviews with gang analysts, Haitian national police officers, an individual living in gang-controlled area, and a representative of a Member State. See also, Maria Abi-Abib, "Haiti's gangs grow stronger as Kenyan-led force prepares to deploy", *New York Times*, 21 May 2024.

⁴³ Interviews with international and national gang analysts, individuals living in gang-controlled areas, a Haitian national police officer and a representative of a Member State, 2024.

⁴⁴ Interviews with gang analysts, individuals living in gang-controlled areas, Haitian national police officers and a government representative working on gang-related issues, 2024. See also, Stephen Eisenhammer, "Exclusive: Haiti ex-coup leader Guy Philippe demands PM resign, wants presidency", *Reuters*, 8 May 2024.

⁴⁵ United Nations confidential documents, June 2024.

⁴⁶ Video on file with the Panel.

Multinational Security Support mission, but also a necessary step in the path to elections.

B. Transnational organized crime dynamics

1. Violations of the arms embargo and domestic arms trafficking

53. Arms trafficking continues unabated, as evidenced by the high levels of armed violence in the country and the new materiel displayed by gangs. As a result of the security vacuum, a range of informal security provisions also fuel demand for weapons. This includes civilians increasingly trying to ensure their own security, as well as the use of private security companies and the multiplication across the country of units of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, which are not under the control of the Government (see below).

54. The Panel has been investigating multiple cases of trafficking from the United States, the Dominican Republic and South America, with the United States remaining the main source of illicit arms and ammunition in Haiti (see [S/2023/674](#)).

(a) Transnational trafficking trends

(i) Trafficking from the United States

a. Trafficking by sea

55. Trafficking from the United States to Haiti is not a sophisticated process. Small trafficking networks are numerous and often based on family and social connections. The Panel has been investigating cases where gang leaders have either relied on accomplices in the United States or pressurized Haitian nationals originally from their neighbourhoods and now living in the United States to facilitate the acquisition and transfer of materiel.

56. Methods generally include the purchase of firearms by straw buyers and the concealment of limited quantities of materiel to avoid detection, including disassembled firearms, among piles of goods stacked in overpacked containers or break-bulk vessels (see [S/2023/674](#), annex 29). In April, 26 firearms and 999 rounds of ammunition were seized in Cap-Haïtien, Nord department. This was the largest seizure of firearms intercepted at any port of entry in Haiti since the establishment of the arms embargo (see annex 21). Despite being brought into the country in small quantities, this recurrent “ant trafficking” quickly builds up, leaving the country awash with weapons.

57. Trafficking routes from the United States have shifted over the course of the reporting period due to the near cessation of activity at the main seaports in the capital since early March 2024, with seizures made exclusively in Cap-Haïtien. While Miami was the port of departure for most seizures previously reported by the Panel, all those conducted during the reporting period originated from Port Everglades, Florida, where some shipping lines provide services to Cap-Haïtien. The Panel visited Miami and Port Everglades in June 2024 and spoke to a range of actors to better understand trafficking trends.

58. No seizures were reported from the Miami River during the reporting period (see [S/2023/674](#), annex 29, for past seizures). This could be explained by the increased controls in Miami and the fact that only a very small number of shipyards are currently operating on the river.

b. Trafficking by air

59. Evidence of trafficking by air from the United States is rare (see annex 21) but the Panel continues to investigate several leads. In May 2022, a seizure was made by the United States authorities of ammunition recovered from a private aircraft heading from Florida to Haiti.⁴⁷ The Panel has requested more information about this case.

60. The presence of multiple informal or clandestine airstrips in Haiti presents a real opportunity for traffickers, and these, along with flights operated by private aircraft, should be scrutinized (See [S/2024/79](#), paras. 18–19). However, the limited aerial surveillance and capability of the Haitian security agencies prevents effective monitoring of the situation by the authorities.

c. Outbound seizures from the United States

61. The Panel already highlighted some of the main loopholes exploited by traffickers in its previous final report ([S/2023/674](#)). As arms control experts further explained to the Panel, due to limited controls over the acquisition and possession of firearms in the United States, their purchase by malign actors, including straw-buyers, is very difficult to prevent or detect. Prosecuting traffickers and preventing illicit exports therefore provide the main starting points for combating transnational arms trafficking.

62. With regard to export controls, although increased resource-intensive searches are being applied for containers or break-bulk vessels travelling from South Florida to Haiti,⁴⁸ very few seizures were made between June 2023 and July 2024. These included some handguns and several rifles, as well as limited quantities of ammunition⁴⁹ (see annex 21). The vast majority of the 200 containers heading from South Florida to Haiti every week are not inspected, and trafficking continues. In addition, the use of freight forwarders for shipping allows traffickers to take advantage of a loosely regulated activity (see [S/2023/674](#), annex 29). It is crucial to strengthen controls on outbound shipments for Haiti in order for the arms embargo to be more effective.

⁴⁷ Data provided by United States Customs and Border Protection, 2024.

⁴⁸ Interviews with a shipping line, a freight forwarder and a law enforcement officer, Florida, June 2024.

⁴⁹ Interviews with a law enforcement officer and a confidential source, June and July 2024; and data obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request to United States Customs and Border Protection.

d. Inbound seizures in Haiti from the United States

Table 1

Cases of inbound seizures in Haiti from the United States

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location/provenance</i>	<i>Mode of transport</i>	<i>Materiel</i>
2 December 2023	Toussaint Louverture Airport from New York	Commercial flight	265 rounds of ammunition
22 December 2023	Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades	Commercial vessel	One 9mm handgun One 5.56x45mm rifle 179 rounds of ammunition
5 April 2024	Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades	Commercial vessel	Nine 5.56x45mm rifles Three 7.62x39mm rifles 14 handguns 999 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39mm, 5.56x45mm, .40 S&W, 9x19mm)
29 April 2024	Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades	Commercial vessel	Two handguns 13 rounds of ammunition
11 June 2024	Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades	Commercial vessel	Conversion kit 150 rounds of ammunition

63. The Panel is in the process of investigating the various cases listed above (see annexes 22 and 23). In the course of its investigations, it interviewed law enforcement, customs and judicial officers, as well as representatives of shipping lines and freight forwarders. Since January, the Panel has issued 49 tracing requests to the United States authorities for details on firearms seized either from gang members or at ports of entry in Haiti for it to have a greater understanding of the chains of custody and identify the trafficking networks involved. At the time of writing, responses were still pending. In July, the Panel also submitted a request to the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain data about traces of firearms recovered in Haiti. The request was not granted.

64. Although seizures of materiel help to build an understanding of the profiles and modus operandi of some traffickers, their limited numbers reflect neither the levels of illicit weapons and ammunition entering Haiti in violation of the arms embargo nor the full range of channels through which traffickers bring weapons to Haiti. Discussions with senior Haitian customs and police officers indicate that a better enforcement of the arms embargo in the country requires an improvement of the security situation, which would make it possible to deploy units to all ports of entry, increase detection and investigation capabilities and fight corruption within border control agencies.

(ii) *Trafficking from the Dominican Republic*

65. Gangs, as well as civilians and Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées agents (see annex 26), continue to procure illicitly firearms but primarily ammunition

from the Dominican Republic (see annex 22 for details about seizures, and sect. II.D.3) despite the efforts of the Dominican authorities to curb arms trafficking into their country. From November 2023 to June 2024, 94 firearms and 571,798 rounds of ammunition were seized at Dominican ports of entry, 97.8 per cent of which came from the United States and 2.2 per cent from Europe and the Caribbean.⁵⁰

66. Although a number of past cases indicate that some limited materiel is trans-shipped directly through the Dominican Republic for end users in Haiti (see [S/2023/674](#)), most of the cases investigated by the Panel indicate that Haitian networks are procuring materiel from the quantities already circulating illegally in the Dominican Republic.

(iii) *Trafficking from South America*

67. On 30 April, the President of Colombia made a public declaration about significant diversions of ammunition from Colombian Army stockpiles and mentioned that it was likely that some missing items had gone to Haiti.⁵¹ Following a request for information by the Panel in May, the Colombian authorities responded that, after carrying out investigations, to date they were unable to corroborate the possible diversion of weapons and ammunition to Haiti.⁵²

68. In 2023, several AK-pattern rifles recovered in Haiti were traced back to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.⁵³ Those rifles had been either brought into Haiti along with drugs or trafficked from the Dominican Republic, where recent seizures yielded weapons originating from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.⁵⁴ The Panel has contacted the Venezuelan authorities to seek further information, and a response is still pending.

69. Reports of other trafficking activities from South America are currently being investigated by the Panel.

(iv) *Trafficking from Haiti to Jamaica*

70. During the Panel's visit to Jamaica in May 2024, the authorities explained that Haiti is a significant source of illicit firearms for the criminal groups operating in the country. There is a well-established system of exchanging cannabis from Jamaica for small arms from Haiti, with over 25 very active "guns for ganja" syndicates in Jamaica (see sect. II.B.2.1). Although prices remain the same as previously reported by the Panel (18kg of marijuana for a pistol and 40kg for a semi-automatic rifle), with the scarcity of essential goods in Haiti, guns have also increasingly been exchanged for food, including meat or charcoal.

71. While it is almost impossible to distinguish firearms transferred illicitly directly from the United States to Jamaica from those that transited via Haiti, seizures of firearms with Haitian national police markings provide a clear indicator that weapons from Haiti continue to fuel armed violence in Jamaica. Indeed, 47 firearms with such markings have been recovered in Jamaica to date, mostly handguns. The weapons, recovered from crime scenes, have been involved in a total of 13 murders. For

⁵⁰ Data provided by the Dominican authorities, July 2024.

⁵¹ See www.orfetv.com/2024/05/02/luego-de-inspeccion-en-tolemaida-y-la-guajira-se-encontro-que-hay-mas-de-un-millon-de-municiones-explosivos-y-armas-de-las-fuerzas-militares-perdidos-presidente-petro/.

⁵² Official response from Colombia (16 July 2024), on file with the Panel (translated by the Panel).

⁵³ Interview with an intelligence officer from a regional Member State, 2023.

⁵⁴ Interview with an intelligence officer from a regional Member State, 2023. Interview with a security attaché based in the region, 2023.

instance, one Galil rifle and two Taurus handguns from the Haitian national police stockpile were seized by Jamaican authorities in February 2024.⁵⁵

(b) Arms trafficking and non-State armed actors

(i) Gangs

72. Interviews with eye witnesses and reviews of images and videos posted online by gangs indicate that they have been increasingly procuring weapons of larger calibres, including 7.62x39mm and to a lesser extent 7.62x51mm and 12.7x99mm, resulting in more significant damage, more severe wounds and more casualties,⁵⁶ and posing a greater challenge to the police and the Multinational Security Support mission. Grand Ravine, 400 Mawowo and 5 Segond continue to be the most prolific gangs in terms of their ability to procure materiel, the latter having benefited from the support of Dimitri Hérard (see sect. II.A and annex 24). Gangs have increasingly been deploying commercial uncrewed aerial systems (drones) to conduct reconnaissance, identify targets and coordinate attacks. See annexes 24 and 25 for more details on new materiel used by gangs.

73. Despite the levels of circulation of firearms in the country, demand continues to grow and prices remain very high, reflecting the amount of cash available to gangs. Prices are higher in Port-au-Prince than elsewhere in the country as demand there is stronger and the logistics of getting materiel into the capital adds costs.

Table 2

Price of materiel in Port-au-Prince and other parts of Haiti

<i>Type of materiel</i>	<i>Port-au-Prince</i>	<i>Land border area/north of Haiti</i>
Firearms		
9 mm handgun	US \$2 500–US \$4 000	US \$2 000
AR-type semi-automatic rifle (5.56x45mm)	US \$7 000–US \$10 000	US \$3 000–US \$4 000
AK-type rifle (7.62x39mm)	US \$10 000–US \$12 000	US \$5 000–US \$6 000
Ammunition		
9mm round	US \$2–US \$3	US \$2–US \$3
5.56x45mm round	US \$5	
7.62x39mm round	US \$6	

Sources: Estimates based on interviews with private security companies, police officers and Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées agents, June and July 2024.

(ii) Private security companies

74. Despite the arms embargo, some private security companies operating in Haiti continue to procure weapons and ammunition.⁵⁷ Much of the materiel used by such companies is acquired illicitly and not registered nationally.⁵⁸ As with civilians, those companies that are willing to register their weapons with the police and obtain a

⁵⁵ Interviews with Jamaican officials, May 2024.

⁵⁶ Interviews with medical staff working in Port-au-Prince, July 2024.

⁵⁷ Interviews with clients of several large private security companies, 2024.

⁵⁸ Interviews with a Haitian national police officer, the head of a private security company and a former governmental official, 2023.

formal license – even retroactively – do so easily and without being questioned about the provenance of the materiel.⁵⁹ During its investigations, the Panel noticed that, in order to bypass the United States restrictions on transfers of arms to Haiti, some companies tend to procure materiel directly from firearms producers from Asia.

75. A source who observed the stockpiles of several private security companies in his official capacity told the Panel about the mismanagement of stockpiles, the common possession of unregistered weapons, including semi-automatic rifles, which are both illegal in Haiti, and the number of firearms exceeding authorized limits.

76. According to the Panel's tracing efforts, weapons registered to private security companies regularly turn up in the hands of criminals, confirming that those companies are fuelling the circulation of illicit materiel. While diversions from the stockpiles of private security companies occur mostly through loss and theft, the prominent figures that own the companies can also use their own unregulated stockpiles to arm gangs.

(c) Arms trafficking and governmental entities

(i) Diversions from Haitian national police stockpiles

77. Over the past four years, close to 1,000 firearms have been diverted from the relatively limited Haitian national police stockpiles.⁶⁰ In its previous reports, the Panel raised concerns about the lack of control over arms and ammunition belonging to the police and the regular diversions taking place that are fuelling armed violence (see S/2023/674, annex 33). The Panel also highlighted the challenges related to the management of seized materiel.⁶¹

78. The Haitian national police has a deficient ammunition management system. Although the main storage facility in Port-au-Prince conducts record-keeping, there are insufficient accountability mechanisms down the distribution line. Sources within the police, as well as other first-hand witnesses, told the Panel that some officers sell their ammunition on the illicit market.⁶²

(ii) Diversions from National Palace stockpiles and abuse of official positions for illicit trafficking

79. Several police units are based at the National Palace to protect the President and the Palace.⁶³ Officially, these units fall under the control of the Central Directorate of Administrative Police, but in reality they are very much autonomous with very little oversight from the leadership of the police.⁶⁴ This autonomy is also reflected in the management of weapons and ammunition at the Palace, where the Haitian national police leadership has not been able to perform a stock-check for several years. Palace stockpiles have been a source of diversions in the past, and the lack of oversight continues to represent a risk.

80. In total, 54 Galil automatic rifles belonging to the Haitian national police were diverted from Palace stockpiles between 2013 and 2016, when Pierre-Leon Junior Saint Rémy, a close relative of President Michel Joseph Martelly's wife, was in charge of security at the Palace and oversaw the management of its stockpile. Information

⁵⁹ Interviews with clients of various private security companies, 2023 and 2024; and interviews with Haitian national police officers, 2024.

⁶⁰ Confidential source, 2024.

⁶¹ Between November 2023 and June 2024, the Haitian national police and the Haitian customs seized a total of 168 firearms, including 83 pistols and 41 rifles. United Nations police data.

⁶² Interviews with Haitian national police officers, 2023 and 2024.

⁶³ Unité de sécurité présidentielle and Counter-ambush team.

⁶⁴ Interviews with senior Haitian national police officers and current and former employees at the Palace, 2023 and 2024.

provided to the Panel indicates that these weapons had been transferred to individuals – including gang members – in return for their support to the President. Some rifles have since been recovered from crime scenes and gang members in Haiti and abroad and continue to fuel violence.⁶⁵

81. More recently, in November 2020, Laguel Civil, the then-security coordinator at the National Palace, together with Dimitri Hérard, the former head of the National Palace General Security Unit, imported more than 200 firearms from a producer in Asia, including 5.56x45mm rifles and 9x19mm pistols, without any formal government oversight.⁶⁶ Although a small number of rifles were issued to the Haitian national police in 2020, the rest have been passed on to unknown end users, likely for financial reward, further fuelling the levels of illicit arms proliferation in the country.⁶⁷

82. The Panel has also received information about the ongoing involvement of Mr. Hérard in arms trafficking while he is at large (see sect. II.A). In addition to the procurement of new firearms that he facilitated for Izo (see annexes 24 and 25), there are reports of collusion with trafficking networks from Latin American countries which the Panel is investigating further.

(iii) *Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées*

83. Under the leadership of Jeantel Joseph, the former director of the Agence nationale des aires protégées from 2017 to 2024, the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées grew into a powerful armed entity outside of government control (see [S/2024/253](#)). According to senior Brigade agents, it currently counts around 6,000 “members” across the country, 95 per cent of whom are not on any formal institutional payroll.⁶⁸ The chain of command is unclear, with bitter rivalries between heads of brigades located in the same areas, each claiming their legitimacy (see annex 26).⁶⁹

84. Although the Agence nationale des aires protégées should be focusing on the country’s nature reserves, units of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées are found in many cities, where they often perform de facto police work and engage in a range of criminal activities, including illicit taxation on roads and cross-border trafficking. Agents are armed with a range of firearms, including 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm rifles that have been illicitly acquired. While the criteria for joining the Brigade include the possession of a firearm, weapons have also been supplied by local figures and purchased by some commanders with funds obtained in exchange for protection and from illicit activities.

85. During the reporting period, Jeantel Joseph used armed Brigade agents to support Guy Philippe (see sect. II.A) in ensuring his personal protection and to foment violent demonstrations against the Government. Despite his removal from the Agence nationale des aires protégées in 2024, Joseph maintains firm control over several Brigade units.⁷⁰ On the one hand, Brigade units often fill the substantial security vacuum, but on the other hand, they are acting outside of State control, with many Haitians identifying them as a primary threat to the stability of the country.

⁶⁵ Interviews with confidential sources and confidential reports, 2023 and 2024.

⁶⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, 2024.

⁶⁷ Interviews with two senior Haitian national police officers, June and July 2024.

⁶⁸ Interviews with Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées senior agents, June and July 2024.

⁶⁹ Interviews with Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées agents and local authorities in three departments, June and July 2024.

⁷⁰ Interviews with governmental representatives and Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées agents, June and July 2024. The Commission of restructuration of the Agence nationale des aires protégées created in January 2024 by the Haitian authorities is still not operational.

2. Drug trafficking

86. Drug trafficking has been extensively reported as one of the main root causes of the acute criminality and high levels of violence in the country.⁷¹ Far from being just local criminal groups, gangs are connected to wider illicit trafficking networks headed by high-level drug traffickers. Information obtained by the Panel indicates that some Haitian businesspeople involved in imports and exports, as well as civil servants and former senators, are involved in drug trafficking.⁷² Given the complex networks involved and the high levels of insecurity on the ground, it is impossible to document the full extent of drug trafficking activity taking place in Haiti. This is further reflected in the small number of seizures that have been made during the reporting period: between November 2023 and July 2024, national authorities reported the seizure of 262.2 kg of cannabis and 10.42 kg of cocaine in Haiti.⁷³

(a) Cannabis

87. Haiti is not a significant producer of illicit drugs for export, although there is an increasing number of cannabis production areas for local consumption, in particular in the Artibonite region and in certain high-altitude areas located in the far North and far South of the country. However, many of those areas were destroyed by the Haitian anti-narcotics brigade (Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants).⁷⁴ Haiti remains an important transit route for cannabis that is trafficked from Jamaica, mostly destined for the Dominican Republic, mainly for consumption by tourists.⁷⁵

(i) Jamaica

88. Most of the cannabis that enters Haiti is transported from Jamaica and enters through the south of the country by sea.⁷⁶ Despite the operational efforts of law enforcement, the “guns for drugs” trade that has existed between Haiti and Jamaica for over two decades continues to thrive.⁷⁷

89. This trade has been conducted primarily by established transnational organized criminal groups and gangs in both countries. In Jamaica, approximately 244 gangs operate, as well as over 45 “guns for drugs” syndicates, of which at least 20 were very active in 2023. Organized trafficking groups in Jamaica make at least two trips per month to Haiti with locally produced cannabis as a currency to obtain firearms. Although fishers play a crucial role in facilitating this bartering model, increasingly gangs have been less dependent on them to transact their business.⁷⁸

90. The guns for drugs trade is a profitable one. The value of cannabis can increase 10 times in Haiti. Depending on the quality and the geographical location of production, in Jamaica, one pound of “regular cannabis” costs between J\$1,500 and J\$2,000 (approximately US \$9.65–US \$12.87), while the same quantity in Haiti will cost between US \$80 and US \$100. A pistol (9mm) in Haiti can be traded for 40lbs of cannabis and can cost J\$265,000 (around US \$1,520) in Jamaica. A rifle smuggled

⁷¹ Interviews with a Haitian national police officer, regional authorities and political analyst, 2024.

⁷² Interviews with a Haitian national police officer, a government representative working on gang-related issues, a politician, gang and political analysts, an individual living in gang-controlled area, and civil society representatives, January 2023 to July 2024.

⁷³ Haitian national police data.

⁷⁴ Interview with a Haitian national police officer, August 2024.

⁷⁵ See S/2024/79; and interviews with regional authorities, 2024.

⁷⁶ Interviews with regional anti-narcotic officers, May 2024; and S/2024/79, 2023. See also, UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking”, 2023.

⁷⁷ Confidential report from a Member State, July 2024.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

from Haiti can be traded for 80 to 90lbs of cannabis and can fetch J\$500,000.00 (US \$3,420) in Jamaica.⁷⁹

91. The crisis in Haiti favours the strengthening of transnational criminal networks between both countries, given their geographic proximity and the porous borders of both jurisdictions. For instance, in Jamaica, traffickers can use around 184 uncontrolled ports across the island, of which 51 per cent are reported to be active. According to confidential sources, some firearms transferred from Haiti to Jamaica have reached Central American States, where they have been traded for cocaine.⁸⁰

(ii) *Dominican Republic*

92. The cannabis from Jamaica that enters Haiti is mainly transported to the Dominican Republic by small, well-organized criminal groups, some headed by Haitians,⁸¹ who represent the second most detained nationality for drug-related crimes in the Dominican Republic, after Dominicans themselves. In 2023, about 3,600 Haitians were arrested⁸² for distributing, selling, or possessing small quantities of cannabis, the street value of which in the country ranges from RD\$5,000 to 6,000 per pound (approximately US \$85 to US \$100).⁸³

93. Cannabis is trafficked primarily across the land border shared with Haiti, which spans over 390 km and has only four official crossing points, at Dajabón, Elías Piña, Pedernales and Ouanaminthe, and up to 90 illegal ones. Operations carried out by the Dominican authorities between 4 September 2023 and 31 April 2024 yielded approximately 614.16 kg of cannabis at the border provinces of Elías Piña (172.17 kg) and Pedernales (441.48 kg); other seizures are detailed in annex 27.

94. Cannabis is often transported into the Dominican Republic by trucks, concealed among other products (see sect. II.D.3).⁸⁴ For instance, on 27 December 2023, 167.18 kg of cannabis were seized in boxes of lemons inside a truck in Elías Piña.⁸⁵ Small quantities of arms and drugs are also likely to be trafficked alongside other goods, such as cigarettes, alcohol and food, that increasingly are being smuggled across the border.⁸⁶

(b) **Cocaine**

95. The number of seizures of cocaine linked to Haiti has risen since mid-2023. The Panel has conducted follow-up inquiries into a major cocaine seizure conducted on 29 September by Belgian authorities, who found 308.7 kg of the drug at the port of Antwerp, Belgium. The cocaine was hidden inside sports bags in a shipping container that was originally loaded in Port-au-Prince on 29 August and trans-shipped through Kingston from 4 to 7 September. The Panel travelled to Antwerp and Jamaica to meet with law enforcement agents working on the case. The Belgian and Jamaican authorities told the Panel that the drug could have been loaded either in Port-au-Prince, Kingston or even in Antwerp, and investigations continue. The Panel will provide updates on the case in due course.

⁷⁹ Interview with regional security sources, May 2024, and confidential report, July 2024.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Interviews with regional anti-narcotic officers, January and May 2024.

⁸² Dominican Republic, Consejo Nacional de Drogas, “Observatorio Dominicano de drogas: informe estadístico anual 2023”, 2024.

⁸³ Interview with regional authorities, May 2024.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ See Dominican Republic, Ministerio de Defensa, “CESFronT Y DNCD incautan 368 libras de marihuana en Elías Piña”, 27 December 2023.

⁸⁶ Interview with regional judicial officers, May 2024.

96. On 7 June, the Dominican authorities seized 268 packages of cocaine on the coast of Pedernales,⁸⁷ arresting two individuals. While no confirmed linkages with Haiti were reported, the authorities told the Panel that it is often the case that the precarious security situation and ineffective border controls in Haiti attract traffickers, who want to avoid the more thorough controls in the Dominican Republic. In that way, they transport cocaine from the southeastern border of Haiti to Dominican provinces such as Pedernales. The authorities also reported cases of aircraft and sea vessels from South America diverting to Haiti before heading to North America.⁸⁸

97. The Haitian authorities also reported two seizures along the southeastern coast, confirming southern departments as critical entry points for drugs. On 2 July, in Bel-Anse, South-East department, authorities intercepted 2.2 kg of cocaine, as part of a shipment of 12 kg; meaning that around 10 kg were still in circulation. On 10 July, in Jacmel, on the southeastern coast, an individual was arrested in possession of around 1 kg of cocaine. Given the proximity of the dates and locations of the seizures, it is likely that the drugs from the two cases originated from the same single shipment distributed in this area.

98. In another development, on 4 July 2024, in Mirebalais commune, in the Centre department, authorities seized 7.9 kg of cocaine, one of the largest quantities ever intercepted in the area. Two individuals, including one woman, were arrested.⁸⁹ The woman mentioned that a former policeman had been among the main drug suppliers.

99. The Panel has also received multiple reports on the presence of Caribbean and Latin American nationals within the ranks of Haitian gangs and/or present in gang-controlled areas in Haiti, some of whom are suspected of being involved in drug trafficking.⁹⁰ On 21 October 2023, four Colombians and one Haitian national were arrested by the Haitian national police in Belladère commune, Centre department. The individuals are suspected of being associated with an aircraft found on 19 October in Ducis, Les Cayes commune, South department, that is likely to have been used for trafficking drugs.⁹¹

3. Smuggling of migrants⁹²

100. Migration is a human right that should take place in a safe, orderly and dignified manner,⁹³ which is not the case for most Haitian migrants.

101. The sanctions designation criteria established in paragraphs 15 and 16 of Security Council resolution 2653 (2022), include being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti. Those actions include, but are not limited to, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or supporting criminal activities and ... criminal networks that promote violence, including ... trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants.

102. The smuggling of migrants is a complex, multilayered crime. It involves a web of actors, including ringleaders; counterfeiters; land, sea and air transporters;

⁸⁷ See Hoy, “¡268 paquetes de cocaína y una lancha rápida incautados! Operativo antidrogas en Pedernales”, 7 June 2024.

⁸⁸ Interview with regional intelligence officers, January 2024.

⁸⁹ Interview with Haitian national police officer, July 2024.

⁹⁰ Interviews with regional intelligence officers, June 2024.

⁹¹ Interviews with representatives of Haitian, Dominican and Colombian authorities, 2024.

⁹² The Panel follows the definitions of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants contained in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

⁹³ See <https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/blogs/six-essential-elements-make-migration-safe-orderly-and-regular>.

transborder smugglers;⁹⁴ and corrupt officials; among others, often operating across multiple jurisdictions.

The 2023 smuggling “air bridge” case

103. The Panel investigated the five-month “air bridge” from June to October 2023, during which more than 47,000 Haitian migrants flew from Haiti to Nicaragua for onward illegal movement towards North America (see annex 28).

104. The Panel has been investigating several types of actors involved in smuggling, including the individuals who manage smuggling operations, as well as the flight charter companies implicated.

105. One specific network entailed two Haitian nationals, Jean Michel Dorcenat and Kenny Beaubrun, who operate a large-scale smuggling operation in Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince with connections to local criminals throughout the region.⁹⁵

106. According to eye witnesses and a security agency from a Member State, between August and October 2023, those individuals, acting together or alone, facilitated the travel of more than 3,500 people in 52 chartered flights from Haiti to Nicaragua, from which they were smuggled towards Mexico and the United States.

107. In addition to chartering the flights, Messrs Dorcenat and Beaubrun rely on a network of formal and informal travel agencies in the region (see annex 29).⁹⁶ They also provide migrants with forged passports and/or visas for those that need them, including by corrupting officials.⁹⁷

108. The Panel obtained evidence that, while the men facilitated the movement of the migrants, they also defrauded travel agencies and the migrants themselves by not fulfilling their promises.⁹⁸

109. In the view of the Panel, flight charter companies (see annex 30) have played an instrumental role in smuggling Haitian migrants to Central America, with the ultimate goal of reaching North America (see annex 31).⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Commonly known as coyotes or polleros or within the context of Dominican Republic – Haiti as “*poteas*” or “*potias*”.

⁹⁵ Migrant smugglers in the region often collaborate with local and international criminal networks to facilitate cross-border movement. These criminal organizations have diversified their portfolios, engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, among other illicit activities. For instance, the criminal organization Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) operates across El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States, and is involved in migrant smuggling in Chiapas state, Mexico. Smaller smuggling groups frequently connect migrants with larger cartels, like the Cartel del Golfo and the Cartel del Noreste, which control smuggling routes from Chiapas through Tamaulipas in Mexico and to the United States. Interviews with humanitarian organizations, law enforcement and security officers, April, March and November 2023, and February, March, April and June 2024. Confidential information provided by a Member State, July 2024. See also, Estela Aragón, Monica Barrantes y Larissa Álvarez, *Perfiles y Modos de Operación de Personas Facilitadoras del Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes en América Central, México y la República Dominicana* (San José, Costa Rica, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNODC, 2023).

⁹⁶ Travel agencies and social media profiles are actively marketing these trips. These advertisements are not limited to airfare; many offered comprehensive packages including visas, passports and onward transportation towards Mexico and the United States. Most of these entities were fraudulent, hindering tracking efforts. Furthermore, financial transactions were often conducted in small, untraceable cash payments outside the banking system. Confidential sources, October, November 2023 and April and June 2024.

⁹⁷ Interviews with confidential sources, April 2024.

⁹⁸ Interviews with confidential sources, included travel agencies, May, June and July 2024.

⁹⁹ In the Panel’s opinion, there is a legal gap in the regulation of the aviation sector regarding the prevention of migrant smuggling, which could be addressed by the relevant international organizations and interested partners.

110. The Panel identified two charter companies implicated in transporting Haitian nationals during the “air bridge”.¹⁰⁰ According to confidential sources, the companies worked closely with individuals and travel agencies in the smuggling scheme and were aware that they were being hired to transport migrants for onward smuggling to North America. The Panel contacted the two companies, but had received no reply by the time of writing.

111. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights call on States to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress human rights violations through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication, while business should respect human rights throughout their operations and be particularly mindful in conflict-affected areas due to the possible higher risk of gross human rights abuses.

112. Information is widely available regarding the multidimensional crisis in Haiti and extreme levels of violence, as well as the unprecedented number of migrants crossing Central America in recent years. In the Panel’s opinion, a basic human rights due diligence process (see [A/73/163](#), para. 16) would have highlighted the high risk of migrant smuggling. The Panel found no evidence that such due diligence had ever been conducted by any of the flight charter companies transporting people, one-way only, from Haiti to Nicaragua.

113. The desire of Haitians to leave the country because of violence is being exploited at different levels. For instance, the Panel obtained reports of extortion by some Haitian civil aviation authorities of individuals arranging charter flights.¹⁰¹ These cases suggest a scheme based on aircraft size, with payments ranging from US \$15,000 to US \$35,000 per flight. The Panel also received reports of similar extortion practices by some ground handling companies, with fees between US \$10,000 and US \$15,000 demanded to service charter flights.¹⁰² The Panel’s investigations are ongoing.

C. Acts that violate international human rights law or that constitute human rights abuses¹⁰³

114. Pervasive human rights violations continue to be experienced across Haiti, in particular in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Artibonite region. Between January and June, there were 3,638 homicides,¹⁰⁴ including 3,241 males (including 51 boys) and 397 females (including 13 girls). In addition, 2,211 people were injured and 1,162 were kidnapped.¹⁰⁵ Concerning the latter, the Panel identified several incidents of “mass kidnappings”¹⁰⁶ committed by the Kokorat San Ras gang, led by Meyer, and the Gran Grif gang, led by Luckson Elan (see annex 33).

115. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) of May 2024, around half the Haitian population (5 million people) is experiencing IPC 3-level food insecurity (crisis), with 1.6 million facing IPC 4-level food insecurity

¹⁰⁰ See for example, flight history of FLYMEX aircraft XA-VBC between Port-au-Prince, Haiti and Managua, Nicaragua from August to October 2023 (annex 30).

¹⁰¹ Interviews with an analyst, November 2023 and May 2024. Confidential source, July 2024.

¹⁰² Interview confidential source, July 2024.

¹⁰³ See also annex 32 on other human rights violations.

¹⁰⁴ This is the highest number of homicides since the United Nations began recording intentional homicides in Haiti. United Nations police data. July 2024.

¹⁰⁵ This number includes 724 men, 14 boys, 409 women and 15 girls, a 20 per cent decrease according to United Nations police data, July 2024.

¹⁰⁶ For the Panel’s report purposes “mass kidnappings” are those where 10 or more persons are kidnapped in a single incident.

(emergency).¹⁰⁷ The Cité Soleil commune in Port-au-Prince remains one of the most affected areas. One in two Haitian children currently faces acute food insecurity.¹⁰⁸ The reopening of the international airport in May and the arrival in June of the Multinational Security Support mission have improved humanitarian access and assistance, including food distributions, although several challenges persist.¹⁰⁹

116. As of July, the number of self-defence groups had increased to around 60, while in January there had been around 30.¹¹⁰ As of June, the *Bwa Kale* movement and various self-defence groups had killed at least 182 people (See [S/2024/508](#)).

117. According to the Haitian national police, as at 30 June, the force was composed of 12,931 officers, including 1,571 women. This equates to 1.09 police officers per 1,000 residents. Since January, 23 officers had been killed and 48 injured. In addition, approximately 1,000 officers had left the institution due to desertion, resignation or emigration. Furthermore, of the 412 police installations nationwide, around 74 remained non-operational due to gang violence.¹¹¹

118. As at 24 July, the prison system in Haiti continued to be overcrowded, housing 7,542 inmates, including 418 women and 246 minors. About 83 per cent of inmates were in pretrial detention, with 0.33 m² of space available per inmate. Appalling incarceration conditions had led to the deaths of more than 111 inmates since January due to anaemia, gastrointestinal diseases, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases.¹¹²

119. As of June, there were 578,074 internally displaced persons in Haiti, marking a nearly 60 per cent increase from March 2024 (362,551).¹¹³ This figure is more than double the number of internally displaced persons in 2022, making Haiti the country with the highest number of internal displacements in the world for violence related to crime (see annex 34).¹¹⁴

120. Haitian nationals continue to fall victim to human smugglers, who employ dangerous routes by land, sea and air. These perilous journeys often result in tragedy. On 17 July, a boat carrying 80 Haitian migrants to the Turks and Caicos Islands caught fire, claiming the lives of 40 people and injuring many others.¹¹⁵ This incident underscores the thriving business of migrant smuggling via unsafe sea crossings (see [S/2023/674](#) and annex 35).

1. Sexual and gender-based violence

121. Women and girls remain highly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence.¹¹⁶ The surge in internally displaced persons and their dire living conditions exacerbate this risk, making them especially susceptible to sexual assault and

¹⁰⁷ World Food Programme (WFP), “WFP Haiti: country brief”, May 2024.

¹⁰⁸ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “Haiti: IPC acute food insecurity snapshot”, March–June 2024.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews with United Nations agencies and humanitarian actors, July 2024.

¹¹⁰ Interviews with a gang analyst and a humanitarian specialist, July 2024.

¹¹¹ United Nations police data. July 2024.

¹¹² In 27 cases the cause of death was unknown. United Nations police data, July 2024.

¹¹³ IOM, “Displacement situation in Haiti: round 7”, June 2024 (visited in June 2024).

¹¹⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Haiti: soaring number of displaced desperately need protection and aid priority, UN experts urge”, 20 June 2024 (visited in June 2024). Figures in annex 34 covers data on internally displaced persons, deportees/returnees – including sea interdictions – and refugees.

¹¹⁵ IOM, “Tragic boat fire claims 40 migrant lives off Haiti’s coast”, 19 July 2024.

¹¹⁶ According to some sources, between April and June 2024, up to 40 rape cases were reported daily in some areas of Port-au-Prince. See BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti”.

exploitation.¹¹⁷ For example, on 29 March, 5 Segond gang members broke into a gymnasium that functions as an internally displaced persons site in Port-au-Prince and raped two girls aged 3 and 12 years old.¹¹⁸

122. During the reporting period, the Panel interviewed multiple victims of rape and other sexual violence, including members of the LGBTQI+ community. The Panel received the testimony of a 17-year-old girl who indicated that, on 15 January, while walking near her home in Delmas, Port-au-Prince, two Delmas 95 gang members took her to an abandoned building where they raped her. She fell pregnant but later had an abortion. She was afraid to be attacked again and decided to flee to the Dominican Republic.¹¹⁹

123. The Panel interviewed two individuals from the LGBTQI+ community who reported that they had experienced sexual violence by gangs in Port-au-Prince. A 21-year-old man reported ongoing harassment due to his sexual orientation by a gang led by a United Nations sanctioned individual. The harassment eventually extended to his family, who forced him to leave their home fearing further violence. After a brief period of homelessness and temporary refuge in an internally displaced persons site, he was able to leave Haiti with the help of friends and relatives.¹²⁰ A 25-year-old man recounted living with his partner near the Port-au-Prince airport. They were subjected to constant harassment and extortion by gang members. When the victim became unemployed and unable to pay the extortion demands, gang members broke into their home and assaulted his partner. Fearing for their lives, both men fled Haiti.¹²¹

124. Additional incidents offer a glimpse of the prevalence of sexual violence in Haiti. For example, on 30 November, a 22-year-old woman was killed by two bullets to her vagina for refusing to have sexual relations with Gran Grif gang leader Luckson Elan, at Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite. On 8 December, in Drouillard (Cité Soleil), members of the Terre Noire gang, led by Jonel Catel, stopped a van full of passengers on their way to the Brooklyn neighbourhood. In front of the other passengers, the gang members collectively raped three women and then killed them.¹²²

125. Furthermore, the Panel received information of sexual violence against minors. For example, on 15 January, a 7-year-old girl was raped by a 16-year-old Ti Bwa gang member in Fontamara, Carrefour commune. On 18 February, a 15-year-old girl, suffering from a mental disability, was raped by two Ti Bwa gang members in the same area. On 26 January, in Drouillard (Cité Soleil) a 17-year-old girl was raped and killed by Terre Noire gang members while leaving the Brooklyn area to go to school. On 24 July 2024, 23 women who had been kidnapped, in several incidents, and raped by unidentified gang members were rescued by the police in the Gressier commune. An undisclosed number of kidnappers involved in these incidents were either killed by the police or lynched by the local population.¹²³

¹¹⁷ OHCHR, “Women and girls bear the brunt of crisis ravaging Haiti, say UN experts”, 6 May 2024; and UN News, “Haiti: Displaced women face ‘unprecedented’ level of insecurity and sexual violence”, 17 July 2024.

¹¹⁸ United Nations data and interviews with humanitarian actors, April 2024.

¹¹⁹ Interview with a confidential source, May 2024.

¹²⁰ Interview with victim, confidential source, May 2024.

¹²¹ Interview with victim, confidential source, May 2024. The victim did not want to identify his aggressors.

¹²² Interviews with non-governmental organization (NGO) members and human rights defenders, June and July 2024; and United Nations data June 2024.

¹²³ Interviews with United Nations agency officers, NGO members and human rights defenders, May, June and July 2024; and United Nations data November 2023 to June 2024.

126. The Panel also identified cases of rape committed by the gang members of 5 Segond, Gran Grif, Canaan, Kraze Barye and 400 Mawozo, among others.¹²⁴ The Panel's investigations are ongoing.

2. Recruitment of children

127. During the reporting period, the recruitment of children as young as 10 by gangs increased significantly (see [S/2024/384](#)), and children may now represent up to 50 per cent of all gang members.¹²⁵ The dire situation in Haiti makes children more vulnerable to recruitment by gangs. A lack of access to education, employment and basic necessities creates a situation where joining gangs is seen as the only viable means of survival. Gangs also lure children by giving them money, a mobile phone, motorbikes or other goods, promising further economic benefits upon joining and perhaps also some sort of social recognition. If those tactics fail, gangs resort to death threats against the children or their families, leaving the minors with no option but to join the gangs (see annex 32.3).¹²⁶

128. Some of the gangs that resort most to child recruitment are Brooklyn, Grand Ravine, 5 Segond, Gran Grif, 400 Mawozo, Belekou¹²⁷ Ti Bwa and 103 Zombie.¹²⁸

129. Child recruitment also depends on the amount of money that a gang can give to a child. However, children cannot choose which gang they would like to work for, as gangs are very territorial and any attempt to leave their territory is considered treason. Any defection or refusal to join a gang is punished by death. Moreover, children from outside a gang-controlled area are viewed with suspicion and face the risk of being labelled as spies and potentially killed.

130. A child can receive between G10,000–G15,000 (US \$70–US \$110) a fortnight, according to their skills and the tasks performed. For example, children at a checkpoint may make G15,000 (US \$110) a fortnight, while a child participating in clashes may make G25,000 (US \$180) a fortnight.¹²⁹ Salaries depend also on the gang's capacity to make money.¹³⁰

131. Children are used for different tasks depending on their age, sex and skills. For example, girls usually participate in household chores and as spies to collect information from possible kidnapping victims, or to check on police or other gangs' movements. However, there have been reports of girls carrying weapons and probably engaging in clashes.¹³¹ The Panel has received information indicating that minors have been involved in *Viv Ansanm* attacks in Port-au-Prince and in managing checkpoints.¹³²

132. The Panel was also informed that children are given drugs and alcohol when they participate in clashes.¹³³ One particular concerning report included that Dimitri

¹²⁴ Interviews with human rights defenders, NGO's members, United Nations humanitarian agencies officers; and United Nations data.

¹²⁵ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), "Violence drives Haiti's children into armed groups; up to half of all members are now children – UNICEF", 31 May 2024.

¹²⁶ Based on the ongoing violence against children it is possible to conclude that the six grave violations against children continue to be committed. See also, [S/2023/674](#).

¹²⁷ United Nations police data, July 2024. See also, [S/2024/508](#).

¹²⁸ Interviews with a gang analyst and two humanitarian actors, July 2024.

¹²⁹ Interview with a humanitarian actor, July 2024. Money exchange rates based on www.xe.com/ (accessed on July 2024).

¹³⁰ Interview with a humanitarian actor, July 2024.

¹³¹ Interviews with human rights defenders and NGO members, May and June 2024.

¹³² Interviews with gang analyst, United Nations agency officers, NGO members and human rights defenders, May, June and July 2024.

¹³³ Interviews with human rights defenders, May 2024.

Hérard had trained child members of 5 Segond how to use weapons and military tactics.¹³⁴

133. There are also minors who command gang cells and control territory. For example, Ti Bebe Bougòy was a minor when he took the lead of 103 Zombie in 2022. Many gang leaders are young adults in their early twenties, who therefore not only appeal to children but also prefer to recruit them as they can control them more easily.¹³⁵

134. In that regard, while the October 2023 signing of the protocol on the transfer, reception and care of children associated with armed gangs encountered during operations to secure the territory, by the Government and the United Nations system, is a positive step, the arrival of the Multinational Security Support mission operation underscores the urgent need for its full implementation.

135. In a testimony to the Panel, one minor recounted his ordeal in escaping from joining the Grand Ravine gang and how he had to flee to the Dominican Republic in order to avoid being killed by the gang.¹³⁶ In another testimony, a 16-year-old girl explained to the Panel how 5 Segond gang members had pressured her 17-year-old brother to join the gang. Initially, they had invited him to drink alcohol and party, but he refused due to his religious beliefs. This rejection angered the gang members, who began extorting him every time he left home. Eventually, he became too afraid to go outside. The gang then started interrogating his family about his whereabouts and demanding money. The family decided to leave the Village-de-Dieu area one by one. However, the brother was caught by the gang while attempting to escape and was killed on the spot. The witness managed to escape with a relative and left the country but is unaware of her mother's whereabouts.¹³⁷

3. Use of human shields¹³⁸

136. Since the beginning of 2024, the Panel has observed many gangs using the population as human shields. This new tactic includes preventing civilians from evacuating to safety, trapping them in their homes and summarily killing those who attempt to escape. Gangs have also called on the population to return to their homes under the promise that the areas are now safe (see also sect. II.A). The use of human shields is a serious human rights violation.

137. This strategy could allow gangs to blend in with civilians during operations by the Haitian national police and potentially the Multinational Security Support mission, thus increasing the risk of civilian casualties, especially in densely populated areas.

138. For example, in Carrefour-Feuilles, the Grand Ravine gang has occupied various houses with the inhabitants inside, forbidding them to leave their houses.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Interviews with gang analyst, United Nations agency officers, and human rights defenders, May, June and July 2024.

¹³⁵ Interview with two humanitarian actors, July 2024.

¹³⁶ Interview with a confidential source, May 2024.

¹³⁷ Interview with a confidential source, May 2024.

¹³⁸ For the purposes of the present report, the Panel employs the term “human shields” to describe situations where a fighting faction deliberately uses civilians to deter attacks against it. This usage does not imply a determination regarding the applicability of international humanitarian law.

¹³⁹ Interview with gang analyst, July 2024.

4. Wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private property¹⁴⁰

139. Between February and May, *Viv Ansanm* adopted as a tactic the wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private infrastructure and property in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (see sect. II.A).

140. The area surrounding the National Palace was particularly affected. This strategically important zone includes such critical institutions as the General Hospital; several university faculties; the premises of the official national journal, *Le Moniteur*; and *Le Nouvelliste*, the country's oldest newspaper. About 130 businesses, 650 vehicles, 957 homes and several government buildings were ransacked or burned. Thousands of people were forced to relocate.¹⁴¹

141. On 24 March, *Viv Ansanm* launched a large-scale indiscriminate attack on several blocks around the National Palace (see annex 36). The aim of the attack was to empty the area of the population and to cause as much damage as possible. The Panel's investigation led to the identification of Izo, the leader of 5 Segond, as one of the main aggressors in the attack.¹⁴²

D. Illicit financial flows

1. Challenges to the economy of Haiti

142. Gang-related violence has exacerbated the flow of illicit finances as gangs seek to increase their territory and therefore their sources of revenue before joint operations of the Haitian national police and Multinational Security Support mission.

143. Certain economic actors continue to finance gangs and organized criminal networks to protect their business enterprises and abet illicit trade. This relationship is critical in the fuelling of gang violence, as several gangs have publicly affirmed (see annex 37).

144. During the reporting period, several corporate entities closed or disinvested as a way of derisking, leading to a gradual contraction of the country's economy.¹⁴³

145. The country also continues to experience diversion of public funds intended for the provision of basic needs to Haitians and the construction and development of critical infrastructure.

2. Gang attacks on strategic economic hubs

146. As it became more apparent that the Multinational Security Support mission would soon deploy, gangs became more aggressive. They sought to capitalize on the limited window of opportunity for generating additional illicit revenue by conquering

¹⁴⁰ For the purposes of the present report, the Panel employs the term "wanton destruction" to describe situations where private or public property is destroyed indiscriminately by fighting factions. This usage does not imply a determination regarding the applicability of international humanitarian law.

¹⁴¹ Interviews with human rights defenders and NGO members, May and June 2024. See also, National Human Right Defense Network, "RNDDH's position on the chaotic situation in Haiti", 6 March 2024; and BINUH, "Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti", January–March 2024.

¹⁴² Interviews with United Nations agency officers, NGO members and human rights defenders, May, June and July 2024.

¹⁴³ Interviews with a bank staff member, a finance analyst and government anti-corruption official, May 2024. See also, United States Department of Agriculture, Grain and feed annual: Haiti, report No. HA2024-003, 17 April 2024.

new territory (see sect. II.A) and targeting key economic hubs, such as seaports, roads, private investment firms and banks.

(a) Attacks on seaports

(i) Caribbean Port Services container terminal

147. The reactivation of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance (see sect. II.A) resulted in an unprecedented onslaught on seaports, as gangs rushed to generate illicit revenue.

148. The Wharf Jeremie and La Saline gangs competed to generate revenue by extorting trucks to and from the Caribbean Port Services container terminal, located at the national port authority port in the La Saline area of Port-au-Prince. The container terminal handles about 80 per cent of the cargo coming into Port-au-Prince.¹⁴⁴

149. According to four cargo operators and two drivers, cargo trucks typically paid US \$200–US \$300 per container leaving the port to each of the two gangs. With a minimum of 200 containers leaving the terminal daily, the gangs collected huge revenues, leading transporters to stop operations in early March due to overextortion.

150. As an alternative, gangs opted to loot the containers to compensate for reduced revenue as a result of a truck owners' strike. The port was forced to close (see annex 38).¹⁴⁵

(ii) Varreux terminal

151. Gangs also scaled up attacks on the Varreux terminal, the largest fuel depot in Haiti, adjacent to Cité Soleil commune, thereby compromising the fuel supply to the rest of the country. The terminal stores about 70 per cent of the county's bulk fuel,¹⁴⁶ in addition to operating as a general cargo port for other commodities.¹⁴⁷

152. Attacks in the reporting period were conducted by the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, including where members of 5 Segond destroyed power infrastructure and looted a ship. After several attempts to break into the port, in March, the gang attacked the Varreux power plant operated by Electricité D'Haiti, plunging Port-au-Prince into darkness.¹⁴⁸ The aim was to paralyze the plant's operations, then loot the oil products and sell them on (see annex 39).¹⁴⁹ The intervention of the Haitian national police prevented the gangs from gaining access to the port.

153. In April, the gang attacked a ship, the *Magalie*, in Port-au-Prince bay after it had unloaded some its cargo of rice at the Varreux terminal, and looted some of its remaining cargo before the Haitian national police rescued the vessel.¹⁵⁰ Two sources with knowledge of the looting and a trader in Village de Dieu, 5 Segond's stronghold, informed the Panel that the gang had commandeered trucks to transport the rice to its territorial neighbourhood, where it distributed some for free to local schools and sold the rest at open markets at half the market price as a "goodwill" gesture to please the community. The source noted that "the gang gets the commodities for 'free', so selling

¹⁴⁴ See Philippe Coles, "Caribbean port services: Port-au-Prince, Haiti", Project Cargo Weekly, 4 October 2018.

¹⁴⁵ Jérémie Tillon, "La compagnie Carribean Port Service suspend toutes ses activités dans le port à la suite de l'attaque perpétrée par les gangs", 7 March 2024.

¹⁴⁶ iCiHaiti, "Insecurity: the Varreux oil terminal blocked", 23 April 2024.

¹⁴⁷ Interviews with a customs official and a national port authority staff member, March 2024. See also, <https://dlca.logcluster.org/211a-haiti-port-terminal-varreux>.

¹⁴⁸ Char Adams and Fredlyn Pierre Louis, "Parts of Haiti left in darkness after armed groups attack power stations", NBC News, 18 March 2024.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with a security agent and a customs officer linked to Port Varreux, April 2024.

¹⁵⁰ Raghieb Raza, "Gangs in Haiti hijack food-carrying ship in Port-au-Prince", 11 April 2024.

it at a throw-away price still earns them a ‘profit’ while also winning them support from the community”.¹⁵¹

154. Between 22 April and 1 May, *Viv Ansanm* gangs blocked access to Varreux and the Caribbean Port Services terminal, thereby choking the supply of fuel and other commodities to the country. Specifically, 5 Segond hijacked trucks outside the terminal and used them to block the road, stopping operations at the port (see annex 39). This led to fuel scarcity and higher commodity prices, to the benefit of illicit street dealers and fuel stations owned by gangs.¹⁵²

155. Since June, the Haitian national police has been increasing operations in the vicinity of the terminal, securing fuel distribution.

(b) Attacks on roads and businesses

156. The Panel has continued to investigate how *Viv Ansanm* gangs generate revenue by levying taxes on communal roads and businesses and other illicit activities. Although gangs have come together under the *Viv Ansanm* banner, they continue to manage revenue generation at the gang level.¹⁵³ For instance, the cooperation during the reporting period between Les Argentins, led by Kempes Sanon, and Delmas 6, led by Jimmy Cherizier (HTi.001) is illustrative of this.

157. Since February, the gangs have jointly attacked the Solino area in their effort to take over the neighbourhood (see sect. II.A.1). They have also jointly targeted Upper Delmas, Christ Roi, Bourbon and Nazon, which are considered middle- and high-income residential areas “suitable” for extortion and kidnapping.¹⁵⁴

158. Despite the joint attacks to expand territory, with regard to revenue collection each gang maintains its *modus operandi*. For instance, Delmas 6 has been looting businesses, including those of their “clients” who pay it a monthly fee for “protection”, while Les Argentins is involved in the spoliation and extortion of residents. There is no coordinated revenue collection strategy, and in some instances the two gangs have clashed over territorial economic boundaries (see annex 41 and sect. II.A.1).¹⁵⁵

(c) Attacks on the banking sector

159. The Haitian banking sector faces increased challenges, both physical (attacks by gangs) and financial due to compliance challenges and risks.

160. Attacks on banks by *Viv Ansanm* alliance members have sowed panic in the banking sector, leading clients to engage in bank runs. For instance, in early March, gangs attacked and looted branches of BNC, SOGEBANK and UNIBANK in Croix-des-Bouquets commune.¹⁵⁶ On 18 March, the Banque de la République d’Haïti, the Central Bank, in downtown Port-au-Prince, was attacked in an attempted looting, leading to fatalities, temporary closure and further repercussions, such as a forex

¹⁵¹ Interview with a trader based in Village De Dieu, May 2024.

¹⁵² Interview with proprietors of two petrol stations and a rice importer, June 2024. See also, iCiHaiti, “Insecurity: the Varreux oil terminal blocked”; and Crisis 24, “Haiti: gang violence, heightened security measures likely to continue through at least mid-May/update 16”, 2 May 2024.

¹⁵³ Interview with an official of a taxi syndicate, a gang analyst and two seaport operators, June 2024.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with a business retailer in Upper Delmas and two taxi operators based in Delmas 6, May and June 2024.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with two businessmen whose kiosks were looted and burned down in Solino; and one Haitian national police officer aware of the case, May and June 2024.

¹⁵⁶ Eroid Théodore, “Attaque armée contre la mairie de Croix-des-Bouquets: des pertes considérables enregistrées”, 8 March 2024.

shortage due to capital flight.¹⁵⁷ Soon after, Citibank, which offered corporate services and correspondence banking, closed its operations in the country, and some clients transferred their money to overseas banks in the region (see annex 42).

161. The attacks on banks have contributed to panic among clients, leading to bulk withdrawals while some businesses have disinvested in the country due to political instability and low investor confidence. Key corporate clients, such as exporters and hoteliers, are among those that have disinvested as their markets have shrivelled.¹⁵⁸

162. According to a bank analyst, only about 28 per cent of the Haitian population have a bank account, down from about 32 per cent in 2017.¹⁵⁹ The remaining 72 per cent use non-banking facilities, including bulk cash. In 2023, Haiti was among the top three intended destination countries for bulk cash seized in the United States.¹⁶⁰ According to Haiti authorities, some of the bulk cash that manages to enter the country feeds the illicit flow networks, including the financing of gang activities.¹⁶¹

163. The banking sector of Haiti continues to experience a loss of skilled labour, mainly due to gang-related insecurity.¹⁶² The Governor of the Banque de la République d'Haïti observed that about 250 skilled executives left the banking sector and Haiti in 2023, largely due to insecurity, describing it as a major loss that hampers the country's economic development.¹⁶³ Other factors, such as money-laundering, further strain the confidence in the banking sector, in addition to a large unbanked population and compliance issues (see annex 43).

3. Cross-border illicit financial flows

164. The economic ties between Haiti and the Dominican Republic are characterized by both formal and informal trade. Communities on both sides of the border trade seamlessly, with informal trade meshed in illicit activities.¹⁶⁴ Some elite economic actors have engaged with gangs to pursue illicit cross-border financial activities.

165. The Panel found that the 400 Mawozo gang is part of a criminal network involved in the smuggling of contraband, as well as extortion and assassinations.¹⁶⁵ The gang continues to focus its attention on the smuggling of arms and ammunition (see S/2023/674, para. 104), which it sells on to other gangs within the greater *Viv Ansanm* alliance (see annex 16).

166. Since most markets are located in the Dominican Republic, organized criminal syndicates operate on both sides of the border and are meshed within the cross-border communities, making it difficult for customs and other law enforcement bodies to

¹⁵⁷ Interview with a banker and two financial security personnel, April 2024. See Agence France-Presse, "Haïti: une attaque contre la Banque centrale repoussée, plusieurs assaillants tués", *Le Monde*, 19 March 2024.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with a banker, a former government finance official and a financial analyst, April and May 2024.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with a bank analyst and a finance advisor, May 2024. See also, Alliance for Financial Inclusion, "Haiti: digital financial services (SFD)", 2018.

¹⁶⁰ United States, Department of Treasury, *2024 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment* (2024).

¹⁶¹ Interview with an anti-money-laundering analyst, a financial crimes officer and a finance risk analyst, April 2024.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ Haiti Libre, "Haiti: economy – nearly 250 executives left the banking sector and Haiti in 2023", 6 January 2024.

¹⁶⁴ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Cross-border trade and corruption along the Haiti-Dominican Republic border", March 2019.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with a Polifront officer, a customs official and Haitian national police officer, June 2024.

tackle them. Such attempts often attract the wrath of the criminal ecosystem, as noted by several past altercations.¹⁶⁶

(a) Financing of 400 Mawozo and organized criminal networks

167. Information provided by a Member State corroborated the Panel's investigation of illicit financial activities in the Belladère border area, according to which Rony Célestin, a businessperson and former Haitian senator, was one of the financiers of the 400 Mawozo gang and a criminal network that abets his smuggling activities.

168. This cross-border criminal network is composed of businesspeople, informal traders, transporters, corrupt border security and customs agents, smugglers from local communities and gang members.

169. The Panel spoke to 18 confidential sources in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, some of whom were part of the network and others who had direct knowledge of the matter. Five of the sources independently explained to the Panel how the network facilitates the passage of cargo trucks transporting Mr. Célestin's contraband, at times including concealed arms and ammunition destined for 400 Mawozo, with his knowledge. Often, members of the gang observe the transport from close proximity to ensure that the cargo is not inspected.¹⁶⁷

170. The sources added that 400 Mawozo's control over roads leading to cross-border points, including Belladère and Malpasse, has positioned the gang as a major supplier of ammunition to other gangs in Haiti. With regard to Belladère, they described how small batches of 100 to 500 rounds of ammunition and two or three rifles or pistols are sometimes concealed in contraband commodities and foodstuffs as break bulk cargo imported by Mr. Célestin's firms. Once the cargo enters Haiti, 400 Mawozo coordinates with his focal points in ensuring its safe delivery (see annex 44).¹⁶⁸

171. Five sources added that Mr. Célestin's smuggling network with 400 Mawozo also involves some corrupt border officials, who for a fee facilitate the movement of migrant labourers, at times including children, destined for the informal labour market in the Dominican Republic. The sources added that they were also aware that his trucks, when returning to the Dominican Republic from Haiti, sometimes smuggle drugs, including cannabis, in concealed compartments.

(i) Tax evasion, trade mis-invoicing and price-fixing

172. The Panel found that firms in which Mr. Célestin and his spouse are beneficial owners generate illicit finances by importing contraband goods. They evade the payment of duties through trade malpractices, including mis-invoicing and the corrupting of customs officials. Sources in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, aware of the matter, explained to the Panel that Mr. Célestin had developed a network among customs officials tasked with ensuring that his consignments circumvent the payment of import duties and related taxes. Mr. Célestin uses armed men to put pressure on customs officers and law enforcement agents to act in his favour.¹⁶⁹

173. Because of the financial advantage of importing large quantities of goods and bypassing most taxes, Mr. Célestin is able to sell goods at a lower price, resulting in

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with five confidential sources in Haiti and three in the Dominican Republic, May and June 2024, respectively.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with four confidential sources, three Santo Domingo - Port-au-Prince cargo truck drivers and two bus agents operating between Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince, June 2024.

¹⁶⁹ Confidential source, June 2024.

competitors closing their businesses. He also sometimes endears to the community by engaging in philanthropic activities.

(ii) *Laundering of proceeds of illicit financial flows*

174. Sources explained to the Panel that Mr. Célestin, a major importer of cement and iron in the country,¹⁷⁰ and his spouse are the beneficial owners of at least eight trading companies, whose operations the Panel is aware of and which they use to launder money.

175. Mr. Célestin launders the proceeds of his illicit cross-border activities by investing in legitimate activities aimed at sanitizing his image. He exploits his business influence to gain favours, including tenders to supply construction material – mainly contraband cement and iron sheets – to government institutions, although in several instances he has been paid without delivering on the bids awarded to him.¹⁷¹

176. Mr. Célestin has been sanctioned by a Member State for economic crimes, including corruption.¹⁷² The Panel obtained information about his wealth and found that he holds a number of bank accounts in various currencies.¹⁷³ For instance, in 2017, one of the joint accounts that he and his wife held contained US \$1,000,825.54, and in 2018, another jointly held account contained US \$75,315.50. In 2021, the couple also bought a house in Canada worth Can\$4.25 million (US \$3.1 million)¹⁷⁴ with an unexplained source of funds that financial investigators believed had been acquired illicitly.¹⁷⁵ Finally, when called upon by the Haitian authorities in 2020 to declare his wealth, Mr. Célestin failed to disclose his real net worth.

4. Diversion of public funds and available control measures

177. Public funds intended for the provision of basic services continue to flow into illicit networks, benefiting individuals responsible for implementing national policies. The practice continues to undermine governance and the public trust in the State.

178. In its 2019 Mutual Evaluation Report on anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing methods, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force pointed out a number of shortcomings by Haiti. These were further emphasized in the Task Force's fourth enhanced follow-up report and technical compliance re-rating, released in July 2024.¹⁷⁶

179. Haiti is on the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force's grey list due to strategic deficiencies in its regimes to counter money-laundering, terrorist financing and

¹⁷⁰ Gazette Haiti, "Affaires Rony Célestin: Ensemble Contre la Corruption (ECC) recommande la formation d'une commission mixte et un audit financier de la questure de la 49 et 50ème législature", 25 February 2021.

¹⁷¹ Former governmental official and an anti-corruption officer, 2024.

¹⁷² Rony Célestin was sanctioned by Canada under the Special Economic Measures Act and the United Nations Act in response to the activities of criminal gangs and those who support them in fomenting violence and insecurity. See www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; and Canada, Global Affairs, "Canada imposes additional sanctions against Haitian political elites", 19 November 2024.

¹⁷³ Confidential report on illicit financial flows, seen by the Panel, June 2024.

¹⁷⁴ Vincent Larouche, "Une villa de 4,25 millions pour la famille d'un sénateur haïtien", La Presse, 16 February 2021; and Hugo Joncas, "Les proches d'un sénateur haïtien investissent 6 millions \$ au Québec", *Le Journal de Montréal*, 17 February 2021.

¹⁷⁵ Confidential sources, 2024.

¹⁷⁶ Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Republic of Haiti – 4th Enhanced Follow-Up Report and Technical Compliance Re-Rating* (2024).

proliferation financing.¹⁷⁷ These aspects present a risk to the international financial system. Owing to the challenges the country is facing, the Task Force has allowed Haiti the latitude to report on progress at its own pace.¹⁷⁸

180. In the 2024 Mutual Evaluation Report, however, the efforts made by the Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau, the anti-corruption unit and the central financial intelligence unit in gaining access to and utilizing financial intelligence to conduct their functions were acknowledged.

181. At the time of reporting, the country's anti-corruption unit had prepared 11 high-level cases that were ready for prosecution, involving the diversion of government funds running into millions of United States dollars. Despite the challenges, Haiti is reported to be on course to institute regulatory anti-money-laundering requirements, such as the reporting of suspicious activity, customer identification, customer due diligence and the keeping of beneficial ownership registers.¹⁷⁹

5. Other related findings

182. During its investigations, the Panel came across cases of illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources by individuals involved in the destabilization of the country. The Panel believes that the proceeds from the sale of those resources are used to finance activities of gangs and criminal networks.

III. Recommendations

183. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the Security Council:

(a) Request Member States, in particular those in the Caribbean and North, Central and South America regions, to report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to effectively implement the arms embargo established by paragraph 14 of Council resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#);

(b) Reinstate the scope of the arms embargo by ensuring that future relevant resolutions of the Council include the original language contained in paragraph 11 of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), namely, "arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel", instead of the language contained in paragraph 6 of Council resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), namely, "small arms, light weapons and ammunition" (see annex 25);

(c) Update the sanctions designation criteria set out in paragraphs 15 and 16 of Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) by including the engagement by individuals or armed groups in activities that destabilize Haiti through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources.

184. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the Committee:

¹⁷⁷ Financial Action Task Force, "Jurisdictions under increased monitoring: June 2024", 28 June 2024.

¹⁷⁸ Discussion with Caribbean Financial Action Task Force secretariat, July 2024.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with two financial investigators and risk analyst, June and July 2024.

(a) Continue to consider the statements of cases and additional related information submitted by the Panel in 2023 and 2024, and update the list of individuals designated pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022);

(b) Encourage Member States, in particular those in the Caribbean and North, Central and South America regions, to strengthen their border control mechanisms to identify and tackle trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, as well as other transnational criminal activities, and support the Haitian authorities in building their general border control capacity, including by financing UNODC programming in Haiti;

(c) Encourage Member States to work with the International Civil Aviation Organization, along with relevant United Nations humanitarian agencies and other organizations as needed, to develop international standards and recommended practices in the aviation sector to tackle trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants;

(d) Call upon the Government of Haiti, with the support of national and international partners, to fully implement the protocol on the transfer, reception and care of children associated with armed gangs encountered during operations to secure the territory, signed by the Government and the United Nations system in Haiti in 2023, and to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research, in charge of minors;

(e) Urge Member States to continue to contribute financially to the Multinational Security Support mission to ensure its deployment outside of Port-au-Prince, in particular in the Artibonite department;

(f) Call upon Member States to support the Haitian authorities and their partners to develop and implement a holistic approach to tackling gang violence. In addition to the Multinational Security Support mission, this should include disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration and community violence reduction programming, as well as justice and corrections capacities;

(g) Encourage Member States to build the capacity of Haitian security agencies to deploy tactical assets, including aerial and maritime, to tackle gang activity and the trafficking of arms and drugs;

(h) Encourage Member States, in particular those in the region, to support the strengthening of the capacity of the Haitian anti-narcotics brigade through the provision of equipment, by establishing information-sharing channels with the brigade and by conducting joint operations, as relevant;

(i) Encourage the Government of Haiti, with the support of its international partners, to undertake a risk assessment relating to money-laundering and financing of terrorism, and develop national policies to mitigate those risks, in line with the evaluation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and as a way of combating illicit financial flows;

(j) Request Member States, including those planning to transfer firearms, ammunition and related materiel to the Haitian national police, either by sale or donation, to support the police in strengthening its weapons and ammunition management capacities in order to mitigate potential diversions, including physical security and stockpile management, as well as by conducting post-delivery controls.

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Annex 1: Methodology and communications

Methodology and Opportunity to Reply

The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text, findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation, the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members.

The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest achievable standard of proof.

The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support.

The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows:

1. Providing an individual with an opportunity to reply should be the norm.
2. An individual may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment, that there is a risk that by doing so it would:
 - a) Result in the individual destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive advance notice of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources;
 - c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other local or international organizations; or
 - e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.

After an individual or entity is designated by the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a de-listing process through the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines> and see also <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures-Delisting>

Annex 2: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from November 2023 to August 2024

Member State	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA/visit accepted
Bahamas	1				1	
Colombia	1			1		
Costa Rica	1				1	
Dominican Republic	5	1		1		3
Ecuador	1				1	
El Salvador	1	1				
Guatemala	2		1			1 Visit pending
Honduras	2		1			1
Jamaica	1					1
Kenya	1		1			
Mexico	2	2				
Nicaragua	1				1	
Panama	3			1		2 Visit pending
Turkiye	1		1			
United States	3		1	2	2	
Venezuela	1				1	

Company	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA
FlyMex	1				1	
Fly-select	1			1		

Annex 3: Reactivation of *Viv Ansanm* alliance



Source: France 24

As mentioned in the Panel’s periodic update of March 2024, while Prime Minister Henry was in New York to attend high-level meetings and rally support for the MSS deployment, G9 and G-Pèp gangs¹⁸¹ reactivated the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, which was originally launched late September 2023.

As the Kenyan-led mission prepared to deploy, gangs intensified their offensives and adapted their strategies accordingly. From 29 February 2024, the main gangs from the two rival coalitions (G9 and G-Pèp) formed an unprecedented common front against the government, enabling coordinated attacks against State authority, and critical infrastructure in Port-au-Prince, including police stations, prisons, the main seaport, businesses, banks, as well as the international and domestic airports. Consequently, *Viv Ansanm* not only prevented the Prime Minister Ariel Henry from returning to Haiti but also played a significant role in his ousting¹⁸².

Gangs then continued to deliberately threaten the political transition as well as the MSS, by trying to thwart police operations – e.g by undertaking punctuated attacks against police premises – and committing abuses against the population.

While *Viv Ansanm* has enabled gangs to show improved coordination and tactical operating capabilities, it cannot be disregarded that they have also become more powerful due to the backing of key influential figures, including political, economic and security actors.

Regardless of gangs becoming more autonomous – funding their operations *inter alia* through kidnap for ransoms, hijacking of trucks, illegal tolls, and extortion –, the recent crisis has highlighted connections between the actions of the gangs and that of certain individuals such as Guy Philippe and Dimitri Herard. Other actors were also reportedly tempted to mobilize the *Viv Ansanm* alliance as their ‘armed wing’, including businessmen involved in competition around seaports, and drug traffickers that wanted to benefit from the union of gangs to facilitate drug-smuggling operations. Moreover, the destruction of public infrastructures, such as courthouses and prisons, hampering investigations and judicial processes, also reportedly favors a range of alleged criminals, including those involved in President Moïse’s assassination¹⁸³.

¹⁸¹ Including those led by UN sanctioned individuals: Jimmy Cherizier (alias “Barbeque” -HTi.001), Johnson André (alias “Izo” - HTi.002), Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli” - HTi.003), Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo San Jou”- HTi.004) and Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005).

¹⁸² See (S/2024/253), 2024.

¹⁸³ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, HNP officers, individual living in gang-controlled area, civil society representatives, government representatives working in anti-gang operations, 2024.

Despite the apparent unity of this alliance of connivence, since April 2024, inter-gang clashes were reported in the areas of La Saline and Wharf Jérémie (leading to the withdrawal of Wharf Jérémie gang from *Viv Ansanm*) as well as in Mariani and Carrefour. Also, the increasing number of kidnappings by certain gangs – despite a previous agreement of non-kidnapping – reveals disagreements within the alliance¹⁸⁴. Although each gang continues to pursue its financial interests (see Annex 41), cohesion holds within the alliance as it is mainly driven by the threats of potential MSS operations¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸⁴ UN confidential report, May 2024.

¹⁸⁵ Interviews with international and national gang analysts, 2024 and UN confidential report, June 2024.

Annex 4: Profiles of main gangs within the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area¹⁸⁶

<i>Viv Ansanm</i>					
Gang / Leader	Affiliation	Locality	Headcount	Criminal activity ¹⁸⁷	
Delmas 6 Jimmy Cherizier alias Barbeque (HTi.001) <i>Viv Ansanm</i> 's spokesperson	G9	Delmas (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, airport crossroad)	Around 150 members	Murder, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion.	
Belekou Following the killing of Iskar Andrice, Bendji is the new leader	G9	Belekou	Around 200 members	Murder, robbery, extortion, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks	
Ti Bwa Christ-Roi Chery alias Chrisla	G9	Ti Bois, Fontamara and Carrefour (excluding Mariani). Ti Bwa has about 13 cells in Carrefour	Around 400 members	Murder, robbery, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, targeted assassinations, drug trafficking	
La Saline	Krache Dife Jean Gardy alias Pece Pim Pim	G9	Downtown Port-au-Prince, Rues (St-Martin, Tiremasse, des Fronts Fort, des Remparts, Monseigneur Guilloux, du Quai, Pétiou, du Peuple, du Centre, Montalais, St Laurent, Houille, Bonne Foi, Dr Aubry, Pavée, Macajou, Borgella, des Césars, des Miracles, des Caserne), St-Joseph, Bas Bel-Air	Around 200 members	Robbery, rape, kidnapping, murder, destruction of property, extortion, hijacking of trucks and goods
	Gang de La Saline Bout Janjan (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)	Initially G9; G-Pèp ally (since 30 Janvier 2024)	La Saline, Aviation, Nan Charbon, part of Grand Rue	Around 100 members	Robbery, murder, hijacking of trucks and goods, rape
Gang de Pierre VI Wilson Pierre alias Sonson	G9	Duvivier, Cité Soleil	Around 150 members	Robbery, ransoming, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion	
Simon Pelé Djouma Albert alias Djouma (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)	G9	Simon Pelé	Around 80 members	Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks	
Nan Boston Mathias Sainthil	G9	Boston and Carrefour Drouillard	Around 100 members	Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks	

¹⁸⁶ This Annex is based on interviews conducted in 2023 and 2024 with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang and political analysts, representatives of foreign intelligence agencies, HNP officers and analysts, government representatives and confidential reports.

¹⁸⁷ This column includes main criminal activities that each gang has committed over the years. With *Viv Ansanm*, gangs have, in addition, perpetrated attacks against State institutions and key infrastructures.

<p>Baz Pilate</p> <p>Ezekiel Alexandre alias Ze (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)</p>	G9	1st and 2 nd Avenues, Bolosse to Cite Eternel, 2 nd and 3 rd ruelle Plus (in 3 rd Circumscription), and part of Carrefour-Feuilles	Around 100 members	Murder, robbery, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, ransoming, targeted assassinations, drug trafficking
<p>Chyen Mechan</p> <p>Claudy Celestin alias Stevenson Pierre alias Chyen Mechan</p> <p>Claudy Célestin is a dismissed civil servant of the Ministry of the Interior</p>	Initially G9 ally; Involved in G9 inter-fighting , (from September 2023 until <i>Viv Ansanm</i> relaunching)	Santo 1 to Santo 19, Marin, and Shadda districts in the commune of Croix-de-Mission and Butte Boyer in the commune of Tabarre. Control parts of RN1 and RN8	Around 100 members	Murder, robberies, extortion Attack against the international airport
<p>Fort Dimanche</p> <p>After Mesidyé was killed, Resan is the new chief</p>	Initially G9 ally; G-Pèp ally	Fort Dimanche	Few members who joined La Saline gang	Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion
<p>Gang de Tokyo</p> <p>Chalè</p>	G9 ally	Tokyo	Around 15 members	Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion
<p>Terre Noire</p> <p>Jonel Catel (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)</p>	G9 ally	Terre Noire	Around 200 members	Robbery, ransoming, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, rape of Brooklyn population
<p>Haut Belair / Argentins</p> <p>Kempes Sanon</p>	G-Pèp	Haut Bel-Air, Fort National	Around 250 members	Kidnapping, extortion, hijacking of goods and trucks, theft, rape, murder, violence against civilian populations
<p>Kraze Barye</p> <p>Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005)</p>	G-Pèp ally	Tabarre commune (Torcelle, Pernier and Haut Tabarre)	Around 80 members	Murder, political crimes, drug trafficking, kidnapping, rape, robbery, spoliation of land, theft and sale of houses, hijacking of vehicles, extortion, burglaries
<p>5 Second</p> <p>Johnson André alias Izo (HTi.002)</p> <p>Emmanuel Solomon alias Manno</p>	G-Pèp ally	Bicentenaire, the area from Rue Champs de Mars up to Village-de-Dieu, and part of Martissant (from 2B, in front of the police sub-station up to Martissant 4, until the coast). The bay of Port-au-Prince (port Lafito, Cimenterie and les Moulins d'Haiti, including Source Matelas and Titanyen). Checkpoints in Downtown Port-au-Prince (Rue des Casernes, Rue Pavée, Route de la République, Bicentenaire, Portail Leogane, Route Dehoux, Rue de la Réunion, Rue Monseigneur Guilloux)	Around 1000 members	Murder, drug trafficking, kidnapping, vehicle theft, rape, armed robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods

<p>Grand Ravine</p> <p>Bougoy</p> <p>Killik</p> <p>Renel Destina alias Ti Lapli (HTi.003)</p>	G-Pèp ally	<p>From 5th Avenue Bolosse via Martissant (1, 3, 5, 7,9,11,13,15,17,19, 21,23), habitation Le Clerc, Fort-St Clair, Route des Dalles, until Grand Ravine, RN2; Mariani 2 until entry of Leogane, (Carrefour commune); Gressier commune, part of Carrefour Feuilles.</p> <p>Checkpoints in Downtown Port-au-Prince (Cemetery, Carrefour-Feuille, Rue Magloire Ambroise, Rue Edmond Paul, Rue Alerte, Avenue Christophe, Rue Capois, Place Jeremie)</p>	Around 1500 members	Murder, kidnapping, vehicle theft, rape, armed robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods.
<p>400 Mawozo</p> <p>Wilson Joseph alias Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004)</p> <p>Germine Joly alias Yonyon (sentenced to 35 years imprisonment in the United States)</p>	G-Pèp ally	<p>Croix-des-Bouquets (except Canaan), La Tremblay, Dargout, Cottard, Papaye, Meyer, Thomazeau, Lilavois (access to Meyer)</p> <p>Also operates along the RN8 that connects Port-au-Prince with the border point of Jimani.</p>	Around 300 members	Kidnapping, trafficking of drugs and weapons, spoliation, murder, rape, armed robbery, vehicle theft, hijacking of goods, summary executions
<p>Canaan</p> <p>Jeff Larose alias Jeff</p>	G-Pèp ally	<p>Cannan, Onaville, Jerusalem, Corail, Rosemberg, Lilavois, Bon Repos</p>	Around 600 members	Kidnapping, land appropriation, rape, home burglary, hijacking of goods and vehicles, ransoming, murder, drug trafficking

Not part of *Viv Ansanm*

Gang and leaders	Affiliation	Territory	Headcount	Criminal activity
<p>Brooklyn</p> <p>Gabriel Jean-Pierre alias Ti Gabriel</p>	G-Pèp	Brooklyn, Soleil 9, 4, 17 and 19, Ti Zile, Wharf	Around 200 members	Extortion, destruction of property, hijacking of goods, violence against civilian populations
<p>Wharf Jérémie</p> <p>Micanor Altès alias Monel Felix</p>	G9	Wharf Jérémie, La Saline, Fort Dimanche	Around 300 members	Robbery hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion

Annex 5: Some of the *Viv Ansanm*'s attacks

29 February: Canaan gang's attack against Bon Repos police station

Stills from videos filmed on 29 February and shared with the Panel



The manager of Bon Repos police station killed and cut by Canaan gang members

Stills from videos filmed on 29 February and shared with the Panel

Graphic images with gruesome content

Graphic images with gruesome content

2 March: National prison escapees
Stills from videos filmed on 2 March and shared with the Panel



Bodies of prisoners in front of the Penitentiary. One of those, eaten by dogs
Photo shared with the Panel on 4 March



The National prison completely empty



Stills from video shared on:
<https://www.france24.com/fr/video/20240305-spirale-de-violences-en-haiti-l-aeroport-attaques-par-les-gangs>

2 March: Burning of the Peace Court of Croix-des-Bouquets commune
Photo shared with the Panel on 2 March



3 March: Burning of Cabaret police station by Canaan gang members



Stills from video shared with the Panel on 3 March



3 March: Hospital Saint François de Salle vandalized by Grand Ravine and 5 Second

Source: <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/247070/scenes-de-pillage-a-lhopital-saint-francois-de-sales>




ARCHIDIOCESE DE PORT-AU-PRINCE


CENTRE HOSPITALO-UNIVERSITAIRE SAINT FRANÇOIS DE SALES

Administration de l'Hôpital Saint François de Sales

Communiqué


L'administration de l'Hôpital Saint François de Sales informe le public en général et la communauté médicale en particulier que dans la nuit du 3 au 4 mars, l'ensemble de ses structures de soins et de service a été vandalisé.

L'hôpital saint François de Sales est l'une des institutions les plus importantes de la mission sociale de l'Église dans l'Archidiocèse de Port-au-Prince. Après tout ce que sa reconstruction a coûté à l'Église après le séisme, cette vandalisation peut être considérée comme un nouveau cataclysme pour notre centre hospitalier. C'est un coup dur porté à la mission sociale de l'Église mais aussi à un pays où l'accès aux soins de santé est déjà presque un luxe.

L'accès aux soins est l'aspect le plus exigible du droit à la santé qui doit être interprété, dans la logique de la jouissance des droits fondamentaux de la personne, comme le droit de pouvoir être soigné de manière adaptée. Cet acte de vandalisme qu'a subi l'hôpital saint François de Sales porte, en ce sens, atteinte au droit à la santé qui est un droit fondamental dont chacun doit jouir quelle que soit sa condition sociale. L'administration de l'Hôpital exprime sa désolation devant cet acte qui n'aura pour conséquence que de mettre à genoux un système de santé fonctionnant déjà avec ses faiblesses.

En attendant de faire le bilan des pertes énormes qu'ont occasionnées ces pillages et ces casses, l'administration de l'hôpital Saint François de Sales, espère que reviennent l'ordre et la paix publique dans le pays, dans la Capitale en particulier, afin que la vie reprenne son droit et que les personnes qui souffrent puissent recevoir les soins que requiert leur cas.

Port-au-Prince, le 4 mars 2024


 Hôpital Saint François de Sales
 Directeur Général

Mgr Jean Théodule Domond
 Directeur Général de l'Hôpital Saint François de Sales

Centre Hospitalo-Universitaire St François de Sales: respect de la Vie, Dignité & Excellence.
 53, Rue Charéron, Port-au-Prince, Haïti (WI)
 Téléphones : (509) 3239-1313 / 3313-3513 / 3227-6379

4 March: gang members attack Port-au-Prince international airport

Stills from video shared on: <https://www.france24.com/fr/vi%C3%A9o/20240305-spirale-de-violences-en-ha%C3%ACti-l-a%C3%A9roport-attaqu%C3%A9s-par-les-gangs>



6 March: Grand Ravine's attack against Marché Salomon police station

Stills from video shared with the Panel on 7 March



7 March: Looting of containers by gangs and civilians at CPS container terminal

Stills from video shared with the Panel on 7 March



9 March: 400 Mawozo leader at the Croix-des-bouquets police station, mocking former Prime Minister Ariel Henry

Stills from video shared with the Panel on 10 March



14 March: Shootings on the international airport surroundings and against the building of HNP Direction

Source: HNP facebook page


Tirs dirigés vers la Police Nationale d'Haïti : Un Ancien #Responsable de la BOID Touché.

Ce jeudi 14 mars, des individus lourdement armés ont semé la panique une fois de plus dans le #périmètre extérieur de l'aéroport international de Mais Gaté. Ils ont ouvert le feu en direction de l'immeuble logeant la Direction générale de la Police Nationale d'Haïti (PNH), selon des sources policières. Parmi les victimes, un ancien responsable de la Brigade d'Opération et d'Intervention Départementale (BOID) aurait été touché par un projectile. Les détails sur l'incident restent à clarifier, mais cette attaque souligne les défis persistants auxquels est confrontée la sécurité en Haïti. #rezolatibonit



14 March: Attack against the house of the former HNP General Director (inset) in Croix-des-Bouquets commune


Source: UNPOL, March 2024. See also: <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/247244/la-residence-du-chef-de-la-police-pillee-et-incendiee>



16 March: Looting of containers at the CPS terminal

Still from video posted on social media on 16 March



<p>17 March: Residences burnt by Bel-Air gang <i>Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 March</i></p>	<p>17 March : A 15-year-old girl killed by a stray bullet in Delmas 8 by Delmas 6 gang <i>Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 March</i></p>
	<p>Graphic images with gruesome content</p>

26 and 27 March: looting of Health centers in Delmas 18 and Saint Martin 1

Still from video shared with the Panel on 27 March, showing Delmas 18 Hospital totally destroyed



4 April: Canaan gang destroyed Bon Repos police station using heavy equipment

Still from video shared with the Panel on 27 March



18 May 2024: demolition of the Cabaret civilian prison by Canaan gang

Still from video shared with the Panel on 18 March



17 May 2024: Demolition of the Croix-des-Bouquets police station by 400 Mawozo
Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 March



21 May 2024: 5 Second demolishing the La Saline sub-station
Still from video shared with the Panel on 22 March




21 May 2024: 5 Sgond destroying and setting fire to Martissant sub-police station
Photograph and still from video shared with the Panel on 22 March




13 August 2024: Cabaret police station destroyed by Canaan and 5 Sgond gangs
Still from video shared with the Panel on 14 August 2024



Annex 6: Gang presence in the West department as of June 2024



The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 7: Fracturing of G9 and weakening of Barbeque since late September 2023

According to the Panel's interim report (S/24/253), late 2023 - before the re-launching of *Viv Ansanm* in February 2024- , severe fighting both within and between gangs marked not only the fracturing of the G9 coalition, led by Barbeque, but also the aggressive expansion of G-Pèp, including over the main gateways of the capital, in addition to consolidating alliances with Artibonite gangs¹².

As a recall, a key trigger for the growing ruptures within G9 was the death of G9 gang leaders, such as of Tysson, the then G9-affiliated Carrefour Drouillard (punitively executed by G9 for ignoring instructions of G9), and the accidental death of Iskar Andrice¹³ (alias "Iskar"), leader of the Belekou gang and co-founder of G9. These deaths triggered territorial disputes among G9-affiliated gangs and between G9 and G-Pèp. Moreover, G9 gangs also engaged in renewed fighting in La Saline area of the Port-au-Prince commune¹⁸⁸.

Whenever he is weakened, Barbeque strategically either calls for an alliance with other groups, so as not to be attacked, and/or uses a political narrative (such as calling for dialogue) to try to escape police operations¹⁸⁹. Therefore, facing the fragmentation of G9 and the growing threat by G-Pèp to the territory he controls, Barbeque was already increasing his political narrative against the government. In January 2024, Barbeque published videos calling for a revolution to change the existing political system for the benefit of all Haitians¹⁷. At the same time, he instigated the re-launching of *Viv Ansanm*, on 29 February 2024¹⁹⁰. In consequence, G9 and G-Pèp gangs then ceased their inter-fighting.

Currently, Barbeque is weakened by the ongoing police operations over his gang-held area, and the loss of economic resources. Mid-March 2024, after gangs looted and set fire to the vacant private home of former HNP Director-General, in the Cul-de-Sac plain, HNP operations were launched in lower Delmas area, Barbeque's stronghold. Gang members were killed and injured, and Barbeque's residence was burnt. Since then, he has been mobile, seeking refuge with *Viv Ansanm*'s gangs, including 5 Segond area, in Village-de-Dieu¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸ See S/2-24/253.

¹⁸⁹ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, June and July 2024.

¹⁹⁰ Barbeque was one of the instigators of the alliance. Interview with gang analysts, July 2024.

¹⁹¹ UNPOL report, March 2024.











Annex 8: Lanmo San Jou, leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, showing money including from extortion

Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 June 2024



Annex 9: HNP warrant notices against Dimitri Herard and some gang leaders who escaped prison, on 2 March 2024

Source: HNP Facebook page

<p align="center">Dimitri Herard</p>  <p align="center">POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p align="center">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p>  <p>NOM : HERARD PRENOM : DIMITRY</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HOMICIDE • BRACAGE • VIOL • VOL DE NUIT A MAINS ARMÉES • ACTE DE TERRORISME • EVADE DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation Prière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p align="right"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>	<p align="center">Leader of Simon Pele gang</p>  <p align="center">POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p align="center">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p>  <p>NOM : ALBERT PRENOM : STEEVENSON ALIAS : Djouma</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENLEVEMENT ET SEQUESTRATION CONTRE RANÇON • ABUS DE CONFIANCE • ENLEVEMENT ET SEQUESTRATION CONTRE RANÇON • DETOURNEMENT DE MARCHANDISES • EVASION DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation Prière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p align="right"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>
<p align="center">Leader of Baz Pilate gang</p>  <p align="center">POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p align="center">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p>  <p>NOM : ALEXANDRE PRENOM : EZECHIEL ALIAS : Ze</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSASSINAT • TENTATIVE D'ASSASSINAT • VOL A MAINS ARMÉES • ENLEVEMENT ET SEQUESTRATION • EVASION DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation Prière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p align="right"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>	<p align="center">Leader of Gang Galil</p>  <p align="center">POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p align="center">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p>  <p>NOM : ETHEARD PRENOM : WOULDLY ALIAS : SONSON LAFAMILIA</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENLEVEMENT • DETENTION ILLEGAL D'ARME DE GUERRE • BLANCHIMENT DES AVOIRS • ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS • EVASION DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation Prière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p align="right"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>
<p align="center">Leader of Terre Noire gang</p>  <p align="center">POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p align="center">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p>  <p>NOM : CATHEL PRENOM : JONES</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSASSINAT • TENTATIVE D'ASSASSINAT • DETENTION ILLEGALE D'ARME DE GUERRE • ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS • EVASION DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation Prière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p align="right"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>	

Annex 10: Attacks over Solino neighborhood intensified since February 2024

As a former policeman, Barbeque had close relationships with other HNP officers, including certain he accused on social media of trafficking weapons with him. Some policemen residing in Solino neighborhood were his allies in the fight against gangs, notably base 117, in Delmas 2, as well as Krache Dife and Les Argentins (also known as Bel-Air)¹⁹².

When Barbeque became the leader of the G9 coalition and of Delmas 6 gang, he still enjoyed some sort of arrangements with certain police officers. For instance, at the time Barbeque was facing the fracturing of G9, he reportedly requested certain police officers to prevent the Chyen Mechan gang of attacking other G9 gangs, such as Terre Noire and Pierre VI. In addition, policemen and the Solino self-defense group were supported by Barbeque in the fight against Kempes, who wanted to take over Solino neighborhood in order to access other territories¹⁹³.

With *Viv Ansanm* reactivation and the recurrent gang attacks against police premises, the relationship between Barbeque and these police officers strained. Barbeque, together with Krache Dife and Simon Pelé gangs, then joined hands with his once-time rival, Kempes, to attack Solino and Delmas 24 neighborhoods, in view of opening access to the middle-class neighborhoods of Bourdon, Chris Roi, Haut Delmas and Nazon. The aim is to bring in more income from kidnappings and extortion of businesses in this wealthy area¹⁹⁴.

As a result, high levels of violence have been recorded in Solino, with raids intensifying since February 2024, and at least 128 people, including 13 children, killed or injured, since March 2024. More than 5,100 people were displaced to other areas. Several victims were shot while inside their residences or in the streets¹⁹⁵.

The Solino self-defense group, which is particularly well organized with different commissions (logistics, kitchen, security)¹⁹⁶, has barricaded the key arteries surrounding the neighborhood to prevent incursions from the gangs.

¹⁹² Interviews with government official working on gang-related issues and national and international gang analysts, 2024.


¹⁹³ *Idem*.

¹⁹⁴ BINUH Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, April-June 2024 and interview with gang analysts and government representative working in anti-gang operations, 2024.




¹⁹⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with international gang analyst, June 2024.



Annex 11: Attack against UTAG police officers

<p>Weapons recovered from police officers by Barbeque <i>Still from video filmed on 8 June 2024</i></p>	<p>Armored vehicle burnt <i>Still from video filmed on 8 June 2024</i></p>
	
<p>Corpses of two police officers <i>Photos shared with the Panel on 9 June 2024</i></p>	
<p>Graphic images with gruesome content</p>	<p>Graphic images with gruesome content</p>

Annex 12: Expansion over southern communes of the West department

Partial destruction of Gressier police station by Grand Ravine before the finally takeover on 7 July 2024 <i>Stills from video shared on 2 July 2024</i>	
	
Driver burnt by Grand Ravine gang members in Gressier <i>Still from video shared on 1 July 2024</i>	103 Zombie group of Grand Ravine invaded Leogane commune, on 20 July 2024 <i>Still from video shared on 20 July 2024</i>
Graphic images with gruesome content	
	103 Zombie leader, Ti Bébè Bougòy

Annex 13: Increased violence by Artibonite gangs

<p>Vehicle burnt by Gran Grif at RN1 <i>Still from video shared on 15 July 2024</i></p>		<p>‘Show of force’ by Gran Grif in Moreau Paye, Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite commune <i>Still from video diffused on 12 July 2024</i></p>	
			
<p>Farmers killed by Gran Grif in Moreau Drouet locality, Liancourt commune, on 5 April 2024 <i>Stills from video and photos shared on 5 April 2024</i></p>			
<p>Graphic image with gruesome content</p>	<p>Graphic image with gruesome content</p>	<p>Graphic image with gruesome content</p>	<p>Graphic image with gruesome content</p>


Residents massacred in the commune of Terre Neuve by the Kokorat San Ras gang, on 15 June 2024 <i>Photos shared with the Panel on 16 June 2024</i>	
Graphic image with gruesome content showing an injured baby	Graphic image with gruesome content showing a dead woman
Graphic image with gruesome content showing a dead woman	Graphic image with gruesome content showing a dead man
07 April 2024: Kokorat San Ras members killed a member of a self-defence group in Joanis locality	
Graphic image with gruesome content showing man cut in pieces and killed	Graphic image with gruesome content showing man cut in pieces and killed

Annex 14: Profile of Gangs in the Artibonite department¹⁹⁷

Gang and Leaders	Locality	Strength	Main criminal activity
<p>Gran Grif (Savien gang)</p> <p>Luckson Elan alias General Luckson</p>	<p>Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Savien, Liancourt, Pont Sondé, Carrefour Paye, Moreau Drouet, Hatte, Patchwal</p> <p>Controls part of RN1, and the secondary road 11, from Pont Sondé to Mirebalais, on Morne Pierre Paul and Chandelle, Liancourt commune</p>	About 300 members	<p>Murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of trucks and goods, violence against civilian population, kidnapping</p>
<p>Kokorat San Ras</p> <p>Ferdens Tilus alias Meyer</p>	<p>La Croix Périsse, Commune de l'Estère, Ti Bwadam, Gros Morne</p> <p>Controls parts of the RN1 and of the RNS, linking the Bassin-Bleu and Gros-Morne communes</p>	Around 100 members	<p>Murder, robbery, rape kidnapping, hijacking of trucks and goods</p>
<p>Coalition des Révolutionnaires pour Sauver l'Artibonite (Jean Denis coalition)</p> <p>Ti-Mepris</p>	Jean Denis	Around 100 members	<p>Violence against gang members and civilian population from gang member areas, murder, destruction of property</p>
<p>Raboteau</p> <p>Wilford Ferdinand alias Ti-Will</p>	Gonaïves	Around 50 members	<p>Murder, extortion, street blocking, drug trafficking, destruction of property</p>
<p>Ti Grif</p> <p>Izolan</p>	Palmis	Around 40 members	<p>Murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of trucks and goods, violence against civilian populations, kidnapping</p>
<p>Decahos</p> <p>Paulda</p>	Gonaïves	Around 50 members	<p>Robbery and drug trafficking</p>

¹⁹⁷ This Annex is based on interviews conducted between February 2023 and July 2024 with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang analysts, HNP analysts, government representatives and confidential reports.

Annex 15: Gang controlled area in the Artibonite department as of August 2024



Source: Map elaborated based on confidential data

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 16: Gangs adapting their strategy ahead of MSS operations

Blockade of the main road leading to the city center of Croix-des-Bouquets by the 400 Mawozo gang

Photo shared on social media on 8 July 2024



The construction of a wharf by Izo in Village de Dieu neighborhood to facilitate maritime movements

Source: Ayibopost



Image of Izo's drone tracking MSS operations, in June 2024

Stills from video shared in June 2024



400 Mawozo displaying recently acquired arms and ammunition

Stills from video broadcasted on 31 July 2024



Stills from video broadcasted on 5 August 2024





Annex 17: 400 Mawozo's acquisition of firearms and attacks against Ganthier commune (July 2024)

New acquisition of weapons and ammunition by 400 Mawozo <i>Stills from video shared on 18 July 2024</i>			
			
Ganthier police station burnt by 400 Mawozo <i>Stills from video shared on 20 July 2024</i>	400 Mawozo demolished the Ganthier police station, on 25 July 2024 <i>Stills from video diffused on 25 July 2024</i>		
			

Members of the 400 Mawozo gang set fire to the Ganthier customs office on 04 August 2024
Photo and stills from video broadcasted on 04 August 2024



Lamo San Jou with gang members, including minors, that participated in the attack
Stills from video broadcasted on 04 August 2024



Annex 18: Active campaign calling for Bwa Kale in anticipation of the MSS deployment

Messages from social media shared with the Panel on 28 May 2024

	<p><u>Translation</u> : Donne la main à ton voisin et demande-lui s'il a déjà acheté sa machette !</p> <p>Dis-lui, c'est Bwa Kale qu'il faut privilégier en ce moment.</p> <p><i>Give your neighbor a hand and ask him if he has already bought his machete! Tell him, it's Bwa Kale who should be the priority at the moment</i></p>
<p>Ke tout ayisyen rele Bwa kale.</p> <p>Di tout moun kap vin pran pòz filozòf yo, pou diw ou padwe aji menm jan ak bandi ya, dil #La_violence_contre #la_violence_n'est_pas_une_violence</p> <p>Dil ou pa janm wè yap achte te gaz, bay moun kap souffri ak maladi kansè,</p> <p>#Gwo_maladi, #gwo_remed.</p> <p>#Wa_abòne_siw_vle #Wa_patajel_siw_vle.</p> <p>@tout le monde</p> 	<p><u>Translation</u> : Que tous les Haïtiens crient : Vive Bwa Kale. A tous ceux qui se mettent dans une posture d'intellectuel et qui disent qu'on ne doit pas agir comme les bandits, on doit les dire la violence contre la violence n'est pas une violence. On n'a jamais acheté du thé pour les personnes souffrant du cancer. Aux grands maux, les grands remèdes.</p> <p><i>Let all Haitians shout: Long live Bwa Kale. To all those who put themselves in the position of an intellectual and who say that we must not act like bandits, we must tell them that violence against violence is not violence. We have never bought tea for people suffering from cancer. Big problems require big solutions.</i></p>

Annex 19: Attempts by gangs to win the sympathy of the population

Canaan gang, led by Jeff, gives presents to women on mothers' day

Stills from video shared with the Panel on 28 May 2024

Cash handouts by gang members



Residents of Cité Soleil go out after the destruction of protective walls separating gang-held areas, following a peace pledge by gangs in the area (24 July 2024)



Annex 20: Anti-MSS demonstration by Delmas 6 gang

26 June 2024: Members of the Delmas 6 gang demonstrated while singing that they were ready to defend themselves against Kenyan police officers

Stills from video diffused on 26 June 2024



Annex 21: Seizures conducted on their way to Haiti or at Haitian ports of entry since the creation of the sanctions regime in October 2022

Table: Seizures conducted at Haiti's ports of entry or on their way to Haiti between the adoption of resolution 2356 on 22 October 2022 and 1st July 2024.

Date	Location/authorities	Firearms	Ammunition	Other materiel	Information
25 October 2022	Miami Airport USA	9mm handgun		1 magazine	The pistol was discovered in a parcel being shipped to Haiti
8 November 2022	Elias Pina, Dominican Republic		12,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm 10,160 rounds of 5.56x45mm		Two Haitian women were arrested while attempting to cross the border into Haiti in a private vehicle.
31 December 2022	Cap Haitien Haiti		989 rounds of 9x19mm		Seizure from a container coming from the US. One individual was arrested in Haiti.
11 January 2023	Miami port USA	One revolver	41 rounds		The revolver was concealed in a sofa
24 April 2023	Cap Haïtien Haiti	One 9mm handgun	Eight 9mm rounds 4 boxes of 12-gauge cartridges (100 in total)	2 knives	Found in a container transported by the Sara Express coming from the Miami River (Antillean Marine Shipping).
7 June 2023	CPS container park – Port au Prince Haiti	PA-15 5.56mm rifle	340 rounds of 5.56x45mm 115 rounds of 9mm	5 magazines 1 helmet	Container coming from Miami. Some materiel concealed in a popcorn machine. The rifle was purchased for the first time in the US in 2017. Two individuals arrested in Haiti.
2023 (Unknown date between January and June)	Miami USA	2 pistols		1 magazine	
2023 (Unknown date between January and June)	Miami USA			23 vests	
18 October 2023	Dajabon Dominican Republic		1,850 rounds of 9mm		A minor was intercepted while trying to exit the DR
1 November 2023	USA Miami	1 revolver 357 Magnum	5 rounds of S&W .40 cal 36 rounds of 9x19mm		Commercial Vessel

Unknown date	USA South Florida	Several handguns 1 automatic rifle Several semi-automatic rifles	Unknown quantity of ammunition		
30 November 2023	USA Miami			'35 cannon L-1 37mm' [the Panel was not able to identify what exact item it is]	Commercial aircraft
2 December 2023	International Airport Haiti		50 rounds of .45 40 rounds of 5.56x45mm 150 rounds of 9x19mm 25 of 12 gauge cartridges	19,390 USD in cash Six radios One video surveillance system One flak jacket	Passenger arriving from NY on commercial aircraft
22 December 2023	Cap Haitien Haiti	9mm handgun 5.56x45mm rifle	92 rounds of 9mm 9 rounds of .45 78 rounds of 5.56x45mm	3 flak jackets 1 helmet 7 magazines	Seizure from container from Florida Serial number of the handgun was erased
05 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	Nine 5.56x45mm rifles Three 7.62x39mm rifles 14 handguns	999 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39mm, 5.56x45mm, .40 S&W, 9mm, .25 ACP)	34 magazines	Seizures from container, commercial vessel, from Port Everglades
29 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	One .40 handgun One 9x19mm handgun	13 rounds of 9x19mm	2 magazines	
11 June 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti		150 rounds of ammunition	Conversion kit (handgun to rifle)	
TOTAL		>23 handguns >14 semi-automatic rifle	>26, 238 rounds of various calibers		

Table elaborated by the Panel based on data provided by Haitian, Dominican and US law enforcement agencies, 2023 and 2024.

Annex 22: Details of seizures operated on their way or at ports of entry in Haiti during the reporting period.

Seizures from the US

Case 1: On 2 December 2023, the Haitian authorities seized 265 rounds of ammunition of various calibers, six radios, one flak jacket, and a video surveillance system, as well as a 19,390 USD in cash from a US citizen travelling on a commercial flight from New York to Haiti¹⁹⁸.



Source: VBI, 2023

Case 2 : on 22 December 2023, in Cap-Haitien, the Haitian authorities seized a 9mm handgun, a 5.56x45mm semi-automatic rifle, and 179 rounds of ammunition found in a container coming from Port Everglades, as well as one helmet and three flak jackets¹⁹⁹. The Panel has sent a tracing request to the US.



Source: Confidential

Case 3: on 5 April 2024, in Cap-Haitien, Haitian Customs seized 26 firearms and 999 rounds ammunition found in a container originating from Florida²⁰⁰. This is the largest seizure of firearms intercepted at any port of entry in Haiti since the establishment of the sanctions regime. The Panel interviewed Haitian Police and Customs officers, sent a tracing request to the US, and interviewed the freight forwarder and the shipping broker. The results of its inquiries have facilitated a mapping of the criminal network involved. See Annex 23.

¹⁹⁸ Interviews with representative of Customs, December 2023, and with a HNP investigator, February 2024.

¹⁹⁹ Confidential report, 2023 and interview with HNP officer, January 2024.

²⁰⁰ Interviews with Customs and HNP officers, 2024.



Source: HNP, 2024

Case 4: on 29 April 2024, two handguns with two magazines and 13 rounds of 9x19mm ammunition were discovered in a container that arrived into Cap-Haitien from Port Everglades²⁰¹. The firearms had been sent by a Haitian national (who had recently settled in the US) to his wife in Haiti²⁰². A tracing request was sent to the US.



Source: HNP Facebook page, 30.04.24

Case 5: on 11 June 2024, in Cap-Haitien, a conversion kit (used to transform a handgun into a rifle) and a 9mm high capacity magazine – both unusual items for Haiti – as well as 150 rounds of ammunition (100 x 9x19mm and 50 x .38) were discovered in container KOSU-496-108-8 arriving from Port Everglades.

²⁰¹ Interview with a Customs officer, 2024.

²⁰² Interview with a judicial source, July 2024.




Source: Confidential

Seizures in/from the Dominican Republic

The Dominican authorities have made some seizures during the reporting period with two small seizures of 9mm ammunition between September 2023 and April 2024 in Dajabon and Elias Pina, and a larger one of 1,850 rounds of 9mm ammunition in Dajabon, in October 2023, from a minor attempting to cross the border into Haiti²⁰³.

In Haiti, in December 2023, the HNP arrested three individuals in Mirebalais (Centre department) transporting 9.960 rounds of ammunition. Based on the Panel's physical inspection of the seizure, it included 5.56x45mm ammunition produced by various manufacturers in the US and Europe, some as recently as 2022. The ammunition was sent across the border from the Dominican Republic and collected by accomplices on the Haitian side²⁰⁴.



Source: Panel of Experts.

In July 2024, 5000 rounds of 5.56x45mm ammunition were seized by the Police in Mirebalais, Centre department, after the rider of a motorcycle was shot by a self-defense group²⁰⁵. A second motorcyclist escaped. According to the Haitian

²⁰³ Information provided by the Dominican authorities, June 2024.

²⁰⁴ Interviews with one senior HNP officer and one HNP investigator, January 2024. Interview with Mirebalais local authority, February 2024.

²⁰⁵ Interview with Mirebalais local authorities, August 2024.

authorities, the ammunition crossed over from the Dominican Republic. The ammunition was produced by Fiochi Munizione (Italy) – the Panel sent a tracing request to the Italian authorities in August 2024.



Source: confidential

Annex 23: 5 April 2024 seizure in Cap-Haitien

On 5 April 2024, the Haitian authorities seized 26 firearms as well as ammunition found in a container (no. KOSU4514876) that had arrived into Cap-Haitien from Port Everglades, Florida, on 27 March. The container was being transported by the vessel 'Rainer D' operated by Ocean King which routinely serves this route. The seizure is the largest one since the establishment of the sanctions regime in October 2022.

The Panel presents the evidence it has gathered on this case below; however, the Panel withholds the names of individuals and companies involved – either knowingly or unknowingly – as national investigations are ongoing.

This case illustrates the types of networks involved in arms trafficking from the United States, their *modus operandi*, and the challenges associated with effectively enforcing the United Nations arms embargo on Haiti.

Detection

The materiel was brought into Haiti concealed in two separate boxes both bearing the number '75', packed in amongst many other boxes and different kinds of packages. The first box had earlier been picked up by a senior Customs officer, who had put it into his vehicle with the intention of removing it from the port undetected. When the second box was opened during the search of the container and weapons were discovered, the Customs officer removed the box from his vehicle and promptly left the port; he was arrested several days later and was removed from his position in Customs.



Source: Confidential



Source: Confidential

Matériel seized

Full details of the weapons recovered during the seizure are provided below. Specifically, the search yielded 12 rifles, including 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm, 14 pistols, and 999 rounds of ammunition (278 x 9x19mm, 36 x .40, 633 x 5.56X45mm, 52 x 7.62x39mm) as well as 34 magazines.

On 15 April 2024, the Panel sent a tracing request to the US authorities in order to identify the chain of custody of the matériel. The Panel also requested the US authorities to share information about the sender and the ship that had transported the matériel, including any related documentary evidence and any information about the network(s) and the intended end-user(s). A response is still pending.

Trafficking network

Senders from the United States

Three Haitian brothers have been identified as being among the primary actors involved in the trafficking ring responsible for bringing these weapons into Haiti, including a former HNP officer who is the leader of the group. While two of the brothers are based in the US and used straw buyers to purchase the matériel, one is based in Haiti and is in charge of selling it on. This was not their first illicit transfer to Haiti.

Corrupt Customs officers facilitating entry of matériel into Haiti.

In Cap-Haitien, Customs officers were paid to facilitate the passage of the illicit goods. Although only one Customs officer was arrested, more officers are implicated and investigations continue²⁰⁶.

Following this seizure, the Customs authorities established a commission to travel from Port-au-Prince to look into the work of the Cap-Haitien office. In addition to the Customs officer who had attempted to remove the matériel from the port and was subsequently fired, one other Customs officer was suspended for four months and two others received cautions²⁰⁷.

²⁰⁶ Confidential source, June 2024.

²⁰⁷ Confidential source, June 2024.

Distribution

Enquiries indicate that the clearing agent who fled the port when he saw that the boxes had been searched acts as an intermediary with one of the three brothers in charge of selling materiel to end-users. The ring seems to sell to anyone and is not attached to any specific gang or other armed actor.

Transportation to Haiti

Freight forwarder

The leader of the network used a freight forwarder who himself used a broker to ship the container to Haiti. The Panel interviewed both the freight forwarder and the shipping broker during a fact-finding mission to Florida in June 2024. The Panel interviewed the freight forwarder who denied being involved and explained that he was not aware of the content of the boxes in which the weapons and ammunition had been found.

As the Panel has already reported in Annex 29 of S/2023/674, there are many Haitian nationals or individuals of Haitian descent who work as freight forwarders in South Florida. The freight forwarder is a US citizen of Haitian origin. As is common practice among freight forwarders, he rented a yard in a warehouse in Port Everglade and rented a container from the shipping broker. His job consists of filling the container with personal effects or relatively small quantities of goods from a range of individuals. The container in question for instance included goods from more than 100 individuals and included food, oil, clothes, and family items.

Freight forwarding is loosely regulated and freight forwarders do not control the merchandise they fill in containers. The freight forwarder explained that, typically, clients arrive at the yard to hand over goods that are already packaged and sealed. He went on to say that the person who had dropped the two boxes was not previously known to him, so he asked him to send a copy of his ID by WhatsApp. This was subsequently deleted from the conversation as a result of which the forwarder said he was not able to recover it. The sender had paid 150 USD cash.

With regards to organizing the shipment and distributions of packages, the freight forwarder uses number codes on parcels and attributed the number '75' to the boxes transporting the arms and ammunition. The consignee who collects the parcels at the port, may not be the final end user and may just be an additional step in the chain of custody.

Shipping broker

The shipping company is charged with renting a container out to a freight forwarder, to bring it to the yard and take it back to the shipping line once it is ready to be shipped. Based on our enquiries, it is unlikely that the shipping company was aware of the transportation of the firearms.

Annex 24: New equipment in the hands of gangs

The Panel has noticed that a number of gangs have acquired new types materiel and larger calibers, particularly the two most powerful gangs, 5 Segond and Grand Ravine which, along with 400 Mawozo, continue to be the most prolific in terms of their ability to procure materiel and to supply allied gangs with weapons and ammunition.

7.62x39mm

Although gangs continue to exclusively use small arms, the Panel has noticed a gradual shift towards higher calibers since its first mandate. Historically, gangs have typically used craft weapons, handguns, 12-gauge shotguns, and later 5.56x45mm semi-automatic (AR-type) rifles. Over the past two years, they have increasingly been trying to procure 7.62x39mm semi-automatic, as well as some automatic (AK-type) rifles. Although the caliber of these rifles is not significantly larger than the AR-type, they have more stopping power and result in more damage. While AK-type rifles and/or their ammunition coming from the US and the Dominican Republic have featured in seizures conducted in Haiti (see Annex 21), a very limited number were traced back to Venezuela and the Panel has also received information of transfers from other countries in South America which it is looking into. 7.62x39mm rifles and their ammunition are currently more expensive than the AR-variants and 5.56x45mm ammunition (or .223).

7.62x51mm

During its last mandate, the Panel had already identified that some gangs were in possession of limited amounts of 7.62x51mm rifles (see S/2023/674). Most cases involved firearms diverted from HNP stockpiles including some general-purpose machine guns. This higher caliber materiel remains rare in Haiti, though a quantity of the ammunition was seized previously (see Eglise Episcopale case, S/2023/674) and some has also featured this year in seizures made during Police operations²⁰⁸.

Recent exchanges with HNP officers involved in anti-gang operations indicate that they are seeing increasing amounts of this materiel during operations. Indeed, a video²⁰⁹ posted in March 2024 mimicking the codes of the “special forces” units of Latin American drug cartels shows members of the ‘Unité Village de Dieu’ (UVD) – presented as the ‘tactical corps’ of the 5 Segond gang headed by Izo – wearing military uniforms with UVD patches, standing alongside refurbished camouflaged vehicles and carrying newly-procured weapons, including FAL-pattern (7.62x51mm) rifles (see images below).

Confidential sources explained that these rifles along with the uniforms, were retrieved by Dimitri Herard after he escaped prison and took refuge in Village de Dieu. However, the original source of the rifles remains unclear. Originally produced by FN Herstal in Belgium, FAL rifles are among the most common in the world, manufactured in multiple countries (both legally through licenses sold by FN Herstal and reproduced illegally in several locations), including in South America, and are in service in more than 80 states across the globe (the Forces Armées d’Haiti (FADH) have also procured FALs in the past)²¹⁰.

12.7x99mm (.50 cal)

In the previous mandate, the Panel reported on the concerning attempts by gangs to procure 12.7x99mm ammunition, a caliber used for heavy machine guns and anti-materiel rifles. The Panel is aware that Ti Bwa and Grand Ravine have this type of ammunition and that attempts to import .50 cal rifles have been made (one was seized in Miami in 2022 on its way to Haiti and 400 Mawozo also managed to acquire one in the US – See S/2023/674). More recently, interviews with HNP officers from operational units indicate that 12.7x99mm was used in the downtown area of Port-au-Prince in July. One senior anti-gang officer told the Panel that four or five of these weapons are currently owned by gangs, with Izo and Jeff Canaan both having one each²¹¹. .50cal represent a significant risk for HNP officers and their partners during operations.

²⁰⁸ See for instance, HNP official Facebook page, 9 February 2024

²⁰⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qx-5DY61Lqo>

²¹⁰ Interview with a FAL expert, June 2024.

²¹¹ Interview with a senior representative of an HNP operational unit, July 2024.

Unité Village de Dieu





Annex 25: The use of uncrewed aerial systems by gangs

Although uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), more commonly referred as drones, are not covered by the UN arms embargo (resolutions 2699 and 2700 - 2023), their acquisition has had a significant impact on the fighting capacity of gangs. The Panel believes that it is important to monitor their transfers and that, in addition to small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, the embargo should cover spare parts, and any other type of military materiel, as well as training, financial and technical assistance as mentioned in the original embargo (see paragraph 11 of S/RES/2653 – 2022) – see Recommendations. The Panel believes that the provision of drones to gangs, even commercial ones, constitutes an assistance to criminal groups and therefore meets designation criteria - see criteria d), paragraph 16 of resolution 2653 (2022).

Gang leaders, including Chrisla, Izo, Jeff Canaan, and Vitelhomme, have increasingly been deploying UAS²¹² which – though they do not yet appear to have been weaponised – have contributed to significantly enhancing their fighting capability.

Evidence collected by the Panel shows, for instance, that both Izo and Vitelhomme have been using UAS since at least early 2023 to conduct reconnaissance, identify targets and coordinate attacks:

- On 2 March 2024, Izo remotely coordinated an attack against the national penitentiary leading to the escape of thousands of prisoners, including gang members, drug traffickers and arms traffickers (see photo below).
- In early 2023, Vitelhomme used a drone in a battle with the HNP swat team (see photo below)

UAS identified by the Panel include ‘quadcopters’ produced by one of the largest manufacturers of commercially available UAS. Exports or imports of these into Haiti are not restricted and are therefore very difficult to control; furthermore, given the general obsolete state of arms control legislation in the country, the use of UAS is not controlled or restricted in Haiti.



Photo: Izo coordinating the attack against the national penitentiary through drone footage, April 2024 (source: Tik Tok)

²¹² Interview with a senior representative of an HNP operational unit, July 2024.



Photo: UAS belonging to Vitelhomme downed by the HNP during an operation in April 2023 (source: confidential)

Annex 26: Brigade de Surveillance des Aires Protégées (BSAP)

The BSAP was created by the Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées (National Agency for Protected Areas - ANAP) whose official mandate is to protect biodiversity and manage the National System of Protected Areas – see 2024 Interim Report S/2024/253²¹³. With the absence of a legal order establishing the Brigade it is difficult to identify its date of creation. Reportedly, the ANAP has had a small group of poorly equipped armed agents composed of former members of the Defence Forces since its creation in 2006. The group's headcounts and scope of tasks developed significantly from 2014 and then from 2017 when the ANAP became a General Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and the appointment of Jeantel Joseph, the former secretary of state for public security under President Jovenel Moïse, as the Director of the ANAP²¹⁴.

While the legal grounds for the creation of the brigade are highly contested – the Haitian constitution mentions that the Police and Army are the only armed bodies that can exist on the national territory²¹⁵ – the Brigade is not under the control of the government and some units largely respond to the orders of its (now dismissed) leader, Jeantel Joseph. He has a close relationship with Guy Philippe as they both belonged to the same political entity in 2015. In 2024, Jeantel Joseph, as the coordinator of the *Reveil National pour la Souveraineté d'Haiti (RNSH)* political coalition openly backed Guy Philippe. On 17 January 2024, Jeantel Joseph was also mentioned in a judicial order in relation to the assassination of President Moïse in 2021 for having provided the necessary logistics to the mercenaries who killed the president²¹⁶.

BSAP agents are mostly based in rural and border areas but have increasingly been seen carrying weapons in urban areas where they often carry out police-like work in the absence of effective State security. Local authorities in a range of departments have relationships on various levels with local BSAP units, with some commending their security work and confirming that there is a degree of ongoing collaboration. Interviews with confidential sources indicate that some local authorities and local stakeholders pay BSAP agents to provide security.

Civil society organizations and local authorities have also raised concerns about members of the BSAP committing crimes, including blocking roads and demanding payment for safe passage²¹⁷. Some BSAP members – some of whom are deployed along the border with the Dominican Republic and southern departments – are reported to be involved in cross-border smuggling of goods, including drugs²¹⁸. Some members of the BSAP have also been involved in kidnappings, gang activities and the illicit trafficking and possession of firearms²¹⁹. Finally, several confidential sources mentioned that some BSAP units are working for local politicians and businessmen, including Rony Célestin in Hinche.

Recent developments

The BSAP recently rose to prominence during the tensions around the construction of the canal off the Massacre River - near the border with the Dominican Republic. Construction of the canal became a question of national pride for many Haitians which BSAP exploited to win the hearts of many through its provision of 'security' to the site²²⁰ with little reaction from the Government. BSAP boosted its ranks at the time of this event.

After his return to the country in November 2023, Guy Philippe was protected by agents of the BSAP who have also participated in anti-government protests he initiated. This led to more volunteers joining the Brigade. Several of the senior members are former acolytes of Guy Philippe from the 2004 coup.

²¹³ [Accueil - ANAP](#)

²¹⁴ Confidential report, February 2024.

²¹⁵ See article 263.1 of the Haitian Constitution.

²¹⁶ République d'Haiti. Ordonnance du 17 Janvier 2024. Assassinat du Président Jovenel Moïse.

²¹⁷ Interviews with local authorities of Plateau Central, February 2024.

²¹⁸ Interview with senior HNP officer, February 2024.

²¹⁹ Confidential report, 2021. Interview with human rights defender, January 2024.

²²⁰ See for instance, Daudier, Valéry. 2023. Canal sur la riviere Massacre : des agents de la BSAP et des membres de la population en protection des travaux. Le Nouvelliste.

Despite very few reactions from political actors throughout the country, civil society organizations and some law enforcement and Army representatives raised concerns at the time, including about the potential for deadly clashes involving the Brigade while the country was experiencing severe anti-government protests²²¹.

Jeantel Joseph did not comply with the order from the government to provide a list of agents and their firearms. On 23 January 2024, Joseph was officially dismissed as Director of ANAP by an *arrete* in the *Moniteur* (Official journal of Haiti) which also created a Technical Restructuring Committee in charge of assessing the ANAP and providing recommendations to improve its management²²². The following day, BSAP agents and other actors attacked the Customs office in Ouanaminthe in reprisal²²³. At the date of drafting, the Committee is still not operational.

On 29 January 2024, the government issued a communique requiring people affiliated with the ANAP to report in and register at the closest Ministry of Environment office and banning any armed BSAP agent from operating within urban areas²²⁴. While some members of the BSAP complied, others did not, and have continued to recognize Joseph as their leader and to carry firearms in urban areas. During the peak of demonstrations on 5, 6 and 7 February 2024, BSAP agents participated in anti-government protests fomented by Guy Philippe in several cities, including Port-au-Prince, Mirebalais²²⁵, and Gonaives²²⁶. Several armed incidents took place in Port-au-Prince on 7 February where clashes with the HNP resulted in the deaths of five BSAP agents and the arrests of three others²²⁷, while BSAP agents killed two civilians and injured two more in Mirebalais²²⁸. National investigations are ongoing.

Composition and Structure

The composition and structure of the BSAP remains very vague as most agents and units across the country are not registered. Interviews with senior BSAP agents indicate that the Brigade counts around 6000 members²²⁹, the vast majority of whom are ‘volunteers’ given that only 56 individuals are formally appointed by the government (civil servant status) and 82 have a contractual status. Most official BSAP positions were distributed by Jeantel Joseph. The BSAP is mostly composed of men between 20 and 70 years old.

Interviews with BSAP agents and local authorities indicate that volunteers have to join with their firearms and also have to purchase their uniform. Reasons for joining include search for revenues, local prestige and authority, support the community and regularisation of firearms (see below).

Administratively, the BSAP is headed up by a national coordinator who sits in Port-au-Prince and who is a civil servant of the ANAP. However, while some units do respond to this individual, others refuse to recognize his legitimacy²³⁰.

There are currently seven departmental directorates (Central, Ouest, North, North West, North East, South East and South) and another is currently being created in the Nippes. During its interviews with local authorities across the country, the Panel was told that BSAP units continue to multiply across the country, including outside of the departments mentioned above. For instance, most recently a commander requested the local authorities in Petit-Goave to establish a BSAP unit there. Typically, a senior member of an existing BSAP unit would leave the unit to set up a new cell elsewhere.

A commander the Panel spoke to directly said that he recruits locally, has registered the volunteers and has information on each of them. He, and other BSAP agents, explained that units across the country vary from a few dozen men to over 1000.

²²¹ For instance, on 6 February 2024, the Military Association of Haiti released a communique warning of potential armed clashes between BSAP, the HNP, the Army and gangs. Association Militaire d’Haiti. Note. 6 February 2024.

²²² See le *Moniteur*, 23 January 2024.

²²³ Interview with senior Customs officer, February 2024.

²²⁴ [Communiqué de Presse – Communication Haïti](#)

²²⁵ Interview with representative of Mirebalais local authorities, February 2024.

²²⁶ Interview with representative of Gonaives local authorities, February 2024.

²²⁷ Information provided by UNPOL

²²⁸ Interview with representative of Mirebalais local authorities, February 2024.

²²⁹ Although this number was cited by several senior BSAP agents, the Panel believes that it may be underestimated.

²³⁰ Interviews with BSAP agents, June and July 2024.

There are serious rivalries within the BSAP with unit commanders in the same area vying for legitimacy. This will likely be a significant challenge for any effort aiming at managing the Brigade and put it under State control.

Illicit firearms

Analysis of firearms displayed by members of BSAP indicates that they have a range of small arms, including craft weapons, handguns, shotguns and semi-automatic rifles (see image) that they have sourced illicitly. From discussions with BSAP agents and ANAP personnel, firearms are procured from various sources (details below).

In 2017, a limited number of 12 gauge rifles (30-40) were donated to the BSAP headquarter by the Police. In addition, former demobilized members of the Forces Armées d’Haiti (FADH) joined the BSAP and brought their firearms with them. Owning a firearm is often a prerequisite for joining BSAP; some units have also purchased weapons with money they received from local authorities or in exchange services provided to the local population. A BSAP agent also explained that some local business operators join the BSAP with their weapons as they believe the registration process will legalize it.

Two BSAP agents told the Panel that a large part of the materiel used by BSAP agents is illicitly imported from the Dominican Republic.



Source: still from video interview with head of BSAP unit of Lascahobas, posted on social media, 2024.

BSAP agents interviewed by the Panel explained that they want recognition and to be officially integrated into the BSAP with a formal status and salary. Discussions with civil society organizations and Haitian security specialists indicate that it is critical that the authorities launch the work of the Restructuring Committee to document agents, vet them and provide them with a formal contract, as well as register firearms and confiscate those that are not required for official forestry work. Some interlocutors suggested that a DDR-type programme could be a solution.

Conclusion

The Panel is of the view that most BSAP units are acting outside the mandate of ANAP and do not protect the environment. They act out of governmental control, are increasing in headcount and actually outnumber gang members in the country. The requirement of registering with a firearm fuels arms trafficking further and potential arms embargo violations.

The Panel is concerned about the likely use of autonomous BSAP units by political actors, particularly during elections, to the detriment of the peace, security and stability of Haiti as well as by criminal networks trafficking arms and drugs. The Panel continues to monitor the involvement of BSAP agents in activities meeting designation criteria, including arms

trafficking. Finally, the lack of environmental control exposes natural resources of the country to illicit exploitation and trade, further destabilising Haiti.

Annex 27: Drug seizures by Dominican authorities


On 24 May 2024, four sacks containing 39 packages of cannabis, with approximately 384 pounds, were seized in Elias Piña, coming from Haiti. The sacks were abandoned by four individuals who escaped after noticing the presence of Dominican authorities²³¹.



Source: Confidential report, July 2024

On 16 March 2024, Dominican authorities informed that two individuals were arrested, and 49.5 pounds of cannabis were seized in a vehicle in Puerto Llano, Elias Piña²³².

On 24 January 2024, Dominican authorities seized five packages of cannabis, with an approximate weight of 26.3 pounds, in Pedernales. The individuals involved fled to Haiti²³³.




Source: Confidential report, July 2024

²³¹ Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://www.dncd.gob.do/index.php/noticias1/noticias/item/2080-cesfront-y-dncd-inautan-384-libras-de-marihuana-en-elias-pina>

²³² Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://www.dncd.gob.do/index.php/noticias1/noticias/item/2006-arrestan-dos-hombres-y-ocupan-49-libras-de-marihuana-en-elias-pina>

²³³ Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://prensaygente.com/cesfront-y-dncd-ocupan-26-libras-de-marihuana-en-pedernales/>

On 27 December 2023, 368.59 pounds of cannabis were seized hidden inside boxes of lemons in a red truck, in Elias Piña²³⁴.



Source: Confidential report, July 2024

²³⁴ Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://mide.gob.do/cesfront-y-dncd-incautan-368-libras-de-marihuana-en-elias-pina/>

Annex 28: Comparison of number of Haitian nationals entering Panama and Honduras between June to October 2023

The Panel identified a significant discrepancy between the number of Haitian migrants registered by Panama upon crossing the Darien Gap and the number registered by Honduras entering from Nicaragua. This difference amounts to approximately 47,345 individuals.


The high volume of charter flights transporting Haitian nationals to Nicaragua during the period in question suggests this discrepancy is linked to smuggling activities via those flights that arrived in Managua. It is important to note that these figures only reflect registered migrants in Panama and Honduras. The true number of Haitian nationals transiting Central America is likely much higher.

Country	June	July	August	Sept.	October	Total
Honduras	1,305	1,558	4,051	14,898	35,529	57,341
Panama	1,446	1,226	1,559	2,563	3,202	9,996


Panel’s own table based on State’s official data

HONDURAS

Irregular migration of Haitians in Honduras per year.



Irregular migration of Haitians in Honduras from June to October 2023.



Statistics from the National Institute of Migration of Honduras. Available at: <https://inm.gob.hn/migracion-irregular.html> Visit 03 July 2024.

PANAMA

Irregular migration of Haitians in Panama. Irregular Transit of Foreigners at the Border with Colombia by Country According to Order of Importance

Cuadro No. 004 TRÁNSITO IRREGULAR DE EXTRANJEROS POR LA FRONTERA CON COLOMBIA POR PAÍS SEGÚN ORDEN DE IMPORTANCIA: AÑO 2023

País	Total	Ene.	Feb.	Mar.	Abr.	May.	Jun.	Jul.	Ago.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dic.
Total	520,085	24,634	24,657	38,099	40,297	38,962	29,722	55,387	81,946	75,268	49,256	37,231	24,626
Venezuela	328,650	2,337	7,097	20,816	25,395	26,409	18,501	38,033	62,700	58,716	34,594	22,547	11,505
Ecuador	57,250	6,352	5,203	2,772	2,683	3,059	5,052	9,773	8,642	4,744	2,849	2,996	3,125
Haiti	46,422	10,222	6,522	6,896	4,830	3,023	1,446	1,226	1,559	2,563	3,202	2,648	2,285
China	25,565	913	1,285	1,657	1,683	1,497	1,722	1,789	2,433	2,588	2,934	4,090	2,974

Statistics from the National Institute of Migration of Panama. Available at: <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/IRREGULARES-X-DARIEN-2023.pdf>. Visit 03 July 2024.

Annex 29: Posts of travel agencies and social media profiles actively marketing trips to Nicaragua and Mexico

Publicity posts of various travel agencies marketing trips from Haiti or the Dominican Republic to Nicaragua, 2024.



The image shows a social media post from a user named 'avocatdeborahlarosilire' (Deborah Travel Agency). The post includes a video player showing a United Airlines advertisement. The ad features the United logo and the slogan 'THE BEST TRAVEL AGENCY IN THE WORLD'. It lists 'Service gratuit' (Free service) including: 'Faire des applications' (Make applications), 'Consultation pour application' (Consultation for application), and 'Carte de travail' (Work card). It also details a 'FULL PACKAGE' including 'BILLET D'AVION' (Air ticket), 'HOTEL', 'BUS', and 'LOCATION DE VOITURE' (Car rental), with 'UN SIM FULL INCLUSE ET DEJEUNER' (A full SIM included and breakfast). Two travel options are listed: 'Voyage direct de Haïti à' (Direct flight from Haiti to) with destinations Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Panama, priced at 1800 US; and 'Voyage direct de St. Domingue à' (Direct flight from St. Domingue to) with destinations Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Panama, priced at 1300 US. A note states: 'A Note :Tois (3) voyage par mois. Faites le 10, 20, 30 chaque mois.' (Note: 3 trips per month. Make them on the 10, 20, 30 of each month). The ad includes a phone number '+1 (754) 255 03 02' and an address '176-826 world way, San ingloria, CA 90445, United States'. The social media post shows 28 likes, 3 comments, and 12 shares. The video player shows a TikTok link: 'https://www.tiktok.com/@avocatdeborahlarosilire/vid...'. Below the video are three comments: 'Ciara Akeelah enterese' (4-25), 'VIP eske nous gen biwo St domeng' (2-22), and another comment partially visible.

The advertisement is for 'PASSAGE VOYAGE MEXIQUE PAR NICARAGUA'. It features a graphic of a plane flying over a building. The text includes 'VOL CHARTER' and '20 SEPTEMBRE 2023'. The price is prominently displayed as '\$ 2950'. Below the price, it says 'Les places sont limitées'. At the bottom, there is a phone number '344' and the word 'AGE'.

The advertisement is for 'Angel Travel Agency' and is dated '8 de septembre de 2023'. It features a graphic with the text 'VOYAGE MEXICO' and a large price tag of '3500'. Below the price, it says 'SPECIAL OFFER' and 'VOL HAITI - NICARAGUA EPI DE NICARAGUA POU MEXICO...'. The ad lists the following services: 'FULL PACKAGE POUR MEXICO - VOL HAITI - NICARAGUA TAXI NICARAGUA - HOTEL NICARAGUA - NOURRITURE - BUS, HOTEL, MANJE, POU TOUT PEYI WAP PASE YO JISKA TAPATCHULA MEXICO. FULL ASSISTANCE.' It also includes the text 'Ver traducción'.

Spécial VOL DIRECT
Haïti Nicaragua
 Avec Beauduy Travel Agency
 Contact: +1 809-554-0220 Ext. 0
 beauduytravelagency1@gmail.com

beauduytravelagency • Segoir

beauduytravelagency • 📍 Ouverture 24 Bonne nouvelle: VOL DIRECT SORTI HAÏTI À NICARAGUA.

rele kounyea pouw reserver plaz paw la. +1809 554 0220 ext. 0
 Ou pa besoin ni visa transit Paramá, ni ou pa besoin visa dominicain.
 Selman passpòrt w ak carte corona virus la, ak carte fevye jaune lan.
 Item kounyea sou +1809 554 0220 dekwè fin konpoze appèl la peze zero epi kital sone.

Ou ekri nou sou e-mail sa. beauduytravelagency1@gmail.com
 Ou bien pase nn bureau a Higüey la Altigracia, derniere station bus pouw ale BAVARO ou bien PUNTA CANA an jardenaw Higüey la.
 Calle Francisco Rijo Cuto Esquina Gral Gregorio Luperón, segundo Nivel, Puerta #5,
 45 som Ver traducción

martin_ingnw mw rele nou mwèn ekri nou mwèn pa janm la jwenn nou
 41 som Reponder Ver traducción

36 Me gusta
 8 de agosto de 2023

Añade un comentario...

Social media post marketing trips to Nicaragua and Mexico 2023. Available: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CvtUIzLslq/> and <https://www.facebook.com/search/posts/?q=travel%20haiti%20full%20package> Visit July 2024

Annex 30: Flight history for Flymex aircraft XA-VBC, from August to October 2023.

Flymex airline’s aircraft XA-VBC flight history between 14 August 2023 and 26 October 2023, showing multiplecharter flights departing from Port-au-Prince with destination to Managua.

Flight history for aircraft - XA-VBC									
AIRCRAFT		TYPE CODE		MODE S					
Embraer ERJ-145LR		E145		0D0902					
AIRLINE		Code		SERIAL NUMBER (MSN)					
FlyMex		-		145098					
OPERATOR		Code		AGE (Dec 1998)					
-		-		25 years					
DATE	FROM	TO	FLIGHT	FLIGHT TIME	STD	ATD	STA	STATUS	
26 Oct 2023	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	2:30	00:30	22:01	23:30	Landed 23:30	KML CSV Play
25 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	(XAVBC)	3:15	13:45	10:30	15:45	Landed 15:45	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:19	23:25	21:07	21:25	Landed 21:25	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:29	18:23	15:54	20:23	Landed 20:23	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:22	16:46	14:24	14:46	Landed 14:46	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:07	10:49	08:42	11:49	Landed 11:49	KML CSV Play
23 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:55	20:23	18:28	21:23	Landed 21:23	KML CSV Play
23 Oct 2023	—	—	(XAVBC)	-	—	—	—	Unknown	KML CSV Play
22 Oct 2023	Cuernavaca (CVJ)	Morelia (MLM)	(XAVBC)	0:35	11:30	10:55	11:30	Landed 11:30	KML CSV Play
21 Oct 2023	Veracruz (VER)	Cuernavaca (CVJ)	(XAVBC)	0:38	10:25	09:42	10:20	Landed 10:20	KML CSV Play
20 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Veracruz (VER)	(XAVBC)	0:40	09:12	08:32	09:12	Landed 09:12	KML CSV Play
20 Oct 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:26	02:39	01:14	02:39	Landed 02:39	KML CSV Play
20 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:10	00:14	23:04	00:14	Landed 00:14	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:25	23:35	21:10	21:35	Landed 21:35	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:17	18:30	16:13	20:30	Landed 20:30	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:21	16:39	14:18	14:39	Landed 14:39	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:26	10:46	08:21	12:46	Landed 12:46	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	22:53	20:30	20:53	Landed 20:53	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:32	17:40	15:08	19:40	Landed 19:40	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:27	15:24	12:57	13:24	Landed 13:24	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:07	10:21	08:14	11:21	Landed 11:21	KML CSV Play
17 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:46	21:53	20:08	22:53	Landed 22:53	KML CSV Play

15 Oct 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:27	20:21	18:54	20:21	Landed 20:21			
15 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:11	18:15	17:04	18:15	Landed 18:15			
15 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:16	18:05	15:49	16:05	Landed 16:05			
15 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:13	12:13	09:59	13:13	Landed 13:13			
13 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	21:03	19:41	22:03	Landed 22:03			
13 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:16	20:32	18:16	18:32	Landed 18:32			
13 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:11	16:09	13:58	17:09	Landed 17:09			
13 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:19	00:49	23:31	01:49	Landed 01:49			
13 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:18	00:41	22:23	22:41	Landed 22:41			
12 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:30	19:07	16:37	21:07	Landed 21:07			
10 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	0:16	16:21	16:00	16:16	Landed 16:16			
10 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:17	16:44	14:27	14:44	Landed 14:44			
10 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:11	11:36	09:25	12:36	Landed 12:36			
10 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:50	06:55	05:05	07:55	Landed 07:55			
07 Oct 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:24	19:38	18:14	19:38	Landed 19:38			
07 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:04	17:24	16:20	17:24	Landed 17:24			
07 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:29	17:17	14:49	15:17	Landed 15:17			
07 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:14	11:37	09:23	12:37	Landed 12:37			
05 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:30	18:45	17:15	19:45	Landed 19:45			
05 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:27	18:14	15:47	16:14	Landed 16:14			
05 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:10	13:05	10:55	14:05	Landed 14:05			
04 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:27	19:06	17:39	20:06	Landed 20:06			
04 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:25	18:13	15:48	16:13	Landed 16:13			
04 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:08	11:36	09:28	12:36	Landed 12:36			
03 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:29	18:56	17:26	19:56	Landed 19:56			
03 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	18:18	15:55	16:18	Landed 16:18			
03 Oct 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:32	12:22	09:50	14:22	Landed 14:22			
03 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:29	07:42	06:12	07:42	Landed 07:42			
30 Sep 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:28	18:41	17:13	18:41	Landed 18:41			
30 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:07	16:23	15:14	16:21	Landed 16:21			
30 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:19	16:22	14:02	14:22	Landed 14:22			
30 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:16	11:19	09:02	12:19	Landed 12:19			
29 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:25	16:42	15:17	17:42	Landed 17:42			
29 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:15	16:31	14:16	14:31	Landed 14:31			
29 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:20	11:15	08:55	12:15	Landed 12:15			
28 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:26	16:55	15:29	17:55	Landed 17:55			
28 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:18	16:45	14:27	14:45	Landed 14:45			
28 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:09	11:50	09:41	12:50	Landed 12:50			
27 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:25	18:02	16:37	19:02	Landed 19:02			
27 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:20	17:48	15:28	15:48	Landed 15:48			
27 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:30	11:28	08:58	13:28	Landed 13:28			
27 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:29	06:55	05:26	06:55	Landed 06:55			
26 Sep 2023	Queretaro (QRO)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:20	10:59	10:34	10:54	Landed 10:54			
25 Sep 2023	Ciudad Victoria (CVM)	Queretaro (QRO)	(XAVBC)	0:40	14:02	13:22	14:02	Landed 14:02			

24 Sep 2023	Nuevo Laredo (NLD)	Ciudad Victoria (CVM)	(XAVBC)	0:42	15:25	14:38	14:21	Landed 14:21			
23 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Nuevo Laredo (NLD)	(XAVBC)	1:37	14:26	12:49	15:26	Landed 15:26			
22 Sep 2023	Hermosillo (HMO)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	2:10	13:00	10:50	14:00	Landed 14:00			
21 Sep 2023	Reynosa (REX)	Hermosillo (HMO)	(XAVBC)	1:56	17:28	15:31	15:28	Landed 15:28			
21 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Reynosa (REX)	(XAVBC)	1:10	10:45	09:35	11:45	Landed 11:45			
20 Sep 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:31	20:53	19:22	20:53	Landed 20:53			
20 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:12	16:47	15:34	16:46	Landed 16:46			
20 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:26	16:33	14:07	14:33	Landed 14:33			
20 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:09	11:36	09:28	12:36	Landed 12:36			
19 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:27	17:30	16:03	18:30	Landed 18:30			
19 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:21	16:59	14:37	14:58	Landed 14:58			
19 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:06	12:29	10:23	13:29	Landed 13:29			
18 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:25	19:37	18:12	20:37	Landed 20:37			
18 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:24	19:07	16:43	17:07	Landed 17:07			
18 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:31	13:55	11:24	15:55	Landed 15:55			
18 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:30	09:46	08:16	09:46	Landed 09:46			
17 Sep 2023	Reynosa (REX)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:09	11:36	10:27	10:36	Landed 10:36			
17 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Reynosa (REX)	(XAVBC)	1:35	08:13	06:37	09:13	Landed 09:13			
16 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:33	13:35	12:01	13:35	Landed 13:35			
16 Sep 2023	Zacatecas (ZCL)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:50	09:27	08:36	09:27	Landed 09:27			
15 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Zacatecas (ZCL)	(XAVBC)	0:56	23:34	22:38	23:34	Landed 23:34			
15 Sep 2023	Saltillo (SLW)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:06	02:57	01:51	02:57	Landed 02:57			
15 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Saltillo (SLW)	(XAVBC)	1:18	00:29	23:11	00:29	Landed 00:29			
13 Sep 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:27	18:58	17:31	18:58	Landed 18:58			
13 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:08	16:47	15:37	16:45	Landed 16:45			
13 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:24	16:51	14:27	14:50	Landed 14:50			
13 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:15	12:00	09:44	13:00	Landed 13:00			
12 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:24	13:24	12:00	14:24	Landed 14:24			
12 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:22	13:10	10:48	11:10	Landed 11:10			
12 Sep 2023	Cancun (CUN)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:05	06:42	04:36	07:42	Landed 07:42			
11 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Cancun (CUN)	(XAVBC)	0:17	21:16	20:54	21:11	Landed 21:11			
11 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	19:18	17:56	20:18	Landed 20:18			
11 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:21	19:12	16:51	17:12	Landed 17:12			
11 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:04	13:34	11:30	14:34	Landed 14:34			
09 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:26	18:28	17:02	19:28	Landed 19:28			
09 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	18:07	15:44	16:07	Landed 16:07			
09 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:07	13:11	10:59	14:06	Landed 14:06			
06 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	18:33	17:11	19:33	Landed 19:33			
06 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	18:05	15:42	16:05	Landed 16:05			
06 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:31	12:42	10:10	14:42	Landed 14:42			
06 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:31	07:58	06:26	07:58	Landed 07:58			
05 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:36	18:52	18:16	18:52	Landed 18:52			
31 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:27	23:11	21:44	23:11	Landed 23:11			
31 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:11	21:02	19:48	21:00	Landed 21:00			

31 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:18	20:00	17:42	18:00	Landed 18:00			
31 Aug 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:13	14:41	12:28	15:41	Landed 15:41			
30 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	19:56	18:34	20:56	Landed 20:56			
30 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:19	18:53	16:33	16:53	Landed 16:53			
30 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	3:01	13:27	10:26	15:27	Landed 15:27			
29 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:08	18:45	17:35	18:43	Landed 18:43			
29 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:29	18:40	16:11	16:40	Landed 16:40			
29 Aug 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:34	12:56	10:22	14:56	Landed 14:56			
29 Aug 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:27	08:32	07:05	08:32	Landed 08:32			
26 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:26	19:35	18:09	19:35	Landed 19:35			
26 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:06	17:13	16:07	17:13	Landed 17:13			
26 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:30	17:14	14:44	15:14	Landed 15:14			
26 Aug 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:41	11:21	08:40	13:21	Landed 13:21			
26 Aug 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:29	06:48	05:19	06:48	Landed 06:48			
23 Aug 2023	San Luis Potosi (SLP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:40	00:08	23:28	00:08	Landed 00:08			
22 Aug 2023	Merida (MID)	San Luis Potosi (SLP)	(XAVBC)	1:42	22:55	21:14	22:55	Landed 22:55			
22 Aug 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:35	19:02	17:27	19:02	Landed 19:02			
19 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:29	14:26	12:57	14:26	Landed 14:26			
19 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	—	(XAVBC)	-	11:01	11:00	—	Unknown			
19 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:27	12:20	09:53	10:20	Landed 10:20			
18 Aug 2023	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	0:35	21:53	21:18	21:53	Landed 21:53			
14 Aug 2023	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	(XAVBC)	1:42	17:18	15:36	17:18	Landed 17:18			

FlightRadar24, Flight history for aircraft XA-VBC (as of 22 May 2024). Available at <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/xa-vbc#> visit 22 May 2024.

Annex 31: Map showing main air and land migrant smuggling routes from Haiti to North America



Panel's map own elaboration based on "Clear Map" from United Nations Geospatial services <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mapsgeo/webservices> (Visited July 2024)

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

For a more detail view of the different migrant routes in Mexico see S/2023/674.

Annex 32: Other violations of human rights

In line with resolution 2653 (2022), the Panel has undertaken a comprehensive investigation approach into human rights violations in Haiti. While gangs are the primary perpetrators, the Panel recognizes the complicity of some public officials, politicians, and economic figures in either supporting these groups or weakening state institutions that could combat them. The Panel is committed to investigating all parties involved.

Haiti faces a critical situation. Gang violence is escalating not only in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area but also in the wider western and Artibonite departments, where their growing power is a major concern. Beyond the specific violations documented in this report – including sexual and gender-based violence, child recruitment, use of human shields, wanton destruction of public and private property and smuggling of migrants – the Panel is particularly concerned about the following additional areas:

Violations to the right to health

Haiti's population health care has been hampered by gang violence. Healthcare facilities are struggling due to supply and staff shortages. Around 40% of hospital beds are unusable due to gang-looting, and the security situation has led almost half of Haiti's medical professionals to migrate.²³⁵ Haitians are unable to access medical care since 21% of healthcare facilities, and nearly half of Port-au-Prince hospitals are in gang-controlled zones.²³⁶ As of July 2024, more than 30 medical centers in Haiti are closed due to gang vandalism, including Haiti's largest hospital.²³⁷

On 29 February 2024, Haiti's State University Hospital was ransacked. It remains non-operational despite being recovered from the gangs by the police on 9 July 2024.²³⁸ (See section II.A.1).

In March 2024, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance destroyed Jude-Anne Hospital (see Annex 32.1) and ransacked the Hospital and Saint Martin Health Center in the Delmas 18 commune.²³⁹

Despite an increase in IDP numbers, health sector interventions remain limited to 23 IDP sites due to lack of resources and staffing.²⁴⁰

From 1 January to 30 June 2024, WHO reported 2,672 cases and 13 deaths of cholera in Haiti.²⁴¹

Violations to the right to education

Gang violence has seriously disrupted and endangered the educational system in Haiti. As of 5 July 2024, 919 schools were closed (515 permanently closed) and more than a dozen schools have been destroyed, affecting nearly 156,000 students mainly in the West and Artibonite departments.²⁴² Moreover, many school teachers and university professors are unable to go to work or have left the country due to violence and economic hardship.²⁴³

Gang violence has caused a significant educational crisis in Haiti. Between 2019 and 2023, children have lost on average, an entire year of schooling. The economic fallout from the violence has also forced many parents into unemployment, further limiting children's access to education across all grade levels.²⁴⁴

Between February and May 2024, members of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance vandalized and set fire to the premises of the Faculty of Science, Faculty of Linguistics, Faculty of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, and the *École Normale Supérieure* at the State University of Haiti, the National School of Arts, the Mixed School Les Frères Nau, National Library in Port-au-Prince, among many other educational sites.²⁴⁵

²³⁵ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haitian-capitals-crippled-health-system-brink>

²³⁶ See <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/haiti-who-health-emergency-appeal-2024>

²³⁷ See United Nations Data, <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-situation-report-4-05-june-2024> and <https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/UNFPA%20Haiti%20Sitrep%20%235.pdf>.

²³⁸ <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/haitian-police-say-they-have-taken-largest-hospital-back-from-gang-control-1.6957194>

²³⁹ See <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-emergency-situation-report-no-14-2-april-2024>

²⁴⁰ See <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/haiti-who-health-emergency-appeal-2024>

²⁴¹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/multi-country-outbreak-cholera-external-situation-report-16-published-18-july-2024>

²⁴² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-emergency-situation-report-no-28-5-july-2024>.

²⁴³ Interviews with NGO's members May 2024.

²⁴⁴ Interviews with humanitarian actors. July 2024.

²⁴⁵ See section on Wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private property.

Around 39 schools are occupied by over 60,000 IDPs, restricting children's attendance to classes.²⁴⁶ Schools' premises and playgrounds are used as temporary shelters as witnessed by the Panel during its visit to the Lycée Jean Marie Vincent, Port-au-Prince. (S/2024/253).

Schools have also been taken by gangs such as Terre Noire, Grand Ravine, Warf Jérémie, Kraze Barye, Charbon and Canaan.²⁴⁷

Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance

Since late February 2024, escalating gang violence has severely hampered humanitarian efforts in Haiti. *Viv Ansanm* gang members attacked critical infrastructure, robbed containers carrying first aid supplies, and looted hospitals and pharmacies, among other humanitarian aid sites, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Blockaded roadways and the closure of the main airport and seaport have severely restricted the movement of vital supplies and humanitarian personnel. These disruptions have worsened existing shortages and hindered the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid, thereby risking the Haitian population's well-being. (Annex 32.2)

On 15 June 2024, Ezekiel, a recent escapee from the National prison, leader of the Baze Pilate gang, went to a school in his territory in Carrefour Feuilles and broke in the middle of a WFP food distribution. He threatened everyone and stole around 150 sacks of rice.²⁴⁸

Nonetheless, despite the security crisis, as of June 2024, the WFP has provided critical food assistance to hundreds of thousands of Haitians through its emergency and school meals programs. For example, as of May 2024, over USD 2.7 million in cash-based transfers (CBT) and 1,837 metric tons of food benefited about 735,639 people.²⁴⁹ As of June 2024, more than a million hot meals have been provided to IDPs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.²⁵⁰ Despite these positive developments, food insecurity remains dire (see Section II.C).

Deficiencies of the justice and prison systems

Gang violence has crippled Haiti's justice system. Many courthouses remain destroyed, non-operational, or located in inaccessible areas, effectively barring judicial personnel and lawyers from accessing them.²⁵¹ Interviews with lawyers reveal the additional loss of crucial case files, legal documents, and identification cards due to these attacks.²⁵² This breakdown affects all legal areas – criminal, civil, and administrative – rendering the administration of justice in Haiti nearly impossible.²⁵³ Furthermore, Haiti's judicial system has been paralyzed by ongoing strikes since last October over labor disputes concerning pay and working conditions.²⁵⁴

Moreover, during April and May 2024 two lawyers, and then a judge and a lawyer were killed by the Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras gangs, respectively, in two separate incidents. A judge investigating drug trafficking reported that he had recently received death threats.²⁵⁵ These attacks on the judiciary aim to create a climate of fear and intimidation and constitute serious threats to the exercise of judicial independence and legal representation. Between January and July 2024, 23 police officers were killed due to gang violence.²⁵⁶

The early March attacks on Haiti's two largest prisons, the national penitentiary of Port-au-Prince and the Croix-des-Bouquets prison, during which about 4,624 detainees escaped, have significantly weakened the already dysfunctional correctional system. Only 16 prisons remain operational, and overcrowding is severe with a population exceeding capacity

²⁴⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-haiti-round-7-june-2024>.

²⁴⁷ Interviews with UN humanitarian officer, May and June 2024 and a NGO member 2024. See also,

<https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s2024508-enarruzh>

²⁴⁸ Interviews with human rights defenders and NGO's members, July 2024.

²⁴⁹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/wfp-haiti-country-brief-may-2024>.

²⁵⁰ <https://x.com/wfp/status/1808406627801833791?s=43&t=3kFgrKDPT9SeorQ5dwAnew>

²⁵¹ The Port-au-Prince, Croix-des-Bouquets, Gonaives, Trou du Nord, and Petit-Goâve courthouses, to mention a few, have been rendered non-operational by gangs.²⁵¹

²⁵² Interviews with Haitian lawyers, May and June 2024.

²⁵³ See also <https://ayibopost.com/the-legal-profession-is-dying-in-port-au-prince/>

²⁵⁴ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf

²⁵⁵ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf

²⁵⁶ UN data

by nearly 300%²⁵⁷. Pre-trial detainees make up the vast majority of inmates, raising concerns about fairness and due process.

Despite efforts from the Haitian Government and UN agencies, Haiti's penitentiary system continues to be in crisis. Prisons across the country suffer from severe overcrowding²⁵⁸, shortages of essential resources such as food, medical supplies, and cooking gas, and significant issues with sewage and garbage disposal. Gang attacks on prisons are also a constant threat. Initiatives to reduce overcrowding through special hearings have only free 63 individuals so far this year.²⁵⁹

Particularly worrisome is the *Centre d'éducation et de réinsertion des mineurs en conflit avec la loi* (CERMICOL), original aim at minors, now houses men, women, girls and boys, and it is more than 400% overcrowded²⁶⁰. It is also now the only operational prison in Port-au-Prince.²⁶¹

Forced displacement of population

Gang violence have resulted in a dramatic surge of people being displaced either internally or internationally. Gangs have also used the forced displacement of the population as a tactic to fight against other gangs or to loot property. In a recent interview, Ti Lapli, the leader of the Grand Ravine gang, acknowledged using forced displacement of the population as a fighting tactic (see Annex 32.3)

As of June 2024, there are 578,074 IDPs in Haiti, marking a nearly 60% increase from March 2024 (362,551).²⁶² More than 50% are women and girls.

According to UNICEF, one child is displaced every minute in Haiti as armed violence persists.²⁶³ As of 2 July 2024, the number of internally displaced children in the country exceeded 300,000, representing a 60% increase since March.²⁶⁴

Gang violence in Port-au-Prince led to an exodus of about 95,000 people fleeing the capital between 8 March and 9 April 2024. As of June 2024, nearly 50% of all IDPs in Haiti are in the Great South.²⁶⁵ Among the most serious attacks that led to a high number of IDPs are the following: on 29 February 2024, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance attacked several parts of Port-au-Prince metropolitan area which resulted in the displacement of 14,740 individuals (see Annex 32.4). On 18 February 2024, *Viv Ansanm* attacked the areas of Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau, Centre department, resulting in 1,590 IDPs (see Annex 32.5). Between 25 April and 5 May 2024, attacks perpetrated by the *Viv Ansanm* alliance in Delmas 24 and Solino resulted in about 5,000 IDPs.²⁶⁶

On 11 May 2024, *Viv Ansanm* caused clashes in the Gressier commune, West department, resulting in 4,463 people displaced to other locations in the West and South departments (see Annex 32.6).

Living conditions at IDP sites continue to be appalling and in need of basic services, as it has been already reported by the Panel (S/2023/674 and S/2024/253).

Finally, many of the Haitian nationals who have been forcibly returned to Haiti, have also become IDPs. In 2023, more than a quarter of a million Haitians were forcibly returned to Haiti, 96% of them from the Dominican Republic.²⁶⁷

Violations by the police

From 1 January to 31 March 2024, 590 civilians unrelated to gangs were killed or injured during police operations against gangs.²⁶⁸ There have been also reports of extrajudicial executions by police officers in the areas of Cité Soleil, Drouillard

²⁵⁷ UN data

²⁵⁸ Overcrowding is rampant, with an average of 0.33 square meters of space per inmate. The most overcrowded prisons include Mirebalais, Les Cayes, Saint-Marc, Anse-à-Veau, Jacmel, Jérémie, Fort Liberté I, Port-de-Paix, Cap-Haïtien, and CERMICOL, with occupancy rates ranging from 347% to 980%. UNPOL Data. July 2024.

²⁵⁹ UNPOL Data. July 2024.

²⁶⁰ United Nations Police data.

²⁶¹ UNPOL Data. July 2024.

²⁶² <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-haiti-round-7-june-2024?close=true> visited June 2024.

²⁶³ See <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/one-child-displaced-every-minute-haiti-armed-violence-persists-unicef>

²⁶⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/one-child-displaced-every-minute-haiti-armed-violence-persists-unicef>

²⁶⁵ Idem.

²⁶⁶ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-412-updates-displacement-following-attacks-delmas-25-april-07>

²⁶⁷ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-haitians-forcibly-returned-haiti-profiles-migration-experience-and-intentions?close=true>

²⁶⁸ See Panel's third confidential periodic report.

and Vincent in the commune of Port-au-Prince.²⁶⁹

As of 30 June 2024, the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police (IGPNH) opened 23 investigations of alleged human rights violations committed by the police, so far none of those cases have been concluded. Since 3 March 2024, IGPNH has faced several challenges since their offices have remained closed due to continued gang violence in the area, which has seriously halted its performance.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁹ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf

²⁷⁰ UNPOL Data. July 2024.

Annex 32.1: Destruction of Jude-Anne Hospital, Port-au-Prince, by Delmas 6 gang members led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias “Barbeque” 18 March 2024.




Pictures from social media

Annex 32.2: Humanitarian access, January – June 2024.

The security situation in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite department dramatically worsened between February and April 2024, severely hampering humanitarian aid delivery to Haitians in need. Humanitarian workers faced numerous challenges, including armed clashes, movement restrictions, direct interference in their work, and even violence.

Between April 2023 and June 2024, over 1,700 incidents targeting humanitarian personnel and operations were recorded.

The following map and figure show the constraints to access humanitarian aid:




TENDANCE ET TYPOLOGIE DES INCIDENTS

Evolution des incidents par trimestre
(avril 2023 - juin 2024)



Répartition des incidents par type de contrainte



Source: OCHA, Haiti - Aperçu de la sévérité de l'accès humanitaire, janvier à juin 2024 (visited 26 juillet 2024). <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-aperçu-de-la-severite-de-laccés-humanitaire-janvier-juin-2024-26-juillet-2024>

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 32.3: Ti Lapli's confessions concerning recruitment of children and forced displacement of the population.

Recruitment of children:



Ti Lapli claims that due to a lack of jobs, children seek him out for assistance, which leads them to fight for him.

Forced displacement of the population






Ti Lapli admits using forced displacement as a tactic during clashes with other gangs. This tactic involves driving people out from their homes and burning houses.

Stills taken from a video: "Reportage exclusif en Haïti: à Port-au Prince, capitale assiégée par les gangs" FRANCE 24. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5GNZRS9SaM> Visited July 2024.

Annex 32.4: IDPs from Port-au-Prince, 29 February 2024

IDPs following armed clashes between gangs in Port-au-Prince on 29 February 2024.




"IOM. Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 39.1 — Updates on displacement following attacks in the municipality of Port-au-Prince (29 February — 02 March 2024)." Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-391-updates-displacement-following-attacks-municipality-port>. Visited 20 July 2024

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 32.5: IDPs from Mirebalais, Saut-d’Eau and Thomazeau, 18 February 2024

IDP following armed clashes between gangs in Mirebalais, Saut-d’Eau and Thomazeau (18 February 2024)




“IOM. Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 38 — Displacement following attacks in Mirebalais, Thomazeau and Saut-d’Eau (19 — 20 February 2024).” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-38-displacement-following-attacks-mirebalais-thomazeau-and> Visited 20 July 2024

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 32.6: IDPs from Gressier commune, 11 May 2024.

IDPs following armed clashes between gangs in Gressier on 11 May 2024.



“IOM. Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 42 — Displacement following attacks in the municipality of Gressier (11-12 May 2024).” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-42-displacement-following-attacks-municipality-gressier-11-12?close=true>. Visited 20 July 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 33: Mass kidnappings by Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif gangs (October 2023 - June 2024)

This table summarizes the recorded mass kidnappings incidents carried out by the Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif gangs between October 2023 and June 2024. For the Panel’s report purposes “mass kidnappings” are those where 10 or more persons are kidnapped in a single incident.

According to Panel’s own account about 500 people were mass kidnapped during the above-mentioned period by those two gangs.

When data was available the number of passengers is disaggregated by sex and age.

Kokorat San Ras gang

Date	Event	# Kidnapped persons	Ransom requested	Location in Artibonite department
27 October 2023	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	13 pax: 9 women, 3 men, 1 adolescent	No ransom; all belongings were taken	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
11 November 2023	Kidnapping from a bus	17 pax	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
17 November 2024	Kidnapping from a merchandise truck	13 pax: 9 adults, 3 adolescents, 1 elderly man	750,000 HTG (\$5682.30 USD approx.) in total	La Croix Périsse
20 November 2023	Kidnapping from a bus	15 pax: 10 men, 5 women	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
20 November 2023	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 6 women, 4 men	N/A	La Croix Périsse
4 December 2023	Kidnapping from a minibus	10 pax: 4 women, 6 men	N/A	La Croix Périsse
5 January 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	20 pax: 7 women, 13 men	N/A	La Croix Périsse
9 January 2024	Kidnapping from a minibus	10 pax: 6 men, 4 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
20 January 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 6 men, 4 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
17 February 2024	Kidnapping from two trucks	12 pax: 8 women, 4 men	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per truck	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne

18 February 2024	Kidnapping from a bus	20 pax: 13 men, 7 women	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
7 April 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 3 men, 7 women	1,000,000 HTG (\$7576 USD approx.) per hostage	La Croix Périsse
24 April 2024	Kidnapping of two pickup trucks	20 pax: 8 men, 12 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
28 May 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	19 pax: 8 men, 11 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
15 June 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	15 pax: 8 men, 7 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
16 June 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	16 pax: 11 men, 5 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
17 June 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 7 men, 3 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
27 June 2024	Kidnapping from a minibus	12 pax: 7 men, 5 women	1,250,000 HTG (\$9470 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne

Gran Grif gang

Date	Event	# Kidnapped persons	Ransom	Location in the Artibonite department
01 December 2023	Kidnapping from a bus	18 pax: 4 women, 2 girls (16 years), 12 men	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
12 December 2023	Kidnapping from bus	10 pax: 7 men, 3 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
09 January 2024	Kidnapping from a bus	25 pax: 15 men, 10 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
12 January 2024	Kidnapping from a public transport vehicle	14 pax: 8 men, 6 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
26 April 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 6 men, 4 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
01 May 2024	Kidnapping from two minibuses	15 pax: 5 men, 10 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
04 June 2024	Kidnapping from a bus	32 pax: 22 men, 10 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
23 June 2024	Kidnapping	15 pax: 9 men, 6 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
04 July 2024	Kidnapping and shooting incident	18 pax: 10 men, 8 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite

Panel's own table based on UN data.


Annex 34: Migration, Deportees/Returnees, Refugees and IDPs

There is no Haitian official data on the exact number of Haitian nationals that have been forcibly displaced internally or that have fled the country due to the violence and economic situation in Haiti. However, according to the Panel's own assessment, during the reporting period, about half a million persons have left their homes, nearly 300,000 as IDPs and about 200,000 as migrants/refugees.

The following information, collected from different organizations and States' data, provides a glimpse of the impact of such violence.


IOM

As of June 2024, a total of 578,074 Haitian nationals were internally displaced.²⁷¹ More than half of them are women and minors.



According to the IOM from January to July 2024, 89,721 Haitians were deported to Haiti, out of which 96.04% came from the Dominican Republic.

²⁷¹ <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/haiti>



IOM. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Haiti 2024. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/node/23491>
 In 2023, a total of 216,677 Haitians were forcibly returned to Haiti, out of which 96% came from the Dominican Republic.



Figure 1. Haitians forcibly returned to Haiti in 2023 by sending country and number of interviewed among them

	Number of returnees ¹	Number of returnees interviewed
Dominican Republic	208,169 (96%)	7,409 (83%)
Turks and Caicos	3,338 (2%)	897 (10%)
Bahamas	2,021 (1%)	219 (2%)
United States of America	1,862 (1%)	220 (2%)
Cuba	751 (<1%)	58 (1%)
Turkey	463 (<1%)	72 (1%)
Jamaica	73 (<1%)	24 (<1%)
TOTAL	216,677 (100%)	8,899 (100%)

IOM. Haitians forcibly returned to Haiti — Profiles, migration experience and intentions of Haitians returned in 2023. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-haitians-forcibly-returned-haiti-profiles-migration-experience-and-intentions?close=true>.

UNCHR

Haitian refugees and asylum seekers from 2018 to 2023.



UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, 16 July 2024. Data as of December 2023. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=3UEuLJ>.

US Customs and Border Protection ²⁷²

U.S. Customs and Border Protection data show a total of 163,781 Haitians encountered in 2023, while a total of 126,175 Haitians were encountered from January through June 2024.



“U.S Custom and Border Protection, Nationwide Encounters, Haiti.” Available at: <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>.

²⁷² Encounter data includes U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Title 8 Apprehensions, Office of Field Operations (OFO) Title 8 Inadmissibles, and Title 42 Expulsions for fiscal years (FY) 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. Demographics for USBP and OFO include:





- a. Accompanied Minors (AM)
- b. Individuals in a Family Unit (FMUA)
- c. Single Adults
- d. Unaccompanied Children (UC) / Single Minors

US Customs and Border Protection. <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>, visited July 2024.

GARR

According to the *Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés* (GARR), an Haitian NGO, there were a total of 92,148 repatriations and a total of 24,351 refoulements to Haiti during the months of April, May and June 2024. Below is the counting for the months of May and June 2024 as examples. Information for the months of January, February, and March was not available.

Repatriations and Refoulements June and May 2024



“Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés, Rapport Mensuel: Rapatriements, Retours spontanés, Refoulements.” Available at: x.com/GARRHaiti

PANAMA

In 2023, more than half a million migrants (520,085) crossed the Darien Gap, out of which 46,422 were Haitian nationals.²⁷³ From January to June 2024, 10,173 Haitian nationals were recorded to cross the Darien Gap.²⁷⁴

Región	Total	Ene.	Feb.	Mar.	Abr.	May.	Jun.	Jul.	Ago.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dic.
Total	520,085	24,634	24,657	38,099	40,297	38,962	29,722	55,387	81,946	75,268	49,256	37,231	24,626
América del Sur	419,197	11,014	14,399	26,623	31,030	32,157	24,976	50,425	75,471	67,358	40,841	28,218	16,685
Antillas	48,246	10,468	6,645	7,005	4,964	3,128	1,539	1,372	1,777	2,766	3,350	2,790	2,442
Asia	42,386	2,134	2,803	3,637	3,357	2,927	2,549	2,830	3,795	4,170	4,349	5,247	4,588
África	10,109	1,010	806	815	925	741	637	756	876	965	708	970	900
Europa	69	3	2	17	16	5	11	3	4	1	3	1	3
América Central	29	1	1	1	1	3	8	-	2	4	5	2	1
Eurasia	25	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	2	-	-	-
América del Norte	23	1	1	1	4	1	2	-	1	2	-	3	7
Oceanía	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-

Cifras preliminares al 31 de diciembre del 2023 sujetas a revisión y actualización.



País	Total	Ene.	Feb.	Mar.	Abr.	May.	Jun.	Jul.	Ago.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dic.
Total	520,085	24,634	24,657	38,099	40,297	38,962	29,722	55,387	81,946	75,268	49,256	37,231	24,626
Venezuela	328,650	2,337	7,097	20,816	25,395	26,409	18,501	38,033	62,700	58,716	34,594	22,547	11,505
Ecuador	57,250	6,352	5,203	2,772	2,683	3,059	5,052	9,773	8,642	4,744	2,849	2,996	3,125
Haití	46,422	10,222	6,522	6,896	4,830	3,023	1,446	1,226	1,559	2,563	3,202	2,648	2,285
China	25,565	913	1,285	1,657	1,683	1,497	1,722	1,789	2,433	2,588	2,934	4,090	2,974
Colombia	18,841	333	637	1,260	1,634	1,645	894	1,884	2,989	2,570	2,051	1,716	1,228
Chile (1)	5,877	1,076	641	782	561	356	172	167	307	450	578	420	367
Aljanistán	4,267	291	276	359	386	192	217	321	467	609	400	365	384
Perú	4,093	39	100	261	277	394	209	376	653	667	535	327	255
Brasil (1)	3,838	765	650	657	441	254	125	155	126	163	178	164	160
India	3,736	562	872	1,109	446	161	65	96	27	43	36	113	206
Nepal	2,252	76	56	117	336	533	172	148	221	231	145	118	99
Vietnam	2,102	19	-	31	34	97	28	132	298	260	397	273	533
Bangladesh	1,931	127	132	87	77	148	185	243	159	260	200	125	188
Camerún	1,636	190	168	174	107	158	139	98	104	136	108	180	74
Angola	1,157	171	57	14	8	9	20	185	177	116	77	130	193
Cuba	1,124	142	36	35	59	59	74	123	172	166	97	85	76
Somalia	1,124	123	161	160	248	141	27	41	29	57	29	65	43
Burkina Faso	977	43	21	40	112	59	54	93	122	122	118	106	87
Pakistán	872	55	41	106	254	172	54	25	23	28	28	43	43
Ghana	790	53	51	56	39	24	66	71	60	120	63	82	105
Rep. Dominicana	686	104	87	73	74	43	17	20	45	36	50	56	81
Nigeria	640	77	70	107	51	59	44	46	46	53	45	27	15
Congo	622	80	73	35	29	30	30	25	81	47	45	78	69
Eritrea	457	68	53	65	91	50	27	29	18	17	7	15	17
Sudán	450	8	12	14	88	77	57	33	69	26	21	26	19
Siria	431	4	20	11	32	38	22	17	48	74	77	57	31
Togo	394	8	11	11	4	7	17	25	45	88	48	70	60
Guyana Francesa	368	95	67	54	18	17	7	10	14	19	20	24	23
Guinea	394	67	18	11	15	9	46	37	27	11	35	32	26
Sri Lanka	380	30	65	75	40	55	10	10	7	1	6	5	26
Irán	314	10	6	7	25	6	27	25	45	46	69	13	35
Etiopía	308	38	27	26	34	24	13	13	18	23	30	34	28
Mali	278	15	10	19	29	19	19	17	27	52	25	24	22
Sierra Leona	154	5	18	48	19	10	18	9	4	5	3	4	11
Kirguistán	142	23	39	50	23	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Otros Países	1,673	113	75	104	115	126	146	92	184	161	156	173	228

(1) Hijos de ciudadanos haitianos cuyos registros de nacimiento corresponden a estos países.

“Migration, Panama Republic. Irregular Transit of foreigners through the Colombian border, 2023.” Available at <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/IRREGULARES-X-DARIEN-2023.pdf>.

²⁷³ See <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/IRREGULARES-X-DARIEN-2023.pdf>

²⁷⁴ See <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/mas-de-185-mil-personas-han-transitado-la-selva-del-darien-en-el-2024/#:~:text=2024%20E2%80%93%20Migraci%C3%B3n%20Panam%C3%A1-M,%C3%81S%20DE%20185%20MIL%20PERSONAS%20HAN%20TRANSITADO,DEL%20DARI%C3%89N%20EN%20EL%202024&text=Panam%C3%A1%20C%2020%20de%20junio%20de,unas%20186%20mil%200969%20personas>


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

In 2023, a total of 251,011 Haitian nationals were returned to their country.²⁷⁵ During the first semester of 2024, the Directorate General of Migration (DGM) reported that a total of 66,227 Haitian nationals were deported from the Dominican Republic.²⁷⁶ According to some humanitarian agencies more than 113,000 have been deported from the Dominican Republic as of July 2024.²⁷⁷

HONDURAS

According to National Institute of Migration of Honduras, from January to May 2024 a total of 13,616 Haitian nationals entered the country.

“Honduras Migration. Irregular migration to Honduras by Haitians throughout January to May 2024.” Available at: <https://inm.gob.hn/migracion-irregular.html>



MEXICO

According to the Mexican Commission for Refugees (Comar), 44,239 Haitian nationals applied for refugee status in 2023.²⁷⁸ In addition, from January to June 2024, a total of 41,427 people requested recognition as refugees in Mexico, of which 8,833 were Haitian nationals.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ See <https://www.diariolibre.com/politica/gobierno/2024/03/11/cuantas-deportaciones-de-haitianos-realizo-rd-en-2023/2640029>

²⁷⁶ See <https://migracion.gob.do/en-6-meses-mas-67-mil-extranjeros-de-diferentes-nacionalidades-han-sido-deportados-a-sus-paises-de-origen/>

²⁷⁷ Confidential report. Humanitarian agencies. July 2024

²⁷⁸ See <https://www.gob.mx/comar/articulos/boletin-estadistico-de-solicitantes-de-refugio-en-mexico-182244?idiom=es>.

²⁷⁹ See <https://www.gob.mx/comar/articulos/la-comar-en-numeros-369895?idiom=es>.

SEA INTERDICTIONS

Migrant smuggling operations have been thwarted through sea interdictions by the Bahamas and the United States. On 11 March 2024, 140 Haitian migrants were intercepted by the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) in waters off Turks and Caicos Islands.²⁸⁰ Moreover, on 7 April 2024, the RBDF apprehended 257 Haitian migrants, thereby preventing the continuation of an illicit migration operation.²⁸¹ On 10 June 2024, the US Coast Guard returned a total of 305 migrants to the Bahamas and Haiti, after multiple interdictions of unlawful maritime migration.²⁸² As of 1 July 2024, the US Coast Guard has interdicted more than 260 Haitians through sea interdictions.²⁸³ On 17 July 2024, a makeshift boat with 80 Haitian migrants heading to Turks and Caicos Islands caught fire; 40 persons died while many other were injured. The boat had set sail just two days prior from Fort Saint-Michel, Haiti.²⁸⁴

TURKS AND CAICOS

The Acting Assistant Commissioner of Police and Commissioner of police of Turks and Caicos Islands revealed that in 2023 the country interdicted 4,016 irregular migrants from Haiti, while from January to 24 June 2024 a total of 865 Haitians were intercepted. Of these 865 Haitian nationals, 727 were males including 8 minors, and 138 females including also minors.²⁸⁵

BAHAMAS

Each entry in this table provides an overview of incidents related to Haitian migrants according to press releases from the Bahamas Department of Immigration, which can be accessed at: <https://www.immigration.gov.bs/?s=haiti>. A total of 1,474 Haitians were recorded by this authority, with 1,118 in 2023 and 356 in the months of January-March 2024.

Date	Number of Haitians	Description of the Event
1 February 2023	245	Repatriation from Matthew Town, Inagua to Port-au-Prince, Haiti
8 March 2023	134	Repatriation from New Providence, including a flight to Port-au-Prince and another to Cap Haitien.
17 April 2023	259	Repatriation from New Providence to Port-au-Prince in two groups, including adults and minors.
17 July 2023	275	Haitian migrants under custody in New Providence after being discovered by the RBDF.
24 July 2023	143	A woman died during a repatriation process from New Providence.
13 September 2023	44	Repatriation from New Providence to Port-au-Prince.
12 January 2024	18	Haitian migrants apprehended in Matthew Town, Inagua.
15 March 2024	43	Apprehension of Haitians in New Providence during a joint operation.
17 March 2024	49	Haitians handed over to the enforcement unit by the RBDF after a patrol.

²⁸⁰ See <https://rbdf.gov.bs/rbdf-intercepts-migrants-in-turks-and-caicos-islands/>

²⁸¹ See <https://rbdf.gov.bs/royal-bahamas-defence-force-secures-bahamas/>.

²⁸² See <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3802235/coast-guard-transfers-109-migrants-to-bahamas-repatriates-196-migrants-to-haiti/>.

²⁸³ See <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3789058/coast-guard-repatriates-136-migrants-to-dominican-republic-following-3-separate/>, <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3802235/coast-guard-transfers-109-migrants-to-bahamas-repatriates-196-migrants-to-haiti/>

²⁸⁴ <https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/news/tragic-boat-fire-claims-40-migrant-lives-haitis-coast>

²⁸⁵ See <https://suntci.com/tci-sees-decrease-in-illegal-migrants-from-haiti-so-far-this-year-p11138-129.htm>

20 March 2024	264	Repatriation from Matthew Town, Inagua to Cap-Haitien, Haiti
Total	1474	

Panel's own table based on public data.

JAMAICA

Although Jamaica does not have official online open-access databases on immigration, according to information from local newspapers, between July 2023 and May 2024, there were five recorded entries of Haitian migrants, with approximately 80 repatriated and 22 in police custody.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁶ See <https://radiojamaicanewsonline.com/local/more-than-80-haitians-who-arrived-in-jamaica-since-last-year-repatriated>

Annex 35: Building of makeshift boats at Port-de-Paix, Haiti

Satellite imagery at three different sites at Port-de-Paix, North-West department, shows very active building areas for makeshift boats, as already reported by the Panel (S/2023/674). According to different local confidential sources²⁸⁷ many of these boats are used for migrant smuggling towards the United States.

Circles in orange color indicate boats being built and construction sites.

Stills taken from Google Earth, Visited on June 2024.

Maps Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 03162024



²⁸⁷ Confidential sources, May and June 2024.



Annex 36: Wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private infrastructure by gangs in the downtown area of Port-au-Prince.

Between February and May 2024, the gang alliance *Viv Ansanm* adopted as a tactic the wanton destruction of public and private infrastructure; it also included attacks against State symbols, such as the National Palace.

The area surrounding the National Palace was particularly affected. This strategically important zone houses critical institutions like the General Hospital, the city's main medical center; the University Schools of Medicine and Law; the Ministry of Economy and Finance; the National Teachers School; and *Le Nouvelliste* media house. Dozens of small businesses and homes were also destroyed.


Below is a satellite image of the area attacked.



The polygon in yellow indicates the perimeter of the area affected by *Viv Ansanm* wanton destruction and ransacking. Port-au-Prince. Google Earth. Visited June 2024.

Maps Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 03162024

On 24 March 2024, the *Viv Ansanm* gang coalition, launched an attack around the National Palace area. Izo's 5 Second gang was the primary aggressor in this assault.²⁸⁸ The wanton attack destroyed two city blocks as shown by the following satellite images.



*Images from Planet.com. Visited June 2024.
Planet Labs PBC*

On the ground pictures taken by online media also showed the destruction of that area.

²⁸⁸ Interviews with human rights defenders and UN humanitarian agencies, April and June 2024.



Picture taken on 25 March 2024. | © Jean Feguens Regala/AyiboPost. Available at: <https://ayibopost.com/photos-les-gangs-ont-defigure-le-bas-de-la-ville-de-port-au-prince/>.

Annex 37: Gangs explain that they receive weapons from economic actors

Gangs regularly mention that economic actors provide them with firearms. This does not preclude the fact that they also procure firearms independently (see S/2023/674).

The illicit revenue generated by economic actors, when paid to gangs, is used in acquiring arms and ammunition used in attacking economic hubs (such as seaports), extorting road users, looting of public and private properties, kidnapping for ransom and facilitating and protecting cross-border illicit trade. This creates a cycle of interdependence between economic actors and gangs.

Excerpts of a video documentary²⁸⁹ in which Tigres, one of the deputies of Renel Destina alias “Ti Lapli,” leader of the Grand Ravine gang discloses how the weapons the gang has, were bought with money given to them by the rich people in the community. (see, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EMfLTuzEwWQ>).



²⁸⁹ France 24. 2024. Reportage exclusif en Haïti : a Port-au-Prince, capitale assiégée par les gangs.

Below: In an interview in May 2024, Jimmy Chérizier narrated how gangs acquire arms and ammunition through networks linked to elite actors.

See excerpts of the video below²⁹⁰, in which Chérizier responds to question of how his gang gets arms and ammunition. He says that most of the materiel are supplied to the gangs by the rich in society, but it's the less fortunate who are targeted for punishment instead. See, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo48IeiZJx0>.



²⁹⁰ Brut. 2024. La grande interview : Jimmy Chérizier.

Annex 38: The impact of gang attacks on the CPS container terminal

As the chaos continued at the port, on 15 March, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, along with civilians, looted a container with humanitarian aid belonging to UNICEF and containing essential supplies for life-saving aid to children.²⁹¹ The closure of the port widely affected the supply chain of basic commodities, leading to shortages. Given the magnitude of cargo that CPS handles, the closure has subsequently inflicted a heavy loss on the Customs revenue collection.²⁹² These paralyzed operations, forcing it to close. Some traders, for fear of losses, paid gangs to get their commodities that were stuck in high seas, smuggled into the country through informal docking sites²⁹³.

The attack on the APN Port by gangs led to global marine insurance companies to caution their clients against docking at CPS and Martissant terminals (which also suffered gang attacks) due to risks of armed robberies and other criminal activities.²⁹⁴ At the time of drafting, the CPS terminal was only partially operational, with a looming risk of further looting.²⁹⁵ Gangs have taken advantage of the situation to offer commodity importers an alternative access to inland at exorbitant fees. For instance, some businessmen pay gangs controlling various informal docking zones between \$5,000USD and \$10,000USD per container depending on the value of goods, to get their cargo delivered on the shores. The most common goods include rice, sugar, cooking, oil and personal effects (referred to as *pèpè* (see, [S/2023/674](#), Annex 24). The items are offloaded from the high seas onto feeder boats which then discharge the items into trucks on the shores, evading Customs.²⁹⁶

²⁹¹ <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/armed-violence-deepening-malnutrition-crisis-children-haiti>

²⁹² Interviews with Customs official, HNP officer and two clearing agents, April 2024.

²⁹³ Interview with the Secteur Transport Terrestre Haitien (STTH), HNP and Customs, May and June 2024.


[https://www.facebook.com/syndicatAPCH?__cft__\[0\]=AZUDGekcdE-vbxBcEb8ofZlBKoo3uYMRKdsDjpMVahpsrLOBWky3mPWO1CbBfkCrKZcq5PnOHU3iMgyXWg6MPoNMW0NnqoRAZQXwU_r-KFsm3SDMxv29dK7K2FDDSIDO34z9RXpa3pzmYYs_hL1Ni0sUisJUC_N-Z8zP_Rcvwm7QxgHmqwh56XK582seE8ozPEuYiEf-3FJg6b1Wm_MVnE6j&__tn__=-UC,P-R](https://www.facebook.com/syndicatAPCH?__cft__[0]=AZUDGekcdE-vbxBcEb8ofZlBKoo3uYMRKdsDjpMVahpsrLOBWky3mPWO1CbBfkCrKZcq5PnOHU3iMgyXWg6MPoNMW0NnqoRAZQXwU_r-KFsm3SDMxv29dK7K2FDDSIDO34z9RXpa3pzmYYs_hL1Ni0sUisJUC_N-Z8zP_Rcvwm7QxgHmqwh56XK582seE8ozPEuYiEf-3FJg6b1Wm_MVnE6j&__tn__=-UC,P-R)

²⁹⁴ <https://north-standard.com/insights/news/haiti-civil-unrest-affecting-port-operations/>.

²⁹⁵ Interviews with two cargo agents and a customs official, July 2024. Also see, <https://www.karibinfo.com/news/haiti-un-mois-sans-navires-au-cps-aucune-arrivee-prevue-par-les-lignes-maritimes/>.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

Annex 39: A copy of the press statement issued by Electricité D’Haïti (EDH) in March, informing the public of the attack against its facility at the Varreux Power Plant and its impact on electricity supply



NOTE D'INFORMATION

Port-au-Prince, le 18 mars 2024

Objet : L'EDH frappée par le vent du pillage

Le Service de Communication de l'Electricité D'Haïti (EDH) tient à informer le public en général et les abonnés en particulier que l'EDH n'a pas été épargnée par les actes de vandalisme et de terreur des bandits. De tels agissements de vol et de sabotage ne font qu'aggraver encore plus la situation financière et technique de l'entreprise.

Entre autres, quatre (4) sous-stations de la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince ainsi que la Centrale de Varreux ont été détruites et rendues totalement dys-fonctionnelles. En conséquence, les zones listées ci-dessous ne peuvent pas être alimentées comme à l'accoutumée :

- Croix des Bossales, Route Nationale #1, Boulevard 15 Octobre, Cité Soleil, Route de l'Aéroport, Village Solidarité...
- Croix des Bouquets, Beudet, Thomazeau, Route de Malpasse, Fonds Parisien...
- Place Jérémie, Avenue Magloire Ambroise, Jean Philippe, Monseigneur Guilloux, Route des Dalles, Fouchard, Savane Pistache, Fort Mercredi...
- Boulevard Marin, Santo, Croix des Missions, Lizon, Bon Repos, Lilavois, Haut Tabarre, Entrée Ambassade USA, Hôpital Petits Frères et Sœurs et les quartiers avoisinants.

Des documents importants, des installations électriques, des câbles, des inverters, des batteries ainsi que du matériel informatique et de bureautique ont été emportés par ces malfrats.

Toutefois, la Direction Générale tout en renouvelant son engagement à continuer à desservir sa clientèle lance un cri de secours aux autorités concernées pour la sécurisation de ses multiples sites à travers le pays.

Service de Communication EDH

Siège Social Angle Rue Charéron et Blvd Harry Truman, Port-au-Prince, Ouest, ht6110

Document provided to the Panel by a confidential source.

Annex 40: The blocking of the entrance to Varreux terminal by the 5 Segond gang using hijacked trucks (22 April 2024)

During this period, people turned to informal fuel dealers (commonly referred to as “Sur le trottoir,”)²⁹⁷, despite cases of fuel adulteration. At the “Sur le trottoir,” outlets, some which are owned by gang members, a liter of gasoline sold for about 500 GD (\$3.75 USD), up from the normal 200GD (\$1.5 USD) per liter.²⁹⁸ This yielded more revenue for gangs operating “Sur le trottoir,” and contributed to inflation.

A customs official and two port agents informed the Panel that threats on Varreux are persistent and the failure of gangs to seize control of the installation has turned the gang’s focus on kidnaping the Port’s employees for ransom. A confidential report seen by the Panel indicated that on 23 May 2024, three employees were robbed, and their vehicle stolen. Four days later, 10 employees were kidnapped aboard a Varreux terminal vehicle. The port therefore remains at a constant danger of attack by gangs in their quest to maximize their revenue.

²⁹⁷ <https://www.haitiprogres.com/news/2024/04/24/la-penurie-dessence-continue/>.

²⁹⁸ Interview with a gasoline retailer, two drivers, living in Delmas 28 and Gressier suburbs, May 2024.

Annex 41: Some of the strategies used by Les Argentins and Delmas 6 in revenue collection

Since early 2023, Les Argentins gang, a member of the G-Pèp alliance operating from Haut Bel-Air region had been attacking Solino neighbourhoods with the aim of expanding its kidnapping territory. This contributed to the rise of the Solino self-defense group (which, according to a confidential report seen by the Panel, is made up of members of the local population and some active police officers assigned to police stations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area) to counter Les Argentins. (see also Annex 10).

However, when Les Argentins and Delmas 6 collaborated under *Viv Ansanm*, they invaded Solino. A HNP officer and a resident of Solino stated that whenever police operations intensified along the Route de Delmas and the Avenue John Brown, the two main roads leading into Solino, both Les Argentins and Delmas 6 gangs employed different tactics to guarantee revenue collection, demonstrating resilience and determination to generate revenue. For instance, Les Argentins would place coffins on designated roadside locations, in which residents of the area, including road users (mainly trucks and taxis) would ‘faithfully’ drop the toll fees. Failure to conform would attract the gang’s wrath down the road. Similarly, Delmas 6 gang would burn the house of those who failed to yield to the gang’s demands²⁹⁹.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

Annex 42: A Citibank notice for closing down of its operations in Haiti.

July 8th, 2024

**Important notice – July 8th, 2024
Citibank N.A., Haiti Branch**

Dear Citi client,

Citi is hereby informing you that it will cease its operations in Haiti and pursue the voluntary surrender of its banking license with the regulatory approval of Banque de la Republique d'Haiti (BRH). International and correspondent banking services will continue for existing clients.

In our 53-year history, Citi has played an important role in helping local businesses, institutions, individuals, and communities achieve their financial goals and has contributed to the country's growth. We are proud of the history we have built together, proactively engaging with the community, through our social responsibility programs and disaster relief efforts to support the resilience and inclusion of communities across the country.

Citi will stay in close contact and communication with you to facilitate this transition process, including where applicable, withdrawing your funds, or transferring them from Citi Haiti to other local alternative options. Please be assured our focus is to assist you in a smooth transition for your business during this process.

We very much value having had the opportunity to provide you with our services, and for your loyalty and partnership.

Citi remains committed to Latin America and maintains a strong presence in the market where we have operated for over a century and built an unmatched network for our clients.

Warm regards,

Máximo Vidal
Hispaniola Head

Deborah Stark
Haiti Business Head

Letter provided by a confidential source. Also available at:

<https://x.com/mbduvalier/status/1810416842592461022?s=48&t=2ohpW1VkksMbL54enFPvug>.

Annex 43: Banking and compliance

On the financial compliance front, the fact that the bulk of the country's economy is unbanked adds to the fragility of the banking sector. About 55.5%³⁰⁰ of the country's GDP operates mainly outside the formal banking network. This, to a certain extent poses several risks including those of compliance with international and regional financial bodies.

A member of a recently closed bank in Haiti stated that to ensure the resilience of their operations in the current environment, banks in Haiti will need to implement comprehensive and multi-layered security measures ranging from physical security to due diligence measures such as knowing-your-customer (KYC), fraud prevention, compliance training, cybersecurity, risk management among others. These measures can only be onboarded by a bank when the country's strategic environment shows optimism.

³⁰⁰ See, <https://www.worldeconomics.com/National-Statistics/Informal-Economy/Haiti.aspx>.

Annex 44: Rony Celestin's way of moving contraband

Four sources highlighted that since 2016, the 400 Mawozo gang has been the dominant gang facilitating smuggling activities at the border, in support of Celestin's businesses.³⁰¹ The sources explained to the Panel Celestin's modus operandi.

The same sources and a former staff of Celestin indicated how Celestin, through his border agents, pays the 400 Mawozo gang, his designated customs officials and other members of the criminal network a total of \$3000-5000 USD per cargo truck of contraband commodities (depending on the nature and value of the goods).

The money is meant to facilitate the circumvention of inspection, payment of duties and safeguarding against looting by other gangs while on transit to the destination in Haiti. Often the cargo is dispatched to Celestin's home in Hinche through Los Palis town, in the Center Department for sorting before they are disseminated to various distribution outlets, among them the eight companies affiliated to him. According to three confidential sources, from Hinche, some BSAP agents take over the escort of the goods (where necessary) to ensure they reach undeterred to Celestin's shops in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

A judicial official, a former customs officer and an anti-corruption investigator confirmed that Celestin's activities are widely known within the business community, including how he uses his business influence to bribe and frustrate investigations and prosecutions of cases linked to him.

³⁰¹ Interview with a former customs officer, a member of a governmental agency and two former gang members formerly based in Belladère, January and June 2024.