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Battle of the Bismarck Sea

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Battle of the Bismarck Sea
Part of World War II, Pacific War
Splashes in the water. A bomb explodes violently in a ship as an aircraft swoops low overhead.
An A-20 Havoc/Boston bomber of the 89th Squadron, 3rd Attack Group is shown at the moment that it clears a Japanese merchant ship following a successful skip bombing attack off Wewak, New Guinea in March 1944. This photo illustrates the type of low level attack that was used so successfully during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.
Date2–4 March 1943
Location
Bismarck Sea, in the vicinity of Lae
Result Decisive Allied victory
Belligerents
United States United States
Australia Australia		 Japan Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
United States Ennis Whitehead
Australia Joe Hewitt		 Japan Masatomi Kimura
Japan Gunichi Mikawa
Strength
39 heavy bombers;
41 medium bombers;
34 light bombers;
54 fighters
10 torpedo boats		 8 destroyers,
8 troop transports,
100 aircraft
Casualties and losses
2 bombers,
4 fighters destroyed
13 killed[1]		 8 transports,
5 destroyers sunk
20 fighters destroyed,
2,890+ dead[2]
Map of eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands. Guadalcanal is at the lower right, Rabaul in the upper center, and Port Moresby, Buna, and Gona in the lower left.

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea (2–4 March 1943) took place in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) during World War II. During the course of the battle, aircraft of the U.S. Fifth Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) attacked a Japanese convoy that was carrying troops to Lae, New Guinea. Most of the task force was destroyed, and Japanese troop losses were heavy.

In December 1942, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters decided to reinforce their position in the South West Pacific. A plan was devised to move some 6,900 troops from Rabaul directly to Lae. The plan was understood to be risky, because Allied air power in the area was strong, but it was decided to proceed because otherwise the troops would have to march through inhospitable swamp, mountain and jungle terrain without roads. On 28 February 1943, the convoy—comprising eight destroyers and eight troop transports with an escort of approximately 100 fighters—set out from Simpson Harbour in Rabaul.

The Allies had detected preparations for the convoy, and naval codebreakers in Melbourne and Washington, D.C. had decrypted and translated messages indicating the convoy's intended destination and date of arrival. The Allied Air Forces had developed new techniques that they hoped would improve the chances of successful air attack on ships. They detected and shadowed the convoy, which came under sustained air attack on 2–3 March 1943. Follow-up attacks by PT boats and aircraft were made on 4 March. All eight transports and four of the escorting destroyers were sunk. Out of 6,900 troops who were badly needed in New Guinea, only about 1,200 made it to Lae. Another 2,700 were saved by destroyers and submarines and returned to Rabaul. The Japanese would make no further attempts to reinforce Lae by ship, greatly hindering their ultimately unsuccessful efforts to stop Allied offensives in New Guinea.

Background

Allied offensives

Six months after Imperial Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States won a strategic victory at the Battle of Midway. Seizing the strategic initiative, the United States and its Allies landed on Guadalcanal in the southern Solomon Islands in August 1942, beginning the Solomon Islands Campaign. The battle for Guadalcanal ended in victory for the Allies with the withdrawal of Japanese forces from the island in early February 1943. At the same time, Australian and American forces in New Guinea fought the Japanese land offensive along the Kokoda Track. The Allied forces captured Buna-Gona, destroying Japanese forces in that area.[3][4]

The ultimate goal of the Allied counter-offensives in New Guinea and the Solomons was to capture the main Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain, later codified as Operation Cartwheel, and clear the way for the eventual reconquest of the Philippines. Recognising the threat, the Japanese continued to send land, naval, and aerial reinforcements to the area in an attempt to check the Allied advances.[5]

Japanese plans

Reviewing the progress of the Battle of Guadalcanal and the Battle of Buna-Gona in December 1942, the Japanese faced the prospect that neither could be held. Accordingly, Imperial General Headquarters decided to take steps to strengthen the Japanese position in the South West Pacific by sending Lieutenant General Jusei Aoki's 20th Division from Korea to Guadalcanal and Lieutenant General Heisuke Abe's 41st Division from China to Rabaul.[6] Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura, the commander of the Japanese Eighth Area Army at Rabaul, ordered Lieutenant General Hatazō Adachi's XVIII Army to secure Madang, Wewak and Tuluvu in New Guinea. On 29 December, Adachi ordered the 102nd Infantry Regiment and other units under the command of Major General Toru Okabe, the commander of the infantry group of the 51st Division, to move from Rabaul to Lae and advance inland to capture Wau.[7] Following the decision to evacuate Guadalcanal on 4 January,[8] the Japanese switched priorities from the Solomon Islands to New Guinea, and it was decided to send both the 20th and 41st Divisions to Wewak.[6]

On 5 January 1943, the convoy carrying Okabe's force set out for Lae from Rabaul. Forewarned by Ultra, United States Army Air Force (USAAF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft spotted, shadowed and attacked the convoy, which was shielded by low clouds and Japanese fighters. The Allies claimed to have shot down 69 Japanese aircraft for the loss of 10 of their own.[9] An RAAF Consolidated PBY Catalina sank the transport Nichiryu Maru.[10] Although destroyers rescued 739 of the 1,100 troops on board, the ship took with it all of Okabe's medical supplies. Another transport, Myoko Maru, was so badly damaged at Lae by USAAF North American B-25 Mitchells that it had to be beached. Nonetheless, the convoy succeeded in reaching Lae on 7 January and landing the troops. However, Okabe was defeated in the Battle of Wau.[11]

Most of the 20th Division was landed at Wewak from naval high speed transports on 19 January 1943. The bulk of the 41st Division followed on 12 February.[6] Imamura and Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, the commander of the South East Area Fleet, developed a plan to move the command post of the headquarters of the Japanese XVIII Army and the main body of the 51st Division from Rabaul to Lae on 3 March, followed by moving the remainder of the 20th Division to Madang on 10 March.[12] This plan was acknowledged to be risky, because Allied air power in the area was strong. The XVIII Army staff gave the operation a 50–50 chance of success. They held war games of the operation which predicted losses of four out of ten transports, and between 30 and 40 aircraft. On the other hand, if the troops were landed at Madang, they faced a march of over 140 mi (230 km) over inhospitable swamp, mountain and jungle terrain without roads.[13]

Allied intelligence

Map of New Guinea indicating the route taken by the Japanese along the north coast of New Britain and through the Vitiaz Strait
Japanese ship and Allied air movements during the battle

The Allies soon began detecting signs of preparations for a new convoy. A Japanese floatplane of the type normally used for anti-submarine patrols in advance of convoys was sighted on 7 February 1943. The Allied Air Forces South West Pacific Area commander—Lieutenant General George Kenney—ordered an increase in reconnaissance patrols over Rabaul. On 14 February, aerial photographs were taken that showed 79 vessels in port, including 45 merchant ships and six transports. It was clear that another convoy was being prepared, but its destination was not known. However, on 8 February, a coded message was intercepted which naval codebreakers in Melbourne and Washington, D.C. decrypted and translated over the next eight days. This revealed the Japanese intention to land convoys at Wewak, Madang and Lae. Subsequently, codebreakers decrypted a message from the Japanese 11th Air Fleet to the effect that destroyers and six transports would reach Lae about 5 March. Another report indicated that they would reach Lae by 12 March. On 22 February, reconnaissance aircraft reported 59 merchant vessels in the harbour at Rabaul.[14]

Kenney read this Ultra intelligence in the office of the Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific Area—General Douglas MacArthur—on 25 February. The prospect of an additional 6,900 Japanese troops in the Lae area greatly disturbed MacArthur, as they might seriously impact upon his plans to capture and develop the area. Kenney wrote out orders for Brigadier General Ennis Whitehead, the commander of the Advance Echelon (ADVON) of the Fifth Air Force in New Guinea, which were sent by courier. He informed Whitehead of the proposed convoy date, and warned him about the usual Japanese pre-convoy air attack. He also urged that flying hours be cut back so as to allow for a large strike on the convoy, and instructed him to move forward as many aircraft as possible so that they could be close to the nearby captured airfields around Dobodura, where they would not be subject to the vagaries of weather over the Owen Stanley Range.[15] Kenney flew up to Port Moresby on 26 February, where he met with Whitehead. The two generals inspected fighter and bomber units in the area, and agreed to attack the Japanese convoy in the Vitiaz Straits. Kenney returned to Brisbane on 28 February.[16]

Allied tactics

In the South West Pacific, "the air mission was to interdict Japan's sea supply lanes and enable the ground forces to conduct an island-hopping strategy."[17] A conventional strategic bombing campaign was out of the question because industrial targets in Japan were well beyond the range of even the largest strategic bombers operating from bases in Australia and New Guinea.[18] But the results of the effort against the January convoy were very disappointing. Some 416 sorties had been flown with only two ships sunk and three damaged. Clearly, a change of tactics was in order. Group Captain Bill Garing, an RAAF officer on Kenney's staff with considerable experience with air-sea operations, including a tour of duty in Europe, recommended that Japanese convoys be subjected to simultaneous attack from different altitudes and directions.[19]

A man in wearing a leather helmet with goggles on his head stands hands on hips in front of an a twin-propeller aircraft. He wears an uninflated life jacket bearing the inscription "Capt Faurot". This name is painted on the aircraft too, which sports nose art of the ace of spades, indicating his ace status, and a skull with glasses and a top hat smoking a cigar. The engine cowl has artwork making it look like a shark.
Captain Robert L. Faurot of the 39th Fighter Squadron, seen here in front of his P-38 Lightning. He was shot down by Japanese fighters during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

Major Paul I. "Pappy" Gunn and his men at the 81st Depot Repair Squadron in Townsville, Queensland, modified some USAAF Douglas A-20 Havoc light bombers by installing four .50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns in their noses.[20] Two 450-US-gallon (1,700 L; 370 imp gal) fuel tanks were added to give the aircraft more range. This was successful, and an attempt was then made to create a longer range attack aircraft by doing the same thing to a B-25 medium bomber to operate as a "commerce destroyer".[21][22] This proved to be somewhat more difficult. The resulting aircraft was obviously nose heavy despite adding lead ballast to the tail, and the vibrations caused by firing the machine guns were enough to make rivets pop out of the skin of the aircraft.[23] The tail guns and belly turrets were removed, the latter being of little use if the aircraft was flying low.[24]

The Mitchell crews developed a new technique called skip bombing. Flying only a few dozen feet above the sea toward their targets, they would release their bombs, which would then, ideally, ricochet across the surface of the water and explode at the side of the target ship, under it, or just over it.[15] Another technique was mast height bombing, in which a bomber would approach the target at low altitude, 200 to 500 feet (61 to 152 m), at about 265 to 275 miles per hour (426 to 443 km/h), and then drop down to mast height, 10 to 15 feet (3.0 to 4.6 m) about 600 yards (550 m) from the target. They would release their bombs at around 300 yards (270 m), aiming directly at the side of the ship. The Battle of the Bismarck sea would demonstrate that this was the more successful of the two tactics.[25] However, they were not mutually exclusive. A bomber could drop two bombs, skipping the first and launching the second at mast height.[26] Practice missions were carried out against the SS Pruth, a liner that had run aground in 1923.[27]

The Fifth Air Force had two heavy bomber groups. The 43rd Bombardment Group was equipped with about 55 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses. Most of these had seen hard war service over the previous six months and the availability rate was low. The recently arrived 90th Bombardment Group was equipped with Consolidated B-24 Liberators but they too had maintenance problems. There were two medium groups, the 38th Bombardment Group, which was equipped with B-25 Mitchells, and the 22nd Bombardment Group, which was equipped with Martin B-26 Marauders, but the former was missing two of its four squadrons that had been diverted to the South Pacific Area, and the latter had taken so many losses that it had been withdrawn to Australia to be rebuilt.[28]

There was also a light group, the 3rd Attack Group, which was equipped with a mixture of A-20 Havocs and B-25 Mitchells.[28] The 3rd Attack Group was not just short of aircraft; it was critically short of aircrew as well. To make up the numbers the USAAF turned to the RAAF for help. Australian aircrew were assigned to most of the group's aircraft, serving in every role except aircraft commander.[29] In addition to the RAAF aircrew with the USAAF squadrons, there were RAAF units in the Port Moresby area. No. 30 Squadron RAAF, which had arrived in Port Moresby in September 1942, was equipped with the Australian-made Bristol Beaufighter. Both the aircraft and the squadron proved adept at low level attacks.[30] Also in the Port Moresby area were two fighter groups, the 35th Fighter Group and the 49th Fighter Group, which were equipped with Bell P-400, Curtiss P-40 Warhawk and Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters, but only the latter were suitable for long range escort missions.[28]

Battle

First attacks

The Japanese convoy—comprising eight destroyers and eight troop transports with an escort of approximately 100 fighters—assembled and departed from Simpson Harbour in Rabaul on 28 February.[31] During the January operation, a course was followed that hugged the south coast of New Britain. This had made it easy to provide air cover, but being close to the airfields also made it possible for the Allied Air Forces to attack both the convoy and the airfields at the same time. This time, a route was chosen along the north coast, in the hope that the Allies would be deceived into thinking that the convoy's objective was Madang. Allied air attacks on the convoy at this point would have to fly over New Britain, allowing easy interdiction from Japanese air bases there, but the final leg of the voyage would be particularly dangerous, because the convoy would have to negotiate the restricted waters of the Vitiaz Strait.[32] The Japanese named the convoy "Operation 81."[33]

A ship under way, with splashes on both sides.
Fifth Air Force bombs bracket the transport Taimei Maru[34]

The destroyers carried 958 troops while the transports took 5,954. All the ships were combat loaded to expedite unloading at Lae. The commander of the Japanese XVIII Army—Lieutenant General Hatazō Adachi—travelled on the destroyer Tokitsukaze, while that of the 51st Division—Lieutenant General Hidemitsu Nakano—was on board the destroyer Yukikaze.[31] The escort commander—Rear Admiral Masatomi Kimura of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla—flew his flag from the destroyer Shirayuki. The other five destroyers were Arashio, Asashio, Asagumo, Shikinami and Uranami. They escorted seven Army transports: Aiyo Maru (2,716 tons; 7,686 m3), Kembu Maru (950 tons; 2,688 m3), Kyokusei Maru (5,493 tons; 15,545 m3), Oigawa Maru (6,494 tons; 18,378 m3), Shinai Maru (3,793 tons; 10,734 m3), Taimai Maru (2,883 tons; 8,159 m3) and Teiyo Maru (6,870 tons; 19,442 m3). Rounding out the force was the lone Navy transport Najima (8,125 tons; 22,994 m3).[2][35] All the ships carried troops, equipment and ammunition, except for the Kembu Maru, which carried 1,000 drums of avgas and 650 drums of other fuel.[36]

The convoy, moving at 7 kn (8.1 mph; 13 km/h),[37] was not detected for several days because of two tropical storms which struck the Solomon and Bismarck Seas between 27 February and 1 March. However, at about 15:00 on 1 March, the crew of a patrolling B-24 Liberator heavy bomber spotted the convoy. Eight B-17 Flying Fortresses were sent to the location but failed to locate the ships. [38]

At dawn on 2 March, a force of six RAAF A-20 Bostons attacked Lae to reduce its ability to provide support. At about 10:00, another Liberator found the convoy. Eight B-17s took off to attack the ships, followed an hour later by another 20.[39] They found the convoy and attacked with 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs from 5,000 ft (1,500 m). They claimed to have sunk up to three merchant ships. Kyokusei Maru, carrying 1,200 army troops, had sunk and two other transports, Teiyo Maru and Nojima were damaged.[40][41] Eight Japanese fighters were destroyed and 13 damaged in the day's action.[42]

The destroyers Yukikaze and Asagumo plucked 950 survivors of Kyokusei Maru from the water. These two destroyers, being faster than the convoy since its speed was dictated by the slower transports, broke away from the group to disembark the survivors at Lae. The destroyers resumed their escort duties the next day.[40] The convoy—without the troop transport and two destroyers—was attacked again on the evening of 2 March by 11 B-17s, with one transport sustaining minor damage. During the night, PBY Catalina flying boats from No. 11 Squadron RAAF took over the task of shadowing the convoy.[39]

Further attacks

A ship viewed from far above. There are a dozen splashes in the water around it.
Japanese transport under aerial attack in the Bismarck Sea, 3 March 1943

By 3 March, the convoy was within range of the air base at Milne Bay, and eight Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers from No. 100 Squadron RAAF took off from there. However, because of bad weather only two found the convoy, and neither scored any hits. The convoy now rounded the Huon Peninsula, which brought it into clearer conditions. A force of 90 Allied aircraft took off from Port Moresby, and headed for Cape Ward Hunt, while 22 A-20 Bostons of No. 22 Squadron RAAF attacked the Japanese fighter base at Lae, reducing the convoy's air cover. Attacks on the base continued throughout the day.[43][44]

At 10:00, 13 B-17s reached the convoy and bombed from medium altitude, causing the ships to disperse, and prolonging the journey. They attracted a number of Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, which were engaged by the P-38 Lightning escorts. Three Lightnings were shot down. The fighter pilots claimed 15 Zeros destroyed, while the B-17 crews claimed five more.[43][44] Actual Japanese fighter losses for the day were seven destroyed and three damaged.[45]

A B-17 broke up in the air, and its crew was forced to take to their parachutes. The Japanese pilot machine-gunned some of the B-17 crew members as they descended and attacked others in the water after they landed.[43]

The 13 Beaufighters from No. 30 Squadron RAAF approached at low level to give the impression they were Beauforts making another torpedo attack. If the ships turned to face them, the standard procedure in case of a torpedo attack, the Beaufighters maximised the damage they inflicted on the ships' anti-aircraft guns, bridges and crews in strafing runs with their four 20 mm (0.79 in) nose cannons and six wing-mounted .303 in (7.70 mm) machine guns.[43] On board one of the Beaufighters was cameraman Damien Parer, who shot dramatic footage of the battle.[46] Immediately afterward, seven B-25s of the 38th Bombardment Group's 71st Bombardment Squadron bombed from about 750 m (2,460 ft), while six from the 405th Bombardment Squadron attacked at mast height.[43][44]

Shirayuki was the first ship to be hit, by a combination of strafing and bombing attacks. Almost all the men on the bridge became casualties, including Kimura, who was wounded. One bomb hit started a magazine explosion that caused the stern to break off, and the ship to sink. Her crew was transferred to Shikinami, and Shirayuki was scuttled. The destroyer Tokitsukaze was also hit and fatally damaged, and later sank. Its crew was taken off by Yukikaze. The destroyer Arashio was hit, and collided with the transport Nojima, disabling her. Both the destroyer and the transport were abandoned, and Nojima was later sunk by an air attack.[47]

Two aircraft fly after a ship at very low altitude
Allied aircraft execute a low-level attack on a Japanese ship

Fourteen B-25s returned that afternoon, reportedly claiming 17 hits or near misses. By this time, a third of the transports were sunk or sinking. As the Beaufighters and B-25s had expended their munitions, some USAAF A-20 Havocs of the 3rd Attack Group joined in. Another five hits were claimed by B-17s of the 43rd Bombardment Group from higher altitudes. During the afternoon, further attacks from USAAF B-25s and Bostons of No. 22 Squadron RAAF followed.[48]

Garrett Middlebrook, a co-pilot in one of the B-25s, described the ferocity of the strafing attacks:

They went in and hit this troop ship. What I saw looked like little sticks, maybe a foot long or something like that, or splinters flying up off the deck of ship; they'd fly all around...and twist crazily in the air and fall out in the water. Then I realized what I was watching were human beings. I was watching hundreds of those Japanese just blown off the deck by those machine guns. They just splintered around the air like sticks in a whirlwind and they'd fall in the water.[49]

All seven of the transports were hit and most were burning or sinking about 100 km (54 nmi; 62 mi) south east of Finschhafen, along with the destroyers Shirayuki, Tokitsukaze and Arashio. Four of the destroyers—Shikinami, Yukikaze, Uranami and Asagumo—picked up as many survivors as possible and then retired to Rabaul, accompanied by the destroyer Hatsuyuki, which had come from Rabaul to assist.[47] That night, a force of ten U.S. Navy PT boats—under the command of Lieutenant Commander Barry Atkins—set out to attack the convoy. Two boats struck submerged debris and were forced to return. The other eight arrived off Lae in the early hours of 4 March. Atkins spotted a fire that turned out to be the transport Oigawa Maru. PT-143 and PT-150 fired torpedoes at it, sinking the crippled vessel. In the morning, a fifth destroyer—Asashio—was sunk when a B-17 hit her with a 500 lb (230 kg) bomb while she was picking up survivors from Arashio.[50]

Some 2,700 survivors were taken to Rabaul by the destroyers. On 4 March, another 1,000 or so survivors were adrift on rafts.[47] On the evenings of 3–5 March, PT boats and planes attacked Japanese rescue vessels, as well as the survivors from the sunken vessels on life rafts and swimming or floating in the sea. This was later justified on the grounds that rescued servicemen would have been rapidly landed at their military destination and promptly returned to active service.[51] On 6 March, the Japanese submarines I-17 and I-26 picked up 170 of them. Two days later, I-26 found another 54 and put them ashore at Lae.[47] Hundreds made their way to various islands. One band of 18 landed on Kiriwina, where it was captured by PT-114. Another made its way to Guadalcanal, only to be killed by an American patrol.[52]

Aftermath

The battle was a disaster for the Japanese. Out of 6,900 troops who were badly needed in New Guinea, only about 1,200 made it to Lae. Another 2,700 were saved by destroyers and submarines and returned to Rabaul.[53] About 2,890 Japanese soldiers and sailors were killed. The Allies lost 13 aircrew killed, of whom ten died in combat and three in an accident, and eight wounded. Aircraft losses were one B-17 and three P-38s in combat, and one B-25 and one Beaufighter in accidents. Due to miscounting of the Japanese force, MacArthur issued a communiqué on 7 March claiming that 22 ships, which included 12 transports, three cruisers and seven destroyers, had been sunk along with 12,792 troops.[1] Army Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C. looked into the matter in mid-1943 and concluded that there were only 16 ships involved. However, GHQ SWPA elected to stick to its original story.[54] After the war, Kenney would repeat the claim.[55]

The Allied Air Forces had used 233,847 rounds of ammunition, and dropped 261 500 lb and 253 1,000 lb bombs. They claimed 19 hits and 42 near misses with the former, and 59 hits and 39 near misses from the latter. Of the 137 bombs dropped in low level attacks, 48, or 35%, were claimed to have hit, but only 29, or 7.5%, of the 387 bombs dropped from medium altitude.[56] This compared favourably with efforts in August and September 1942 when only 3% of bombs dropped were claimed to have scored hits.[57] It was noted that while the high altitude attacks scored few hits, they had dispersed the convoy, while the gunfire from the Beaufighters had knocked out many of the anti-aircraft defences. Aircraft attacking from multiple directions had confused and overwhelmed the Japanese defences, resulting in lower casualties and more accurate bombing. The results therefore vindicated not just the tactics of mast height attack, but of mounting coordinated attacks from multiple directions.[56]

Japanese movements in eastern New Guinea, 1942-1944

There was no doubt that the Japanese had suffered a major defeat. Imamura's chief of staff flew to Imperial General Headquarters to report on the disaster. It was decided that there would be no more attempts to land troops at Lae. [58] The losses incurred in the Bismarck Sea caused grave concern for the security of Lae and Rabaul. This resulted in a change of strategy. On 25 March a joint Army-Navy Central Agreement on South West Area Operations gave operations in New Guinea priority over those in the Solomon Islands campaign.[59] The XVIII Army was allocated additional shipping, ordnance and anti-aircraft units, which were sent to Wewak or Hansa Bay.[60] Said Rabaul staff officer Masatake Okumiya of the defeat, "Our losses for this single battle were fantastic. Not during the entire savage fighting at Guadalcanal did we suffer a single comparable blow. We knew we could no longer run cargo ships or even fast destroyer transports to any front on the north coast of New Guinea, east of Wewak."[61]

The planned movement of the 20th Division to Madang was revised in the light of what had occurred in the Bismarck Sea. The operation was postponed for two days, and the destination was altered from Madang to Hansa Bay further west.[60] To reduce the Allied air threat, the Allied airfield at Wau was bombed on 9 March, and that at Dobodura on 11 March. Three Allied aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and one P-40 was lost in the air, but the Allied fighters claimed to have shot down nine Japanese planes.[62] The transports reached Hansa Bay unscathed on 12 March, and the troops made their way down to Madang on foot or in barges. The 20th Division then became involved in an attempt to construct a road from Madang to Lae through the Ramu and Markham Valleys. It would toil on the road for the next few months, but its efforts would ultimately be frustrated by New Guinea's weather and the rugged terrain of the Finisterre Range.[60]

Some submarines were made available for supply runs to Lae, but they did not have the required capacity to support the troops there by themselves. An operation was carried out on 29 March in which four destroyers successfully delivered 800 troops to Finschhafen, but the growing threat from Allied aircraft led to the development of routes along the coast of New Guinea from Madang to Finschhafen, and along both the north and south coasts of New Britain to Finschhafen, and thence to Lae using Army landing craft. It was by this means that the remainder of the 51st Division finally made the trip to Lae in May.[60]

The necessity of delivering troops and supplies to the front in this manner caused immense difficulties for the Japanese in their attempts to stop further Allied advances. After the war, Japanese officers at Rabaul estimated that around 20,000 troops were lost in transit to New Guinea from Rabaul, a significant factor in Japan's ultimate defeat in the New Guinea campaign.[63]

In April, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto used the additional air resources allocated to Rabaul in Operation I-Go, an air offensive designed to redress the situation by destroying Allied ships and aircraft in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.[64] The operation was indecisive, and Yamamoto would himself become a casualty of Allied intelligence and air power.[65]

See also

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Notes

  1. ^ a b Gillison 1962, p. 695
  2. ^ a b Gillison 1962, p. 696
  3. ^ Murray 2001, p. 196
  4. ^ Hayashi 1959, pp. 64–66
  5. ^ Morison 1958, p. 12
  6. ^ a b c Tanaka 1980, p. 48
  7. ^ Willoughby 1966, pp. 188–190
  8. ^ Willoughby 1966, p. 193
  9. ^ Watson 1950, p. 136
  10. ^ Gillison 1962, pp. 674–675
  11. ^ Willoughby 1966, pp. 190–193
  12. ^ Tanaka 1980, p. 49
  13. ^ Drea 1992, p. 67
  14. ^ Drea 1992, pp. 68–69
  15. ^ a b Kreis 1996, p. 265
  16. ^ Kenney 1949, pp. 198–201
  17. ^ Rodman 2005, p. 24
  18. ^ Rodman 2005, p. 14
  19. ^ McAulay 1991, pp. 19–20
  20. ^ Kenney 1949, pp. 76–77
  21. ^ Kenney 1949, p. 144
  22. ^ Rodman 2005, pp. 40–42
  23. ^ Kenney 1949, pp. 161–162
  24. ^ Rodman 2005, pp. 43–44
  25. ^ Rodman 2005, p. 68
  26. ^ Rodman 2005, p. 41
  27. ^ McAulay 1991, p. 20
  28. ^ a b c Watson 1946, pp. 6–8
  29. ^ McAulay 1991, pp. 26–27
  30. ^ Gillison 1962, pp. 139–140, 631–633
  31. ^ a b Morison 1950, p. 55
  32. ^ Yoshihara 1955
  33. ^ Gamble 2010, p. 303
  34. ^ McAulay 1991, pp. 154–155
  35. ^ McAulay 1991, pp. 178–179
  36. ^ McAulay 1991, p. 39
  37. ^ Morison 1950, p. 56
  38. ^ Watson 1950, p. 142
  39. ^ a b Gillison 1962, p. 691
  40. ^ a b Morison 1950, p. 58
  41. ^ Gamble 2010, p. 303
  42. ^ Gamble 2010, p. 313
  43. ^ a b c d e Gillison 1962, pp. 692–693
  44. ^ a b c Watson 1950, pp. 144–145
  45. ^ Gamble 2010, p. 313
  46. ^ McAulay 1991, pp. 64–65
  47. ^ a b c d Gillison 1962, p. 697
  48. ^ Gillison 1962, pp. 693–694
  49. ^ Bergerud 2000, p. 592
  50. ^ Morison 1950, p. 61
  51. ^ Gillison 1962, pp. 694–695
  52. ^ Morison 1950, p. 62
  53. ^ Tanaka 1980, p. 50
  54. ^ Watson 1950, pp. 147–148
  55. ^ Kenney 1949, pp. 205–206
  56. ^ a b Rodman 2005, pp. 69–71
  57. ^ McAulay 2008, p. 240
  58. ^ Morison 1950, pp. 62–63
  59. ^ Drea 1992, p. 72
  60. ^ a b c d Tanaka 1980, pp. 50–53
  61. ^ Bergerud 2000, p. 592
  62. ^ Watson 1950, p. 159
  63. ^ Bergerud 2000, pp. 592, 598
  64. ^ Morison 1950, p. 117
  65. ^ Morison 1950, pp. 127–129

References

Further reading

07°15′S 148°15′E / 7.250°S 148.250°E / -7.250; 148.250

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