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==== F-86s clear the skies ====
==== F-86s clear the skies ====
[[Image:F-86-4fiw.jpg|thumb|North American F-86F-25-NH Sabres of the 4th FIW/335th FIS "Chiefs" over Korea. Serial 52-5346 identifiable.]]
[[Image:8fbg-80fbs-f-86.jpg|thumb|North American F-86F-30-NA Sabres of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group, Korea, 1953. Serial 52-4877 in front in Wing Commander's colors, 52-4473 alongside.]]
[[Image:F-86-51fig-korea.jpg|right|thumb|North American F-86E-10-NA Sabres of the 25th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (51st) FBG over Korea. Identifiable is serial is 51-2742.]]
The Chinese apparently did have plans for a major spring 1951 offensive to complete the task of driving the UN out of Korea. This plan was to be based on the construction of a series of North Korean air bases and for Chinese MiGs to use these bases as forward landing strips to provide air superiority over the North, preventing UN aircraft from interfering with the advance.<ref name="multiple1">Marshall, Chester (1993). Warbird History--B-29 Superfortress. Motorbooks International ISBN 0879387858.</ref>
The Chinese apparently did have plans for a major spring 1951 offensive to complete the task of driving the UN out of Korea. This plan was to be based on the construction of a series of North Korean air bases and for Chinese MiGs to use these bases as forward landing strips to provide air superiority over the North, preventing UN aircraft from interfering with the advance.<ref name="multiple1">Marshall, Chester (1993). Warbird History--B-29 Superfortress. Motorbooks International ISBN 0879387858.</ref>



Revision as of 11:54, 21 September 2008

Bases of the United States Air Force
in South Korea
Part of Pacific Air Forces Seventh Air Force

Location of USAF bases in South Korea
Date1950-Present
Location
Result Armistice 1953, North and South Korea still technically in a state of war

The United States Air Force In South Korea is composed of units assigned to Pacific Air Forces Seventh Air Force. The mission of the personnel, equipment and aircraft is to deter, protect and defend the Republic of Korea from attack from North Korea.

Overview

The mission of Seventh Air Force is to plan, direct, and conduct combined air operations in the Republic of Korea and in the Northwest Pacific in support of PACAF, the United States Pacific Command, United Nations Command, US-ROK Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea.[1]

Currently, Seventh Air Force provides command and control to two Wings based permanently in South Korea:when two F-82 Twin Mustang fighter planes destroyed three North Korean airplanes

The 8th Fighter Wing made up of two F-16 fighter squadrons, the 35th Fighter Squadron, and the 80th Fighter Squadron.
As the most forward deployed permanently-based wing in the Air Force, the 51st Fighter Wing is charged with providing mission ready Airmen to execute combat operations and receive follow-on forces. The wing is equippped with 24 PAA, F-16 and A-10 squadrons, along with a C-12 airlift flight and a myriad of base support agencies conducts the full spectrum of missions providing for the defense of the Republic of Korea.

History

On 27 June 1950 the United Nations Security Council voted to assist the South Koreans in resisting the invasion of their country by the armed forces of North Korea that began on 25 June. United States President Harry Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur (commander of the US occupying forces in Japan) to commit units to the battle. MacArthur ordered General George E. Stratemeyer, Commander in Chief of Far East Air Force (FEAF) based in Japan to attack attacking North Korean forces between the front lines and the 38th parallel.[2]

That day, two Japan-based USAF F-82 Twin Mustangs destroyed three North Korean Air Force planes over Seoul as a C-54 Skymaster was attempting to evacuate U.S. civilians, including many women and children, from the advancing North Korean Army in the opening days of the Korean War.[3]

The United States Air Force has maintained a presence in South Korea ever since.

Korean War

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. Commander in Chief of Far East Air Force during the Korean War.

  for information concerning aircraft flown by FEAF in the Korean War; bases, and units engaged in combat operations.

South Korea fell within the USAF Far East Air Force (FEAF) Area of Responsiblity (AOR), and Far East Air Force units responded quickly and effectively in the first critical week of the war, proving in many ways the utility of airpower in modern war.

FEAF's Fifth Air Force was the main United Nations combat air command. Logistics and transport units were assigned to Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command, and on 8 July a special FEAF Bomber Command was set up under the command of Major General Emmett O'Donnell.[4]

Initial USAF Response

Initial FEAF missions were the transportation of Army and Marine units and equipment from Japan to South Korea, the evacuation of American civilian nationals, and obtaining significant intelligence through aerial reconnaissance of North Korean troop movements south. Fighter-bomber ground attack missions by Japan based F-80Cs significantly slowed the North Korean Army's advance during July 1950. On 13 July, the FEAF Bomber Command took over command of the 19th Bombardment Group and of the 22nd and 92nd Bombardment Groups which had been transferred from Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the United States to Japan. These B-29 Superfortress units were used in tactical attacks which were not very successful.[5]

Despite repeated air attacks by UN aircraft on the advancing North Korean troops, by early September the UN armies had been squeezed down into a small area south of the Naktong River, called the "Pusan Perimeter", and there was a very real fear that the hard-pressed UN troops might be forced to evacuate the entire Korean peninsula. In late July, MacArthur agreed to divert the B-29s to interdiction raids against North Korean targets nearer the 38th Parallel in an attempt to interrupt supplies being delivered to North Korean troops in the south.[5]

Formation of B-29s over the daytime skies of North Korea 1950.
Lockheed F-80C-10-LO Shooting Star 49-8708 of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group, 80th FBS, Korea, 1950
49th FBW Republic F-84E-25-RE Thunderjets taking off in Korea. Serial 51-221 in foreground.
North American F-51D-25-NA Mustang Serial 44-73000 in Korea

Later in July, the SAC 98th and 307th Bombardment Groups were also sent to Japan to join the FEAF. The 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Group completed the team. The 92nd and 98th BGs and the 31st SRG operated from bases in Japan, whereas the 19th, 22nd, and 307th BGs were based in Okinawa. Five major industrial centers in North Korea were earmarked for attack. This sort of mission is what the B-29 had been designed for, and by early September, all known industrial facilities in North Korea had been destroyed except for some oil storage facilities at Rashin, which was considered too close to the Soviet border to risk an attack. By late September, all 18 strategic targets in North Korea had been destroyed, and the B-29 Force now turned to secondary targets.[5]

Along with the SAC B-29 units, Tactical Air Command (TAC) deployed numerous Fighter, Fighter-Bomber, Tactical Bomber Transport and support units to FEAF. TAC Lockheed F-80C Shooting Star and Republic F-84E Thunderjets units deployed to FEAF to rapidly gain control of the air from the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Corps (KPAFAC). For a time in August and September 1950, all FEAF flying units had to fly from bases in Japan. The only continuously usable tactical base in Korea was Taegu, which the FEAF used as a staging field to refuel and arm tactical aircraft.[6].

North Korea was was equipped with an assortment of Russian-built equipment such as the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-11 fighters, the Ilyushin Il-10 ground attack aircraft and a smattering of Yak-18 and Polikarpov Po-2 trainers. Having largely eliminated the KPAFAC, the FEAF now turned to the task of ground attack in trying to halt the rapid North Korean advance.[7] By September, the North Korean aircraft had largely been swept from the sky.

By August 1950, in order to build up close support forces, 145 North American F-51D Mustangs were shipped from the United States aboard the aircraft carrier USS Boxer (CV-21). These planes were quickly assembled and flown out to combat units. The 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing gave up its F-80 Shooting Star jets for Mustangs, perhaps one of the few occasions in history in which a combat outfit traded in its jets for piston-engined aircraft. The Mustangs were instrumental in halting the North Korean advance, giving United Nations forces enough time to build up sufficient strength to be able to go over onto the offensive.[8]

With both American strategic and tactical air power arriving in force, F-80 Shooting Stars and F-51 Mustangs closed most rail and road traffic by day, and destroyed 32 critical bridges necessary for the conduct of warfare. Trains used by military and civilians alike waited out the daylight hours in tunnels.[4]

Throughout all parts of Korea, B-29 Superfortresses knocked out the main supply dumps and eliminated oil refineries and seaports that handled imports. The bombing was designed to starve North Korean forces of ammunition and other martial supplies. On 16 September as part of a strategic bombing campaign, the FEAF bombed Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, and Wonsan, an east coast port 80 miles north of the 38th parallel. Naval air power also attacked transportation choke points. The North Korean forces were already strung out over the peninsula, and the destruction caused by American bombers prevented needed supplies from reaching North Korean forces in the south.[4]

With control of the air obtained, General MacArthur's invasion of Inchon on 15 September 1950 suddenly reversed the fortunes of the UN forces in Korea. In the south, the Eighth U.S. Army, made up of U.S., ROK, and British forces, counterattacked the next day and United Nations forces in the Pusan Perimeter began to push north rapidly.[9]

U.S. Marines attached to X Corps captured Kimpo Air Base near Seoul on September 17. Two days later the first FEAF cargo carrier landed there, inaugurating an around-the-clock airlift of supplies, fuel, and troops. C-54s returned wounded personnel to hospitals in Japan, and C-119s airdropped supplies to front-line forces. Bad weather hindered close air support of the Eighth Army, but on the 26th the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division forged out of the Pusan Perimeter north of Taegu and within a day thrust northward to link up with 7th Infantry Division forces near Osan, 25 miles south of Seoul. Air controllers, using tactics similar to those developed in France during World War II, accompanied the advancing tank columns, supported tank commanders with aerial reconnaissance, and called in close air support missions as needed. On September 26, General Douglas MacArthur announced the recapture of Seoul, but street fighting continued for several more days.[9]

As US forces swept North Korean troops from South Korea, aviation engineers rebuilt the airfields, beginning with Pohang, on the east coast 50 miles northeast of Taegu. USAF flying units returned on 7 October to Pohang and to other rebuilt airfields at Kimpo, near Seoul, and at Suwon, 20 miles south of Seoul. By the end of the month North Korean forces had been driven entirely out of South Korea.[9]

United Nations Offensive 1950

For the United Nations forces, victory was in the air by early October 1950. The Inchon landing and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter had destroyed the North Korean units operating south of the 38th Parallel. With the return of Seoul to the South Korean government, the Republic of Korea regained the status it had enjoyed before the 25 June invasion. To stop at this juncture would have been consistent with America’s policy of containment.[10]

With the North Korean forces largely removed from the South, the United Nations decided to enforce its prewar intention of reuniting all of Korea under one government, and UN forces advanced across the 38th Parallel and into North Korea in early October 1950. However, the decision to cross the 38th Parallel appears, in retrospect, to have been the turning point in the Korean War.[10]

On 1 October Chinese Premier Chou En-lai warned that China would not tolerate or stand aside if UN forces invaded North Korea. This was a clear threat that China would intervene if that should happen. On the second the Soviet delegate to the United Nations proposed that a cease-fire in Korea be called and that all foreign troops be withdrawn. On 2 October, India warned the United Nations that China told them it would enter the war if U.N. forces cross the 38th Parallel. However, despite these warnings from China, The U.S. Army X Corps made amphibious landings at Wonsan and Iwon, which had already been captured by South Korean forces advancing by land. [10]

Many in the West, including General MacArthur, thought that taking the war into Northern China would be necessary since North Korean troops were being supplied by bases in Manchuria. MacArthur believed that Chinese supply depots near Mukden (now Shenyang) in southern Manchuria and railroad lines leading across the Yalu River into North Korea should be bombed by USAF B-29s. However, President Truman and his senior advisors disagreed, ordering MacArthur to be very cautious when his ground forces approached the Manchurian border along the Yalu. [2]

The UN offensive greatly concerned the Chinese, who worried that the UN forces would not stop at the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China, and might extend their rollback policy into China. By the end of October, UN forces were up near the Chinese frontier and some forward units were actually on the southern banks of the Yalu River. On 1 November 1950, a group of F-51s and B-26s were attacking an airfield an airfield near Sinuiju (just across the Yalu from China) when they encountered six swept-wing jets coming across the Yalu at them, firing as they approached. The Mustangs were able to escape the attack and return to base to report that the MiG-15 had appeared in Korea.[8]

Chinese Intervention 1950

When the Soviet-built Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 (MiG-15) first appeared over the skies of Korea, its performance was vastly superior to every United Nations aircraft then in use in the theater. The MiG-15 was equal to the the F-86A. It was a better dogfighter, with an edge in maneuverability and excellent acceleration. Its top speed, however, was slightly less than that of the F-86.

In order to counter the MiG threat, on 8 November the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing (which consisted of the 334th 335th, and 336th Squadrons) based at Wilmington, Delaware and equipped with the F-86A Sabre was ordered to Korea. However, before any of these Sabres could reach the front, on 26 November 1950, Chinese armies intervened with devastating force in Korea, breaking through the United Nations lines and throwing them back in utter confusion.

The Chinese struck in the west, along the Chongchon River, and completely overran several South Korean divisions and successfully landed a heavy blow to the flank of the remaining UN forces. The ensuing defeat of the U.S. Eighth Army resulted in the longest retreat of any American military unit in history.[11] In the east, at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, a 30,000 man unit from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division and U.S. Marine Corps was also unprepared for the Chinese tactics and was soon surrounded, though they eventually managed to escape the encirclement, after inflicting heavy casualties on six Chinese divisions.[12]

However, the MiG-15s did not provide any effective air support for this invasion, being unable to establish any effective intervention below a narrow strip up near the Yalu. The MiG pilots were relatively inexperienced and were poor marksmen. They would seldom risk more than one pass at their targets before they would dart back north across the Yalu. Had the MiGs been able to establish and hold air superiority over the battle area, the UN forces may well have been thrown entirely out of Korea.[13]

The first advanced detachment of 336th FIS F-86As arrived at Kimpo airfield (K-14) south of Seoul on 15 December. The first Sabre mission took place on 17 December. It was an armed reconnaissance of the region just south of the Yalu. Lt. Col. Bruce H. Hinton, commander of the 336th Squadron, succeeding in shooting down one MiG-15 out of a flight of four, to score first blood for the Sabre.[13]

By the end of 1950, Chinese armies had driven UN forces out of North Korea and had begun to invade the South. The Sabres were forced to evacuate Kimpo and return to Japan which put them out of range of the action up at the Yalu. Even though the Yalu was now out of range, on 14 January, an F-86A detachment appeared at Taegu (K-37) to participate as fighter bombers to try to halt the Chinese advance. The F-86A was not very successful in the fighter-bomber role, being judged much less effective than slower types such as the F-80 and the F-84.[13]

Eventually, the Chinese advance ground to a halt due to extended supply lines and the relentless UN air attacks. The Chinese advance was halted by the end of January, and the UN ground forces began pushing them back. Kimpo airfield was recovered on 10 February. The halting of the Chinese advance can be blamed largely on the inability of the MiGs to provide any effective support for the Chinese attack. Not only had no Chinese bombers appeared to attack UN troops, but no MiGs had flown south of the Yalu region to provide any air support.

MiG-15s versus B-29s

MiG-15 delivered by a defecting North Korean pilot to the US Air Force
Boeing B-29A-45-BN Superfortress 44-16727. Converted to F-13A. (RB-29A, 91st SRS) shot down by MiGs, possibly over China or extreme northern N Korea Jul 4, 1952. 11 of 13 taken POW.
Remains of Boeing B-29A-50-BN Superfortress 44-61813 Aircraft was converted to F-13A Photo Recon configuration. (RB-29A, 31st SRS) Was serverely damaged by MiGs and crash landed at Johnson AB, Japan Nov 9, 1950.

In February 1951, a series of B-29 interdiction raids began against Chinese supply lines in the northwest of Korea. Up to early 1951, in the absence of organized defenses, B-29s had been able to make bombing runs at altitudes as low as 10,000 feet without any danger. However, on 25 February 25, four B-29s on a raid against Sunchon were attacked by eight MiG-15s. The MiG-15 was originally intended to intercept American bombers like the B-29. It was even evaluated in mock air-to-air combat trials with an interned ex-U.S. B-29, as well as the later Soviet B-29 copy, the Tu-4 Bull. To ensure the destruction of such large bombers, the MiG-15 carried cannon armament: two 23 mm with 80 rounds per gun and a single 37 mm with 40.[14]

With the appearance of the MiG-15 in the skies over North Korea, unescorted raids at low altitudes now became extremely dangerous. Consequently, the missions were now flown at 20,000 feet, defensive formations were used, and fighter escort was provided by F-80C and F-84E aircraft. These fighters were ineffective against the MiG-15, and coordination between the bombers and fighters was often poor.[15]

On 25 February four B-29s on a raid against Sunchon were attacked by eight MiG-15s. On 1 March a Superfortress formation was jumped by nine MiGs On April 12, a force of 48 B-29s attacking the railroad bridge linking Korea with Antung, Manchuria were attacked by dozens of MiGs, and three B-29s were shot down and seven were damaged. Because of these losses, General Stratemeyer called off these raids on 12 April and diverted the B-29s to close-support raids against Chinese targets further south around the 38th parallel.[16]

In October 1951, USAF planners decided to concentrate on the destruction of Chinese air power in northern Korea before trying a more vigorous bombing policy. The B-29s were to launch attacks on Chinese air bases in north Korea. They were acting as bait, hoping to lure MiG-15s into battle, where they could be destroyed by F-86 fighters. However, the MiG squadrons had been widely dispersed, making it difficult for USAF intelligence to find them, and B-29 losses were heavy. By October 27, five B-29s had been lost and 20 more heavily damaged.[15]

MiG-15s could come in much higher than the B-29 escorts could fly, and dive directly into the bomber formation ripping them apart with blistering cannon fire. B-29 gunners had only a split second to fire on a diving Mig, and many times only put a few holes in it.

These raids were suspended and replaced by night attacks using B-29s equipped with navigation radar. This radar was able to pinpoint small targets with great accuracy. The 98th Wing was the first to be equipped, followed by the 19th and 307th. The first nighttime raids began in November 1952, and continued throughout the remainder of the Korean War. However, night fighters and radar-controlled defenses did cause significant losses. On 10 June 1952, four B-29s of the 19th Bomb Group were lit up by 24 searchlights. They were instantly attacked by 12 Migs which shot down two and severely damaged a third causing it to crash. The B-29 for all practical purposes had become a sitting duck. Between Nov. 18, 1952, and Jan. 30, 1953, communist night-fighters shot down five B-29s and severely damaged three more using a combination of Radar directed searchlights.[16]

With the appearance of the MiG-15 over the skies of Korea, the B-29 was simply rendered obsolete as an offensive bomber. When the Korean War ended, the B-29s had flown over 21,000 sorties, nearly 167,000 tons of bombs had been dropped, and 34 B-29s had been lost in combat (16 to fighters, four to flak, and fourteen to other causes). B-29 gunners had accounted for 34 Communist fighters (16 of these being MiG-15s) probably destroyed another 17 (all MiG-15s) and damaged 11 (all MiG-15s).[15]

F-86s clear the skies

North American F-86F-25-NH Sabres of the 4th FIW/335th FIS "Chiefs" over Korea. Serial 52-5346 identifiable.
North American F-86F-30-NA Sabres of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group, Korea, 1953. Serial 52-4877 in front in Wing Commander's colors, 52-4473 alongside.
North American F-86E-10-NA Sabres of the 25th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (51st) FBG over Korea. Identifiable is serial is 51-2742.

The Chinese apparently did have plans for a major spring 1951 offensive to complete the task of driving the UN out of Korea. This plan was to be based on the construction of a series of North Korean air bases and for Chinese MiGs to use these bases as forward landing strips to provide air superiority over the North, preventing UN aircraft from interfering with the advance.[5]

In early March, the MiGs began to become more active in support of this offensive, On 1 March 1951, MiGs attacked a formation of nine B-29s and severely damaged three of them. Fortunately, by this time the UN base at Suwon (K-13) was now ready, and the Sabres were now able to return to Korea and reenter the fray over the Yalu. The Sabres of the 334th Squadron began their first Yalu patrols on March 6th, and the rest of the squadron moved in four days later. At the same time, the 336th Squadron moved to Taegu from Japan, so that they could stage Sabres through Suwon. The 4th Fighter Wing's other squadron, the 335th, stayed in Japan until May 1.[17]

The biggest air battle of that spring took place on 12 April when a formation of 39 B-29s escorted by F-84Es and F-86As were attacked by over 70 MiGs. Three B-29s were lost, whereas 14 MiGs were claimed destroyed, four by the escorting Sabres and ten by B-29 gunners.

The strip of airspace in western Korea just south of the Yalu RIver soon became known as "MiG Alley" to the Sabre pilots. The Sabres would arrive for their 25-minute patrols in five minute intervals. The MiGs would usually cruise back and forth at high altitude on the other side of the Yalu, looking for an opportune time to intervene. Very often they would remain on the north side of the river, tantalizingly out of reach. When the MiGs did choose to enter battle, the Sabres would usually have only a fleeting chance to fire at the enemy before the MiGs broke off and escaped back across the Yalu. No F-86As were lost in action during the first five months of 1951, and they flew 3550 sorties and scored 22 victories. Most of the attrition was caused by accidents rather than by losses in actual combat.[17][18]

In June of 1951, the MiGs began to show more aggressive behavior, and their pilots began to get somewhat better. In air battles on June 17th, 18th, and 19th, six MiGs were destroyed but two Sabres were lost. Another Sabre was lost on June 11 when the 4th Wing covering an F-80 attack on the Sinuiju airfield shot down two more MiGs. As the first year of the Korean War came to an end, it was apparent that the F-86A Sabre had been instrumental in frustrating the MiG-15's bid for air superiority. Without control of the air, the Communist Chinese were unable to establish their series of air bases and they were not able to carry out effective air support of their spring offensive, and the Korean War settled down to a stalemate on the ground. The ground battle line was roughly the 38th Parallel where United Nations forces controlled most South Korean territory, and the Chinese and North Koreans controlled most North Korean territory, with some exceptions. It would remain that way for the rest of the war.[18]

Throughout the summer and early fall of 1951, the Sabres of the 4th FIW continued to seek battle with the MiGs near the Yalu. For the next year and a half, the dual continued. New, improved models of the F-86 appeared with the F-86E entering action in Korea with the 4th Wing in July 1951, replacing that unit's F-86As on a one-by-one basis.[17]

At any one time, only about 60 Sabres could be put into the air, assuming that everything was "right", with the rest of the force remaining at Kimpo or Suwon on alert or down for maintenance. Even when at maximum levels, the Sabre force was far outnumbered by the MiGs. By late 1951, there were enough MiGs available so that the Chinese forces attempted to move a couple of MiG squadrons into the base at Uiju, North Korea. UN air attacks soon made this base untenable, forcing the MiGs back across the Yalu.

It is now known that there were Soviet Air Force (VVS) fighter squadrons which participated in the air combat along the Yalu. They were rotated through the MiG bases on the northern side of the Yalu. Soviet Air Force MiGs operated from bases at Antung, Fengcheng, Tak Tung Kao, Takushan, Juantien, and others. At Mukden in Manchuria there were large numbers of MiGs waiting to replace those lost in battle or rotating home. Some Eastern Block units also participated. In addition, Soviet Units carried out extensive training of Chinese and North Korean pilots. Soviet archives that have only recently come to light officially list 345 Soviet-piloted MiG-15s having been lost to UN aircraft of all types during the Korean conflict. There are no comparable figures available for Chinese or North Korean losses. By the early spring of 1953, most of the Soviet units had been withdrawn from combat, and most of the MiGs were now being flown by Chinese or North Korean pilots.[19]

On 22 October 1951 seventy-five new F-86Es were ordered shipped to Japan to replace the F-80Cs of the 51st Wing based at Suwon. The 51st Wing (consisting of the 16th and 25 FIS) began operations with its new F-86Es from Suwon on December 1, with the famous World War 2 ace Col. Francis S. Gabreski as wing commander. The first kill for the 51th FIS was scored by Lt. Paul Roach of the 25th FIS on December 2. Col. Gabreski had scored 31 kills over Europe in World War 2, and he added 6.5 victories to his score in Korea. [17][18]

In late 1951, the rules of engagement were modified, making it possible for UN pilots to cross the Yalu when in "hot pursuit" of an enemy. However, there were lots of unofficial violations of this rule, and there were some occasions in which bombing and strafing attacks were carried out by UN aircraft on Communist facilities north of the Yalu, and F-86s did on occasions went north of the Yalu looking for MiGs. There were even some MiG kills scored on the "wrong" side of the Yalu. The Manchurian sanctuary was lifted in the second week of April of 1952.[18]

The first F-86Fs reached Korea in June and July of 1952, and they were issued to the 51st Wing's new 39th Squadron. F-86Fs were provided to the 335th Squadron of the 4th Wing in September of 1952. The arrival of the F-86F quickly boosted Sabre victories in Korea. The 4th Wing's 335th Squadron scored a total of 81 victories during the remainder of 1952, while the other two 4th Wing squadrons (which were still operating F-86Es) got 41.[17][18]

A wing modification to the Sabre, called the "6-3" gave the F-86F increased maximum speed .In addition, there was a slight improvement in range. The most significant improvement was, however, in the maneuverability at high altitudes and at high Mach numbers. Sabre wing modification conversion kits were shipped to Korea in high secrecy in September 1952 to convert F-86F aircraft already there to the new configuration. Enough kits were eventually supplied to convert all Korean-based F-86Fs and some F-86Es to this new configuration. The "6-3" wing was an immediate success, quickly boosting Sabre victories in Korea. With the "6-3-wing" F-86F, the USAF now had a fighter which could match the maximum speed of the MiG at altitudes all the way up to the Sabre's service ceiling of 47,000 feet, could turn inside the MiG, and which had almost as great a rate of climb. It was with F-86F with the "6-3" wing that the Sabre was to rack up its biggest score during the Korean War. Between May 8, 1953 and May 31, 1953, F-86Fs with 6-3 wings accounted for 56 MiG kills vs only one lost, one of the most one-sided air battles ever fought[18] [17]

The arrival of the "6-3" winged Sabre in Korea was soon to be followed by the fighter-bomber Sabre. The first F-86F-30-NA fighter-bombers arrived in Korea on January 28, 1953, and they equipped the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing based at Osan. This Wing flew its first Yalu patrol on February 25, and scored its first MiG kill on the same day.

By the end of hostilities, F-86 pilots were credited with shooting down 792 MiGs for a loss of only 78 Sabres, a victory ratio of 10 to 1.[20] Postwar totals officially credited by the USAF are 379 kills for 103 Sabres lost,[21] amounting to a ratio of nearly 4 to 1. Modern research by Dorr, Lake and Thompson has claimed the actual ratio is closer to 2 to 1.[22]

1953 Armistice

Negotiations for an armistice had been going on for nearly eighteen months. It was thought that if a series of military targets could be located and then destroyed ,the Communist side could be persuaded to agree to an armistice. The first of these raids took place on 11 July 1952 against 30 different targets in Pyongyang. Similar strikes took place against Sungho-Ri, Chosin, Sindok, and Sinuiju. The nighttime bombing techniques of the B-29 crews improved, and on 30 September 1952 45 B-29s wiped out the chemical plant at Namsan-Ri.[5]

By late spring of 1953, the emphasis was again on Chinese airfields and bridges in the north. The objective was to keep these fields unserviceable since tentative truce terms had allowed for a 12 hour free period between the signing of the truce agreement and the time it became effective, which could have given the Communist side enough time to move in massive numbers of aircraft to the ten major North Korean airfields.[5]

The Korean War finally ended on 27 July 1953, with a negotiated truce in which the country remained divided into two. The last Sabre/MiG fight of the Korean War took place on 22 July 1953, when Lt. Sam P. Young of the 31st Wing scored his first and only victory. The last kill of the Korean War took place on 27 July, when Capt. Ralph S. Parr flying an F-86F-30 shot down an Il-12 twin-engined transport aircraft. At the end of the Korean War, the seven American fighter Wings in Korea had 297 Sabres on hand, with 132 of them being with fighter-bomber Wings.[17]

Korean War Campaigns

There were ten designated campaigns for Korean War Service.[23]

Post Korean War

References

  1. ^ Seventh Air Force website, units description
  2. ^ a b American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, William Manchester, Little, Brown, 1978.
  3. ^ Thompson, Warren. "F-82: Killers over Korea." AirEnthusiast Six, March-June 1978. Bromley, Kent, UK: Pilot Press Ltd., 1978.
  4. ^ a b c Futrell, Robert Frank (1983) The United States Air Force In Korea, 1950-1953, Maxwell AFB, Alabama Office of Air Force History, ISBN 0912799714
  5. ^ a b c d e f Marshall, Chester (1993). Warbird History--B-29 Superfortress. Motorbooks International ISBN 0879387858.
  6. ^ The Remembered War, Air Force Magazine, Journal of the Air Force Association, July 2003, Vol. 86, No. 7
  7. ^ Warren E. Thompson, Fighter Combat over Korea, Part 1: First Kills, Wings of Fame, Vol 1, 1995.
  8. ^ a b Fighting Mustang: The Chronicle of the P-51, William N. Hess, Doubleday, 1970.
  9. ^ a b c UN Offensive, 1950
  10. ^ a b c The Korean War: The UN Offensive
  11. ^ Cohen, Eliot A; Gooch, John (2005). Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. Free Press, pp 165-195. ISBN 0743280822.
  12. ^ Hopkins, William (1986). One Bugle No Drums: The Marines at Chosin Reservoir. Algonquin.
  13. ^ a b c Larry Davis and Warren Thompson, F-86 Sabre in Korea, Wings of Fame, Volume 11, 1998.
  14. ^ Gordon, Yefim. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15. Leicester, UK: Midland Publishing, 2001. ISBN 1-85780-105-9.
  15. ^ a b c B-29 in Korean War
  16. ^ a b The Boeing B-29 Superfortress, Mich Mayborn, Aircraft in Profile, Doubleday, 1969.
  17. ^ a b c d e f g Werrell, Kenneth. Sabres Over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2005. ISBN 1-59114-933-9.
  18. ^ a b c d e f F-86 Sabre in Action, Larry Davis, Squadron/Signal Publications, 1992
  19. ^ Zaloga, Steven J. "The Russians in MiG Alley: The nationality of the "honcho" pilots is no longer a mystery. The Soviets now admit their part in the Korean War" Air Force Magazine, volume 74, issue 2, February 1991.
  20. ^ Thompson, Warren E. and McLaren, David R. MiG Alley: Sabres Vs. MiGs Over Korea. North Branch, Minnesota: Specialty Press, 2002. ISBN 1-58007-058-2.
  21. ^ The war continues
  22. ^ Dorr, Robert F., Lake, Jon and Thompson, Warren E. Korean War Aces. London: Osprey Publishing, 2005. ISBN 1-85532-501-2.
  23. ^ USAFHA Korean War Campaigns