Introduction. An early social-choice theoretic foundation for majority rule was provided by May (1952). In an environment with a group of agents who choose ...
Nov 20, 2017 · In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we establish that the geometric median satisfies Maskin monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality.
Nov 17, 2017 · Abstract In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we establish that the geomet- ric median satisfies Maskin monotonicity, anonymity, and ...
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In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we establish that the geometric median satisfies Maskin monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality. For three agents ...
In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, it is established that the geometric median satisfies Maskin monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality and is ...
An early social-choice theoretic foundation for majority rule was provided by May. (1952). In an environment with a group of agents who choose one of two ...
Jul 6, 2015 · In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we establish that the geometric median satisfies Maskin monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality.
A spatial analogue of May's Theorem · List of references · Publications that cite this publication.
In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we establish that the geometric median satisfies Maskin monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality.
In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we establish that the geometric median satisfies Maskin monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality.