Abstract
In the literature on judgment aggregation, an important open question is how to measure the distance between any two judgment sets. This is relevant for issues of social choice: if two individuals hold different beliefs then we might want to find a compromise that lies somewhere between them. We propose a set of axioms that determine a measure of distance uniquely. This measure differs from the widely used Hamming metric. The difference between Hamming’s metric and ours boils down to one axiom. Given judgment sets A and B, this axiom says that if the propositions in \({A \cap B}\) jointly imply that the propositions in A−B share the same truth value, then the disagreement between A and B over those propositions in A−B should be counted as a single disagreement. We consider the application of our metric to judgment aggregation, and also use the metric to measure the distance between preference rankings.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0 ), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Duddy, C., Piggins, A. A measure of distance between judgment sets. Soc Choice Welf 39, 855–867 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0565-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0565-y