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'''Depiction''' is reference conveyed through pictures. A picture refers to its object through a non-linguistic two-dimensional scheme, and is distinct from writing or notation. A depictive two-dimensional scheme is called a [[picture plane]] and may be constructed according to [[descriptive geometry]], where they are usually divided between ''projections'' (orthogonal and various oblique angles) and ''perspectives'' (according to number of vanishing points).
Pictures are made with various materials and techniques, such as painting, drawing, or prints (including photography and movies) mosaics, tapestries, stained glass, and collages of unusual and disparate elements. Occasionally, picture-like features may be recognised in simple inkblots, accidental stains, peculiar clouds or a glimpse of the moon, but these are special cases, and it is controversial whether they count as genuine instances of depiction.<ref>e.g. [[Robert David Hopkins]] (1998), "Picture, Image, Experience" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 71.</ref> Similarly, sculpture and theatrical performances are sometimes said to depict, but this requires a broad understanding of 'depict', as simply designating a form of representation that is not linguistic or notational. The bulk of studies of depiction however deal only with pictures. While sculpture and performance clearly represent or refer, they do not strictly picture their objects.
Objects pictured may be factual or fictional, literal or metaphorical, realistic or idealised and in various combination. Idealised depiction is also termed schematic or stylised and extends to icons, diagrams and maps. Classes or styles of picture may abstract their objects by degrees, conversely, establish degrees of the concrete (usually called, a little confusingly, figuration or figurative, since the 'figurative' is then often quite literal). Stylisation can lead to the fully abstract picture, where reference is only to conditions for a picture plane – a severe exercise in self-reference and ultimately a sub-set of pattern.
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== Other psychological resources ==
The appeal to broader psychological factors in qualifying depictive resemblance is echoed in the theories of philosophers such as [[Robert David Hopkins|Robert Hopkins]],<ref>Hopkins, Robert (1998), Picture, Image, and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).</ref> Flint Schier<ref>Schier, Flint (1986), Deeper Into Pictures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).</ref> and [[Kendall Walton]].<ref>Walton, Kendall (1990), Mimesis as Make-believe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).</ref> They enlist 'experience', 'recognition' and 'imagination' respectively. Each provides additional factors to an understanding or interpretation of pictorial reference, although none can explain how a picture resembles an object (if indeed it does), nor how this resemblance is then also a reference.
For example, Schier returns to the contrast with language to try to identify a crucial difference in depictive competence. Understanding a pictorial style does not depend upon learning a vocabulary and syntax. Once grasped, a style allows the recognition of any object known to the user. Of course recognition allows a great deal more than that – books teaching children to read often introduce them to many exotic creatures such as a kangaroo or armadillo through illustrations. Many fictions and caricatures are promptly recognised without prior acquaintance of either a particular style or the object in question.<ref>Ross, Stephanie (1971), 'Caricature', The Monist 58: pp 285-93.</ref> So competence cannot rely on a simple index or synonymy for objects and styles.
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