In a spring 2010 survey, we investigated the characteristics that influenced whether California growers controlled major citrus pests with beneficial insects. We also performed statistical analysis of growers' reliance on Aphytus melinus, a predatory wasp, to control California red scale. The survey results suggest that growers with greater citrus acreage and more education are more likely to use biological control. Marketing outlets, ethnicity and primary information sources also influenced the extent of reliance on beneficial insects. In Probit model analysis, respondents with greater citrus acreage were more likely to incorporate A. melinus into their pest management, as well as those with more education and higher-valued crops. Information sources and growing region also had statistically significant effects.

Recent theoretical work on agricultural contracts has utilized agency theory. Most of this work considers a moral hazard problem, and assumes that producers are homogeneous, so that there is no adverse selection problem. We utilize a sample of producer performance under a broiler production contract to confirm that heterogeneity exists. We model the principal's decision process and test predictions regarding how heterogeneity will affect the principal's decisions. We attempt to differentiate between symmetric and asymmetric information cases. We find some support for our hypotheses, including evidence that adverse selection may affect the processor's decisions.

The use of agricultural contracts between farmers and processors or other buyers has increased substantially in recent years. Roughly half of all U.S. fruit and vegetable production is under contract. Contract usage varies widely across agricultural products. For example, 95% of poultry is raised under contract while only 13% of corn is. The wine grape industry utilizes contracts, yet little is known about the extent of contract use, or the use of specific terms and objectives. We used a survey to analyze contract use among wine grape producers, determine which users are utilizing contracts, and identify how they differ from nonusers. Ninety percent of the growers who responded to the survey have contracts, the majority of which were multiyear, averaging 3.7 years. Growers with more experience, larger vineyards, more expensive grapes and longer relationships with the buyer were more likely to enter into contracts.

The California Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) restricts pesticide use to reduce negative impacts on human health and the environment. The DPR implemented methyl bromide use regulations in 2001. Our study demonstrates that the estimated 2001 costs of these regulations for the California strawberry industry were quite substantial (more than $26 million total), equivalent to roughly 25% of estimated industry returns over total cash costs in 2001. These impacts were unevenly distributed across growers. Growers with small fields in urban areas had higher per-acre costs than growers with large fields in agricultural areas.

We consider the impact of taxes on the quantity and quality produced of goods whose market values accrue with age. The analysis is motivated by the high and increasing taxation rates in the wine industry across the globe. If society values both quality and quantity as goods, an optimal tax system would never reduce the quality marketed, though it necessarily reduces quantity. Any two-tax system that includes a volumetric sales tax and any one of three other types of tax - an ad valorem sales tax, an ad valorem storage tax, or a volumetric storage tax - spans the quality/revenue space and can support an optimal tax system. Any tax system that reduces quality relative to the market equilibrium with no taxes could increase tax revenues and reduce the quality distortion without increasing the quantity distortion. Given this, the only explanation for taxation schemes that reduce both the quantity and quality of goods like wine must be a Calvinistic social welfare function.