View source for 2005 Mumbai High fire

{{Infobox event
| title = Mumbai High fire
| image = Fire raging at the Mumbai High North complex.jpg
| image_upright = 1.2
| caption = Riser jet fire engulfing the production platform
| map = {{Location map many
| India
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|float      = center
|border     = none
|caption    =  Location of the Mumbai High North complex in the [[Arabian Sea]]
| alt         =
| relief      = 1
| AlternativeMap =
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| label1      =  Mumbai High North complex
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| position1   =  <!-- or: position, pos1, pos -->
| background1 =  <!-- or: background, bg1, bg -->
| mark1       =  <!-- or: mark -->
| mark1size   =  <!-- or: marksize -->
| link1       =  <!-- or: link -->
| coordinates1=  {{coord|19|45|47|N|71|4|41|E}}
<!--second label/marker-->
| label2      = Mumbai
| label2_size =
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| position2   =  <!-- or: pos2 -->
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| coordinates2= {{coord|19|4|34|N|72|52|39|W}}
}}
| date = July 27, 2005
| Time =
| Timezone =
| venue = Mumbai High North offshore oil production complex, [[Mumbai High Field|Mumbai High oil field]], off [[Maharashtra]], [[India]]
| coordinates = {{coord|19|45|47|N|71|4|41|E}}
| type = Gas riser [[jet fire]]
| cause = Vessel collision against gas flowlines, as a result of high seas, vessel approach on the windward side and faulty positioning system
| reported deaths = 11
| missing = 11
| property damage = - Total loss of Mumbai High North complex (four platforms) and jack-up rig ''Noble Charlie Yester''<br>- Sinking of multi-purpose support vessel ''Samudra Suraksha''<br>- Financial damages estimated at $370 million ($552 million in 2020)
}}{{Short description|Offshore oil and gas disaster}}
On July 27, 2005, a major fire struck [[ONGC]]'s [[Mumbai High Field|Mumbai High North offshore complex]], located approximately {{cvt|100|km}} off [[Mumbai]], [[Maharashtra]], [[India]]. The accident was the consequence of a collision between a support vessel and the production platform. The fire caused 22 fatalities (of whom 11 recovered and 11 missing) and material damage estimated at $370 million.<ref>{{Cite web |title=100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019 |url=https://www.marsh.com/content/dam/marsh/Documents/PDF/UK-en/100-largest-losses-in-hydrocarbon-history.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221004182032/https://www.marsh.com/content/dam/marsh/Documents/PDF/UK-en/100-largest-losses-in-hydrocarbon-history.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-04 |access-date=2023-08-11 |website=[[Marsh (company)|Marsh]]}}</ref>

== Background ==
The Mumbai High oil field, the largest in India, is located in the [[Arabian Sea]], approximately {{cvt|170|km}} west of Mumbai. It is operated by [[Oil and Natural Gas Corporation|ONGC]] and produces oil and gas, which are transported via [[Submarine pipeline|pipeline]] to a processing plant in [[Uran]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |title=Mumbai High Oil Field |url=http://abarrelfull.wikidot.com/mumbai-high-oil-field |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230610134626/http://abarrelfull.wikidot.com/mumbai-high-oil-field |archive-date=2023-06-10 |access-date=2023-08-07 |website=A Barrel Full}}</ref> Located in the northern section of the field at about 100 km from shore was the original Mumbai High North production complex, consisting of four bridge-linked platforms: NA, a [[wellhead]] platform built in 1976; MHF, an [[accommodation platform]], built in 1978; MHN, the production platform, built in 1981; and MNW, a processing platform housing the gas compression and [[Water injection (oil production)|water injection]] facilities. The complex imported well fluids from 11 unmanned wellhead platforms and exported oil and gas to shore, as well as gas for [[gas lift]].<ref name=":4" /> The North complex had a production capacity of 180,000 barrels per day (28,600 m<sup>3</sup>/day, or about 40% of India's domestic production)<ref>{{Cite web |title=Mumbai High North |url=http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200302140621/http://members.home.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm |archive-date=2020-03-02 |website=Oil Rig Disasters}}</ref> and 148 [[Million standard cubic feet per day|MMSCFD]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Verma |first=J.B. |date=2007 |title=Mumbai High Incident and Regulatory Progress Since |url=https://irfoffshoresafety.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Day2-5-VERMA.pdf |access-date=2023-08-07 |website=IRF (International Regulators' Forum)}}</ref>

At the time of the accident, the [[Jackup rig|jack-up]] ''Noble Charlie Yester'' was positioned over NA to carry out well [[workover]] operations.<ref name=":2" /> It was monsoon season and the sea conditions were particularly rough, with winds of {{convert|22|to|25|kn|lk=in}}, currents of {{convert|1.8|to|2|kn}} and [[Swell (ocean)|swell]] of {{convert|4|to|5|m}}.<ref name=":1" />

== Events ==
On the day of the accident, the {{cvt|100|m}}-long multi-purpose support vessel (MSV) ''Samudra Suraksha'', owned by ONGC and operated by the [[Shipping Company of India]] (SCI),<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |title=Mumbai High North, Mumbai, India, 27 July 2005 |url=https://www.fabig.com/industrial-accidents/mumbai-high-north-india/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230604005744/https://www.fabig.com/industrial-accidents/mumbai-high-north-india/ |archive-date=2023-06-04 |access-date=2023-08-07 |website=FABIG (Fire and Blast Information Group)}}</ref> was supporting diving operations elsewhere in the field. At about 14:00 local time a cook onboard the MSV got injured having sliced off the tips of two of his fingers. Medical evacuation to shore was deemed necessary by the MSV [[Sea captain|master]], and this was seconded by ONGC. A helicopter was at the time parked on MHN, however it could not fly to ''Samudra Suraksha'' due to the rough seas making a landing there unsafe. Shortly before 15:00, the Mumbai High North [[offshore installation manager]] (OIM) received a request for the transfer of the injured person onboard MHN. The transfer had to be accomplished using a man-riding basket lifted from one of the platform cranes. The OIM and the master agreed on the use of the south crane,<ref name=":1" /> which was located on the [[Windward and leeward|windward]] side of the platform, an arrangement that made the MSV approach more complicated. There was a crane on the [[Windward and leeward|leeward]] side of the platform but it was not operable.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |last=Walker |first=Steve |date=2007-06-06 |title=Mumbai High North Accident |url=http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/new/features/pdfs/safety8.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070715014023/http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/new/features/pdfs/safety8.pdf |archive-date=2007-07-15 |website=[[Offshore Energies UK|Oil and Gas UK]]}}</ref> The vessel experienced an issue with her [[dynamic positioning]] system, having been observed at around 15:30 that her [[Port and starboard|starboard]] [[azimuth thruster]] pitch was sluggish. The [[chief engineer]] requested some time to fix the issue. However, the master decided to proceed with the approach to the platform, operating the thrusters manually and using an emergency source of control via pushbuttons.<ref name=":1" /> The MSV was brought in [[stern]]-first with wind at {{convert|35|kn}}, swell of {{cvt|5|m}}, and sea current of {{convert|3|kn}}.<ref name=":2" /> The transfer of the injured person was completed, however the strong swell subsequently pushed the MSV against the platform.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Vinnem |first=Jan-Erik |title=Offshore Risk Assessment |last2=Røed |first2=Willy |publisher=[[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |year=2020 |isbn=978-1-4471-7443-1 |edition=4th |volume=1 |location=London |pages=151 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4471-7444-8}}</ref> Her helideck collided with and severed one or more gas export risers, which were supported from the platform jacket. Crucially, they had been installed outside the jacket structure footprint, which made them liable to be struck in case of ship collision. They were protected by structural guards, but these had been designed for collision from smaller [[Platform supply vessel|offshore supply vessels]] (OSV), not larger MSVs.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=2006 |title=Riser Safety in UK Waters – Lessons from Mumbai High North Disaster |url=https://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid/spc/spctosd33.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080801142227/https://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid/spc/spctosd33.pdf |archive-date=2008-08-01 |website=[[Health and Safety Executive]] |series=HID Semi Permanent Circular SPC/Technical/OSD/33.}}</ref> The gas release immediately ignited, resulting in a massive [[jet fire]]. Flames quickly engulfed ''Samudra Suraksha''. The fire escalated to further risers, which lacked fire protection,<ref name=":3" /> and eventually engulfed all the production platform, including its [[Oil production plant|process plant]], as well as the accommodation platform MHF. NA and the jack-up rig were severely affected by [[thermal radiation]].<ref name=":5" /> Within two hours from the fire onset, MHN collapsed into the sea.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |last=Marsh |first=Peter |date=2020-03-01 |title=Lessons Learned Database: Individual Incident Summary Report |url=https://www.icheme.org/media/14085/mumbai-high-north-incident-summary-27-jul-05.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230130202658/https://www.icheme.org/media/14085/mumbai-high-north-incident-summary-27-jul-05.pdf |archive-date=2023-01-30 |access-date=2023-08-06 |website=[[IChemE]]}}</ref>

At the time there were 384 persons in the complex, including the MSV and jack-up rig personnel.<ref name=":1" /> Of these, 362 were rescued over the next 15 hours and 22 perished (of which 11 bodies were recovered and 11 are missing).<ref name=":1" /> The severity of the fire hampered the evacuation and rescue efforts. Only two out of the eight [[Lifeboat (shipboard)|lifeboats]] of the complex proper were launched, and only one out of 10 [[Lifeboat (shipboard)#Liferaft versus lifeboat|liferafts]]. The ''Samudra Prabha'', a [[diving support vessel]] (DSV) operated by SCI like the ''Suraksha'', was in the field at the time and was among the first providing assistance to the emergency operations. She started firefighting operations using [[Deluge gun|fire monitors]], of which she had four with a capacity of {{cvt|1800|m3/hour}} each. The [[Indian Navy]], ONGC, and various supply boats also participated in the emergency and rescue operations. Several crew members of the complex sought safety by jumping directly to the sea. Rescued persons were transferred to supply boats for passage to Mumbai. Rescue helicopters remained unavailable due to weather conditions.<ref name=":6" />

''Prabha'' eventually shifted the firefighting efforts on ''Suraksha'', which was drifting dangerously at the mercy of the swell and the current. At the time of the accident, six divers were in a [[Saturation diving|saturation chamber]] on the MSV; they were rescued 36 hours after the shipboard fire was put off. ''Suraksha'' was handed over to [[tugboat]]s for towing to shore.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |last=Kumar |first=Ashu |date=2011-07-25 |title=Remembering BHN_SURAKSHA Oilfield Fire - A Citizen's Rescue Report at humanrescueintermedia |url=https://drashukumar.wordpress.com/2011/07/25/remembering-bhn_suraksha-oilfield-fire-a-citizens-rescue-report-at-humanrescueintermedia/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210106003140/https://drashukumar.wordpress.com/2011/07/25/remembering-bhn_suraksha-oilfield-fire-a-citizens-rescue-report-at-humanrescueintermedia/ |archive-date=2021-01-06 |access-date=2023-08-09 |website=The Human Rescue Team Intermedia Laboratory}}</ref> However, she sank four days after the fire, when she was a short distance off Mumbai.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" />

== Aftermath ==
The whole complex became a total loss and the field production was impacted for years until a new Mumbai High North complex was built.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-09-21 |title=Mumbai High Field |url=https://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/mumbai-high-field/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230328215254/https://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/mumbai-high-field/ |archive-date=2023-03-28 |access-date=2023-03-28 |website=Offshore Technology}}</ref> No official investigation report has been issued publicly by either the Indian authorities or ONGC.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Samudra Suraksha at Bombay High North |url=https://shipsandoil.co.uk/the-sumadra-suraksha-at-bombay-high-norths  |access-date=2023-08-09 |website=Ships and Oil}}</ref> Subsequent to the disaster, however, the Indian government empowered its [[Oil Industry Safety Directorate]] (OISD) with stronger capacities of action to promote safety in the local offshore oil and gas industry and counter poor safety practices, including in particular the mandate for the regulation of offshore safety.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":8">{{Cite book |last=Thomson |first=J.R. |title=High Integrity Systems and Safety Management in Hazardous Industries |publisher=[[Butterworth-Heinemann]] |year=2015 |isbn=978-0-12-801996-2 |location=Oxford |pages=209–212}}</ref>

=== Analysis and lessons learned ===
The following issues of interest, as well as lessons learnt in [[process safety]], have been pointed out in the years after the accident:
* '''Vulnerability of flowlines and risers to ship collisions''':
** Hydrocarbon flowlines and risers on fixed offshore platforms should not be exposed to potential vessel collisions. In the spirit of [[Inherent safety|inherently safer design]], this is firstly achieved by ensuring they are placed inside the jacket envelope. Alternatively, they should be protected by structural guards designed for credible collision scenarios.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" />
** Avoiding any lift or other vessel operation in proximity to the risers is another effective measure to prevent riser-threatening collisions. Again, an inherent design approach would altogether avoid lifting appliances and laydown areas on the edge of the platform closest to the risers. Locating the risers away from the prevailing weather is also advisable. Further, strict procedures to prevent any vessel approach to said side of the platform should be put in place by the operating company.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" />
* '''Riser fire protection''': The risers on MHN had no fire protection arrangements. In the aftermath of the [[Piper Alpha|Piper Alpha disaster]], it became apparent that riser jet fires can result in the rapid catastrophic loss of an offshore facility. This is due to the high fluid pressures and the large fuel inventory contained in the pipeline, which upon breach of containment becomes available for long lasting fires. It is therefore essential that fires occurring elsewhere in the platform do not cause failure of the risers; this also applies to protecting the risers from fires originating from other risers (the scenario that occurred at Mumbai High). In the wake of [[Piper Alpha#Aftermath|Lord Cullen's report]], the British offshore industry first, followed by the rest of the world, have gradually implemented policies by which the risk of riser fire is quantitatively assessed and riser [[passive fire protection]] is installed accordingly. The fireproofing of the risers all the way down to the water surface is still rare. Passive fire protection of riser boarding [[Shut down valve|shutdown valves]] is far more common, although not universally practiced. Another practice that is sometimes used, subject to risk assessment, is the use of subsea isolation valves (SSIVs); these are pipeline isolation valves placed in the vicinity of the platform, which enable the sectionalization and consequent dramatic reduction of the inventory available to the fire.<ref name=":7" />
* '''Management of marine operations around the complex''': The MSV master and the offshore installation manager found themselves in the dilemma of deciding between aborting a [[Medical evacuation|medevac]] they saw necessary, and having to complete a dangerous vessel approach to the platform under difficult circumstances (bad weather, unavailability of the leeward crane, and faulty dynamic positioning system). Even comprehensive [[Emergency management|emergency management plans]] may not include such an eventuality.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sutton |first=Ian |title=Offshore Safety Management: Implementing a SEMS Program |publisher=[[William Andrew (publisher)|William Andrew]] |year=2014 |isbn=978-0-323-26206-4 |edition=2nd |location=Waltham, Mass. |pages=72}}</ref> However, ''a posteriori'' it has become clear that a vessel the size of ''Samudra Suraksha'' should not have been allowed to approach the platform, especially in the circumstances in which it happened. The importance of enforcing the so-called 500 metres exclusion zone has been stressed from various sources.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":9">{{Cite web |last=Kerin |first=Trish |author-link=Trish Kerin |last2=Purdum |first2=Traci |date=2020-08-05 |title=Podcast: Catastrophe at the Hands of Legacy Design Issues |url=https://www.chemicalprocessing.com/safety-security/fire-explosion-protection/article/11299074/podcast-catastrophe-at-the-hands-of-legacy-design-issues-chemical-processing |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230812051924/https://www.chemicalprocessing.com/safety-security/fire-explosion-protection/article/11299074/podcast-catastrophe-at-the-hands-of-legacy-design-issues-chemical-processing |archive-date=2023-08-12 |access-date=2023-08-12 |website=Chemical Processing}}</ref>
* '''Evacuation of divers from hyperbaric chambers'''.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":9" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=International Maritime Organization |author-link=International Maritime Organization |date=2018-02-13 |title=Work Programme: Proposal for a New Output Concerning Amendments to the Code of Safety for Diving Systems and Resolution A.692(17) |url=https://adas.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/AMSA-Proposal.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230309215543/https://adas.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/AMSA-Proposal.pdf |archive-date=2023-03-09 |access-date=2023-08-12 |website=[[Australian Diver Accreditation Scheme|ADAS]] |series=MSC 99/20/9, Maritime Safety Committee, 99th session, agenda item 20}}</ref>

== References ==
[[Category:Industrial fires and explosions in India]]
[[Category:Collapsed oil platforms|Mumbai High fire]]
[[Category:2005 disasters in India|Mumbai_High_fire]]
[[Category:July 2005 events in India|Mumbai_High_fire]]
[[Category:2005 industrial disasters|Mumbai_High_fire]]
[[Category:Oil platform disasters]]
[[Category:Maritime incidents in 2005|Mumbai_High_fire]]
[[Category:2005 disestablishments in India|Mumbai_High_fire]]
[[Category:Building and structure collapses caused by fire]]
[[Category:Building and structure collapses in India]]

<references />

== Further reading ==
{{Citejournal |last=Daley |first=Jenine |date=2013 |title=Mumbai High North Platform Disaster |url=https://journals.library.mun.ca/index.php/prototype/article/download/468/536 |url-status=live |journal=[[Prototype: Journal of Undergraduate Engineering Research and Scholarship]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231031085231/https://journals.library.mun.ca/index.php/prototype/article/download/468/536 |archive-date=2023-10-31}}

{{2005 shipwrecks|state=collapsed}}

[[Category:Maritime incidents involving engineering failures]]