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In this paper we find common ground for different decision theories in Dempster-Shafer theory by providing an axiomatic utility theory where the completeness requirement is dropped. The resulting preference relation is represented by subjective expectation of sets of utilities whose ordering is based on an ordering of outcome sets derived from a logical decision theory for complete ignorance. Moreover, we explore the preference aggregation problem within the utility theory and generalize some results by Harsanyi and Mongin to the setting of belief functions.
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