Paper 2019/981
Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging
Nirvan Tyagi, Ian Miers, and Thomas Ristenpart
Abstract
Messaging systems are used to spread misinformation and other malicious content, often with dire consequences. End-to-end encryption improves privacy but hinders content-based moderation and, in particular, obfuscates the original source of malicious content. We introduce the idea of message traceback, a new cryptographic approach that enables platforms to simultaneously provide end-to-end encryption while also being able to track down the source of malicious content reported by users. We formalize functionality and security goals for message traceback, and detail two constructions that allow revealing a chain of forwarded messages (path traceback) or the entire forwarding tree (tree traceback). We implement and evaluate prototypes of our traceback schemes to highlight their practicality, and provide a discussion of deployment considerations.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CCS 2019
- DOI
- 10.1145/3319535.3354243
- Keywords
- end-to-end encrypted messaginganonymitytracingabuse reportingmessage franking
- Contact author(s)
- nirvan tyagi @ gmail com
- History
- 2019-08-29: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/981
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/981, author = {Nirvan Tyagi and Ian Miers and Thomas Ristenpart}, title = {Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/981}, year = {2019}, doi = {10.1145/3319535.3354243}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/981} }