



COMPLAINT BY THE UNION OF BURMA REGARDING AGGRESSION AGAINST IT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA

Letter dated 10 September 1953 from the Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General

New York, 10 September 1953

Under instructions of the Government of the Union of Burma, I have the honour to submit herewith copies of the Government of the Union of Burma's report on the Kuomintang situation, for submission to the eighth regular session of the General Assembly in accordance with General Assembly resolution 707 (VII) of 23 April 1953.

(Signed) BA MAUNG
for Permanent Representative of Burma
to the United Nations

REPORT TO THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA ON THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IN ITS TERRITORIES

1. By a cable dated March 25 1953, the Union of Burma requested that a complaint of aggression against her by the Kuomintang Government of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.

2. The General Committee, at its 86th meeting held on 31 March 1953, recommended the inclusion of the item with the title changed to "Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China". On the same day at the 420th plenary meeting, the General Assembly included the subject on the agenda of the seventh session.

3. The First Committee considered the item at its 605th to 612th meetings held between 17 and 22 April 1953 and, by 58 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Burma and China), recommended the adoption by the General Assembly of the Mexican draft resolution as amended by Lebanon and Argentine-Chile. The resolution runs:

"The General Assembly,

"Having examined the complaint by the delegation of the Union of Burma regarding the presence, hostile activities and depredations of foreign forces in the territory of the Union of Burma,

"Considering that these facts constitute a violation of the territory and sovereignty of the Union of Burma,

"Affirming that any assistance given to these forces which enables them to remain in the territory of the Union of Burma or to continue their hostile acts against a Member State is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations,

"Considering that the refusal of these forces to submit to disarmament or internment is contrary to international law and usage,

"1. Deplores this situation and condemns the presence of these forces in Burma and their hostile acts against that country;

"2. Declares that these foreign forces must be disarmed and either agree to internment or leave the territory of the Union of Burma forthwith;

"3. Requests all States to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union of Burma in accordance with the principles of the Charter;

"4. Recommends that the negotiations now in progress through the good offices of certain Member States should be pursued, in order to put an end to this serious situation by means of the immediate disarmament and withdrawal of the said forces from the territory of Burma or by means of their disarmament and internment;

"5. Urges all States:

(a) To afford the Government of the Union of Burma on its request all the assistance in their power to facilitate by peaceful means the evacuation of these forces from Burma; and

(b) To refrain from furnishing any assistance to these forces which may enable them to remain in the territory of the Union of Burma or to continue their hostile acts against that country;

"6. Invites the Government of the Union of Burma to report on the situation to the General Assembly at its eighth session".

4. The General Assembly, at its 428th plenary meeting held on 23 April 1953, adopted this resolution by 59 votes to none, with only China abstaining. The Burmese representative voted for the resolution in the plenary meeting explaining that though Burma would have preferred her own resolution which sought condemnation of the Kuomintang Government for the acts of aggression, Burma was impressed by the sympathetic and helpful attitude of the Member States and that therefore Burma would identify herself with the resolution which had the approval of all the Member States barring China.

5. The Burmese people hoped that the consensus of opinion expressed in the United Nations would force the Kuomintang troops in Burma to cease their depre-

dations and that whoever was responsible for their presence in Burma would bow to the decision of the United Nations. With the object of facilitating their departure, approaches were made to the American Embassy at Rangoon. Due to the Ambassador's efforts and also the efforts of the American Ambassadors at Bangkok and Taipeh, a four-nation committee composed of representatives from the United States of America, Thailand, Burma and the Republic of China came to be formed. The aim of this Committee was to discuss the means and the procedure of evacuating these troops.

6. At the early stages it was felt that the Burmese and the Chinese representatives should not sit together and therefore it came to pass that separate meetings to accommodate the Chinese and the Burmese had to be convened.

7. On 22 May 1953, the first meeting took place at Bangkok at which the United States Ambassador welcomed the representatives of the United States, Thailand and China. The urgent need for a solution of the problems involved was appreciated by all. The initial stand was taken by Colonel I Fu-de the Chinese delegate that his Government could only use its influence to persuade General Li Mi's troops to go to Taiwan. This repatriation, he said, could only be on a volunteer basis. This stand disappointed the Burmese who regarded it as an unhelpful beginning, especially as it followed in the wake of General Li Mi's press interview with a correspondent of "Time", reported in its issue of 18 May 1953 in which he had stated falsely that Burmese action was inspired by the Peoples Republic of China. His statement that the Burmese Foreign Minister had been to China was also false. Li Mi is quoted as having said, "Rather than evacuate we could still turn into bandits and plunder to stay alive" (annex A).

8. The points introduced at this meeting of 22 May (at which the American representative was elected Chairman) were the necessity of disarmament in Burma of these troops, the question of a cease-fire, the creation of safety zones and the need for the Committee to go to Monghsat in order to persuade the local commanders to evacuate their troops.

9. The first sitting with the Burmese representatives took place on 23 May. The Burmese expressed their readiness to accept in principle the points raised by the Chairman at the meeting of the previous day. On the same day, they submitted their plan for a cease-fire in the Monghsat area and along a corridor leading from Monghsat to the Thai border together with alternative plans of evacuation by road, by air and by road and air from Burma to Thailand.

10. These plans were conveyed to the Chinese representative who, at the meeting on 25 May, reiterated the initial stand that he had taken at the first meeting and in fact elaborated on the theme that Li Mi's troops were not part of the Chinese Army. "In view", he said, "of the fact that the Chinese Government maintained no control over these forces, the Chinese Government may not be held legally responsible for any possible failure to carry out in full the United Nations resolution". He said that he could speak only for his Government and not for Li Mi.

11. Despite this alarming statement which portended no happy solution to the problem, the Chairman put up a draft agreement for the Committee's consideration.

12. Some days elapsed and at a subsequent meeting the Chairman was constrained to remark that, while the Thais and the Burmese had accepted the draft agreement and the Burmese had even furnished detailed plans for a visit to Monghsat and the evacuation of the troops, and the Thais had also furnished detailed plans for the passage through Thailand and beyond, the Chinese had not put forward any concrete proposal. Colonel I Fu-de this time came out with the statement that he could not make decisions for General Li Mi and that he would have to go to Taipeh for instructions. He suggested a cease-fire in the territory East of the Salween.

13. During the time Colonel I Fu-de was in Taipeh the question of a cease-fire was considered. The Burmese could not accept the Salween river as a demarcation line, for among other objections it savoured too much the idea underlying the fixation of the 38th parallel as a demarcation line in another part of the world. The Burmese counter-proposals took the shape of safety zones round Monghsat, Mong Yawng, Mong Yang, Pan Yang and Mong Mao (annex B).

14. On 14 June, bowing to the Chairman's request, the Burmese representatives sat together with the Chinese representatives for speedier disposal of the problems involved. At this meeting Colonel I Fu-de who was expected to come back fully authorized to make decisions, made a statement, which seemed significant to the Burmese, that Formosa would take in only those wanting to go to Taiwan. In regard to the proposed visit of the Committee to Monghsat, he said that he could not guarantee the safety of the Burmese members. He then raised the demand that all Chinese (civilians and military personnel alike) kept under detention for collaboration with Li Mi's troops should be forthwith released.

15. The Burmese representatives naturally expressed their misgivings about Chinese intentions. They felt that the release or continued detention or punishment of civilian Chinese collaborators resident in Burma was a matter which the Committee was incompetent to decide.

16. There were further meetings and by 17 June the Chinese representative had accepted the draft agreement in principle except that he continued to insist upon the inclusion in the agreement of the release of Chinese collaborators. The wrangle went on, but on June 29 the other members of the Committee recorded that it was a matter solely within the competence of the Government of Burma. But actually there was no great divergence of views and if the matter were left to the decision of the Government of Burma it was most probable that a solution would evolve to the satisfaction of all concerned. It was unlikely that the Government of Burma would prevent Chinese refugees willing to leave Burma from doing so, and even in the case of collaborators who had hitherto been law-abiding residents of Burma, once the troops had been evacuated from Burma, their problem would not be difficult of solution. The justice and the reasonableness of the Burmese point of view was apparent to the Chinese representative, but it seemed that he had to keep this question alive under instructions in order to lengthen the talks at Bangkok. The question of the expenses of evacuation was also discussed and by the end of June the prospects of an agreement among the four nations appeared to be bright, for there was really nothing left to wrangle about.

17. It was at this stage that Li Mi's Generals appeared on the scene. They had been requested to come to Bangkok to satisfy themselves of the practicability of the schemes of evacuation put forward. They reached Bangkok about 26 June but made no attempt to see anybody. Unfortunately, by then the United States Ambassador Mr. Stanton had left Thailand and these "jungle" Generals probably did not consider that there was anybody of equal or higher status than themselves whom they could contact without losing "face". As for the members of the Committee, they were merely Colonels and others of lesser rank. Then on 28 June Lieut. General Lee Yu Foo made his press statement (annex C). Another provoking statement was also made in the form of fictitious questions and irresponsible answers (annex D).

18. On 15 July, General Li Mi made a statement that he would not issue orders to his troops to withdraw (annex E).

19. This attitude of Li Mi and his Generals created a stir and since they would not co-operate with the Committee, pressure was exerted on Taipeh, with the result that a deputy of General Li Mi, one General Leigh Wen-pin, was despatched from Formosa (annex F). This General was equally static, and it was learned that he was awaiting translations into Chinese of the proceedings of the Committee. Nothing really has happened since then but Chinese manoeuvres are made apparent by the following news items which emanated from Taipeh:

TOKEN REPATRIATION OF KMTS¹ FROM BURMA

To save Formosa's face in the United Nations

Taipeh, 5 August — A high Nationalist Chinese authority has reportedly decided to effect the repatriation of even a "small group" of Nationalist Chinese troops to Taiwan from Burma in order to protect Nationalist China's position in the United Nations, it is reliably learned here.

Meanwhile, reports here said that Lieut. General Lee Che-fung, one of the deputy commanders under General Li Mi, is now exerting all efforts in persuading Nationalist Chinese guerrillas in Burma to return to Taiwan. — PAN ASIA.

KMT WITHDRAWAL TO BEGIN BY END OF AUGUST

Taipeh (Formosa), 13 August — Chinese Nationalist guerrillas are expected to begin withdrawing from Burma at the end of this month, the Nationalist News Agency *World News* said today.

Delegates from Burma, Formosa, Siam and the United States have been meeting in Bangkok since 22 May to secure the withdrawal of the guerrillas.

An agreement on the number of guerrillas involved and the technical problems of the evacuation is expected to be signed within ten days, the agency said.—REUTER (BPS).

20. From the conduct displayed by the Chinese, the Burmese Government regrets to report that it has come to the view that there is no sincerity on their

part, and that even if they should make a pretence of evacuating Li Mi's troops, it would only be along the lines so neatly expressed in the news item of August 5 quoted earlier. The blunt refusal of General Li Mi so faithfully echoed by his "jungle" Generals, the evasive and delaying action of the Chinese representatives and the conduct of the authorities in Formosa all combine to lead to the final conclusion that Li Mi's troops will continue to stay in the territories of Burma on the excuse that they are combating Communism, when in truth they are bandits and traders in opium who resort to widespread depredations and who give active support to the insurgents in Burma. Their depredatory activities continue.

21. The Burmese Government regrets to note that up to this date there has not been a single instance when people in authority in Formosa have expressed sympathy for the Burmese or have deplored publicly the presence of these troops in Burma. One would have expected Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek to issue definite orders for the recall of these troops.

22. General Li Mi resides in Formosa as an honoured hero, and his "jungle" Generals come and go from and to Taipeh. Not only does financial assistance continue to flow into the jungle from Formosa (annex G) but planes also continue to land at Monghsat.

23. On August 10, the Burmese Government was assured by the American Ambassador at Rangoon that the Chinese Government, in recent discussions with General Li Tse-fen (one of the local commanders in Burma) and other leaders of the troops, had been able to impress upon them its determined decision to effect evacuation of the greatest number of troops possible and that Mr. Shao Yu-lin one-time Chinese Ambassador in South Korea, was at Bangkok and on his way to Monghsat as the personal representative of President Chiang Kai Shek to explain to the officers and men the position prevailing.

24. While the Government of Burma places on record its thanks to the American and the Thai Governments for their efforts to bring about a solution, it feels that the talks in Bangkok will lead to no spectacular result. Even at this stage, the Chinese representative, in agreeing to the evacuation of these troops in principle, makes a reservation that only those willing to be repatriated will be taken to Formosa.

25. The Chinese pretend that the evacuation of 12,000 men from the territories of Burma is a difficult operation and yet the world knows that the repatriation of 30,000 Chinese from Indo-China was accomplished overnight and there was no distinction between people wanting to go to Formosa and those who did not. It is equally likely that Chinese communist prisoners of war in Korea who do not wish to return to China will just as easily be repatriated to Formosa whether they like it or not. The fact that nothing has happened to General Li Mi's troops in Burma and that they continue their depredations reveals Chinese insincerity, and the position as it stands is hardly flattering to the United Nations.

(Signed) Sao Hkun Hkro
Foreign Minister.

31 August 1953

¹ I. e., Kuomintang troops.

ANNEX A

("Time", dated 18 May 1953)

DANGER ZONES

Last-ditch Army. At one end of the living room of a Formosan cottage, incense from a burning joss stick rose fragrantly before an image of Buddha. Opposite, in a wicker chair flanked by two bold parrots, sat one of the most talked about and least known generals in the mid-20th century Orient. His long, hard body was encased in the folds of a grey Chinese gown and he jogged on one knee his five-year-old son, Yen.

General Li Mi, 50, is the handsome, scarfaced Nationalist who controls the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas entrenched in the chasmed wilderness that is Burma's border with China. His troops, who style themselves the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army, retreated into Burma after the Nationalist collapse of 1949; they claim to be preparing for a re-invasion of their homeland, and the destruction of the Communist regime.

To the weak Burmese government, which has never controlled its borders since the British Raj departed, Li's lawless veterans are "foreign bandits" who defy its writ, pillage its merchants and give the Chinese Communists an ever-ready excuse for threatening invasion. Last month, in a burst of near unanimity, the United Nations General Assembly condemned Li Mi and advised his guerrillas to get out or be interned. Li Mi refused, and in so doing defied the world. Last week, in Formosa where he is recuperating from a heart attack, he told Time Correspondent John Meeklin his side of the story, in his first interview since the controversy began.

Willing volunteers. "We have been condemned without a trial," said Li. "Why should not the United Nations first have sent somebody to investigate what we are doing instead of simply ordering us out?"

Li's version of the National Salvation Army's activities begins in spring 1950, when he salvaged some 2,000 stragglers from the wreck of the Nationalist Thirteenth Army Group and withdrew his demoralized troops to the Shan mountains on the Burma side of the border. In May 1951 Li attacked Red Yunnan with several thousand recruits gleaned from the borderlands, occupied eight *hsien* (Chinese counties), and appealed for volunteers. "Every able-bodied man in the district" stepped forward, he says; the National Salvation Army increased to 50,000 men.

Then came defeat. Communist regulars counterattacked, sent the Nationalists reeling back to their Burmese lairs. "It was bitterly pathetic," said Li. "Most of my men had no arms. Some sneaked back to their farms to wait for another chance, some took jobs on the Burmese government highway projects. Others were drowned when they tried to escape by swimming mountain torrents."

Since then, the Nationalists have managed to cling to a piece of Burmese real estate the size of West Virginia. One million primitive Burmans are now ruled by five Nationalist generals, loyal to Li Mi. The National Salvation Army, says its commander, has its headquarters on the forested plateau east of the Salween River, where the Burmese, Siamese and Indo-Chinese borders meet. It maintains an air strip, has reliable radio contacts with the government of Formosa.

Li says he controls almost 30,000 men but is quick to concede that only one in three has a firearm. His artillery consists of a few dozen mortars and 75 mm. cannon, but he has almost no ammunition. "We have done no plundering," he said. "We have really been fighting Communists." The general admits that his people levy "dues on visiting businessmen," but these are opium smugglers, he says offhandedly, and they expect to pay.

Most of Li's men live in mud and straw huts, raise rice and vegetables on tiny hillside farms. Some have settled down with Burmese girls but most still yearn for their families in Yunnan, and some secretly visit their kinfolk from time to time. A bold attempt last year to move large numbers of their dependants from Red Yunnan ended in

bloody failure: the Communists seized 800 oldsters and children, and none has been heard of since.

Trouble in Rangoon. To drive out Li Mi, the Burmese government is spending a large part of its total revenues. Li Mi retorts that this is Rangoon's own fault. His relations with the government were reasonably trouble-free, he says, until Burma's Foreign Minister visited Red Peking last July and was pressured into a phony "peace" pact whereby Communist guerrillas in Burma would cease their depredations in exchange for a Burmese offensive against the Nationalist redoubt. Since then, says Li Mi, the Nationalist Salvation Army has been attacked on all sides by (1) Red Chinese regulars, infiltrating from Yunnan, (2) Burmese Communist guerrillas, (3) the Burmese Army. In one incident, he says, the Burmans rounded up 100 of his men and turned 40 over to Chinese Communists, who drenched them in kerosene and burned them to death. His situation, Li concedes, is now "very difficult." Why then does he reject the United Nations proposal that his men should be evacuated to Formosa, where they may live to fight the Communists another day? For one thing, he says his men are determined to stay where they are. What's more, says the general, the United Nations and the United States have been duped by Communist charges that the National Salvation Army is a collection of bandits. Such "vilification", he says, actually included the charges that he personally had been riding around Bangkok in a fancy limousine, that he supports no fewer than twelve concubines. "I don't think my wife would permit it," says Li Mi dryly.

Washington and Taipei have repeatedly denied sending military aid to Li, but the evidence is mounting that in 1951 some United States supplies were airlifted to the Nationalist redoubt. More recently, the traffic has ceased, presumably because the State Department or the Pentagon became convinced that Li Mi's enterprise is doing more harm to Burma than it is to the Red Chinese.

Yet removing the National Salvation Army from its lair in the Shan mountains will not be an easy matter. Says General Li Mi: "Rather than evacuate . . . we could still turn to smuggling or even become bandits and plunder to stay alive. Look at my people. Now they have full freedom to fight the Reds. Here (in Formosa) they would be leashed."

ANNEX B

MAP OF BURMA

(See map attached)

ANNEX C

("The Bangkok Post", dated 29 June 1953)

"LI MI'S MEN WON'T WITHDRAW"

(Troops said dam against "Red Flood") (Situation Here crucial, 100,000-man army in S. Yunnan).

By Theh Chongkhadikij

General Li Mi's troops are not going to withdraw from Burma, because, as they were not represented during the discussion, they consider the United Nations resolution for the withdrawal "unlawful", it was stated today in an exclusive interview by Lieut.-General Lee Yu Foo, leader of a five-man delegation the troops have sent to Bangkok on invitation of the four-nation United Nations committee planning the withdrawal operation.

The general explained that the troops are composed of inhabitants of Yunnan and the surrounding area who are determined to continue their fight against the Communists in order to drive them from their homeland.

General Lee, however, added that he hoped to "peacefully" reach an arrangement "which would solve Burma's difficulties concerning the troops and which would not interfere with the anti-Communist objective of the troops".

The general, who met the writer in a room at the Pacific Hotel, Siphya Road, this morning, spread out a cellophane map of the area above Thailand's northern frontier and pointed out

sections marked in red paint in Yunnan Province of South China where Chinese Communists, he said, are posed for movement into Southeast Asia. Along the Burma border, forming the frontline, are 6,000 "Thai Liberation" troops, comprising men of Thai nationality who inhabit the southern section of Yunnan.

Estimating the strength of Communist troops in Southern Yunnan, including Chinese and Thai (the general called them "Free Thai") at 100,000 men, General Lee said that it is against such a flood that General Li Mi's troops are the dam.

The general, who is 45 and has a shrapnel under his left ear, said that the information was received from intelligence agents they sent into Yunnan and that some of the reports had been made available to the Thai Government.

General Li Mi's delegation has so far only informally met Colonel I Fu-De, head of the Chinese Nationalist Government's delegation and it paid a courtesy call on American Ambassador Edwin E. Stanton yesterday evening. So far the representatives have not met with the Burmese delegates or with the United Nations committee as a whole.

General Lee, who informed two Burmese news correspondents yesterday of the attitude of General Li Mi's troops, was interviewed by the writer through Chinese-English interpretation by a member of the delegation, Major General Liu Han. Besides these two, the delegation includes Major-General Fang Mou Kai, Colonel Liu Choong and one Mr. Loh, whose office was not disclosed.

The "Free Thai" troops, according to the general, comprise three regiments stationed in Cheli state of Yunnan, which borders North Burma. The first regiment is stationed at the headquarters of the Autonomous Thai Nationality Government in Cheli. The 2nd Regiment is stationed at Tahló, nearest Communist regimental post to North Burma and 50 miles from the central North Burma state of Kengtung, while the 3rd Regiment is stationed at Thamuang-luang. These regimental posts are from 100 to 150 miles north of Thailand's northern frontier.

General Lee, pointing to the red areas bearing red flags on the map, said that behind the "Free Thai" troops in Southern Yunnan are the 13th, 14th and 15th Chinese Communist Armies, as well as an independent unit known as the second Border Defence Regiment.

Claiming that his troops are protecting all main routes which have to be used in a Chinese Communist invasion of Southeast Asia, General Lee said that the situation for this region at this time is "very crucial." He explained that North-eastern Indochina has been infiltrated by the Reds and "now there is the French-Cambodian trouble." He said that this might line the other bank of the Mekong River, part of whose course forms Thailand's northeastern border with Communists or pro-Communists.

The general said the 50th Army of the Chinese Reds has been moved into Northern Yunnan from service in Korea. It is difficult to state their purpose, he said, adding that intelligence reports indicated they were recruiting Yunnanese and obtaining supplies. It could be for further continuation of the Korean war or "for other purposes," said the general.

The general also reported that the 16th Army had been shifted from Szechuan Province in the north and are now in Northeast Yunnan, "apparently prepared for support of Ho Chi Minh when the time is ripe." So far, however, the Chinese Communists are only providing the Vietminh with supplies and military advisers, he said.

General Lee also reported that the Burmese Communist military leader, one Loh Shan, has now three regiments in North Burma. He said he believed "only a part of this group is Burmese."

The general said that if General Li Mi's troops are withdrawn, "it would open Thailand to the possibility of a Chinese Communist pincers move, with the Communists coming in from Burma and Indochina".

Claiming that the Chinese Nationalist Government has no control over them, General Lee said General Li Mi's troops number 30,000 men. He said that the group, which calls itself

the Southeast Asian Free People's Anti-Communist Joint Army, is made up of a Yunnan Anti-Communist National Salvation Army (which numbers approximately 12,000), a Moslem anti-Communist section made up of Chinese and Burmese who are followers of Mohammed; and a section of Karens, Kachins and other hill tribes who are anti-Communist.

Concerning the United Nations resolution for withdrawal of the troops, General Lee gave the Burmese correspondents the following statement:

"The resolution, which was unlawful and unreasonable, was haphazardly passed solely on the accusations of the Burmese Government without any explanation from the accused whatsoever, and without an investigation by a United Nations party on the site. Even when the Chinese Communists entered the Korean war, fighting against United Nations troops, they were allowed to send representatives to the peace conference".

General Lee said the troops would welcome on-the-spot investigations by neutral countries or news reporters but on condition the troops first investigate into the motives and purposes of the investigators, in order to prevent agents of Russia, Communist China and other Communist nations from getting into the area occupied by the troops. He added: "We have only one enemy—the Communists. The rest of the peoples of the world are our friends."

On the outcome of the United Nations conference in Bangkok, the General said he told the Burmese correspondents, "It depends upon the sincerity of the Burmese Government. It also depends on the American outlook for the future of Southeast Asia. We believe that basically all four countries participating in the conference are anti-Communist."

In answer to another question, the General said that the troops would be of immeasurable assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Government when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek gives the order for invasion of the mainland to free it from the Communists.

(Note: General Lee's statements are reported as they were made, with the intention of informing the public of a viewpoint not previously published. The "Post" is not taking sides in the controversy and respects the United Nations and Thailand's diplomatic relations.)

ANNEX D

GENERAL LEE YU FOO'S STATEMENT IN THE FORM OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

("The Bangkok Post", dated 29 June 1953)

- Q. With what attitude do your delegates attend this conference?
- A. The delegates of the South-East Asian Free People's Anti-Communist Joint Army have recently sent a petition to the United Nations, the contents of which have been published in the newspapers all over the world, clearly indicating the Joint Army's attitude and wishes. The Yunnan anti-Communist National Salvation Army, whom we represent, is but one member of the Joint Army. Of course, we abide by the principles and wishes of the Joint Army. However, we are of the opinion that the abrupt resolution passed in connexion with our Army is unlawful and unreasonable. We come eagerly to this Bangkok Conference with only one point in mind, viz., to co-operate with all the democratic countries in stemming the tide of Communism and to solve the problems peacefully regarding our forces.
- Q. Is there any truth in the accusations made by the Burmese Government towards your Army, such as "your Army's encroachment upon the Burmese territory," "your Army's disturbance on Burmese subjects," "Communist infiltration into your Army," etc.?
- A. In the past few years, the Burmese Government resorted to means to stage an ill-will domestic and international propaganda against our troops, but we have remained silent since the beginning except by the recent petition to the United Nations. However, we strongly believe that any

person with an analytical mind can easily see through the fantasy of the Burmese propaganda. If statistics are taken on the number of our casualties and captives, as reported by the Burmese Government, there would not be a single man left in General Li Mi's army. Again, if our headquarters, Monghsat, had been captured by the Burmese, as reported by Radio Burma, the existence of our troops at the last base would be lost; why, then, should the Burmese Government trouble themselves to accuse us in the United Nations? Why should there be all the fuss of this Conference in Bangkok? It only serves to show that the propaganda staged by the Burmese Government is far from realistic.

Discipline in our troops. The success or failure of an army hinges entirely upon its discipline. When we first arrived at the Burmese border, the native people there were poverty-stricken. Through the efforts and co-operation of our troops, the financial condition of the natives has been greatly improved, which explains why the natives were on our side when we were attacked by the Burmese troops. They opposed the Burmese Government in changing their thousands of years' old tradition. They were angry and frightened of the raping, robbing and slaughtering of the undisciplined Burmese soldiers. Now which side has better discipline?

Q. Why didn't your army let the world know the truth in the past?

A. Apart from the fact that we were financially embarrassed and could not stage a world-wide propaganda, we had the following reasons:

(1) We had only one enemy—the Communists. The rest of the peoples in the world are our friends. We had to endure whatever misunderstandings and accusations from our friends.

(2) We could not politically or militarily fight against any potential democratic country or their people. Even if we entered into combats in the past, you may rest assured that they were not started by us. That is why we did not stage a protest when the Burmese Government withheld our delegates from the peace mission, and mistreated and molested our anti-Communist Overseas Chinese.

(3) The Burmese fighting our troops, which only reduced the anti-Communist strength in this area, was something instigated, encouraged and forced by the Chinese Communists. That the Burmese Government should fall into the trap set by the Chinese Communists is something much deplored by the freedom-loving people in the world. However, we feel sure that one day the Burmese Government will wake up to the Communist intrigue and be friendly with us again. This is also why we would rather endure accusations from the Burmese than offend them in any respect.

Q. Is your headquarters, with its very poor communication with the outside world, thoroughly aware of the development of the accusations by the Burmese Government in the United Nations?

A. Although the news came to us incomplete and much belated, we were rather surprised at the following points;

1. The resolution was haphazardly passed solely on the accusation of the Burmese Government without any explanation from the accused whatsoever, and without an investigation by a United Nations party on the site. In 1941, when Japan invaded Manchuria and eventually occupied an area equivalent to a few countries of Europe combined, the League of Nations sent a Committee headed by Mr. Leighton to make an investigation on the spot before declaring Japan as an aggressor. Again, even when the Chinese Communists entered the Korean war, fighting against United Nations troops, they were allowed to send representatives to the peace conference. But the procedure with which the United Nations passed the resolution against our troops is not only contrary to the normal procedure in dealing with international conflicts, but also in direct contradiction with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The delegates of certain countries who spoke in favour of the Burmese Government, were based entirely on the

accusation of the Burmese Government. We would like to ask those delegates whether they realized the grotesque Communist intrigue behind the accusation to communize the entire Southeast Asia; whether they master the demarcation of the boundary line between China and Burma; whether they have ever studied the complicated conditions of the border natives; whether they realize how our army was organized; and whether they know the future consequences of such a resolution. We wish you would answer this question: What value is there to this resolution which was passed by delegates who did not have the insight of the case? What do you expect it will accomplish?

Q. Just how was the Southeast Asian Free People's Anti-Communist Joint Army organized?

A. The brief history of the organization of the Joint Army was mentioned in the "Petition to the United Nations." Kindly excuse us for not going into details, which will not only reveal many fallacies of the Burmese Government's policies, but which will be against our principles to disturb the Government. We are still striving for the understanding of the Government so that this point will be clarified in General Li Mi's memoirs when the Communists are defeated.

Q. What conflicts did your Army have with the Burmese troops?

A. This delegation is sent to solve various problems peacefully, and not to issue any communiqués in connexion with this problem. It is sufficient to mention here that to attain peace at all costs, our troops have never taken any initiative to launch any conflicts with the Burmese troops. But we must also mention that we are not cowards and have put up successful defences each time the Burmese have threatened the very existence of our troops.

Q. Do you welcome on-the-spot investigations by neutral countries or news reporters?

A. We welcome such investigations at any time, but on certain conditions.

Q. What are the conditions?

A. First, we investigate the motives and purposes of the investigators. For instance, how can we not refuse or arrest the delegates sent by Russia, Communist China, the Burma Communists, Indo-Chinese Communists or the Free Thai?

Q. What do you think will be the outcome of the Bangkok Conference?

A. It depends upon the sincerity of the Burmese Government. We feel that some day the Burmese Government will realize that they have been fooled by the Chinese Communists. We hope to exchange our sincerity for the understanding of the Burmese Government and peaceful settlement of this issue. Secondly, it depends upon the United States outlook of the future situation in South East Asia. If the United States would look further into the future rather than be satisfied with the present appeasement, the outcome of the conference will be encouraging. We believe that basically all the four countries who are participating in this conference are anti-Communist. However, we must remind our American friends not to underestimate the complexity of dealing with oriental problems. In the past, General Marshall's mediation only destroyed the anti-Communist spirit in the Chinese people. The recent arbitrary peace negotiation which has not secured the approval of Southern Korea beforehand, has created grave consequences. We also hope our American friends will not solve the Asian problems with an American viewpoint.

Q. Have your troops been recently engaged in combat with the Communists in the Yunnan Province?

A. We have had daily combat with the Chinese Communists in Tun Chung, Lung Ling, Tsong Yuen, Cha Li, Fu Hai, Nan Chiao, etc. Within the last two months, we annihilated a complete company of the 115th Regiment of the Communist 39th Division. We also launched a surprise attack on our enemy stronghold at Tsong Yuan, annihilated one battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the 13th Army, burned

16 enemy rice godowns, and captured a large amount of arms and ammunition, not to mention numerous surprise attacks in which the enemy communication systems were destroyed.

Q. What are the recent movements of the Communists in China, Burma, Indochina, Laos and Thailand?

A. A recent intelligence report states as follows:

Chinese Communists: Five field armies, two columns, 23 regiments and 129 battalions are stationed in Yunnan Province. Militia and peace preservation troops are being expanded rapidly. Under Russian supervision, landing strips for jets are being repaired and constructed. Highways are rapidly repaired.

Burmese Communists: Three regiments belonging to Lo Shan, Commanding Chief of the Communists in the North Burmese Districts, are scattered in Northern Burma. One Regiment, infiltrated into Laos through Cha Li, Fu Hai and Nan Chiao, with the intention of entering into Kengtung. The red and white flag of the Burmese Communists is developing rapidly when the Burmese launch attacks on our troops.

Thailand Communists: With the help of the Chinese Communists, the Thailand Communists (Free Thai) are fighting forces steadily in Cha Li, Fu Hai and Chio. Three corps have been established. Some 50,000 families in Thailand have already participated in the activities.

Laos Communists: Already developed into 2,000 men.

Remarks: There are Chinese Communist officers and men in the above Burmese, Laos and Free Thai troops.

(Signed) *Lieut.-General Lee Yu Foo*
Lee Yu Foo
Chief Delegate of Yunnan
Anti-Communist National Troops

ANNEX E

("The Bangkok Tribune", dated 16 July 1953)

LI MI NOT ORDERING EVACUATION OF BURMA

TAIPEH, 15 July.—Lieutenant-General Li Mi has flatly told Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek that he would never issue the order to evacuate his 12,000 anti-Communist guerrillas in north Burma, United Press learned from the best available sources.

The source who is in daily contact with General Li said the colorful guerrilla commander has explained to Chiang Kai Shek that despite his personal loyalty to Chiang and the Nationalist government, it is utterly impossible for him to persuade his men to lay down their arms and come to Formosa.

Li Mi is still recuperating from an earlier apoplectic attack at Grass Mountain, Taipei's suburban spa, and is not expected to assume an active role in the efforts for evacuation of his troops.

General Li headed the Chinese guerrillas evacuated into Burma more than three years ago from China's Yunnan Province ahead of the victorious Chinese Communists. Since then he has made two abortive thrusts back into Yunnan. He caused international concern when his forces clashed with Burmese troops.

Burma charged Nationalist China with aggression in the United Nations. The latest United Nations Assembly session adopted a resolution calling on all Member nations to help evacuate or intern Li Mi's troops.

A four-Power conference with representatives from Nationalist China, Burma, the United States and Thailand has worked out an evacuation program subject to approval of their governments. However, Lieutenant-General Li Che-feng, Li Mi's deputy, announced recently in Bangkok that the program was unacceptable.

General Li Mi shared General Li Che-feng's sentiments. The source said Li Mi objected to the principle of evacuation on the following reasons:

(1) His 12,000 men are scattered in a wide area, almost twice as big as Formosa, with very primitive communications means. It is technically very difficult to group them together to withdraw here.

(2) Eighty per cent of his troops are native Yunnan residents, 15 per cent native Burmese and 5 per cent Chinese from other provinces. Ninety-five per cent of them obviously still defy orders and refuse to leave the region.

(3) All these guerrillas hold themselves as only useful in an anti-Communist war when placed along the Yunnan-Burma border.

They think they will become a liability to the Nationalist government if they come over to Formosa.

General Li Mi further claimed his force constituted a barrier between the Chinese Communists and the Reds in Southeast Asia. He repeatedly has told the Nationalists that the Chinese Communists already have established links with the Burmese Communists and will, if Li Mi's men are taken away, join force with the Malayan communists.—(UP)

ANNEX F

KMT COMMANDERS TURN DOWN BURMA EVACUATION PLAN

BANGKOK, 28 July.—The regional commanders of General Li Mi's KMT guerrillas on Burma's frontier have flatly rejected the four-nation military commission plan to evacuate the 12,000 guerrillas, usually reliable sources reported today.

The five commanders from Monghsat base, headquarters of the guerrillas in Burma, led by Lieut-General Lee Tse Fen, arrived here five weeks ago to give their views on the evacuation plan.

In an open statement immediately on arrival here, they announced they would continue their fight in Burma. This made Gen Li Mi, convalescing in Taipei, send his deputy, Gen Li Win Bin, to Bangkok to persuade the rebelling commanders to accept the evacuation plan, already accepted by the Formosa Government.—PTI.

ANNEX G

("The New York Times", dated 24 July 1953)

CHINESE IN BURMA ASK KOREA STATUS

Invoke principle of 'voluntary' repatriation and ask United States to support them in area

By Henry R. Lieberman, Special to The New York Times

TAIPEH, Formosa, 23 July.—Borrowing a concept upheld by the United States in Korea, most of General Li Mi's Chinese Nationalist guerrillas along the Burma-Yunnan border are now refusing to be evacuated to Formosa from Burma on the ground that they are natives of the border region and that their removal would violate the principle of "voluntary repatriation".

Legalists might be able to point out various differences between the situations in Burma and Korea. Nevertheless, the guerrillas' stand appears to have produced a fundamental snag in the four-Power talks that have been going on in Bangkok, Thailand, since 22 May. The talks in which military representatives of the United States, Burma, Thailand and Nationalist China are participating, were initiated by the United States following a United Nations resolution calling for withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Burmese soil.

Guerrillas reject plan

On 22 June the conferees reached a basic agreement on the ways and means to evacuate the guerrillas except for a few unsettled technical points. Despite the agreement, however, the guerrillas subsequently submitted a report to the State Department that ran counter to the whole purpose of the Bangkok conference.

General Li Mi, who has been in Formosa since last January, discussed the report in an interview here to-day. He said it

was drafted 28 June by Lieut-General Li Tse-feng, a deputy commander in charge of East Burma guerrilla operations, and added that it contained the following "important points":

Only a small part of the guerrilla force can be withdrawn inasmuch as most are indigenous to the area. Those troops who desire to remain should be concentrated in a neutral zone and reorganized under the command of Gen. Li Mi with the United States guaranteeing a cease-fire between the guerrillas and the Burmese Army.

The United States should support the guerrillas in this neutral zone in preparation for any "emergency" in Southeast Asia.

If the prescribed neutral zone is too small for the guerrillas to obtain all the food they need inside the zone, arrangements should be made for them to purchase food outside the neutralized area.

According to General Li Mi, the State Department early this month categorically rejected the guerrilla report. The

United States Embassy here said such a message was not routed via Taipeh, but it was suggested that it could have been routed through the United States Embassy in Bangkok.

"I understand the guerrillas have asked for another reply and that they will withdraw from the conference if it is not satisfactory", General Li Mi said.

General Li Mi is the top commander of the guerrillas in addition to being Nationalist Governor *in absentia* of Communist-held Yunnan Province, but he says most of his men would not heed any evacuation order he might give.

According to General Li Mi, the forces under his command consist of about 30,000 half Chinese and half hill tribesmen with one-third of the total being armed. It is an open secret these forces got some material and financial assistance from the United States for a time. After this aid stopped the Formosa Government began making monthly subsidies to General Li Mi's guerrillas. Formosa is reportedly scheduled to end all financial assistance to the guerrillas this month.