We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types”who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a “pairwise dominant” action, this action is almost always taken.
Jul 28, 2020
Feb 12, 2014 · Abstract:We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the ...
In this article, we study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems showing that when the signals ...
In this article, we study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems showing that when the signals ...
It is argued that in large games (n player games in which unilateral deviations by single players have only a small impact on the utility of other players), ...
Mallesh M Pai, Aaron Roth, and Jonathan Ullman. 2014. “An Anti-Folk Theorem for Large Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.” CoRR, abs/1402.2801.
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In this article, we study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems showing that when the signals ...
Aug 3, 2020 · In this paper, we show that the folk theorem fails for large groups when players are anonymous— so a player's payoff depends only on her own ...
We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect.
It is a well known ?Folk wisdom that infinitely repeated games admit a multitude of equilibria, and that repetition always expands (weakly) the set of ...