Content deleted Content added
Made clear the lease is to a Chinese holdings company, and not the chinese state |
Rescuing 3 sources and tagging 2 as dead.) #IABot (v2.0.9.5 |
||
| (28 intermediate revisions by 9 users not shown) | |||
Line 1:
{{Short description|Port in Sri Lanka}}
{{Infobox Port
| name
| image =
|
| image_caption
| country
|
| blankdetailstitle1 = IATA
| blankdetails1 = HBT
| coordinates = {{Coord|06|07|10|N|81|06|29|E|region:LK|display=inline,title}}
| pushpin_map = yes
| locode
| opened
| operated
| sizeland
| piers =
| berths
| draft_depth = 17.0 m.<ref name="fap-1">{{cite web |title=Port of Hambantota, Sri Lanka |url=https://www.findaport.com/port-of-hambantota |website=www.findaport.com |publisher=Shipping Guides Ltd |access-date=18 September 2020 |archive-date=1 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240901223806/https://www.findaport.com/port-of-hambantota |url-status=live }}</ref>
| containervolume =
| cargotonnage =
| cargovalue =
| website
}}
The '''Hambantota International Port'''{{Efn|Former names: Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port and Magam Ruhunupura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port.}} is a [[port#Modern ports|deep water port]] in [[Hambantota]], Sri Lanka, notable for its 99-year lease to [[China Merchants Port|China Merchant Ports]]. Opened in 2010, it is Sri Lanka's second largest port, after [[Port of Colombo|Colombo]]. In 2020, the port handled 1.8 million tonnes of cargo.<ref name="SLPA20210314">{{cite press release
Construction of the port commenced in January 2008. In 2016, it reported an operating profit of $1.81 million but was considered economically unviable.<ref>{{Cite news|date=17 January 2017|title=Hambantota Port sale in perspective|work=Daily Mirror|url=http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Hambantota-Port-sale-in-perspective-122278.html|access-date=30 May 2021|archive-date=3 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180703164639/http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Hambantota-Port-sale-in-perspective-122278.html|url-status=live}}</ref> As debt repayment got difficult, the newly-elected government decided to privatise an 80% stake of the port to raise foreign exchange in order to repay maturing sovereign bonds unrelated to the port.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Brautigam|first=Deborah|date=6 December 2019|title=A critical look at Chinese 'debt-trap diplomacy': the rise of a meme|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828|journal=Area Development and Policy|language=en|volume=5|issue=1|pages=1–14|doi=10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828|issn=2379-2949|via=|s2cid=214547742|access-date=15 January 2021|archive-date=1 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200701060534/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Moramudali20200101" /> Of the two bidding companies, [[China Merchants Port]] was chosen,<ref name=":3" /> which was to pay $1.12 billion to Sri Lanka and spend additional amounts to develop the port into full operation.<ref name="dailymirror.lk">{{Cite news|date=9 December 2016|title=Agreement signed with Chinese Merchants to develop H'tota Port on PPP Model|work=Daily Mirror|url=http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Agreement-signed-with-Chinese-Merchants-to-develop-H-tota-Port-on-PPP-Model-120477.html|access-date=9 December 2016|archive-date=24 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190324165059/http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Agreement-signed-with-Chinese-Merchants-to-develop-H-tota-Port-on-PPP-Model-120477.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Marray2016">{{cite news |title= Sri Lanka plans to lease Hambantota Port to China |url= http://www.theasset.com/belt-road-online/32098/sri-lanka-plans-to-lease-hambantota-port-to-china |work= The Asset |first= Michael |last= Marray |date= 14 December 2016 |access-date= 23 December 2016 |archive-date= 23 December 2016 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20161223131410/http://www.theasset.com/belt-road-online/32098/sri-lanka-plans-to-lease-hambantota-port-to-china |url-status= live }}</ref><ref name="WSJ 2016">
{{citation |last1=Fairclough |first1=Gordon |last2=Jayasinghe |first2=Uditha |title=Sri Lanka Sells Port Holding to Beijing |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |date=9 December 2016 |id={{ProQuest|1847381102}}}}</ref>
In July 2017, the agreement was signed, but CMPort was allowed a 70% stake. Simultaneously a [[99-year lease]] on the port was granted to CMPort.<ref name="BBC 2017">{{cite news|date=29 July 2017|title=Sri Lanka signs deal on Hambantota port with China|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40761732|access-date=29 July 2017|archive-date=8 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190408102120/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40761732|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Carrai|2019|p=1074}}: "According to the agreement, CMPort will lease the Hambantota Port for 99 years and invest up to US$1,120 million in the port, as well as other marine-related activities in connection to the port, for a total area of 15,000 acres of land."</ref>
As of May 2024, the port has transformed into a busy [[transshipment]] hub in the Indian Ocean, specifically for vehicles, facilitating a turnover of 700,000 units per month. Hambantota is poised to increase its involvement in the bunkering and oil refining industries, and it has the potential of becoming a significant hub for cruise activities.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3261398/chinese-debt-trap-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-set-debunk-narrative-its-success?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=3261398&utm_medium=share_widget | title=Sri Lanka's Hambantota port debunks Chinese debt trap narrative with success | date=3 May 2024 | access-date=9 May 2024 | archive-date=1 September 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240901223831/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3261398/chinese-debt-trap-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-set-debunk-narrative-its-success | url-status=live }}</ref>
== Development history ==
[[Image:Hambantota location.svg|thumb|350px|Hambantota is located along the southern coast of Sri Lanka, six miles away from east-west shipping routes]]
The [[United National Front (Sri Lanka)|United National Front]] had pledged to build a seaport in Hambantota on winning the [[2001 Sri Lankan parliamentary election]].<ref name="Kasturisinghe20030717">{{cite news |last1=Kasturisinghe |first1=Channa |date=17 July 2003 |title=New port for Lanka, an urgent need
In modern times, the port is expected to become part of the "[[21st Century Maritime Silk Road]]" (the maritime part of China's [[Belt and Road Initiative]]) that runs from the Chinese coast via the [[Suez Canal]] to the Mediterranean, and from there to the Upper Adriatic region of [[Trieste]] with its rail connections to [[Central Europe|Central]] and [[Eastern Europe]].<ref name="BBC 2017" /><ref>{{Cite news|last=Shepard|first=Wade|date=28 October 2016|title=Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port And The World's Emptiest Airport Go To The Chinese|work=[[Forbes]]|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/10/28/sold-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-and-the-worlds-emptiest-airport-go-to-the-chinese/?sh=7aac26c94456|access-date=30 May 2021}}</ref>▼
===
In June 2002, Canadian engineering and construction firm [[SNC-Lavalin]] was invited to carry out a feasibility study,{{efn|The ministry had also invited the authority of [[Marseille-Fos Port|Port Autonome de Marseille]] to separately evaluate the project feasibility, after the company expressed interest to conduct a study for free and said that their study would be fully backed by the [[Government of France|French government]] and the [[European Union]].<ref name="Kasturisinghe20201204">{{cite news |last1=Kasturisinghe |first1=Channa |date=4 December 2002 |title=Two feasibility reports to expedite Hambantota Port project |url=http://archives.dailynews.lk/2002/12/04/bus02.html |access-date=29 May 2021 |work=Daily News |archive-date=12 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210512200131/http://archives.dailynews.lk/2002/12/04/bus02.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Political dispute prevented the French feasibility study from being conducted.<ref name="Jansz20031207" />}} with funding from the [[Canadian International Development Agency]].<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=92}} The study concluded that the port could be feasibly developed in three stages costing US$1.7 billion.<ref>{{cite news |date=15 October 2003 |title=Hambantota Crossroads |url=https://www.lankabusinessonline.com/hambantota-crossroads/ |access-date=29 May 2021 |work=Lanka Business Online |archive-date=1 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240901223832/https://www.lankabusinessonline.com/hambantota-crossroads/ |url-status=live }}</ref> It recommended that a joint venture between the [[Sri Lanka Ports Authority]] and a private consortium be set up to undertake the project under a [[Build–operate–transfer|build–own–operate–transfer]] arrangement.<ref name="BrautigamRithmire20210320">{{cite news |last1=Brautigam |first1=Deborah |last2=Rithmire |first2=Meg |date=20 March 2021 |title=The narrative surrounding China's 'debt-trap diplomacy' is a lie that doesn't stand up to scrutiny |url=https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/3125914/narrative-surrounding-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy |access-date=29 May 2021 |work=[[South China Morning Post|Post Magazine]] |archive-date=2 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602214511/https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/3125914/narrative-surrounding-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy |url-status=live }}</ref>
A steering committee of the Ports Authority rejected the report as being non-comprehensive and lacking in primary research.<ref name="Jansz20031207">{{cite news |last1=Jansz |first1=Frederica |date=7 December 2003 |title=Seaport study in stormy seas |url=https://journal.probeinternational.org/2003/12/07/seaport-study-stormy-seas/ |access-date=29 May 2021 |work=The Sunday Leader |publisher=Probe International |archive-date=2 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602213545/https://journal.probeinternational.org/2003/12/07/seaport-study-stormy-seas/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Island20031121">{{cite news |date=21 November 2003 |title=Hambantota port feasibility study rejected
A new port will help relieve pressure on the Colombo port, and also provide services to ships that normally take three-and-a-half-day detours from their shipping lanes to receive these services, including refueling, maintenance, logistics and buying provisions and medical supplies.<ref name="so-gateway" /><ref name="pw-spearhead">{{cite news|date=22 September 2009|title=Hambantota project 'can spearhead' developments|newspaper=Portworld News|url=http://www.portworld.com/news/2009/09/88479|access-date=10 March 2010}}</ref>▼
Canada was concerned about financing the project due to Sri Lankan domestic politics and the project did not advance.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|pages=92-93}}
=== Second feasibility study ===
▲The [[United National Front (Sri Lanka)|United National Front]] had pledged to build a seaport in Hambantota on winning the [[2001 Sri Lankan parliamentary election]].<ref name="Kasturisinghe20030717">{{cite news|last1=Kasturisinghe|first1=Channa|date=17 July 2003|title=New port for Lanka, an urgent need|work=Daily News|url=http://archives.dailynews.lk/2003/07/17/bus01.html|access-date=29 May 2021}}</ref> After victory, Sri Lankan Prime Minister [[Ranil Wickremesinghe]] announced the "Regaining Sri Lanka" economic development programme in 2002, which identified the Hambantota port for development. The plan also included building a [[Oil refinery|refinery]], [[Petrochemical industry|petrochemical industries]], a coal powered [[thermal power station]], and a [[desalination plant]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=REGAINING SRI LANKA -Part 2|url=http://www.erd.gov.lk/publicweb/publications/regaining/Part%20II%20-%20Regaining%20Sri%20Lanka%20-%20Connecting%20to%20Growth%20-%20Text.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=16 November 2003|title=Regaining Sri Lanka: Physical infrastructure Development Plan|work=The Sunday Times|url=http://www.sundaytimes.lk/031116/plus/6.htm|access-date=29 May 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Ladduwahetty|first=Ravi|date=18 June 2002|title=Hambantota port will attract 36,000 ships annually - Ananda Kularatne|work=Daily News|url=http://archives.dailynews.lk/2002/06/18/bus04.html|access-date=9 December 2016}}</ref>
During his 2005 presidential campaign, Hambantota native [[Mahinda Rajapaksa]] had pledged to revitalize Hambantota's economy.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}} After his election, a second feasibility study was commissioned, this time from Danish consulting firm [[Ramboll]].<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}}
The Rajapaksa administration approached both the United States and India with the Ramboll study and sought funding for the Hambantota Port Project.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}} Both countries declined.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}}
=== SNC-Lavalin ===▼
One of the first companies involved in the port project was China Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering Corporation, a subsidiary of the state-owned [[China National Petroleum Corporation]].<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}} China Huanqiu Contracting & Engineering Corporation had been doing business in Sri Lanka since 1997.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}} Following a 2005 agreement between Sri Lanka and China that both countries would facilitate the involvement of Chinese companies in Hambantota's refueling facilities and oil tank projects, China Huanqiu Contracting & Engineering Corporation became a contractor at Hambantota.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}}
After India declined to fund development of the port, Sri Lanka next sought funding from China.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kelegama |first=Saman |url= |title=The new great game : China and South and Central Asia in the era of reform |date=2016 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |others=Thomas Fingar |isbn=978-0-8047-9764-1 |location=Stanford, California |pages=207 |chapter=China as a Balancer in South Asia |oclc=939553543}}</ref> In July 2006, Sri Lankan foreign minister [[Mangala Samaraweera]] met in China with [[Li Ruogu]], the president of the [[Export–Import Bank of China|Export-Import Bank of China]] (China Exim).<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}} After this visit, Sri Lanka and China agreed that both countries would encourage Chinese companies to participate in the port project and encourage the use of [[concessional loans]] from China to finance the project.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Abi-Habib |first=Maria |date=2018-06-25 |title=How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181016135624/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html |archive-date=2018-10-16 |access-date=2022-02-23 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 |quote=The first major loan it took on the project came from the Chinese government’s Export-Import Bank, or Exim, for $307 million. But to obtain the loan, Sri Lanka was required to accept Beijing’s preferred company, China Harbor, as the port’s builder, according to a United States Embassy cable from the time, leaked to WikiLeaks.}}</ref><ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=93}} Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa visited China in February 2007 and the visit resulted in China's decision to fund the port development.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|pages=93-94}}
▲A steering committee of the Ports Authority rejected the report as being non-comprehensive and lacking in primary research.<ref name="Jansz20031207" /><ref name="Island20031121">{{cite news|date=21 November 2003|title=Hambantota port feasibility study rejected|work=The Island|url=http://www.island.lk/2003/11/21/news03.html|access-date=29 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191111045341/http://www.island.lk:80/2003/11/21/news03.html|archive-date=11 November 2019}}</ref> The recommendation to begin container operations at the first stage of the project was criticised for ignoring the potential impact on existing operations at the [[Port of Colombo]].<ref name="Island20031121" />
===
▲
▲The plan to build the port was revived by [[Mahinda Rajapaksa]], a native of Hambantota, after he was [[2005 Sri Lankan presidential election|elected president]] in 2005.<ref name="BrautigamRithmire20210320" /> A second feasibility study was commissioned to [[Ramboll]].<ref name="BrautigamRithmire20210206" /> Ramboll reached conclusions similar to those from SNC-Lavalin.<ref name="BrautigamRithmire20210206">{{cite news |last1=Brautigam |first1=Deborah |last2=Rithmire |first2=Meg |title=The Chinese 'Debt Trap' Is a Myth |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/ |access-date=29 May 2021 |work=The Atlantic |date=6 February 2021}}</ref><ref name="ramboll">{{cite web |title=Feasibility study for a new major seaport in Sri Lanka |url=http://www.ramboll.com/projects/group/hambantotaport |website=Ramboll |access-date=2 January 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150102071939/http://www.ramboll.com/projects/group/hambantotaport |archive-date=2 January 2015}}</ref>
== Location and plans ==
Sri Lanka is situated along the key [[shipping route]] between the [[Malacca Straits]] and the [[Suez Canal]], which links [[Asia]] and [[Europe]]. An estimated 36,000 ships, including 4,500 [[oil tanker]]s, use the route annually.<ref name="so-gateway">{{cite news |last=Sirimane |first=Shirajiv |date=21 February 2010 |title=Hambantota port, gateway to world |url=https://archives.sundayobserver.lk/2010/02/21/fea20.asp |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100224055824/http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2010/02/21/fea20.asp |archive-date=24 February 2010 |access-date=10 March 2010 |newspaper=The Sunday Observer}}</ref><ref name="bw-portzone">{{cite news|last=Ondaatjie|first=Anusha|date=8 March 2010|title=Sri Lanka to Seek Tenants for $550 Million Tax-Free Port Zone|newspaper=[[BusinessWeek]]|url=http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-08/sri-lanka-to-seek-tenants-for-550-million-tax-free-port-zone.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100311180106/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-08/sri-lanka-to-seek-tenants-for-550-million-tax-free-port-zone.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=March 11, 2010|access-date=10 March 2010}}</ref>
▲A new port will help relieve pressure on the Colombo port, and also provide services to ships that normally take three-and-a-half-day detours from their shipping lanes to receive these services, including refueling, maintenance, logistics and buying provisions and medical supplies.<ref name="so-gateway" /><ref name="pw-spearhead">{{cite news|date=22 September 2009|title=Hambantota project 'can spearhead' developments|newspaper=Portworld News|url=http://www.portworld.com/news/2009/09/88479|access-date=10 March 2010}}</ref>[[File:Hambantota Port.jpg|thumb|Hambantota Port]]
== Construction ==
The Sri Lankan government contracted with [[China Merchants Group]], one of [[State-owned enterprises of China|that country's state-owned enterprises]], to build the port.<ref name=":Curtis&Klaus">{{Cite book |last1=Curtis |first1=Simon |title=The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order |last2=Klaus |first2=Ian |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=9780300266900 |location=New Haven and London |publication-date=2024}}</ref>{{Rp|page=68}} The port was constructed in two phases.
=== First phase ===
The Chinese government financed phase one with a 15-year commercial loan from
A $76.5-million [[Bunkering|bunker]] terminal with an initial capacity of 500,000 [[tonnes]] was built, fitted with LPG tanks and fuel tanks for ships and aircraft,<ref name="pw-fivemonths">{{cite news |last=Lee |first=Hong Liang |date=8 March 2010 |title=Hambantota project 'five months ahead of schedule' |url=http://www.portworld.com/news/popular/i92232/Hambantota_project_five_months_ahead_of_schedule |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100309181534/http://www.portworld.com/news/popular/i92232/Hambantota_project_five_months_ahead_of_schedule |archive-date=9 March 2010 |access-date=10 March 2010 |newspaper=PortWorld News}}</ref> as well as ship repair, shipbuilding and crew change facilities.<ref name="dn-congestion">{{cite news|date=22 February 2010|title=Hambantota to ease Colombo Port congestion|newspaper=Daily News|url=http://www.dailynews.lk/2010/02/22/bus03.asp|url-status=dead|access-date=10 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100225073635/http://www.dailynews.lk/2010/02/22/bus03.asp|archive-date=25 February 2010}}</ref>
The first phase of the port was inaugurated on 18 November 2010 by President [[Mahinda Rajapaksa]], whom the port was named after.<ref name="dm-birthday">{{cite news|date=17 February 2010|title=Hambantota Port to be opened on President's birthday: Chamal|newspaper=Daily Mirror|url=http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/index.php/news/provincial-news/3891.html|access-date=10 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100830122808/http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/index.php/news/provincial-news/3891.html|archive-date=30 August 2010}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Reddy|first=B. Muralidhar|date=18 November 2010|title=Hambantota port opened|work=[[The Hindu]]|url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Hambantota-port-opened/article15691420.ece|access-date=20 November 2010|archive-date=29 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029213848/http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article894229.ece|url-status=live}}</ref> The accompanying ceremony cost [[Sri Lankan rupee|₨]] 18.8 million and was subject to an investigation by the Government for corruption''.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Yatawara|first1=Dhaneshi|date=25 October 2015|title=Rs 18.8 m H'tota Port inauguration tamasha|work=Sunday Observer|url=
=== Second phase ===
The second phase of construction began in 2012 after
<!--However, the Rajapaksa government turned down many proposals such as a floating dock by China Harbour Corporation with a local investor, a proposal by a middle eastern firm to operate oil storage and bunkering was turned down due to influence from a young minister who wanted to make a profit by keeping the activities under their control. Proposals for bottling factories, sugar bagging plants and grain processing plants were also refused.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://epaper.dailynews.lk//art.asp?id=2016/12/14/pg37_7&pt=p&h=|title=ePaper: {{!}} Online edition of Daily News - Sri Lanka|website=epaper.dailynews.lk|access-date=2016-12-17}} {{Dead link|date=February 2022|fix-attempted=yes}}</ref>-->
Line 77 ⟶ 81:
=== Operation under Chinese joint venture ===
In 2016, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority had to repay ₨{{nbsp}}9 billion ($134 million) in construction fees for the Hambantota port,<ref>{{cite news |title=Rs. 9b loan repayment biggest challenge to SLPA in 2016 |url=https://www.ft.lk/article/516351/Rs--9b-loan-repayment-biggest-challenge-to-SLPA-in-2016 |access-date=11 July 2021 |work=Daily FT |date=5 January 2016 |archive-date=11 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210711204836/https://www.ft.lk/article/516351/Rs--9b-loan-repayment-biggest-challenge-to-SLPA-in-2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> which, by the end of the year, accumulated a loss of ₨{{nbsp}}46.7 billion ($696 million).<ref>{{cite news |title=Govt.'s new Hambantota Port deal with China will deliver economic transformation: Malik |url=https://www.ft.lk/Shipping-Aviation/Govt-s-new-Hambantota-Port-deal-with-China-will-deliver-economic-transformation-Malik/21-644930 |access-date=11 July 2021 |work=Daily FT |date=11 December 2017 |archive-date=11 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210711204833/https://www.ft.lk/Shipping-Aviation/Govt-s-new-Hambantota-Port-deal-with-China-will-deliver-economic-transformation-Malik/21-644930 |url-status=live }}</ref> After the [[United National Front (Sri Lanka)|National United Front]] won the 2015 [[2015 Sri Lankan presidential election|presidential]] and [[2015 Sri Lankan parliamentary election|parliamentary elections]], Prime Minister [[Ranil Wickremesinghe]] visited China to solve the issue. Then, the ports authority rescinded the agreement with the Chinese operators of the port and replaced it with a concession agreement signed in 2017.<ref name="Erie2021">{{cite journal |last1=Erie |first1=Matthew S. |title=Chinese Law and Development |journal=Harvard International Law Journal |date=2021 |volume=62 |issue=1 |url=https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/HLI110_crop.pdf |pages=51–115 |access-date=2021-06-12 |archive-date=2021-05-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210518163626/https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/HLI110_crop.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
Under the 2017 agreement, Sri Lanka Ports Authority created Hambantota International Port Group (HIPG), which then became a joint venture after China Merchant Ports bought an 85% stake in HIPG as part of the Chinese company's $1.12 billion investment into the port.<ref name="HIPGfiling">{{cite press release|author=<!--Not stated-->|title=Potential Discloseable Transaction: Concession Agreement in Relation to Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka|url=https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2017/0725/ltn20170725444.pdf|location=Hong Kong|publisher=Hong Kong Stock Exchange|date=25 July 2017|access-date=12 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304112527/https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2017/0725/ltn20170725444.pdf|archive-date=4 March 2021}}</ref> The agreement will expire 99 years after its effective date and allows HIPG to develop and operate the Hambantota port exclusively.<ref name="HIPGfiling" /> The agreement also stipulated the creation of a 15,000-acre special economic zone.<ref name="dailymirror.lk" /><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://asianmirror.lk/news/item/20097-sri-lanka-to-sell-80-percent-of-hambantota-port-to-china|title=Sri Lanka To Sell 80 Percent Of Hambantota Port To China|access-date=9 December 2016|work=Asian Mirror|date=29 October 2016|archive-date=20 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220074136/http://asianmirror.lk/news/item/20097-sri-lanka-to-sell-80-percent-of-hambantota-port-to-china|url-status=live}}</ref>
The money from China Merchant Ports was used to strengthen Sri Lanka's US dollar reserves and pay short-term foreign debts unrelated to the port
The agreement was delayed for several months because of concerns that the port could be used for military purposes and opposition from trade unions and political parties, which called it a sellout of Sri Lankan national assets to China.<ref>{{cite web|last=Mitra|first=Devirupa|title=Despite Security Assurances, Chinese Consolidation of Sri Lankan Ports Remains a Worry for India|url=https://thewire.in/163052/hambantota-china-sri-lanka-ports|access-date=23 September 2017|website=TheWire.in|archive-date=31 July 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170731021609/https://thewire.in/163052/hambantota-china-sri-lanka-ports|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Woes of Hambanthota continue |url=http://www.dailynews.lk/2016/12/14/features/101857 |access-date=11 July 2021 |work=Daily News |date=14 December 2016 |archive-date=11 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210711210345/http://www.dailynews.lk/2016/12/14/features/101857 |url-status=live }}</ref> Former president Rajapaksa criticised the plan, including the special economic zone, and warned of social unrest if the plans were carried through.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/05/former-sri-lankan-president-warns-of-social-unrest-if-china-carries-out-its-plan-in-hambantota/#48952e5062f8|title=Former Sri Lankan president warns of social unrest if China carries out its plan in Hambantota|last=Shepard|first=Wade|newspaper=Forbes|access-date=9 December 2016|archive-date=8 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161208133834/http://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/05/former-sri-lankan-president-warns-of-social-unrest-if-china-carries-out-its-plan-in-hambantota/#48952e5062f8|url-status=live}}</ref> [[India]] and the [[United States]] raised concerns that Chinese control of the Hambantota port could harm their interests in the Indian Ocean.<ref>{{cite news|date=29 July 2017|title=Sri Lanka, China seal controversial $1bn port deal|work=Kuwait Times|url=http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/sri-lanka-china-seal-controversial-1bn-port-deal/|access-date=23 September 2017|archive-date=2 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171002214833/http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/sri-lanka-china-seal-controversial-1bn-port-deal/|url-status=live}}</ref> The large Chinese loans, the inability of the Sri Lankan government to service the loans, and the subsequent 99-year Chinese lease on the port have also led to accusations that China was practising [[debt-trap diplomacy]],<ref name="bloomb">{{Cite news|last=Marlow|first=Iain|date=17 April 2018|title=China's $1 Billion White Elephant|work=Bloomberg|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/china-s-1-billion-white-elephant-the-port-ships-don-t-use|access-date=15 September 2018|archive-date=3 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190503015142/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/china-s-1-billion-white-elephant-the-port-ships-don-t-use|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="ps">{{Cite web|last=Chellaney|first=Brahma|date=23 January 2017|title=China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy|url=https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01|access-date=15 September 2018|website=Project Syndicate|language=en|archive-date=29 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170129090158/https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01|url-status=live}}</ref> the factual accuracy of which is disputed.<ref name="Moramudali20200101" /><ref name=":3" /> In September 2021, Sri Lankan geopolitics analyst [[Asanga Abeyagoonasekera]] described of a 'Strategic-trap diplomacy'.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/india-feels-the-squeeze-in-indian-ocean-with-chinese-projects-in-neighborhood-/6230845.html|title=India Feels the Squeeze in Indian Ocean with Chinese Projects in Neighborhood|date=16 September 2021|access-date=28 January 2022|archive-date=16 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210916105205/https://www.voanews.com/a/india-feels-the-squeeze-in-indian-ocean-with-chinese-projects-in-neighborhood-/6230845.html|url-status=live}}</ref>▼
▲The money from China Merchant Ports was used to strengthen Sri Lanka's US dollar reserves and pay short-term foreign debts unrelated to the port.<ref name="Moramudali20200101">{{Cite news|last=Moramudali|first=Umesh|date=1 January 2020|title=The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities|language=en-US|work=The Diplomat|url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/|access-date=15 January 2021}}</ref><ref name=":3" />
In July 2018, the Sri Lankan government announced it would relocate its naval base at [[Galle]] to Hambantota.<ref>{{cite news|date=2 July 2018|title=Sri Lanka to Shift Naval Base to China-Controlled Port City|work=[[Voice of America]]|publisher=|agency=Reuters|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/sri-lanka-to-shift-naval-base-to-china-controlled-port-city/4463801.html|access-date=3 July 2018|archive-date=24 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190324165056/https://www.voanews.com/a/sri-lanka-to-shift-naval-base-to-china-controlled-port-city/4463801.html|url-status=live}}</ref>▼
▲The agreement was delayed for several months because of concerns that the port could be used for military purposes and opposition from trade unions and political parties, which called it a sellout of Sri Lankan national assets to China.<ref>{{cite web|last=Mitra|first=Devirupa|title=Despite Security Assurances, Chinese Consolidation of Sri Lankan Ports Remains a Worry for India|url=https://thewire.in/163052/hambantota-china-sri-lanka-ports|access-date=23 September 2017|website=TheWire.in}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Woes of Hambanthota continue |url=http://www.dailynews.lk/2016/12/14/features/101857 |access-date=11 July 2021 |work=Daily News |date=14 December 2016}}</ref> Former president Rajapaksa criticised the plan, including the special economic zone, and warned of social unrest if the plans were carried through.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/05/former-sri-lankan-president-warns-of-social-unrest-if-china-carries-out-its-plan-in-hambantota/#48952e5062f8|title=Former Sri Lankan president warns of social unrest if China carries out its plan in Hambantota|last=Shepard|first=Wade|newspaper=Forbes|access-date=9 December 2016}}</ref> [[India]] and the [[United States]] raised concerns that Chinese control of the Hambantota port could harm their interests in the Indian Ocean.<ref>{{cite news|date=29 July 2017|title=Sri Lanka, China seal controversial $1bn port deal|work=Kuwait Times|url=http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/sri-lanka-china-seal-controversial-1bn-port-deal/|access-date=23 September 2017}}</ref> The large Chinese loans, the inability of the Sri Lankan government to service the loans, and the subsequent 99-year Chinese lease on the port have also led to accusations that China was practising [[debt-trap diplomacy]],<ref name="bloomb">{{Cite news|last=Marlow|first=Iain|date=17 April 2018|title=China's $1 Billion White Elephant|work=Bloomberg|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/china-s-1-billion-white-elephant-the-port-ships-don-t-use|access-date=15 September 2018}}</ref><ref name="ps">{{Cite web|last=Chellaney|first=Brahma|date=23 January 2017|title=China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy|url=https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01|access-date=15 September 2018|website=Project Syndicate|language=en}}</ref> the factual accuracy of which is disputed.<ref name="Moramudali20200101" /><ref name=":3" /> In September 2021, Sri Lankan geopolitics analyst [[Asanga Abeyagoonasekera]] described of a 'Strategic-trap diplomacy'.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/india-feels-the-squeeze-in-indian-ocean-with-chinese-projects-in-neighborhood-/6230845.html|title=India Feels the Squeeze in Indian Ocean with Chinese Projects in Neighborhood}}</ref>
In 2019, The HIPG introduced automation, represented the port in several international summits and signed agreements with international shipping companies. As a result the nine-storey administration building of the port, the Hambantota Maritime Centre became 95% occupied and in just one year under the new management the port made a 136% increase in the volume of ro-ro vessels handled and even diversified its services to include other port-related activities such as container handling, general cargo, passenger, bunkering, bulk terminal, gas and project cargo.<ref>{{cite news
Writing in 2023, academic and former UK diplomat [[Kerry Brown (historian)|Kerry Brown]] states that China's relationship to the Hambantota port has become the opposite of the theorized debt-trap modus operandi.<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last=Brown |first=Kerry |title=China Incorporated: The Politics of a World Where China is Number One |date=2023 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-26724-4 |location=London |author-link=Kerry Brown (historian)}}</ref>{{Rp|page=56}} Brown observes that China has had to commit more money to the project, expose itself to further risk, and has had to become entangled in complex local politics.<ref name=":10" />{{Rp|page=56}}▼
In February 2021, the Sri Lankan foreign minister [[Dinesh Gunawardena]] said the lease of the Hambantota port to China was a mistake made by the previous government, after reports that Colombo was revisiting the agreement.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Wong|first=Catherine|date=25 February 2021|title=China can extend Hambantota port lease to 198 years, Sri Lankan minister says|work=[[South China Morning Post]]|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3122975/mistake-china-can-extend-hambantota-port-lease-198-years-sri|access-date=8 June 2021|archive-date=9 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210609014223/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3122975/mistake-china-can-extend-hambantota-port-lease-198-years-sri|url-status=live}}</ref>
▲Writing in 2023, academic and former UK diplomat [[Kerry Brown (historian)|Kerry Brown]] states that China's relationship to the Hambantota port has become the opposite of the theorized debt-trap modus operandi.<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last=Brown |first=Kerry |title=China Incorporated: The Politics of a World Where China is Number One |date=2023 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-26724-4 |location=London |author-link=Kerry Brown (historian)}}</ref>{{Rp|page=56}} Brown observes that China has had to commit more money to the project, expose itself to further risk, and has had to become entangled in complex local politics.<ref name=":10" />{{Rp|page=56}} As of at least 2024, the port is not a significant commercial success, although shipping through the port is increasing.<ref name=":Curtis&Klaus" />{{Rp|page=69}}
▲The HIPG introduced automation, represented the port in several international summits and signed agreements with international shipping companies. As a result the nine-storey administration building of the port, the Hambantota Maritime Centre became 95% occupied and in just one year under the new management the port made a 136% increase in the volume of ro-ro vessels handled and even diversified its services to include other port-related activities such as container handling, general cargo, passenger, bunkering, bulk terminal, gas and project cargo.<ref>{{cite news |date=25 September 2019|work=Daily News|title= Hambantota Int'l Port makes phenomenal progress |url=https://www.dailynews.lk/2019/09/25/finance/197904/hambantota-int%E2%80%99l-port-makes-phenomenal-progress |access-date=8 January 2020}}</ref>
As of May 2024, Hambantota port has become a thriving hub for transshipment in the Indian Ocean, particularly for vehicles, with a monthly turnover of 700,000 units. It is set to play a larger role in boosting the bunkering and oil refining industries, and it shows promise as a potential center for cruise activities. Tissa Wickramasinghe, the Chief Operating Officer of HIPG in Sri Lanka, conveyed contentment with the advancement of the port, affirming that it is successfully achieving its objectives and serving its intended purposes. He also noted that the port facilitated nearly 600,000 tonnes of bunkering operations last year, following the leasing of its bunkering facility to [[Sinopec]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3261398/chinese-debt-trap-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-set-debunk-narrative-its-success?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=3261398&utm_medium=share_widget | title=Sri Lanka's Hambantota port debunks Chinese debt trap narrative with success | date=3 May 2024 | access-date=9 May 2024 | archive-date=4 June 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240604114435/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3261398/chinese-debt-trap-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-set-debunk-narrative-its-success | url-status=live }}</ref>
▲In July 2018, the Sri Lankan government announced it would relocate its naval base at [[Galle]] to Hambantota.<ref>{{cite news|date=2 July 2018|title=Sri Lanka to Shift Naval Base to China-Controlled Port City|work=[[Voice of America]]|publisher=|agency=Reuters|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/sri-lanka-to-shift-naval-base-to-china-controlled-port-city/4463801.html}}</ref>
==Facilities==
[[File:170307-N-OU129-157 170307-N-OU129-157.jpg|thumb|[[Sri Lanka Navy]]'s [[SLNS Samudura]] and [[USNS Fall River (T-EPF-4)]] at Hambanthota Port in 2017]]
In 2020 [[Sinopec|Sinopec's]] Sri Lankan unit expanded Sri Lanka’s share of the regional bunker market and invested $5 million on a tanker which flies the Sri Lankan flag. Lanka Marine Services (LMS) partnered with Sinopec in supplying very low sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO).<ref>{{Cite web|first=Saikiran|last=Kannan|date=March 19, 2021|title=Exclusive: Revival of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka may strengthen China's position in Indian Ocean|url=https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/revival-hambantota-port-sri-lanka-strengthen-china-position-indian-ocean-1781171-2021-03-19|access-date=2021-03-25|website=India Today|language=en|archive-date=2021-03-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210319162212/https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/revival-hambantota-port-sri-lanka-strengthen-china-position-indian-ocean-1781171-2021-03-19|url-status=live}}</ref>
A $550 million [[Special Economic Zone|tax-free port zone]] was set up outside the port.<ref name="bw-portzone"/> In 2016 a 15,000 acre SEZ project was announced with 5,000 acres from Hambantota and the rest from [[Monaragala]], Embilipitiya and [[Matara, Sri Lanka|Matara]].<ref>{{cite news|title=Special Economic Zone at Hambantota port :State will keep ownership of land: Malik|url=http://dailynews.lk/2016/12/22/local/102717|access-date=2017-03-19|archive-date=2017-03-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170319111752/http://dailynews.lk/2016/12/22/local/102717|url-status=live}}</ref>
In July 2019 [[LAUGFS Holdings]] opened a [[Liquid Petroleum Gas]] (LPG) terminal which imports butane and propane and produces LPG to sell domestically or re-export. Within the first 14 months, it had handled 413,000 metric tonnes of LPG, 60% of which was exported to Bangladesh, Maldives and India. As of September the terminal handles around 15 – 20 ship calls per month and it is expected to increase up to 30.<ref>{{cite web |title=Sri Lanka Laugfs terminal handles 400,000MT LP Gas, 60-pct re-exports |date=18 September 2020 |url=https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-laugfs-terminal-handles-400000mt-lp-gas-60-pct-re-exports-74012/ |access-date=18 September 2020 |archive-date=29 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029044706/https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-laugfs-terminal-handles-400000mt-lp-gas-60-pct-re-exports-74012/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
State-owned Litro Gas operates LPG terminal with a storage capacity of 3,000 metric tonnes.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2015-12-07|title=Litro Gas shows impressive growth, completes terminal at Hambantota|url=http://bizenglish.adaderana.lk/litro-gas-shows-impressive-growth-completes-terminal-at-hambantota/|access-date=2021-10-14|website=Adaderana Biz English {{!}} Sri Lanka Business News|language=en-US|archive-date=2021-10-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211022221044/http://bizenglish.adaderana.lk/litro-gas-shows-impressive-growth-completes-terminal-at-hambantota/|url-status=live}}</ref>
==Port operations==
The SLPA had decided to divert all vehicle shipments to the Ruhunu Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa International port from May 31, 2012, as a measure to relieve the congestion at Sri Lanka's main port [[Colombo Harbour]].
On June 6, 2012, Ruhunu Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa International Port officially started [[transshipment]] operations with the ''N4K FRICIA'' ship from Japan containing 15 vehicles and the ''Ellison Sun'' with 1000 vehicles from Chennai Harbour, India.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.colombopage.com/archive_12/Jun06_1338967766CH.php|title=Sri Lanka's southern Hambantota Port begins commercial operations|date=6 June 2012|website=ColomboPage.com|access-date=23 September 2017|archive-date=24 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170924045956/http://www.colombopage.com/archive_12/Jun06_1338967766CH.php|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.porttechnology.org/news/operations_commence_at_hambantota_port|title=Operations commence at Hambantota Port|date=6 June 2012|publisher=Port Technology}}{{Dead link|date=September 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
Japanese, South Korean and Indian car makers have begun transshipping increasing numbers of vehicles through the port. In the first nine months of 2014, the number of vehicles handled at Hambantota crossed the 100,000 mark, up more than 300% compared to the same period in 2013, with the number of ship calls more than doubling to 161. The biggest user of the port is the Hyundai plant near Chennai while Tata and Maruti vehicles also come from Mumbai. In future, all Hyundai vehicles made in South Korea, China and India will be transshipped through Hambantota 15,000 units a month once more yard space is available.<ref>{{Cite web|url = http://www.automotivelogisticsmagazine.com/intelligence/the-unexpected-rise-of-hambantota-port|title = Shipping focus: The unexpected rise of Hambantota port|date = 17 December 2014|publisher = Automotive Logistics
In April 2017, making a historic landmark in Sri Lanka, the world's largest pure car and truck carrier (PCTC), the MV ''Hoegh Trigger'', arrived on her [[maiden call]] at the Port of Hambantota.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/worlds-largest-car-carrier-called-at-hambantota-port/|title=World's largest car carrier called at Hambantota port|date=3 April 2017|website=HellenicShippingNews.com|access-date=23 September 2017|archive-date=7 July 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170707210025/http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/worlds-largest-car-carrier-called-at-hambantota-port/|url-status=live}}</ref>
==Incidents==
In December 2016, a mob of workers who were believed to be backed by Rajapaksa loyalists protesting against the leasing of the port vandalised the port and took several ships hostage. The 13-storey building was taken over by the strikers and was flooded, and CCTV systems and electricity were shut down. However, swift action by the Navy rescued the ships, and repair of damaged infrastructure began. The government accused leaders of the strike of protesting against the SEZ that happened in Hambantota, led by members of the Nil Balakaya, an organization created by [[Namal Rajapaksa]]; the government accused them of being political appointees.<ref>{{cite news |title=Swift involvement reduced potential losses to port: Navy |url=http://www.dailymirror.lk/120597/Swift-involvement-reduced-potential-losses-to-port-Navy |access-date=2016-12-18 |archive-date=2016-12-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161223152134/http://www.dailymirror.lk/120597/Swift-involvement-reduced-potential-losses-to-port-Navy |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Hambantota moves in step with the Nation|url=http://dailynews.lk/2016/12/17/features/102173|access-date=2016-12-18|archive-date=2016-12-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161218132704/http://www.dailynews.lk/2016/12/17/features/102173|url-status=live}}</ref> As a result, a shipping line also sent a bill of $400,000 in damages to the port authority.<ref>{{cite news|title='K' LINE RETURNS TO HAMBANTOTA|url=http://
==Notes==
Line 134 ⟶ 140:
== External links ==
{{Commons category}}
* {{Official website
{{Ports of Sri Lanka|state=collapsed}}
| |||