We study equilibrium of the pricing (Bertrand) game between the congestible network service providers. We establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium under ...

We study equilibrium of the pricing (Bertrand) game between the congestible network service providers. We establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium under ...

Jan 1, 2014 · This paper is motivated by study of the economics of Quality of Service (QoS) of congestible services. We introduce a queueing game ...

Based on the review, an integrated framework for mitigation of fire hazards is proposed. The proposed framework involves enhancement of fire safety in four key ...

Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services. Parijat Dube; Rahul Jain. 2014; Automatica. Open problem: The statistical query ...

Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services. This paper is motivated by study of the economics of Quality of Service (QoS) ...

Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services · Parijat DubeR. Jain. Computer Science, Economics. Autom. 2014. 5 Citations.

Jain, “Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services”, Automatica, 50(3):756-767, 2014. 25.[RC1] W. Haskell and R. Jain ...

We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria (OE) in congested markets. The motivating examples are the allocation of network flows in a communication ...

We compare the performance of equilibria in this game to that of the best state achievable through coordination, under two metrics—the social value. (efficiency) ...