Depiction: Difference between revisions

 

Objects pictured may be factual or fictional, literal or metaphorical, realistic or idealised and in various combination. Idealised depiction is also termed schematic or stylised and extends to icons, diagrams and maps. Classes or styles of picture may abstract their objects by degrees, conversely, establish degrees of the concrete (usually called, a little confusingly, figuration or figurative, since the 'figurative' is then often quite literal). Stylisation can lead to the fully abstract picture, where reference is only to conditions for a picture plane – a severe exercise in self-reference and ultimately a sub-set of pattern.

 

But just ''how'' pictures function remains controversial. Philosophers, art historians and critics, perceptual psychologists and other researchers in the arts and social sciences have contributed to the debate and many of the most influential contributions have been interdisciplinary. Some key positions are briefly surveyed below.

 

Traditionally, depiction is distinguished from denotative meaning by the presence of a [[mimesis|mimetic]] element or [[Similarity (philosophy)|resemblance]]. A picture resembles its object in a way a word or sound does not. Resemblance is no guarantee of depiction, obviously. Two pens may resemble one another but do not therefore depict each other. To say a picture resembles its object especially is only to say that its object is that which it especially resembles; which strictly begins with the picture itself. Indeed, since everything resembles something in some way, mere resemblance as a distinguishing trait is trivial. Moreover, depiction is no guarantee of resemblance to an object. A picture of a dragon does not resemble an actual dragon. So resemblance is not enough.

 

In art history, the history of actual attempts to achieve resemblance in depictions is usually covered under the terms "[[realism (arts)|realism]]", [[Naturalism (visual art)|naturalism]]", or "[[illusionism]]".

 

The most famous and elaborate case for resemblance modified by reference, is made by art historian [[Ernst Gombrich]].<ref>Gombrich, E. H. (1960) ''Art and Illusion'' (Oxford: Phaidon Press).</ref><ref>Gombrich, E. H. (1963) Meditations on a Hobbyhorse (Oxford, Phaidon Press).</ref><ref>Gombrich, E. H. ''The Image and the Eye'' (Oxford and New York: Phaidon Press).</ref> Resemblance in pictures is taken to involve illusion. Instincts in [[visual perception]] are said to be triggered or alerted by pictures, even when we are rarely deceived. The eye supposedly cannot resist finding resemblances that accord with illusion. Resemblance is thus narrowed to something like the seeds of illusion. Against the one-way relation of reference Gombrich argues for a weaker or labile relation, inherited from [[:wikt:substitution|substitution]].<ref>Gombrich, E. H. (1960): pp 80-98, (1982): pp 278–297.</ref> Pictures are thus both more primitive and powerful than stricter reference.

 

Gombrich's convictions have important implications for his popular history of art,<ref>Gombrich, E. H. (1995), The Story Of Art 16th ed. (London: Phaidon Press).</ref> for treatment and priorities there. In a later study by [[John Willats]] (1997)<ref>Willats, John, (1997), ''Art and Representation: New Principles In The Analysis Of Pictures'' (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.)</ref> on the variety and development of picture planes, Gombrich's views on the greater realism of perspective underpin many crucial findings.<ref>Gombrich (1995), pp. 133, 228.</ref>

 

A more frankly behaviouristic view is taken by the perceptual psychologist [[James J. Gibson]],<ref>Gibson, James J., 'The Ecological approach to Visual Perception in Pictures' Leonardo, 1978, 11, p.231.</ref> partly in response to Gombrich. Gibson treats visual perception as the eye registering necessary information for behaviour in a given environment. The information is filtered from light rays that meet the retina. The light is called the stimulus energy or sensation. The information consists of underlying patterns or 'invariants' for vital features to the environment.

 

Gibson's view of depiction concerns the re-presentation of these invariants. In the case of illusions or trompe l'oeil, the picture also conveys the stimulus energy, but generally the experience is of perceiving two sets of invariants, one for the picture surface, another for the object pictured. He pointedly rejects any seeds of illusion or substitution and allows that a picture represents when two sets of invariants are displayed. But invariants tell us little more than that the resemblance is visible, dual invariants only that the terms of reference are the same as those for resemblance

 

A similar duality is proposed by the philosopher of art [[Richard Wollheim]]. He calls it 'twofoldness'.<ref>Wollheim, Richard (1987), ''Painting as an Art'' (London: Thames and Hudson) pp 46-7, 72-5.</ref> Our experience of the picture surface is called the 'configurational' aspect, and our experience of the object depicted the 'recognitional'. Wollheim's main claim is that we are simultaneously aware of both the surface and the depicted object. The concept of twofoldness has been very influential in contemporary analytic aesthetics, especially in the writings of [[Dominic Lopes]]<ref>Lopes, Dominic (2005), Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures (Oxford: Clarendon Press).</ref> and of [[Bence Nanay]].<ref>Nanay, Bence (2005), 'Is Twofoldness Necessary for Representational Seeing?', British Journal of Aesthetics 45(3): 263-272.</ref> Again, illusion is forestalled by the prominence of the picture surface where an object is depicted. Yet the object depicted quite simply ''is'' the picture surface under one reading, the surface indifferent to picture, another. The two are hardly compatible or simultaneous. Nor do they ensure a reference relation.

 

Wollheim's account of how a resemblance is agreed or modified, whereby maker and user anticipate each other's roles, does not really explain how a resemblance refers, but rather when an agreed resemblance obtains.

 

 

For example, Schier returns to the contrast with language to try to identify a crucial difference in depictive competence. Understanding a pictorial style does not depend upon learning a vocabulary and syntax. Once grasped, a style allows the recognition of any object known to the user. Of course recognition allows a great deal more than that – books teaching children to read often introduce them to many exotic creatures such as a kangaroo or armadillo through illustrations. Many fictions and caricatures are promptly recognised without prior acquaintance of either a particular style or the object in question.<ref>Ross, Stephanie (1971), 'Caricature', The Monist 58: pp 285-93.</ref> So competence cannot rely on a simple index or synonymy for objects and styles.

Schier's conclusion that lack of syntax and semantics in reference then qualifies as depiction, leaves dance, architecture, animation, sculpture and music all sharing the same mode of reference. This perhaps points as much to limitations in a linguistic model.

 

Reversing orthodoxy, the philosopher [[Nelson Goodman]]<ref>Goodman, Nelson (1968), Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.).</ref> starts from reference and attempts to assimilate resemblance. He denies resemblance as either necessary or sufficient condition for depiction but surprisingly, allows that it arises and fluctuates as a matter of usage or familiarity.<ref>Goodman (1968), pp. 16-19.</ref>

 

Nevertheless, Goodman's framework is revisited by philosopher John Kulvicki<ref>Kulvicki, John (2006), On Images: Their structure and content (Oxford: Oxford University Press).</ref> and applied by art historian James Elkins<ref>Elkins, James (1999), The Domain of Images (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).</ref> to an array of hybrid artefacts, combining picture, pattern and notation.

 

Pictorial [[semiotics]] aims for just the kind of integration of depiction with notation undertaken by Goodman, but fails to identify his requirements for syntax and semantics. It seeks to apply the model of structural linguistics, to reveal core meanings and permutations for pictures of all kinds, but stalls in identifying constituent elements of reference, or as semioticians prefer, 'signification'. Similarly, they accept resemblance although call it 'iconicity' (after [[Charles Sanders Peirce]],<ref>Peirce, Charles Sanders - (1931-58), Collected Papers I-VIII. Hartshorne, C, Weiss, P, & Burks, A, (eds.) (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).</ref> 1931–58) and are uncomfortable in qualifying its role. Older practitioners, such as [[Roland Barthes]]<ref>Barthes, Roland (1969), Elements of semiology (Paris, 1967) translated by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith, (London: Cape).</ref> and [[Umberto Eco]]<ref>Eco, Umberto (1980), A Theory of Semiotics (Milan 1976) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).</ref> variously shift analysis to underlying 'connotations' for an object depicted or concentrate on description of purported content at the expense of more medium-specific meaning. Essentially they establish a more general [[iconography]].

 

 

==Other issues==

 

Other debates about the nature of depiction include the relationship between seeing something in a picture and seeing face to face, whether depictive representation is [[Convention (norm)|conventional]], how understanding novel depictions is possible, the [[aesthetic]] and [[ethical]] value of depiction and the nature of [[Realism (visual arts)|realism]] in pictorial [[art]].

==Further reading==

 

*Bryson Norman (1983) Vision and Painting: The Logic of The Gaze, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

*Eco Umberto (1980), A Theory of Semiotics (Milan 1976) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).

*Wollheim, Richard (1987), Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson).

 

*Alloa, Emmanuel (2010) 'Seeing-as, seeing-in, seeing-with. Looking Through Pictures' Image and imaging in philosophy, science and the arts : proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, Frankfurt:ontos 2010, 179–190.

*Abell, Catharine (2005a), 'Pictorial Implicature', ''The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism'', 63(1): 55–66.

==External links==

{{commons category|Depictions}}

 

[[Category:Aesthetics]]