Individual differences in attitudes towards uncertainty: evidence for multiple latent profiles

Kornilov, S.A. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Chumakova, M.A. Moscow City University of Psychology and Education, Moscow, Russia

Introduction

Every act of decision-making is deeplyintertwined with ability to cope with uncertainty (Kornilova, 2011, 2013).Correspondingly, the traits of tolerance/intolerance for uncertainty/ambiguityare typically described as key traits explaining individual differences indecision making (McLain, 1993; Furnham, 1994; Greco & Roger, 2001; Shalaev,2007; Kornilova, Chumakova, Kornilov & Novikova, 2010). Thus, perhapsunsurprisingly, the construct of intolerance for uncertainty/ambiguity has along history in psychology (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949; Budner, 1962) and remainsboth popular and useful in different subfields of psychological inquiry, inparticular those that examine decision-making in a variety of differentcontexts (Grenier, Barrette & Ladouceur, 2005; Bardi, Guerra & Ramdeny,2009; Furnham & Marks, 2013).

The seminal empirical studiesconducted by Frenkel-Brunswick (1949) indicated that intolerance for cognitiveambiguity was closely related to denial of emotional ambivalence.Frenkel-Brunswick studied a sample of children who demonstrated rigid socialdichotomizing and ethnic prejudice, and found that these children also tendedto display behavioral rigidity in a variety of tasks, including memory andperceptual tasks. These findings prompted other researchers to examine theconstruct of intolerance for uncertainty as a unitary and unidimensional trait reflectingboth personal and cognitive components. Since then there have been severalattempts to develop an omnibus measure of intolerance / tolerance foruncertainty (Budner, 1962; McLain, 1993). However, put together the measuresdeveloped to date have been reported to have significantly lower reliabilitiesthan measures of other personal traits, for example measures of the Big Five(Furnham, 1994; Benjamin, Riggio & Mayes, 1996; Shalaev, 2007; Kornilova etal, 2010; Bors, Gruman & Shukla, 2010). We believe that these lowreliabilities reported in multiple studies provide tentative evidence for themultidimensional nature of the construct of tolerance/intolerance foruncertainty. Thus, the current paper presents the results of a study thatdirectly investigated whether intolerance for uncertainty is best conceptualizedas a unidimensional trait or as a multidimensional complex trait.

Historically, the development of theconcept of intolerance for uncertainty has been closely tied to attempts toexplain certain attitudes towards differences and novelty in the post-World WarII world. An intolerant person was described as having black-or-white thinking,displaying high levels of psychological rigidity, being avoidant ofuncertainty, and even undertaking aggressive attempts to “fight” and resistthings that could be considered novel or unusual (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949;Budner, 1962). This description was taken to represent the negative pole on asingle continuum of intolerance/tolerance for uncertainty, with the oppositecharacteristics describing individuals who can be considered to be tolerant ofuncertainty. Before presenting an alternative to this unidimensional view ofthe construct, we would like to briefly focus on three main lines of reasoningand evidence that substantiate it.

Firstly, significant changes cameabout during the middle of the 20th century in a multitude of life domains.These changes necessitate a reconceptualization of the notion oftolerance/intolerance for uncertainty. Thus, one of the major characteristicsof the changing world is a pervasive and rapid increase in the total amount ofavailable information. This increase, coupled with cross-cultural interactionsin the context of globalization, has underscored the necessity for studying attitudestowards uncertainty, given the sheer number of opportunities for facing uncertaintyin the modern world. Traits typically associated with tolerance for uncertainty(such as flexibility, mobility, and creativity) are now explicitly consideredto be essential for occupational success. Finally, the notion of toleranceitself has undergone a reconceptualization as a universal human value. Takentogether, these considerations suggest that tolerance/intolerance foruncertainty might not necessarily be a “domain-general” unidimensional trait.One can easily imagine someone who appreciates uncertainty in theirprofessional activity, manifested in persistent attempts to solve difficult andcomplex problems, risk-taking, etc. However, that same person might not be ableto cope with uncertainty in personal relationships, manifested, for example, inincreased attempts to control the partner, or the experiencing of negativeemotions related to the unpredictability of other people’s behavior. Shouldsuch a profile be considered characteristic of being intolerant to uncertainty?The unidimensional model of tolerance/intolerance for uncertainty cannotaccount for these multiple manifestations of attitudes towards uncertainty indifferent domains.

Secondly, we would like to focus onthe close relationship between uncertainty and information-seeking as aspecific strategy for overcoming it. When a person faces a lack of clarity withrespect to a particular situation, they can try to remedy this by collectingadditional information on the key causal factors and potential solutions of theproblem, and their consequences, etc. While sometimes this strategy isineffective, it is essential in a wide variety of situations and has, in fact,been considered a fundamental human motive (Kagan, 1972) that is core tocognitive activity in general. In parallel with the previous paragraph, wecould therefore ask another question: is utilizing information-seekingstrategies characteristic of being tolerant or intolerant, or of uncertainty?

Finally, the third foundation of ourinvestigation is the set of empirical findings recently reported by Kornilovaand her group (Kornilova et al, 2010). Crucially for our study, usingstructural equation modeling, Kornilova and colleagues showed that the trait oftolerance/intolerance for uncertainty is best conceptualized as having at leasttwo dimensions, manifested in two latent variables — one of intolerance foruncertainty, and one of acceptance of uncertainty. The presence of two distinct(albeit related) latent factors has been demonstrated in several studiesutilizing different samples and different psycho-diagnostic measures. The firstlatent variable represents the common view of intolerance for uncertainty. Thesecond latent variable is manifested in such observable characteristics as risktaking, openness to new experience, and holding a view of uncertainty as anopportunity for development and self-expression.

Thus, we also propose viewingtolerance and intolerance for uncertainty as two different complex patterns ofcognitive, emotional and behavioral attitudes that are not reducible to aunidimensional trait (Greco & Roger, 2001; Grenier, Barrette &Ladouceur, 2005; Kornilova et al, 2010). At the same time, we suggest thatthere exist relatively stable, quantifiable individual differences in theseattitudes that play a role in a variety of domains and outcomes, and that thespectrum of individual differences in these patterns should be (but, to thebest of our knowledge, has not been to date) studied empirically.

Thus, the main aim of our study was toexamine the psychological texture of attitudes towards uncertainty. Theseattitudes reflect internal representations of uncertainty that are presumablybuilt on the basis of evaluating the environment with respect to certaincharacteristics. Thus, a particular task, situation or environment can beclassified as uncertain if it is complex, novel, and unpredictable (withrespect to consequences). When a situation exhibits these characteristics, itis frequently referred to as being a “risk situation”, a “creative task”, a“prognostic task”, etc. However, a situation that is uncertain with respect tothese objective characteristics may not necessarily be subjectively representedas such, and vice versa. This could be manifested in ignoring or missingcritical contradictions in the ambiguous parameters of the task/environment, orin treating certain parameters as reflecting uncertainty when they do not.Therefore, individual differences in attitudes towards uncertainty could berelated to the specifics of the process of transforming the objectiveparameters of a situation (henceforth, “task”; also see below) into theirsubjective representation that recognizes the contradictions present in thetask (henceforth, “problem”).

The current study was designed largelyon the basis of the functional/leveled framework of regulation of choice anddecision-making (as proposed and developed by Kornilova, 2011, 2013). Accordingto this framework, each act of decision-making requires personal activity andefforts to “get through” the uncertainty. This personal activity manifestsitself in the processes of goal formation which, according to Tikhomirov`spersonal meanings theory of thinking along with the results of a set ofprogrammatic studies (Babaeva, Berezanskaya, Vasilyev, Voyskunskiy &Kornilova, 2009), combine and integrate personal and external/objective levelsof activity. Previously, we developed a theoretical model of the regulation ofrational choice that integrated different components of the intellectual andpersonality potential in the set of processes of uncertainty acceptance andgoal formation (Chumakova, 2013). We found that the relationships betweendecision-making strategies and personality and cognitive traits were moderatedby the specifics of the task. For example, decision-making strategies in anintellectual task were related to achievement motivation (Chumakova, 2010)while characteristics of situational judgment in the context of interpersonalinteractions were related to intraception (Chumakova, 2009). Additional supportfor this model came from studies that demonstrated the existence of thephenomenon of inversion of decision strategies. These studies found thatparticipants with high levels of risk readiness (Kornilova & Chudova, 1990)or with high levels of tolerance for uncertainty (Chumakova & Vedeneeva,2013) employed information-seeking strategies that can be theoretically linkedto intolerance for uncertainty. Within our framework, these findings areexplained as being the result of the formation of the regulative system at thetime of attempting to find a solution for each specific task. The specifics oflevels and components of this regulative system are determined by personal activityin goal-formation based on situational characteristics.

However, there is a substantialaccumulated body of data on the predictive power of the general attitudetowards uncertainty as a dispositional trait with respect to decision-makingstrategies and outcomes (Budner, 1962; Grenier, Barrette & Ladouceur, 2005;Kornilova et al, 2010). At a first glance, these results might seem tocontradict the idea of present-moment regulation of decision making. However,we would like to argue that this general attitude towards uncertaintydetermines the subjective representation of a particular situation ascontaining uncertainty that has to be overcome or resolved. Thisrepresentation, in turn, creates a specific goal context for the formation ofgoals and dynamic regulative systems. Thus, when we investigate individualdifferences toward uncertainty as a potential component of regulation ofdecision-making, we need to characterize the non-situation-specific aspects ofthe subjective representation of an uncertain situation. If subjective un-certainty is “a figure” against “the background” of different situationcharacteristics (novelty, complexity, etc.), which parameters could describeit?

One of the answers to this questioncan be found in the separation of the concepts of “task” and “problem”(Tikhomirov, 1984). The problem situation contains a certain contradictionbetween the desire to solve it, and the absence of readily available solutionsor their methods. This contradiction generates uncertainty that needs to beovercome. According to Kagan, “...uncertainty is characterized, in part, byincompatibility between cognitive structures, between cognitive structures andexperience, or between cognitive structures and behavior” (Kagan, 1972, p.54).The process of transforming a particular situation (the task) into the subjectiveuncertainty that should be overcome (the problem situation) is linked to theidentification of these incompatibilities and contradictions. Critically, whenwe discuss non-situation-specific attitudes to uncertainty, we effectively needto identify which basic contradictions are fundamental for the generalrepresentation of uncertainty.

To identify the parameters that couldbe used to describe these basic contra- dictions, we examined severalquestionnaires aimed at measuring tolerance and intolerance for uncertainty(Budner, 1962; McLain, 1993; Kornilova, 2010). Our initial analysis of thewordings suggested that they tend to contain two major types of questions: thefirst type focuses on generally uncertain situations, and the second focuses oninterpersonal relationships. Therefore, we suggest that the first maincomponent of uncertainty representation is the characterization of the natureof its source. We propose distinguishing three types of such sources:environment, as external circumstances that are personally uncontrolled(Kornilova, 2005); other people’s actions, particularly in interpersonalrelationships (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949; Kornilova, 2010; Chumakova, 2009); andinternal factors related to decision- making criteria*[1] (Kornilova, 2005, 2011,2013). This conceptualization effectively separates external circumstances frompersonal relationships, and is supported by recent reports on the intolerancefor uncertainty in interpersonal relationships, being a factor relativelyindependent from general intolerance for uncertainty, as measured by the newtolerance/intolerance for uncertainty questionnaire (NTN; Kornilova, 2010). Theemergence of this subscale as a separate factor is suggestive of at least acertain degree of its specificity that cannot be reduced to the generaltolerance/intolerance for uncertainty.

Representationally, basiccontradictions emerge as a result of the recognized inconsistency between asituation and prior expectations about it, which is re- flected in the classicdescriptions of intolerance for uncertainty and associated behaviors(Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949; Grenier, Barrette & Ladouceur, 2005; Bardi,Guerra & Ramdeny, 2009; Kornilova et al, 2010). For example, an intolerantperson might consider complex and new situations to be aversive due to amismatch between the actual properties of a particular event in theenvironment, and prior expectations about these properties. A representation ofthis event is subjectively experienced as a stressful feeling of uncertainty.The same logic can be applied to the second source of uncertainty — otherpeople. In this case, an intolerant person is expecting the relationships to bepredictable and controllable. If a particular situation of interpersonalinteraction is unclear, or the other person’s behavior is unpredictable, thisintroduces a mismatch between the expectations and the actual properties of thesituation. We would like to underscore that we view the two types of expectationsmentioned above as relatively independent from each other and, developmentally,largely based on previous experience and emergent belief systems.

In sum, we suggest viewingrepresentational uncertainty as intimately tied to the existence of contradictionsbetween a situation and prior expectations and beliefs about it. However,individual differences in general attitudes to uncertainty are reflective ofnot only these expectations but also of subjective evaluations of an uncertainsituation as threatening, neutral, or attractive (because it provides an opportunityfor development and self-realization; Kagan, 1972; McLain, 1993; Greco &Roger, 2001; Bardi, Guerra & Ramdeny, 2009; Kornilova, 2010). Thecombination of representations of basic contradictions and subjectiveevaluations of uncertainty is crucial for establishing the goal context ofcoping with objectively uncertain situations, which in turn is realized instrategies that lead to avoidance/reduction or acceptance/overcoming ofuncertainty in each specific situation.

Thus, the current study investigatedwhether individual differences in tolerance/intolerance for uncertainty couldbe at least partially explained by the existence of multidimensional individualdifferences in attitudes towards uncertainty that are linked to representationsof uncertainty, specifically, expectations about environment and interpersonalrelationships and the evaluation of uncertainty as threatening or attracting.

Methods

For this study, we recruited a totalof 438 undergraduate students (psychology majors) at Lomonosov Moscow StateUniversity (83 men; the ages ranged from 17 to 46 years, M = 20.4, SD= 3.6).

We used three questionnaires tomeasure tolerance/intolerance to uncertainty and associated traits:

1. New questionnaire for tolerance to uncertainty (NTN; Kornilova, 2010).NTN is a questionnaire that measures three related traits: general tolerancefor uncertainty, general intolerance for uncertainty, and interpersonalintolerance for uncertainty.

2. Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance-I (MSTAT-I) (McLain, 1993).MSTAT-I is a brief questionnaire that measures general tolerance for uncertainty.

3. Personal factors of decision-making (LFR; Kornilova, 2003). LFR is a personalityquestionnaire that is aimed at measuring risk readiness and rationality(defined as information seeking).

Results

To investigate the dimensionality oftolerance/intolerance for uncertainty, we first analyzed the data from threequestionnaires using item-level data. Specifically, in the first step of ouranalysis, we classified all of the items found across the three questionnairesin terms of expectations about the environment and relationships, and thesubjective evaluation of uncertainty. Thus, each item was classified as beingrepresentative of one of the four following hypothesized factors:

1. Expectations about personal relationships (items that placeemphasis on the value of predictability in personal relationships; E-PR).

2. Expectations about the environment (with a general emphasis onclarity and lack of contradictions; E-EV).

3. A generally negative view of uncertainty as a threatening circumstance(items describing negative emotions and/or avoidant behavior; Uncertainty as aThreat, S-UT).

4. A generally positive view of uncertainty (items describing positive emotionsand/or a proactive desire to “deal with” or approach it; Attractiveness of Un-certainty, S-AU).

Table 1. A pooled set of items from three questionnaires selected for theanalysis

Factor	Item wording
Expectations about personal relationships	I try to avoid situations which are ambiguous (MSTAT-2) I dislike ambiguous situations (MSTAT-16) I’m just a little uncomfortable with people unless I feel that I can understand their behavior (NTN-8) I get pretty anxious when I’m in a social situation over which I have no control (NTN-10) It bothers me when I am unable to follow another person’s train of thought (NTN-11) It bothers me when I don’t know how other people react to me (NTN-13)
Expectations about the environment	I have always felt that there is a clear difference between right and wrong (NTN-12) A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear (NTN-22) What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar (NTN-24) The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideas the better (NTN-27
Uncertainty as a Threat	I try to avoid situations which are ambiguous (MSTAT-6) I am good at managing unpredictable situations (reverse-scored item) (MSTAT-7) I’m tolerant of ambiguous situations (reverse-scored item) (MSTAT-11) I enjoy tackling problems that are complex enough to be ambiguous (reverse-scored item) (MSTAT-12) I try to avoid problems that don’t seem to have only one “best” solution (MSTAT-13) I pursue problem situations which are so complex some people call them “mind-boggling” (reverse-scored item) (MSTAT-19)
Attractiveness of Uncertainty	I prefer familiar situations to new ones (reverse-scored item) (MSTAT-8) I often find myself looking for something new, rather than trying to hold things constant in my life (MSTAT-14) I generally prefer novelty over familiarity (MSTAT-15) I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity (MSTAT-22) I can easily and willingly take big risks (LFR-10) I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out later to be a total waste of time (NTN-17) What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar (NTN-24)

A total of 22 items were selected bytwo experts from the pool of 76 items, as being reflective of the hypothesizedlatent factors (see Table 1). In the second step of analysis, we tested theoverall theoretical model proposed in this paper using confirmatory factoranalysis as implemented in EQS v. 6.1 for Windows (Bentler, 1995). Initially, eachof the items only loaded on one corresponding la- tent variable. However, theexamination of model modification indices suggested that some cross-loadingsand error covariances could significantly improve the fit of the model. Each ofthe suggested modifications was examined, and only those that fitted thetheoretical framework and/or represented an overlap between specific itemwordings were included. The final model included four latent variables.Covariances among latent variables and factor loadings (except for those fixedto 1 for the purpose of model identification and latent variable scaling, i.e.,one per each latent variable) were estimated freely. The modified model(presented in Figure 1) displayed an overall satisfactory fit: χ2 (199) = 402.28, p < .001, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .048, SRMR = .05,suggesting that the items could be viewed as representing the hypothesizedfour-variable latent structure.

Figure 1. The main CFA model tested in the study

In the third step we used aperson-centered approach technique, latent profile analysis (Fraley,Raftery, 2007), to identify latent profiles of attitudes towards uncertaintybased on the scores obtained for the four factors described above. Since latentprofile analysis is a model-based technique, the fit of each potential profileconfiguration was tested and compared to the fit of alternative models. Wetested the fit of a total of 100 different models that differed in number oflatent profiles (from 1 to 10) and other parameters, such as the equal vs.unequal variances across profiles, equal vs. unequal sizes of the latentprofiles, etc. The values of the Bayesian InformationCriterion (BIC) for each of the models are presented in Figure 2. Thebest fit was obtained for the 4-profile solution that had the highest BICvalue, suggesting that the participants in the study can be classified ashaving one of the four presumably stable latent profiles of attitudes towardsuncertainty (see Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 2. Fit indices of the tested latent profile models

Figure 3. Average factor scores of the four latent profiles

Overall, Profile I was the mostnumerous, followed by Profiles III, II, and IV (Figure 4). Profile I(“Appreciative”) was characterized by relatively weak expectations ofpredictability from both the environment and personal relationships, and anoverall positive evaluation of uncertainty. Profile II (“Coping”) wascharacterized by relatively weak expectations of predictability with respect topersonal relationships, strong expectations of clarity and predictability fromthe environment in general, a moderate evaluation of the threat coming fromuncertainty, and low levels of attraction to it. Profile III (“Ambivalent”) wascharacterized by strong expectations of predictability with respect to personalrelationships, and weak expectations of predictability with respect to theenvironment in general. This profile tended to view uncertainty as boththreatening and mildly attractive. Profile IV (“Fearing”) was characterized bystrong expectations of clarity and predictability across the two sources ofuncertainty, and a negative view of uncertainty as an overall threateningcircumstance.

Figure 4. The distribution of the four latent profiles in the sample

We also examined gender distributionsacross different latent profiles, and found that they differed across profiles,χ2 (3) = 8.439, p = .038. While Profiles I and IV were representedby a similar number of women and men, Profile II was more characteristic of men,and Profile III was more characteristic of women (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Gender distributions across the four latent profiles

Finally, we investigated therelationship between the estimated probability of belonging to a certainprofile with overall scores obtained using the three administeredquestionnaires, i.e., general tolerance for uncertainty, general intolerancefor uncertainty, interpersonal intolerance for uncertainty, risk readiness, andrationality. These intercorrelations are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Intercorrelations between study measures and the estimated probabilityof belonging to each of the four latent profiles

	Profile I (p)	Profile II (p)	Profile III (p)	Profile IV (p)
Tolerance for uncertainty (NTN)	.377**	-.262**	.084	-.335**
General intolerance for uncertainty (NTN)	-.266**	.338**	-.266**	.294**
Interpersonal intolerance for uncertainty (NTN)	-.553**	.091	.117*	.532**
Tolerance for uncertainty (MSTAT)	.762**	-.161**	-.281**	-.584**
Risk readiness (LFR)	.452**	-.028	-.171**	-.369*
Rationality (LFR)	-.255**	.131**	-.010	.223**

* — p < .05; ** — p < .01

We found that Profile I was positivelyrelated to tolerance for uncertainty and risk readiness, and negatively relatedto general intolerance for uncertainty, interpersonal intolerance for uncertainty,and rationality. These results suggest that individuals with Profile I exhibittraits that correspond to the traditional descriptions of tolerance foruncertainty. Profile IV was negatively related to tolerance for uncertainty andrisk readiness, and positively related to both types of intolerance foruncertainty (general and interpersonal) and rationality, suggesting thatindividuals with Profile IV exhibit traits characteristic of the conventionallyunderstood intolerance for uncertainty.

Profile II was negatively related totolerance for uncertainty, and was positively related to general intolerancefor uncertainty and rationality. However, this profile was not related toeither interpersonal intolerance for uncertainty or risk readiness, supportingthe idea of the independence of attitudes towards uncertainty with respect tothe environment and with respect to personal relationships.

Profile III was negatively related torisk readiness and tolerance for uncertainty measured with MSTAT-I but not NTN.This profile was also negatively related to general intolerance foruncertainty, positively related to interpersonal intolerance for uncertainty,and independent of rationality. Thus, Profile III is simultaneously negativelyrelated to both tolerance and intolerance for uncertainty. We suggest thatthese results cannot be explained by a unidimensional model of intolerance foruncertainty, and necessitate a multidimensional approach that explicitly distinguishesdifferent sources of uncertainty.

Discussion

One of the most important results ofthis study was establishing the existence of four different latent profilesthat characterize attitudes towards uncertainty with respect to expectationsabout different sources of uncertainty (personal relationships and environment)and subjective evaluations of uncertainty (negative and positive).

The first latent profile(“Appreciative” or adaptive) is characterized by an over- all low desire forclarity across both sources of uncertainty. Individuals with this profile areunlikely to view uncertainty as threatening and likely to view it (and thecorresponding complex novel situations) as a challenging opportunity for self-expression and development. They accept the fundamental existence of contradictionsin the environment, and are both ready and equipped to deal with them.Similarly, they do not necessarily expect other people’s behavior to becompletely predictable. Therefore, this attitudinal profile can effectively belabeled as characteristic of a “tolerant” person.

The fourth latent profile (“Fearing”)is the direct opposite of the first profile. Individuals with this profile havestronger expectations for both the environment and relationships to be clear,predictable, and simple. They dislike uncontrollable and unpredictablesituations, and are likely to feel threatened when such situations arise. Theyalso tend to show lower risk readiness and higher interpersonal intolerance foruncertainty. Overall, this profile can be directly mapped onto the classicaldescriptions of an intolerant person.

The two remaining profiles arerevealing with respect to the importance of differentiating expectations aboutdifferent sources of uncertainty in understanding attitudes towardsuncertainty. The second profile (“Coping”) is characterized by a strong desirefor the environment to be simple and clear (similar to what is observed for the“Fearing” latent profile) and by mild expectations of predictability andclarity in personal relationships. Individuals with this profile do not viewun- certainty as either particularly attractive or threatening. Interestingly,there was no correlation between this profile and risk readiness. This suggeststhat risk-taking in individuals holding this profile is rather situation-specific.We also did not find a significant correlation of this profile withinterpersonal intolerance for uncertainty, thus supporting our hypothesis aboutthe partial representational independence of different sources of uncertainty.

The third profile (“Ambivalent”) ischaracterized by low expectations of simplicity from the environment, but arelatively high desire for predictability and clarity in personalrelationships. We labeled this profile “Ambivalent” because individuals holdingthis profile were likely to view uncertainty as simultaneously attractive andthreatening. In fact, their scores on these two factors were close to thescores of individuals who held the first and fourth profiles. This profile wasnot related to rationality defined as information-seeking, which suggests thatthe use of this strategy is situation-specific rather than being a generalcoping strategy. This profile was also significantly but differentially relatedto different types of intolerance for uncertainty: i.e., it was positivelyrelated to interpersonal intolerance for uncertainty and negatively related togeneral intolerance for uncertainty. Taken together,these results provide some support for our hypothesis about thedifferential roles of specific sources of uncertainty in attitudes towards it.

Finally, we found significantdifferences in gender distributions across the four profiles. The“Appreciative” and “Fearing” profiles were equally characteristic of male andfemale participants. However, we found gender imbalances for the “Coping” andthe “Ambivalent” profiles. The “Coping” profile can be considered morecharacteristic of men, and the “Ambivalent” profile can be considered more characteristicof women. The presence of these gender imbalances suggests that gender plays arole in the development of particular profiles of attitudes towards uncertainty.That gender imbalances were found for these two profiles is particularly importantin the context of revealing the gender-differential effects of socio-culturalinfluences on the development of expectations about the two major sources ofun- certainty.

Conclusion

The current study revealed theexistence of four different profiles of attitudes towards uncertainty. Amongthese four profiles, we found a general profile of a tolerant person and threedistinct profiles of an intolerant person, which differed with respect to theirattitudes towards different sources of uncertainty, and subjective evaluationsof uncertainty.

We suggest that differentrepresentations of uncertainty (which include objective and subjectivecomponents) create specific goal contexts that define the process of goalformation. However, we do not believe that differences in representations ofuncertainty necessarily rigidly determine which strategies will be employed indealing with or resolving the uncertainty, given the openness of dynamic regulationsystems in decision making (Kornilova, 2013).

Further research should examinebehavioral differences among these four profiles in decision-making in specificsituations. We are currently conducting a study that is explicitly looking atthese differences, and has the potential to advance our understanding of thetrait(s) of tolerance/intolerance of uncertainty and its involvement indecision-making. Another potentially fruitful avenue of research would be tostudy factors that play a role in the development of uncertainty attitudes withrespect to the environment and personal relationships (e.g., factors such asfamily context and previous experience) and their relationships withdecision-making strategies. Finally, we are currently in the process of conductinganother study that aims to link the identified latent profiles of attitudestowards uncertainty to a host of cognitive and personality traits in thecontext of a broader research program within the Dynamic Regulative Systemsframework (Kornilova, 2013).

Acknowledgements

This study and the preparation of thispublication were supported by the Russian Foundation for Humanities (RGNF;project N13-36-01254).

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Notes

[1] This source emerges during the course and process of decision-making andthus cannot be measured with questionnaires as a fixed/dispositional variable.