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217th Rifle Division

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217th Rifle Division
Active1941–1946
Country Soviet Union
Branch Red Army
TypeDivision
RoleInfantry
EngagementsOperation Barbarossa
Battle of Smolensk (1941)
Operation Typhoon
Battle of Moscow
Kaluga Offensive operation
Battles of Rzhev
Operation Kutuzov
Battle of Smolensk (1943)
Gomel-Rechitsa Offensive operation
Operation Bagration
Bobruysk offensive
Minsk offensive
Vistula-Oder offensive
East Prussian offensive
Battle of Königsberg
DecorationsOrder of Lenin Order of Lenin
Order of the Red Banner Order of the Red Banner
Order of Suvorov 2nd Class Order of Suvorov
Battle honoursUnecha
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Col. Mikhail Alekseevich Grachyov
Col. Vladimir Petrovich Shlegel
Maj. Gen. Kuzma Petrovich Trubnikov
Col. Pyotr Fyodorovich Malyshev
Maj. Gen. Efim Vasilevich Ryzhikov
Col. Nikolai Pavlovich Massonov
Col. Grigorii Arkadevich Grigoryan

The 217th Rifle Division was an infantry division of the Red Army, originally formed in the months just before the start of the German invasion, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of September 13, 1939. It was formed at Voronezh. When Operation Barbarossa began it was in 28th Army but soon after moving to the front it helped form the 43rd Army before being reassigned to 50th Army in Bryansk Front. After barely escaping disbandment during Operation Typhoon one of its rifle regiments was granted the battle honor "Tula" for its part in the defense of that city.

Formation

The division began forming on March 14, 1941, at Voronezh in the Oryol Military District. When completed it had the following order of battle:

  • 740th Rifle Regiment
  • 755th Rifle Regiment
  • 766th Rifle Regiment
  • 668th Artillery Regiment[1]
  • 726th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (until September 10, 1941)
  • 31st Antitank Battalion
  • 279th Reconnaissance Company
  • 396th Sapper Battalion
  • 589th Signal Battalion (later 422nd Signal Company)
  • 389th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 314th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
  • 256th Motor Transport Company (later 686th Motor Transport Battalion)
  • 261st Field Bakery (later 331st Motorized Field Bakery)
  • 155th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
  • 312th Field Postal Station
  • 571st Field Office of the State Bank

Col. Mikhail Alekseevich Grachyov was appointed to command on the day the division began forming; Col. Vladimir Petrovich Shlegel became his chief of staff in June. It was still completing its formation when the German invasion began but unlike the divisions on the frontier it had 10-14 days to receive reinforcements and reservists according to the mobilization plan before it went into battle.[2] At this time it was in the 30th Rifle Corps of the separate 28th Army in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. By July 10 it had been transferred to 33rd Rifle Corps in the same Army.[3] At this time the 217th was en route to Selizharovo under these commands.[4]

Battle of Smolensk

Beginning on July 30 the Reserve Front was authorized and the 43rd Army was soon created on the basis of 33rd Rifle Corps. This Army was attempting to establish a defense along a previously fortified line from Zhukovka to Stolby (50km northwest and west of Bryansk). Within days the 28th Army, under command of Lt. Gen. V. Ya. Kachalov, found itself in an untenable position with its entire defensive front along the Desna River threatened with encirclement. Under orders from the commander of Reserve Front, Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov, Kachalov was ordered to withdraw with two of his divisions, but was killed 16km north of Roslavl with several other members of his headquarters about midday on August 4. The remnants of Kachalov's group came under command of 43rd Army and the next day Zhukov sent orders to its commander, Lt. Gen. I. G. Zakharkin, that read in part:

Immediately send 217th Rifle Division's reconnaissance to the Pustosel, Sviridovka, Asele, Dolgoe, and Novyi Krupets line and tie them in with 258th RD's forces along the Zhukovka and Belogolovki line.

Due to false reporting Stalin came to believe that Kachalov had deserted to the Germans and his name was not finally cleared until 1953.[5]

During the second week of August the 2nd Panzer Group began driving south across the Sozh River creating a threat to Bryansk. In response the STAVKA ordered the creation of Bryansk Front on August 14 consisting of just two armies, the 13th and the new 50th Army, which immediately had the 217th assigned. This Army had eight rifle divisions under command but the 217th was the only one formed before the start of the German invasion. The 50th was under command of Maj. Gen. M. P. Petrov.[6] The 217th, along with the 279th Rifle Division, was to continue to hold its current positions while reconnoitering to the Baranovka–Ratovskaya–Kokhanovo line. From August 18 50th Army was shoring up its defenses on the Front's right wing around and north of Bryansk and by the end of the 21st was holding relatively sound defensive positions along and west of the Desna.[7] On August 18 Colonel Grachyov left his command and was replaced by Colonel Shlegel.

At 2300 hours on August 24 Petrov issued orders to his Army, which was stretched along a 100km-wide front and facing two panzer divisions and a motorized division:

217th RD (with 207th [Howitzer Artillery Regiment]) - defend the line along the eastern bank of the Snopot River and Desna River in the sector from Bolshaya Lutna to 1st of May State Farm, withdraw 766th [Rifle Regiment] into reserve behind the right wing after its relief by 43rd Army's units, conduct an active reconnaissance, and protect the boundary with 43rd Army. Headquarters - Kosevat village.

The division was also directed to protect its boundary with the 279th Rifle Division. In a conversation with the STAVKA on the same date the Front commander, Lt. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko, was warned that this panzer grouping was aimed at these two divisions. However, by this time the priority for 2nd Panzer Group was preparing for the drive southward to encircle Southwestern Front east of Kiev. As this offensive developed on August 26 Yeryomenko was directed to launch diversionary attacks, including on the sector of the 217th. At the same time the 10th Motorized Division had been directed to seize crossings of the Desna in order to protect the flank of 2nd Panzer Group and to intercept Soviet forces attempting to escape encirclement. It captured the town of Korop and established a small bridgehead late on August 28, which forced the 217th back to the defense. The division was reported as "successfully defending the Buda and Kholopenkovy front... except in the Lozitsy, Krasnyi Shchipal, Pavlova Sloboda and Molotkovo sector, where an enemy force of up to two [infantry regiments] and 130 tanks penetrated the forward security positions at 1000 hours but were contained short of the main defensive belt."[8]

By the end of the next day the lead battlegroup of 10th Motorized (which in fact had only 12 tanks on strength) pushed southward 20km. The 217th was reported as holding its previous positions "while repelling and destroying enemy units attacking in the Snopot and Piatnitskoe region" with artillery, mortar and machine gun fire; this situation was essentially unchanged 48 hours later. The STAVKA issued orders at 0615 hours on August 30 for Bryansk Front to go over to the attack with most of its forces toward Roslavl and Starodub. Within 50th Army the 217th and three other divisions were to defend their positions while the remainder began their assault on September 3. In addition to its overextended sector the Front also lacked any substantial armored forces, making the operation entirely unrealistic.[9]

Roslavl-Novozybkov Offensive

At 1000 hours on September 1 Petrov issued orders to the 217th (still supported by two battalions of what is now identified as the 207th Cannon Artillery Regiment) to defend the line from Frolovka along the Desna to the mouth of the Seshcha River and also "seize and hold the Lipovka and Dubrovka region by day's end on 2 September." This attack began after a two-hour artillery preparation but had inadequate air support and was plagued by poor organization and coordination; in a summary report at 1800 hours the division was stated as "partially regrouping" while occupying its previous positions, indicating that its attack had failed. At the end of the next day its situation remained unchanged facing an "inactive enemy."[10]

Regardless of these efforts the 2nd Panzer Group, and specifically XXIV Motorized Corps, was pushing southward into eastern Ukraine. During September 3 the 740th Rifle Regiment occupied Piatnitskoe with one battalion and a second battalion was 1.5km northwest of Vyazovsk, but the division made no further advances the following day. By the end of September 6 it had identified that it was facing the 258th Infantry Division, which was essentially inactive. By now Yeryomenko was aware that his counteroffensive had failed and that his Front was in peril due to developments both to the north and the south. The 217th continued to hold against the 258th the next day.[11] On September 14 Colonel Grachyov returned to command and Colonel Shlegel resumed his role as chief of staff.

Operation Typhoon

Army Group Center launched the main phase of its final offensive on Moscow on October 2. The 217th was still on the right (north) flank of 50th Army, trying to defend a sector 46km in extent with a force of 11,953 men, armed with 360 machine guns and 144 artillery pieces, including 18 antitank guns.[12] The 4th Panzer Group had chosen to make its attack at the boundary between the division and the 53rd Rifle Division of 43rd Army to its north; this was also the boundary between Bryansk Front and Western Front.[13] The 766th Rifle Regiment, on the division's right flank, could not withstand the concentrated attack and fled in panic. In the first hours its supporting battalion of the 668th Artillery Regiment lost 12 of its guns. A later report by one of the division's commissars stated:

On 2 October 1941 the Germans conducted a heavy artillery preparation, destroyed [our] machine-gun emplacements and went on the attack. German aviation didn't give us the chance to deploy. As a result the division was smashed. The 766th Regiment... has been lost. Only around 20 men remained of the 755th Regiment. The division is leaderless. The Red Army men have been abandoned to the whim of fate.

In fact the situation, while dire, was not as bad as this officer, who had abandoned his post, reported. While the 217th had suffered considerable casualties it continued to engage the German forces. However, during the next day the division's retreat also uncovered the left flank of Western Front's 33rd Army. By the end of the day it had fallen back to a line from Budchino to the Vetma River, where it turned and tried to halt the German units that were attacking toward Lyudinovo.[14] It was now facing the 52nd Infantry Division of XXXXIII Army Corps.[15]

By the end of October 4 General Yeryomenko was aware that his Front was again facing the prospect of encirclement. Petrov reported at 2100 hours that the 217th was retreating to the Olshanitsy–Volynskii crossroads–Hill 197.6 area. In the event the depleted division, together with the 290th Rifle Division and the 643rd Cavalry Regiment, was able to hold the German offensive in check on this line until October 6.[16]

On October 7 the 17th Panzer Division captured Bryansk, in the rear of much of 50th Army, while the 18th Panzer Division was driving northward even deeper in the Army's rear.[17] The 50th was now "cordoned off" if not firmly encircled. The next day General Petrov was able to break contact with most of the German forces and his divisions completed a 50km rapid march to the east on October 9 before running into significant resistance. After heavy fighting over the following days they engaged a strong German grouping approaching from the direction of Oryol on October 12 which blocked their path to the east and southeast. A report by German 4th Army the next day claimed 40,000 prisoners had been taken and that the 50th had been destroyed but in fact it had reached a line from Podbuzhe to Karachev and was preparing a breakout across the Resseta River. General Petrov led a flanking detachment on October 15 that cleared the east bank of the river but was mortally wounded in the fighting.[18] By the end of the next day the leading elements of the retreating force had reached Belyov.[19] Colonel Grachyov was taken prisoner on October 17 and Colonel Shlegel again took over command.

The remnants of seven rifle divisions, a tank brigade, and several other units had emerged from encirclement in the Belyov area by October 23. The 217th had managed to save 14 guns of its 668th Regiment. Altogether 12,000 troops of 50th Army escaped to take up new defenses in the sector.[20] The division continued to hold along the Upa River near Odoyev until October 27, after which it resumed its retreat toward Tula, reaching north of that city by November 2.[21] On November 16 Maj. Gen. Kuzma Petrovich Trubnikov, who had previously commanded the 258th Rifle Division, took over command from Colonel Shlegel. On November 22 Lt. Gen. I. V. Boldin was appointed commander of 50th Army. Bryansk Front had been disbanded on November 10 and Boldin's Army was now on the southern flank of Western Front.

Defense of Tula

Tula was a major arsenal for the Soviet Union; many of its small arms and heavier weapons, plus ammunition, were produced in its factories. Boldin's predecessor, Maj. Gen. A. N. Yermakov, had created a sub-headquarters in the form of the Tula Combat Sector on October 29. It consisted of the 217th, 173rd, 290th, 260th and 154th Rifle Divisions, plus the 58th Reserve and 1005th Rifle Regiments. At this time the combat strengths of the divisions varied greatly but on average were about 1,000 personnel each. The 217th had 12 artillery pieces (nine 76mm guns and three 152mm howitzers) and eight mortars. It had seven heavy machine guns and only 62.7 percent of its soldiers had rifles, but this was within the average for the Sector.[22]

From October 30 to November 6 German forces attempted to capture Tula by means of a frontal blow from the south. Mixed groups of infantry and tanks began attacking on the morning of October 30 as leading elements of the 217th and 154th were arriving. The Tula Combat Sector had 4,400-4,500 men under command by the end of the day. These held their positions over the next two days, accounting for 22 tanks and an armored car in the fighting. 50th Army was being reinforced by the 32nd Tank Brigade and 413th Rifle Division during this time which allowed it to reestablish communications with 49th Army to its north. By November 5 all German efforts to take the city from the south had been frustrated, in part because their supply lines were vastly overstretched while arms and ammunition were being fed to 50th Army direct from the factories in their immediate rear. The reinforcements went over to the counterattack at dawn on November 7 but this developed slowly due to active German resistance and inexperience on the Soviet side and made no permanent gains. The next day the 217th and 154th beat off multiple attacks toward Kitaevka and in the area of the Oryol road.[23]

Over the following week the German forces focused on again breaking communications between the two Soviet armies in an effort to encircle Tula. By November 22 the 2nd Panzer Group had captured Stalinogorsk and Tula was deeply outflanked but its defenses were continuing to hold and the German troops were severely worn down, still lacking clothing and equipment for winter warfare. On December 2 Western Front gradually began going over to the counteroffensive. General Boldin received orders late that day to destroy the German forces advancing on Rudnevo. He committed the 740th Rifle Regiment, with nine tanks, the 32nd Tank Brigade, the 124th Tank Regiment (minus one company) to this attack from the south. By 1000 hours on December 3 two battalions of the 740th had taken Gnezdino and from 1400 were fighting for Kryukovo and meeting heavy resistance. The third battalion was advancing with 124th Tanks in conjunction with 112th Tank Division and units of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. A regiment of the 413th was fighting for Dorofeevka by 1400, which to some extent secured the 740th's right flank.[24]

References

Citations

  1. ^ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 96
  2. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 96
  3. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, pp. 18, 26
  4. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 96
  5. ^ David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2010, Kindle ed., chs. 2, 8
  6. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 8
  7. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, pp. 71-72, 75
  8. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 85-86, 89, 94-95, 110, 112, 115, 118-19, 126
  9. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 364-66, 373-75, 378, 381, 386, 391, 393
  10. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 403, 434, 448
  11. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 455, 471, 477, 483, 493
  12. ^ Lev Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2013, Kindle ed., part 3
  13. ^ David Stahel, Operation Typhoon, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2013, p. 63
  14. ^ Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941, Kindle ed., part 3
  15. ^ Stahel, Operation Typhoon, p. 72
  16. ^ Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941, Kindle ed., part 3
  17. ^ Stahel, Operation Typhoon, p. 79
  18. ^ Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941, Kindle ed., part 5
  19. ^ Stahel, Operation Typhoon, p. 180
  20. ^ Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941, Kindle ed., part 5
  21. ^ Stahel, Operation Typhoon, pp. 284, 295
  22. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Moscow, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2015, Kindle ed., part III, ch. 5
  23. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Moscow, Kindle ed., part III, ch. 5
  24. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Moscow, Kindle ed., part III, ch. 5

Bibliography