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Modal fictionalism

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Modal fictionalism is a term used in philosophy, and more specifically in modal logic, to describe the position that holds that talk of possible worlds is actually false, because there are not existing possible worlds, but modal statements can be still be true, because adopting such a discourse may be a useful fiction and truth condition is determined according to such a modal fiction, similar to the way we determine the truth value of sentences when we talk about the content of a story.

A contrast to the position of modal fictionalism would be the position of modal realism, which holds that possible worlds exist and are as real as our world. Modal realism was most famously advanced by the 20th-century thinker David Lewis.

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