Associating social constructionism and extended cognition in information studies

2.1. Social constructionism

Social constructionist theory can be characterized in a variety of ways across many disciplines (Tuominen et al. 2002, p. 3). In the context of information studies a number of useful definitions and explanations are offered, with the work of Tuominen et al. being properly representative of the majority:

Social constructionism focus on talk, interaction and language use in various contexts. In information studies, constructionism provides a dialogic viewpoint to study the assumptions and implicit theories that people draw on when they engage in information practices and produce accounts of them. (Tuominen et al., 2005, p. 1).

Research by Tuominen et al. seeks to capture the socially and linguistically shaped ways of understanding information practices[2].

While I wish to avoid offering an iron clad definition of social constructionism, this paper will employ a relatively concise understanding of the concept. Vakkari (1997) identifies that research perspectives are orientation strategies to the world, and that such orientations can change. Following Touminen et al.'s passage above I want to offer a working definition of social constructionism that seeks to represent the major arguments in information literature while retaining a flexibility to incorporate inevitable future development.

Social constructionism in information studies is taken to mean the focus on dialogue and discourse as the essential elements in people describing and producing their experiences. Dialogue and discourse stress the role of language in the building of social reality, which encompasses information practices as seeking, accessing, creating, using and sharing information. All associated experiences, emotions, identities and social worlds are language based, and thus best researched with a dialogue and discourse focus.

2.1.1. Social constructionism and contextual factors. With the core of social constructionism being language, consideration must be given to social, political and historical contexts which heavily influence or create language. A leading contributor to the social constructionist development in information studies is Sanna Talja who describes information as being concerned with what people do with language and what language does to people (Talja, 1997, p. 70). Information in this understanding is therefore language based which, in turn, is comprised of social, political and historical contributions.

Cognitivism is an influential framework within information studies which presents significant differences to social constructionism. Without going in‐depth into the variety of differences an important issue to consider is the role of context in cognitivism and social constructionism. Cognitivism views information seeking behaviour as time and space dependent, but prioritizes the role of the individual over contextual factors (Tuominen et al., 2002, p. 275). For social constructionist theory the social, political and history context are crucial to understanding information practice. Individuals are not sites of power in information seeking or unique builders of knowledge; rather they are principally influenced by other members of society and society itself. In the most basic of terms cognitivism is an individual‐centred approach to information practice, while social constructionism is a dialogic approach(Tuominen et al., 2002, p. 272)[3]. Dialogue, or language, and contextual factors are the central focus of social constructionism which is in contrast to the cognitivist paradigm. Section 3.2.2 will present the work of Birger Hjørland as similar in motivation to the work of Talja and other social constructionists, and identify possible links with the socio‐cognitive perspective Hjørland presents.

While this is not a comprehensive examination of social constructionist arguments it summarizes major components. The potential change social constructionism offers to information studies is wide ranging and plays out in a variety of ways, with an alternative course proposed in section 3 of this paper. I now present an account of the extended mind argument as developed in cognitive science, before going on to argue for alliances between social constructionism and extended cognitive theory.

2.2. Extended cognition

Many philosophers and cognitive scientists cite Andy Clark and David Chalmer's article “The extended mind” as the seminal text that provided the impetus for theorizing the human mind as outside the confines of biology(Clark and Chalmers, 1998). The history and development of extended cognition reaches much further than Clark and Chalmers article, but they did summarize and promote some central issues in a widely circulated way. In presenting extended cognitive theory I will draw heavily on Andy Clark's work while also incorporating more peripheral contributors such as Ed Hutchins.

2.2.1. The extended mind. Extended mind theorists propose a radical answer to the question: What roles do the external world and human body play in cognitive processes? Andy Clark, a strong proponent of the extended mind couches the central idea of extension as this:

… the project of understanding what is distinctive about human thought and reason may depend on a much broader focus than that to which cognitive science has become most accustomed, one that includes not just body, brain and the natural world, but the props and aids (pens, papers, PCs, institutions) in which our biological brains learn, mature and operate (Clark, 2001a, p. 141).

I will now investigate portions of the external world functioning as a kind of cognitive aid in the extended mind, and specifically complementarity, account.

2.2.2. The complementarity argument. In terms used by cognitive scientists, humans are surrounded by “cognitive tools”, which play integral roles in our cognitive life. The environment, both created and natural, surrounding a cognitive agent provides cognitive tools. The extended mind (EM hereafter) explanation of the ability humans have to exploit and utilize this environment (cognitive tools) bring its unique claims to the fore. The cognitive tools become part of a hybrid that qualifies the combination of external world and brain as a unified cognitive system. The argument for this hybrid comes in two main forms: parity or complementarity.

Some externalists about the mind claim that the external world can serve a cognitive purpose on the basis of parity. The parity criterion requires events and objects in the external world to function in the same way as events and objects in the brain. This view sees parts of the world suited to being involved in cognitive processes because they perform tasks in similar ways to the brain[4]. A part of the world qualifies itself as cognitive if it performs a function, which if it were to occur in the brain, would be called cognitive. Thus, the parity argument extends the mind on the basis of equivalence.

The complementarity claim is similar, but importantly distinct to the parity argument. The complementarity argument (CA henceforth) proposes that it is useful to understand cognitive technologies as affording complementary operations to those that come most naturally to biological brains. This is importantly dissimilar to the parity argument because of its heterogeneity. CA proponents are not looking for “mental” things existing in the world that will move cognition out of the brain. The goal of the CA is to incorporate parts of the world that complement biological cognition precisely because they are different to the functions of the brain. CA argues that parts of the world are useful as cognitive technologies because they perform functions that the biological brain cannot naturally do well.

A crucial attribute of the CA claim is the breaking down of complex cognitive processes into more naturally manageable processes of the biological brain. An example often given in the extended mind literature is that of a large multiplication problem broken down into smaller patterns. Take 329*764, which is broken down into 4*9 then 4*2 and so forth. These more simple patterns can then be joined together to solve the original larger problem. This combination of smaller patterns is an example of how the CA views the breaking down of complex cognitive process via cognitive tools. The pencil and paper used to write the smaller patterns can be seen as a type of extra‐neural memory, but they serve a much more crucial purpose. They provide a cognitive tool that breaks down a large sequential problem into smaller parts that prove more easily processed by the human brain. Cognitive tasks which prove very taxing such as multifarious arrangements of multiple mental tasks are made possible, or more effective through utilizing cognitive tools. Ed Hutchins has done considerable research into human cognitive and environment interaction and summarizes this point in his book Cognition in the Wild:

Such tools permit the users to do the tasks that need to be done while doing the kinds of things people are good at: recognizing patterns, modeling simple dynamics of the world, and manipulating objects in the environment (Hutchins, 1995, p. 155).

Andy Clark, along with others, (Deheane et al., 1999) has forwarded the argument that words and linguistic labels themselves are a fundamental type of cognitive tool (Clark and Thornton, 1997)[5].

CA is a distinctive argument for cognitive extension because it offers a plausible explanation of how human brains repeatedly create and exploit various species of cognitive tools so as to expand and re‐shape the space of human reason (Clark, 2001b, p. 134). Humans employ non‐biological elements in novel ways to complement the basic biological modes of cognition because the external world provides unique means to break down complex cognitive processes into familiar biological cognitive processes. But these unique external technologies are significantly different to the biological means (e.g. pen and paper are quite different to the way theories of cognition propose the biological brain works) of cognitive acts. Consequently, it is not a matter of finding parts of the world which match the biological brain (as the parity argument claims); rather all parts of the external world have the potential to be cognitive tools on the basis of the complementarity criteria. Anything that can aid and/or enhance a cognitive act on the basis of difference qualifies if it complements the biological brain. This heterogeneous mix results in extended cognitive systems whose abilities and explanations of human thought and rationality are quite different to the naked brain.

2.2.3. In summary. While this is not a comprehensive overview of EM, the particular issues presented here will form important contacts with information studies in the sections to come[6]. To better develop both the social constructionist and cognitive science discussions above, potential links between the two will now be explored.

3.1. The linguistic aspect

A more subtle alliance is more specific and potentially fruitful because of its possible developments. Within the argument for extended cognition there are sub‐arguments for language itself being a cognitive technology, as briefly mentioned in section 2.2.2. This argument is often identified, but rarely fully developed[7]. The central tenant of this linguistic focused argument is that language, both verbal and written, provides tools for humans to alter and enhance their cognitive activities. Within this argument public language constitutes more than inter‐personal communication, which is the most obvious role of language. Language can also reorganize information in a way that compliments the human brain, thus augmenting human cognition in a potentially extended sense. The core of this argument is that language enables us to pursue manipulations and juxtapositions of ideas and information in a way which would not be possible, or would quickly overload, the human brain. Written and spoken words allow us to search, store, order and reorganize information in much more advanced manners than the brain by itself[8].

3.1.1. Scrabble and academic writing. There are a variety of ways to argue for language as cognitive tools for humans. The two examples I want to briefly examine are common to most of us. For Scrabble players, it is common practice to place Scrabble tiles in ways to stimulate thought and present possible word fragments. Such a strategy is a basic example of using the external world of language as part of a cognitive process[9]. Another simple example is the writing of an academic paper. Words presented on the screen are cut and pasted, rearranged and manipulated to stimulate ideas and lines of arguments. Is the language on the screen purely reflecting the inner knowledge of the writer? In as much as the words direct, refine, alter, offload and instigate the writer's thoughts they complement cognition in a categorically similar way to the complementarity argument.

Language still allows communication, which is its most obvious cognitive application. The argument here is that further to communication, an extension of cognition is possible based on the complementarity of language as a cognitive tool. Constraints of space prevent a comprehensive argument for language as a cognitive tool in the complimentary sense. Likewise, addressing possible criticisms of such an argument is also prevented. The possibility of language and mind being part of a hybrid cognitive process is intriguing in its possible implications for information studies and I turn to focus on such possibilities in the following sections.

I conclude with sentences from Andy Clark summarizing the liberal spread of cognition into the world via language:

… language is so ubiquitous it is almost invisible; so intimate, it is not clear whether it is a kind of tool or an added dimension of the user. But whatever the boundaries, we confront a complex coalition in which the basic biological brain is fantastically empowered by some of its strangest and most recent creations: words in the air, symbols on the printed page (Clark, 1998, p. 183).

Because of distinct understandings of language and a meshing of the two theories, unique implications and further questions for information studies can be presented. Three issues will be presented below as potentially interesting avenues of research based on the coalition of extended cognition and social constructionism.

3.2. Implications for research

3.2.1. Implications for physical environments. The first issue is a tangible and physical manifestation of combined theory. Research into the architecture and ergonomics of libraries is gaining importance in current information and knowledge discussions[10]. If dialogue and language are seen as integral aspects of information practice then physical spaces can be designed which seek to enable and facilitate a dialogic focus. In particular, if language is seen as a cognitive tool then spaces can be created which use this to their advantage, both in communication and other cognitive tasks. This is a potentially intriguing avenue of research given the developing focus on physical space in information environments, with fascinating implications for how buildings and communication are coordinated.

3.2.2. Hjørland's socio‐cognitive proposal. Birger Hjørland presents many challenging proposals for information studies, particularly his socio‐cognitive viewpoint. Without any attempt to fully explore Hjørland's research and writing here, some broad issues can be raised as potential links. Specifically Hjørland's work on epistemology and socio‐cognitive views within information studies share conceptual concerns expressed in this paper. Hjørland's socio‐cognitive (or domain activity paradigm) viewpoint also focuses on social factors, cognition within a broader context and the domain of activity as critical issues (Hjørland, 2002). As the following passage from his work demonstrates, he shares a concern with social constructionists for incorporating context into IS (information studies) theory:

… the best way to understand information in IS is to study the knowledge domains as thought or discourse communities (Hjørland and Albrechtesen, 1995, p. 400).

A similar methodological emphasis is put on context and dialogue in Hjørland's research. His suggestion of developing an implicit epistemology within information science is also an important contribution and challenge (Hjørland, 1998). Given the broad compatibilities suggested here, one possibility is basing such an epistemology on extended cognition. It could be argued that the socio‐cognitive viewpoint can be seen to epistemologize cognitive activity for IS by necessarily positioning it within a historical and social context. A full and robust exploration of applying extended cognition to Hjørland's work is potential fruitful, but requiring fuller consideration than possible here[11].

3.3. Cognitivism and social constructionism

The final point takes up where much work is currently being conducted in information studies. The dominance of cognitivism in information studies for a number of years has helped lead to the development of social constructionism as a consistent alternative. Where cognitivism begins with the acts of an individual, social constructionism emphasizes context and public language. This difference bears out a two sided criticism: cognitivism focuses on the individual at the expense of the context and social constructionism focuses on the context at the expense of the individual's acts. I want to propose EM as a supplement to social constructionism that goes towards addressing the criticism of neglecting the individual.

By combining extended cognition and social constructionism a balance of context and individual is achieved. The individual is given focus on the basis of cognition being human based, predominantly in individual brains. At the same time the context which the brain is cognizing in is recognized as absolutely integral to understanding human cognition because of its complementarity to the brain. It is at the expense of a full and balanced understanding that either the individual or the context is neglected. In this way a social constructionist framework supplemented with an extended cognition perspective goes towards addressing the criticism that the individual is neglected. To investigate information practice, an understanding of cognitive acts that incorporates both the individual and the context is crucial.