Paper 2019/585

On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) CAESAR Winners

Mustafa Khairallah, Shivam Bhasin, and Anupam Chattopadhyay

Abstract

In this paper, we study DFA attacks on some of the CAESAR competition winners. We study the challenges imposed by the design of these modes, such as masking of the ciphertext. We also show that a very small number of nonce repetition and faults is required, which makes it very practical. We show that OCB and COLM need 1 nonce repetition and 3 faults only to uniquely identify the Key.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. 8th IEEE International Workshop on Advances in Sensors and Interfaces
Keywords
Fault AttacksDFASPNsAESBlock Ciphersdifferential fault analysisautheticated encryptionAEADCOLMDeoxysOCB
Contact author(s)
mustafam001 @ e ntu edu sg
History
2019-05-30: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/585
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/585,
      author = {Mustafa Khairallah and Shivam Bhasin and Anupam Chattopadhyay},
      title = {On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) {CAESAR} Winners},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/585},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/585}
}
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