Markham Colliery disaster: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|England mining disaster}} |
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{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2022}} |
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== 1973 accident == |
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| ⚫ | On 30 July 1973, 18 coal [[miners]] were killed and a further 11 were seriously injured when a descending cage carrying the men failed to slow down as it approached the bottom of the [[shaft mining|mine shaft]], with the 18 miners killed by the impact. The accident was caused by fracture of the brake rod, when a slowly growing [[fatigue (material)|fatigue]] crack reached a critical size, and the brake rod parted. |
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===Background=== |
===Background=== |
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The main part of the set |
The main part of the set-up is the winding motor which is driven by the DC motor. Two double deck cages are attached to the two ends of the winding rope. At the start of the winding cycle, power applied to winding motor is gradually increased and mechanical brake released. The cages accelerate, then maintain a speed of {{convert| 6|m/s|ft/s|0}} until the cages approach the ends of the shaft. During deceleration, generator voltage driving the winding motor is reduced to produce [[regenerative braking]] and it is finally brought to rest by a mechanical brake. |
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Mechanical brake consists of a pair of [[brake shoes]] applied to the underside of the brake paths by the action of the compressed spring nest operating through a system of levers. Force is transmitted from the spring nest to main lever through a {{convert|2|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} diameter steel rod {{convert|8|ft| 11.875|in|m|3}} long.<ref>Demaid, A.P.A and Lawley, A., |
Mechanical brake consists of a pair of [[brake shoes]] applied to the underside of the brake paths by the action of the compressed spring nest operating through a system of levers. Force is transmitted from the spring nest to main lever through a {{convert|2|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} diameter steel rod {{convert|8|ft| 11.875|in|m|3}} long.<ref>Demaid, A.P.A and Lawley, A., "The Markham Mine Disaster", Case Histories Involving Fatigue and Fracture Mechanics, ASTM STP 918, C.M. Hudson and T.P.Rich, Eds., American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, 1986, pp. 389-416</ref> This vertical brake rod is always in tension as the springs are compressed. It also consists of a servospring mechanism which uses the compressed air to counteract the spring force to move the brake shoes away. |
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For the sake of safety there is an automatic controller which |
For the sake of safety there is an automatic controller which cuts off the power supply to winder motor and applies mechanical brake. Also, there is an emergency stop button which activates the "ungabbling gear" which disengages brake control lever from Iversen type valve and applies mechanical brake. |
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===Accident=== |
===Accident=== |
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| ⚫ | On Monday 30 July 1973 the winding engine man noticed some sparks under the brake cylinder when he started to retard the winding. He immediately increased regenerative braking and simultaneously pulled the brake lever to the "on" position. As there was no effect, he pressed the emergency stop button. This too had no effect and the cage crashed the bottom wooden landing baulks with enormous force. |
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| ⚫ | On Monday |
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===Investigation=== |
===Investigation=== |
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| ⚫ | All electrical and mechanical components of the winding system were thoroughly investigated to find the cause of accident. Electrical systems were found to be working as supply of compressed air was available above the servo cylinder. However, the brake shoes were about {{convert|3| mm|in|disp=flip|2}} clear of the brake paths as the vertical brake rod had broken into two pieces, so the investigation concentrated on the failure of the brake rod. |
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| ⚫ | A chemical analysis proved that the material of the brake rod (carbon steel with the designation '''''En8''''', conforming to British Standard 970:1947)<ref>Calder, J (1974) Accident at Markham Colliery Derbyshire HMSO London {{ISBN|9780101555708}} facsimile available from: https://webcommunities.hse.gov.uk/gf2.ti/f/6434/457221.1/PDF/-/Markham_Colliery_Accident_Report.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018 </ref> was within the specification demanded at the time of manufacture. |
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| ⚫ | All electrical and mechanical components of the winding system were thoroughly investigated to find the cause of accident. Electrical systems were found to be working as supply of compressed air was available above the servo cylinder. However the brake shoes were about {{convert|3| mm|in|disp=flip|2}} clear of the brake paths as the vertical brake rod had broken into two pieces |
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| ⚫ | Metallurgical examination of the brake rod showed that it failed because of fatigue. There were many secondary cracks around the fracture surface which were detected by magnetic particle technique. To investigate fatigue failure, it was necessary to determine the in{{nbhyph}}service loading of the brake rod. |
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| ⚫ | A chemical analysis proved that the material of the brake rod (carbon steel with the designation '''''En8''''', conforming to British Standard 970:1947)<ref>Accident at Markham Colliery Derbyshire |
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| ⚫ | Metallurgical examination of the brake rod showed that it failed because of fatigue. There were many secondary cracks around the fracture surface which were detected by magnetic particle technique. To investigate fatigue failure it was necessary to determine the in{{nbhyph}}service loading of the brake rod. |
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The broken rod was replaced with a new rod and loading conditions were applied. Four [[strain gauge]]s were attached at a distance of {{convert|533| mm|in|disp=flip|0}} from the lower end, located 90 degrees apart around the circumference of the rod. Readings were taken during manual release and application of the brake and during emergency application of brake. The results showed that in addition to the expected direct tensile stresses at gauge positions there were substantial stresses due to bending when the brake was operated. The magnitude of stresses varied to such an extent that for the one farthest from the drum there was a change from tension to compression as the brake was released. The rod was not designed for such alternating bending loads. The rod was designed with a factor of safety 6.1 for tensile stress. But when alternative bending stress are induced, failure was inevitable. |
The broken rod was replaced with a new rod and loading conditions were applied. Four [[strain gauge]]s were attached at a distance of {{convert|533| mm|in|disp=flip|0}} from the lower end, located 90 degrees apart around the circumference of the rod. Readings were taken during manual release and application of the brake and during emergency application of brake. The results showed that in addition to the expected direct tensile stresses at gauge positions there were substantial stresses due to bending when the brake was operated. The magnitude of stresses varied to such an extent that for the one farthest from the drum there was a change from tension to compression as the brake was released. The rod was not designed for such alternating bending loads. The rod was designed with a factor of safety 6.1 for tensile stress. But when alternative bending stress are induced, failure was inevitable. |
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It was also found that mild steel bearing pad surfaces were badly worn as [[lubrication]] was not effective at bearings. This was also due to the unexpected bending stress which progressively squeezed the lubricant out of the gap. |
It was also found that mild steel bearing pad surfaces were badly worn as [[lubrication]] was not effective at bearings. This was also due to the unexpected bending stress which progressively squeezed the lubricant out of the gap. |
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=== Follow up === |
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A National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets was formed and first met on 3 December 1973. The Committee produced two reports and an addendum. <ref>National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets (1976) Safe Mariding in Mines, first report HMSO London {{ISBN|011880491X}} available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/mining/manriding-1.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018 </ref> <ref>National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets (1980) Safe Mariding in Mines, second report HMSO London {{ISBN|0118832816}} available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/mining/manriding-2.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018 </ref> <ref>National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets (1985) Safe Mariding in Mines, Supplement and Corrigendum HMSO London {{ISBN|0118838326}} available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/mining/manriding-in-mines-supplement.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018 </ref> |
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The [[National Coal Board]] carried out a programme to examine the braking and safety systems on all of its mine winders and modified them in accordance with the recommendations of the reports. |
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An underground explosion in 1938 had killed 79 miners and seriously injured 40 others. |
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An underground explosion in 1938 had killed 79 miners and seriously injured 40 others.<ref>{{cite news |title=Seventy-Nine Killed In British Mine Disaster |url=https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-expositor/147456571/ |access-date=15 May 2024 |work=The Expositor |date=18 May 1938 |page=1}}</ref> |
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==Closure of |
==Closure of the mine== |
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[[File:Walking Together at Markham Colliery.jpg|thumb|Walking Together sculpture]] |
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The mine closed in 1994. |
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The mine closed in 1994. In 2013, the Walking Together sculpture by Stephen Broadbent was installed at the site of the former colliery. The walking trail of steel figures is a memorial to the 106 miners who died in mining disasters at the colliery in 1937, 1938 and 1973. Each figure represents an individual dead miner whose name is stamped on the circular bronze tag on the figure's chest. By 2020, 88 figures had been installed. Fundraising continued until October 2022 when the last figures were installed, completing the commemoration of the 106 men lost.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://markhamstorymine.org/walking-together-completed-final-13-figures-installed/|title=Walking Together completed – final 13 miners commemorated|website=The Story Mine|access-date=2024-07-29}}</ref> |
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== References == |
== References == |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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* [http://www.dmm2.org.uk/uknames/u1973-01.htm List of miners killed in 1973] |
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070928090943/http://www.dmm2.org.uk/uknames/u1973-01.htm List of miners killed in 1973] |
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* [http://www. |
* [http://www.dmm.org.uk/ukreport/5557-01.htm Text of Calder, J (1974) Accident at Markham Colliery Derbyshire, transcribed but no figures.] |
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[[Category:1938 in England]] |
[[Category:1938 in England]] |
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[[Category:1973 disasters in the United Kingdom]] |
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[[Category:1973 in England]] |
[[Category:1973 in England]] |
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[[Category:1938 mining disasters]] |
[[Category:1938 mining disasters]] |
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[[Category:Coal mining disasters in England]] |
[[Category:Coal mining disasters in England]] |
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[[Category:Mining in Derbyshire]] |
[[Category:Mining in Derbyshire]] |
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[[Category:1930s in Derbyshire]] |
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[[Category:1938 disasters in the United Kingdom]] |
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[[Category:1970s in Derbyshire]] |
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Latest revision as of 18:20, 30 November 2024
Mining accidents at the Markham Colliery at Staveley near Chesterfield, Derbyshire, England.
1973 accident
[edit]On 30 July 1973, 18 coal miners were killed and a further 11 were seriously injured when a descending cage carrying the men failed to slow down as it approached the bottom of the mine shaft, with the 18 miners killed by the impact. The accident was caused by fracture of the brake rod, when a slowly growing fatigue crack reached a critical size, and the brake rod parted.
Following a thorough investigation, it was found that metal fatigue failure occurred in the braking mechanism used to slow down the cage as it descended.
Accident investigation
[edit]Background
[edit]The main part of the set-up is the winding motor which is driven by the DC motor. Two double deck cages are attached to the two ends of the winding rope. At the start of the winding cycle, power applied to winding motor is gradually increased and mechanical brake released. The cages accelerate, then maintain a speed of 6 metres per second (20 ft/s) until the cages approach the ends of the shaft. During deceleration, generator voltage driving the winding motor is reduced to produce regenerative braking and it is finally brought to rest by a mechanical brake.
Mechanical brake consists of a pair of brake shoes applied to the underside of the brake paths by the action of the compressed spring nest operating through a system of levers. Force is transmitted from the spring nest to main lever through a 2 in (51 mm) diameter steel rod 8 feet 11.875 inches (2.740 m) long.[1] This vertical brake rod is always in tension as the springs are compressed. It also consists of a servospring mechanism which uses the compressed air to counteract the spring force to move the brake shoes away.
For the sake of safety there is an automatic controller which cuts off the power supply to winder motor and applies mechanical brake. Also, there is an emergency stop button which activates the "ungabbling gear" which disengages brake control lever from Iversen type valve and applies mechanical brake.
Accident
[edit]On Monday 30 July 1973 the winding engine man noticed some sparks under the brake cylinder when he started to retard the winding. He immediately increased regenerative braking and simultaneously pulled the brake lever to the "on" position. As there was no effect, he pressed the emergency stop button. This too had no effect and the cage crashed the bottom wooden landing baulks with enormous force.
Investigation
[edit]All electrical and mechanical components of the winding system were thoroughly investigated to find the cause of accident. Electrical systems were found to be working as supply of compressed air was available above the servo cylinder. However, the brake shoes were about 0.12 inches (3 mm) clear of the brake paths as the vertical brake rod had broken into two pieces, so the investigation concentrated on the failure of the brake rod.
A chemical analysis proved that the material of the brake rod (carbon steel with the designation En8, conforming to British Standard 970:1947)[2] was within the specification demanded at the time of manufacture.
Metallurgical examination of the brake rod showed that it failed because of fatigue. There were many secondary cracks around the fracture surface which were detected by magnetic particle technique. To investigate fatigue failure, it was necessary to determine the in‑service loading of the brake rod.
The broken rod was replaced with a new rod and loading conditions were applied. Four strain gauges were attached at a distance of 21 inches (533 mm) from the lower end, located 90 degrees apart around the circumference of the rod. Readings were taken during manual release and application of the brake and during emergency application of brake. The results showed that in addition to the expected direct tensile stresses at gauge positions there were substantial stresses due to bending when the brake was operated. The magnitude of stresses varied to such an extent that for the one farthest from the drum there was a change from tension to compression as the brake was released. The rod was not designed for such alternating bending loads. The rod was designed with a factor of safety 6.1 for tensile stress. But when alternative bending stress are induced, failure was inevitable.
It was also found that mild steel bearing pad surfaces were badly worn as lubrication was not effective at bearings. This was also due to the unexpected bending stress which progressively squeezed the lubricant out of the gap.
Follow up
[edit]A National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets was formed and first met on 3 December 1973. The Committee produced two reports and an addendum. [3] [4] [5]
The National Coal Board carried out a programme to examine the braking and safety systems on all of its mine winders and modified them in accordance with the recommendations of the reports.
1938 explosion
[edit]An underground explosion in 1938 had killed 79 miners and seriously injured 40 others.[6]
Closure of the mine
[edit]
The mine closed in 1994. In 2013, the Walking Together sculpture by Stephen Broadbent was installed at the site of the former colliery. The walking trail of steel figures is a memorial to the 106 miners who died in mining disasters at the colliery in 1937, 1938 and 1973. Each figure represents an individual dead miner whose name is stamped on the circular bronze tag on the figure's chest. By 2020, 88 figures had been installed. Fundraising continued until October 2022 when the last figures were installed, completing the commemoration of the 106 men lost.[7]
References
[edit]- ^ Demaid, A.P.A and Lawley, A., "The Markham Mine Disaster", Case Histories Involving Fatigue and Fracture Mechanics, ASTM STP 918, C.M. Hudson and T.P.Rich, Eds., American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, 1986, pp. 389-416
- ^ Calder, J (1974) Accident at Markham Colliery Derbyshire HMSO London ISBN 9780101555708 facsimile available from: https://webcommunities.hse.gov.uk/gf2.ti/f/6434/457221.1/PDF/-/Markham_Colliery_Accident_Report.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018
- ^ National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets (1976) Safe Mariding in Mines, first report HMSO London ISBN 011880491X available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/mining/manriding-1.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018
- ^ National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets (1980) Safe Mariding in Mines, second report HMSO London ISBN 0118832816 available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/mining/manriding-2.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018
- ^ National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets (1985) Safe Mariding in Mines, Supplement and Corrigendum HMSO London ISBN 0118838326 available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/mining/manriding-in-mines-supplement.pdf retrieved on January 17 2018
- ^ "Seventy-Nine Killed In British Mine Disaster". The Expositor. 18 May 1938. p. 1. Retrieved 15 May 2024.
- ^ "Walking Together completed – final 13 miners commemorated". The Story Mine. Retrieved 29 July 2024.